Justitiae

The Court is in receipt of Defendants' correspondence requesting leave to submit for in camera review documents subject to the Court's May 9, 2025 Order granting in part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. The Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' request for in camera review of the aforementioned documents. Materials must be delivered via secure electronic upload immediately, provided the Department coordinates access credentials with the Clerk's Office (( Forum PM )).

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF SAN ANDREAS FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS LAURA MONTBLANC, Plaintiff, v. AKHMAD SHAKHZADOV, LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al, Defendants. Case No. 25-LSC-04117 ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO COMPEL, MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Date: May 9, 2025 Time: 6:09 pm Department: 1 ᅠᅠ The Court, having reviewed the pleadings on file, including Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, Defendant’s Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiff’s responsive filings and Motion for Summary Judgment, IT IS ORDERED: Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in its entirety; Plaintiff’s Request for Summary Judgment is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. STANDARD ᅠᅠ Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint survives dismissal when the well-pleaded facts “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” (Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) 556 U.S. 662, 681; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544, 570.) The Court disregards rote legal conclusions, but assumes the veracity of factual averments and draws every reasonable inference in the plaintiff’s favor. (See Knievel v. ESPN 9th Cir. 2005 393 F.3d 1068, 1072.) ᅠᅠ A government agency is liable only when an official policy, long standing practice, or ratification by a final policymaker causes the deprivation. (Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 690–691; AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare (9th Cir. 2010) 666 F.3d 631, 636-638.) A municipality may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for a single officer’s misconduct on a theory of respondeat superior. (City of Canton v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378, 385). ᅠᅠ Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery “relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case,” unless protected by privilege or otherwise restricted for good cause. Balancing privacy interests against litigants’ need for information, the Court may order redaction, in-camera review, or protective conditions. (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); San. An. Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.020(a); cf. Kelly v. City of San Jose (N.D. San.An. 1987) 114 F.R.D. 653.) In the absence of codified Pitchess statutes, peace officer personnel and internal affairs records are reviewed under a balancing framework grounded in privilege, due process, and the need for judicial oversight. ᅠᅠ A finding of spoliation requires evidence of intentional destruction or alteration of relevant evidence and resulting prejudice. (Silvestri v. General Motors Corp. (4th Cir. 2001) 271 F.3d 583, 590-593.) Sanctions under Rule 37 include preclusion or terminating relief, but only upon a predicate showing of willfulness or bad faith (Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 San.An.4th 1, 11-12; Williams v. Russ (2008) 167 San.An.App.4th 1215.). ANALYSIS ᅠᅠ Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing: (1) Plaintiff fails to plead a plausible claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658; (2) the denial of Plaintiff’s Media Card was not retaliatory; and (3) the resignation of Officer Shakhzadov precludes agency liability for his actions. ᅠᅠ Plaintiff opposes the motion and contends that the Complaint sufficiently pleads a pattern of unconstitutional conduct and retaliatory intent on the part of the Department, especially against outspoken critics of the Los Santos Police Department (“LSPD”); that the denial was undertaken pursuant to a department policy or custom; and that senior officials ratified the decision. Accepting those allegations as true, the Complaint plausibly alleges an institutional custom of retaliatory credentialing. Such allegations suffice at the pleadings stage to pass Monell’s policy-or-practice filter. Whether the proof ultimately substantiates these contentions is a question for summary judgment or trial, nor Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. ᅠᅠ Plaintiff alleges she engaged in protected expression—filming arrest, vlogging criticism of LSPD tactics, and filing a prior public-records lawsuit—after which her Media Card application was uniquely denied. The chronology supports a plausible inference of retaliatory animus under Nieves v. Bartlett (2019) 139 S.Ct. 1715, 1723. The motion thus fails as to the First Amendment claim. ᅠᅠ Defendants’ argue that because Officer Shakhzadov resigned, municipal exposure evaporates. The argument misconstrues Monell: a municipality’s liability flows from its policy, not the tenure of the offending employee. If Plaintiff proves that decision-makers condoned or turned a blind eye to the retaliation, or employs an unconstitutional policy or custom resulting in the violation of the Plaintiff’s rights, the municipality/agency remains answerable. The resignation or continued employment of Officer Shakhzadov has no bearing on this legal framework. (See Long v. County of Los Santos (9th Cir. 1990) 442 F.3d 1178, 1186.) ᅠᅠ Plaintiff’s reliance on Owen v. City of Independence (1980) 445 U.S. 622 is misplaced. Owen held that municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity, but did not alter Monell's core requirement that municipal liability under § 1983 must be based on institutional action or omission. Local municipal agencies remain liable only when the Plaintiff pleads and ultimately proves that a policy, custom, or ratification by a final policymaker caused the constitutional injury. Thus, respondeat superior is unavailable for § 1983 liability. As for the Defendants’, reliance on qualified immunity is also misplaced. Qualified immunity shields individual officers sued for damages; it is unavailable to municipal entities. The Department therefore cannot avoid suit by arguing that “no clearly established right to a press credential exists.” Its only two proper defenses under § 1983 should be (a) that no constitutional violation occurred, and (b) that no policy, custom, or ratification caused the alleged violation—both of which must be substantiated through discovery. ᅠᅠ The requested documents speak directly to Plaintiff’s theory that retaliatory measures were condoned or ratified. Whilst Defendants' concern about third-party privacy is legitimate, assertion of a nebulous “law-enforcement privilege” is unavailing absent a specific statutory basis and does not bar disclosure altogether. Privacy interests may be adequately protected by redaction and a protective order under Rule 26(c) (See Britt v. Superior Court, 20 San.An.3d 844 (1978); Board of Trustees v. Superior Court, 119 San.An.App.3d 516 (1981).) The Court orders production with redaction of personal data and is subject to a two-tier protective order limiting dissemination to counsel, experts, and the Court. ᅠᅠ Plaintiff seeks credential applications from 1 January 2025 through 30 April 2025, including outcomes. The Court finds that documents related to press credential applications are discoverable. To the extent privacy concerns exist, those concerns may be addressed through appropriate redaction of identifying information. Comparator data may be essential to establishing disparate treatment, and the relevance of such evidence outweighs any minimal privacy intrusion under the circumstances. Defendants’ may also substitute unique numeric identifiers for applicant names. ᅠᅠ The Court orders the production of all current written directives governing press interaction, citizen filming, or credential issuance as they reflect official municipal policy. Objections premised on “public-safety sensitivity” are overruled where no specific operational details are implicated. ᅠᅠ Plaintiff moves to compel records for every SWAT deployment since 18 April 2025, contending such data “may reveal” retaliatory patterns. The connection between tactical demployments and credential denials is too attenuated. The request is substantially overbroad. Without a narrowed showing—such as incidents where Plaintiff sought on-scene access and was excluded—the request is DENIED. ᅠᅠ Plaintiff asserts that delayed production of documents evidences or constitutes spoliation. Delay alone, absent a showing of destruction or alteration, does not warrant sanctions. The Court admonishes Defendants that continued dilatory tactics could support Rule 37 sanctions, including evidence preclusion, but the present record is insufficient for such relief. ᅠᅠ Plaintiff requested summary judgment “on the undisputed constitutional violation.” Discovery has only recently begun; numerous factual issues—policy existence, causation, damages—remain unresolved. Consistent with Rule 56(d), the request is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renewal after completion of core discovery and compliance with the Court’s scheduling order. ᅠᅠ While the Court declines to impose sanctions, it will not countenance continued stonewalling. Should Defendants’ fail to meet the production deadlines or file a deficient privilege log, Plaintiff may move ex parte for monetary and evidentiary sanctions. The Court specifically reserves authority under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) and San Andreas Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(h) to adverse-inference instructions, or issue preclusion upon a showing of bad-faith non-compliance. ORDER ᅠᅠ Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED as to all claims. However, the Court emphasizes that any theory of respondeat superior liability under § 1983 is foreclosed as a matter of law, and Plaintiff’s claims against the Department must ultimately rest on proof of an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice. ᅠᅠ Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants shall produce all internal affairs records and investigative materials pertaining to Officer Akhmad Shakhzadov and any personnel materially involved in the denial of Plaintiff’s Media Card. Such records are discoverable and relevant to the claims of constitutional deprivation and potential retaliation. Any claimed privileges shall be supported by a detailed privilege log. The Court reserves the right to conduct in camera review if necessary. Defendants shall produce a list of all Media Card applications submitted between January 1, 2025 and April 30, 2025, including the outcome (granted or denied). Names may be redacted subject to a protective order to be issued separately by the Court. Defendants shall also produce all current written policies, procedures, and training materials regarding the issuance of Media Cards and engagement with the press. These are facially relevant and proportional to the claims at issue. Plaintiff’s request for records of SWAT deployments, gang interactions, and other “newsworthy incidents” from April 18 to present is DENIED on the grounds of overbreadth and insufficient nexus to the specific harms alleged in this matter. ᅠᅠ To the extent Defendants seeks summary judgment, such motion is premature. The Court will not entertain dispositive relief until completion of initial discovery. ᅠᅠ No sanctions are imposed at this time, though the Court notes that Defendants' non-compliance with earlier discovery requests came dangerously close to justifying remedial measures. Future failures may result in sanctions under Rule 37 and San Andreas Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(h). The Court will not impose adverse evidentiary inferences or preclude summary judgment on the basis of discovery disputes absent a showing of bad faith or actual destruction of evidence. ᅠᅠ All production compelled herein shall be completed no later than May 16, 2025. Defendants shall comply with the production deadlines and in camera submission schedule as set forth herein. ᅠᅠ IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: May 09, 2025 By: /s/ Francis J. Stoessel THE HONORABLE FRANCIS J. STOESSEL Presiding Judge of the Superior Court, State of San Andreas, County of Los Santos

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF SAN ANDREAS FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS JUAN TZOMPAXTLE, Plaintiff, v. LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant. Case No. 25-LSC-05121 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ᅠᅠ Based upon Plaintiff Juan Tzompaxtle's ("Petitioner") Complaint and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Court hereby orders as follows: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ᅠᅠ To Defendant the Los Santos Police Department: ᅠᅠ Based upon the verified complaint filed in this action, you are ordered to appear, to show cause why the following relief should not be granted: ᅠᅠ (1) Issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Defendant to produce all evidence supporting the arrest of Plaintiff Juan Tzompaxtle under Penal Code section 610(b), including: ᅠᅠ a. The arresting officer's affidavit of arrest; ᅠᅠ b. Any digital digital in-car video ("DICV") or body camera footage of the May 3, ᅠᅠ 2025 traffic stops and arrest; ᅠᅠ (2) Declaratory relief clarifying the meaning of Vehicle Code section 502, including whether it requires use of headlights when street lamps are illuminated, irrespective of official sunset time. ᅠᅠ (3) Any further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. ᅠᅠ This Order to Show Cause and supporting papers shall be served on Defendant no later than May 10, 2025. Proof of such service shall be filed and delivered to the Court no later than May 12, 2025. Any reply papers shall be filed and served by Defendant on Plaintiff by no later than May 14, 2025. ᅠᅠ IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: May 04, 2025 By: /s/ Francis J. Stoessel THE HONORABLE FRANCIS J. STOESSEL Presiding Judge of the Superior Court, State of San Andreas, County of Los Santos

** The court filing is accepted and the clerk assigns docket number 25-LSC-04119; the Honorable Nicholas C. Mendez, Presiding

** The court filing is accepted and the clerk assigns docket number 25-LSC-05121; the Honorable Francis J. Stoessel, Presiding

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF SAN ANDREAS FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS ALAN SAUCEDO, Plaintiff, v. AN UNKNOWN LOS SANTOS POLICE OFFICER (LSPD) POLICE OFFICER, STAFF OFFICERS OF THE LSPD, Defendants. Case No. 25-LSC-04116 [Assigned for all purposes to the Hon. Francis J. Stoessel, Department 1] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND MOTION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION Date: May 1, 2025 Time: 7:55 pm Department: 1 Complaint Filed: April 19, 2025 Judge: The Honorable Francis J. Stoessel ᅠᅠ Plaintiff Alan Saucedo has moved the Court for an order compelling discovery and issuing a temporary injunction on claims alleging deprivation of rights under color of law and failure of law enforcement leadership to intervene in or disclose police misconduct. ᅠᅠ The Court finds the Plaintiff's discovery requests are supported under Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 San.An.2d 355, 384 and Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 San.An.5th 531, 541, as necessary to eliminate surprise, prevent delay, and enable the parties to ascertain the truth and prepare for trial. Disclosure of internal affairs and personnel records is not barred by statutory restriction under the laws of the State of San Andreas. To the extent privacy or confidentiality concerns exist, the Court directs the parties to confer and submit a proposed protective order to govern the handling of sensitive materials. ᅠᅠ The Court further finds that Plaintiff is entitled to temporary injunctive relief under the standards set forth in IT Corp v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 San.An.3d 63, 69, balancing the likelihood of irreparable harm against the need for prompt internal review. Without this relief, Plaintiff risks the loss of critical evidence impairing his ability to prosecute his claims. ᅠᅠ Having reviewed the motion and procedural record, this Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery and ORDERS Defendants to comply within five (5) calendar days of the date of this Order. The Court further GRANTS the Motion for Temporary Injunction and orders the Defendants shall not close the misconduct review process until Plaintiff has been provided written questions, afforded no fewer ten (10) calendar days to review with counsel, and submit responses. If Plaintiff remains unavailable, Plaintiff's counsel may preserve Plaintiff's rights by submitting a statement addressing the extent of counsel's knowledge and the client's unavailability. If no responses are submitted by the deadline, the injunction shall automatically expire. ORDER ᅠᅠ Based on the facts provided, Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause under the San Andreas Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.310 to compel production of discovery, the Court orders the following: 1. Identification of the unknown Los Santos Police Department Police Officer; 2. Full unredacted internal affairs records of the unknown officer; 3. Full unredacted training history of the unknown officer, including recertification dates; 4. All current LSPD training materials related to use of force; 5. A list, with redactions if appropriate, of all reported use-of-force violations since January 1, 2025; 6. All policies or statements regarding members of the public filming police scenes; 7. All policies of statements regarding members of the public standing outside police tape at police scenes. ᅠᅠ To protect the confidentiality of sensitive information produced in discovery, the Court orders covered materials may only be used for purposes of this litigation and may not be disclosed to any person or entity except the Court and its personnel; and counsel of record. Defendants shall mark all covered materials as “CONFIDENTIAL — SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER.” ᅠᅠ Any violations of this Order may be punishable by sanctions or contempt. ᅠᅠ IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: May 01, 2025 By: /s/ Francis J. Stoessel THE HONORABLE FRANCIS J. STOESSEL Presiding Judge of the Superior Court, State of San Andreas, County of Los Santos

** The clerk reassigns the matter to the Honorable Francis J. Stoessel as the presiding judge.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF SAN ANDREAS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE LOS SANTOS COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Petitioner and Appellant, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS, Respondent. Court of Appeal Case No. 25-A1-04110 (Superior Court Case No. 25-LSC-04111) On Appeal From the Superior Court for the State of San Andreas, County of Los Santos, Case No. 25-LSC-04111, Hon. Florence Weathers-Peterson, Judge ───────────── APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ───────────── STAHL, WEISS & KATZ *Eugene K. Stahl, State Bar No. 990100265 [email protected] 1130 Fountain Ave, 5th Floor Los Santos, San Andreas 90071 175-4021 Attorney for Appellant LOS SANTOS COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. II. JURISDICTION................................................................................................................ III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE......................................................................................... A. Summary of Facts................................................................................................... 1. The March 25, 2025 Police Encounter Involving the LSPD......................... 2. Ms. Mendoza's Claims Against Multiple Law Enforcement Agencies......... 3. Proceedings in the Trial Court and the Denial of LSSD's Demurrer............. IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW............................................................................................... V. LEGAL ARGUMENT....................................................................................................... A. No Justiciable Controversy Exists Between Ms. Mendoza and LSSD................... 1. Declaratory Relief Requires an Actual Controversy...................................... 2. Ms. Mendoza Alleges No Enforcement or Threat by LSSD......................... 3. A Purely Hypothetical Future Dispute Does Not Satisfy Section 1060........ 4. The Constitutional Ban on Advisory Opinions.............................................. B. The Trial Court Erred in Denying LSSD's Demurrer Under Code Civil Procedure Section 379 (Improper Joinder)............................................................... 1. No Factual Nexus Tying LSSD to the Same "Transaction or Occurrence"............................................................................................................. 2. No Overlap of "Law or Fact" Sufficient to Cure the Missing Factual Connection............................................................................................................... C. The Trial Court's Sweeping Injunction Constitutes an Advisory Opinion as to LSSD...................................................................................................................... 1. The Injunction Enjoins Purely Speculative Conduct..................................... 2. Desire for a Broad Ruling Does Not Relax the Standing Requirement......... 3. Contradiction of the Separation of Powers.................................................... D. Public Policy Does Not Override Jurisdictional and Procedural Defects............... 1. Judicial Efficiency Does Not Justify an Advisory Opinion........................... 2. The Right to Record Police Officers Does Not Displace Basic Justiciability Rules................................................................................................... 3. The Limitations of Declaratory Relief........................................................... E. Conclusion on the Merits of the Trial Court's Rulings............................................ VI. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 San.3d 311............................................................................................................ San Andreas Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. Superior Court (2016) 244 San.App.4th 1135............................................................................................... City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 San.4th 69............................................................................................................. Environmental Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra (2008) 158 San.App.4th 877................................................................................................. Curtis v. County of Los Santos (1985) 172 San.App.3d 1243................................................................................................ Landau v. Salam (1971) 4 San.3d 901.............................................................................................................. Lockyer v. City and County of San Fierro (2004) 33 San.4th 1055......................................................................................................... Pacific Legal Foundation v. San Andreas Coastal Com. (1982) 33 San.3d 158............................................................................................................ People v. Slayton (2001) 26 San.4th 1076......................................................................................................... People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court (1970) 1 San.3d 910.............................................................................................................. Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 San.4th 836............................................................................................................. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA (2013) 568 U.S. 398.............................................................................................................. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) 504 U.S. 555.............................................................................................................. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) 573 U.S. 149.............................................................................................................. Statutes 42 U.S.C. § 1983......................................................................................................................... Code Civ. Proc. § 904.1(a)(1)......................................................................................................................... § 430.10................................................................................................................................ § 379..................................................................................................................................... § 1060................................................................................................................................... Pen. Code § 610..................................................................................................................................... I. INTRODUCTION ᅠᅠ This appeal arises from a trial's court decision to issue broad declaratory and injunctive relief against the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department (LSSD), notwithstanding LSSD's complete non-involvement in the events precipitating the lawsuit. Plaintiff and Respondent Gloria Mendoza filed suit based on an incident allegedly involving only the Los Santos Police Department (LSPD). In her complaint Ms. Mendoza maintained that a single LSPD officer, purportedly enforcing or threatening to enforce Penal Code section 610, violated her right to record police activity in public. Despite conceding that the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department played no role in any of these events, Ms. Mendoza requested a far-reaching ruling that would bind the LSSD—and, by extension, every named agency in the action—to an injunction and a declaratory judgment about hypothetical future uses of section 610. ᅠᅠ Although the trial court recognized that the LSSD was not actually involved, it refused to dismiss the Department and instead granted Ms. Mendoza the requested declaratory relief, enjoining all named law enforcement agencies from any perceived future application of section 610 that would impede recording of police activity. The trial court's order thus swept LSSD into a judgment devoid of any factual basis tying it to the alleged wrongdoing. ᅠᅠ LSSD now appeals, contending that the trial court's order contravenes fundamental requirements of justiciability and impermissibly imposes what amounts to an advisory opinion. The Department further submits that the trial court erred by rejecting LSSD's demurrer—despite Ms. Mendoza's complaint failing to allege a cognizable controversy involving LSSD—and by granting injunctive relief premised on speculation regarding hypothetical actions that LSSD was neither alleged to have taken nor is likely to take in the future. San Andreas law forbids such abstract judgments and demands that plaintiffs present an actual, concrete dispute to secure declaratory and injunctive relief. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 San.4th 69, 79; see also Pacific Legal Foundation v. San Andreas Coastal Com. (1982) 33 San.3d 158, 170.) ᅠᅠ In addition, the procedural statutes governing joinder of multiple defendants and the requirements for obtaining injunctive remedies similarly refute the approach the trial court took. Code of Civil Procedures section 379 prescribes that named defendants share a factual nexus in terms of the "transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions" that gave rise to the complaint. Ms. Mendoza's complaint unquestionably focuses on an incident involving an LSPD officer and fails to establish that LSSD in any manner participated in, sanctioned, or threatened to carry out the alleged misconduct. By imposing relief on an uninvolved agency, the trial court ventured beyond the role courts are intended to serve. (See People v. Slayton (2001) 26 San.4th 1076, 1083 [reiterating that courts may not issue abstract rulings on the hypothetical applications of penal statutes].) ᅠᅠ The LSSD respectfully requests that this Court: (1) reverse the trial court's judgment insofar as it applies to the Department, (2) vacate any declaratory or injunctive relief purporting to bind LSSD, and (3) direct the trial court to dismiss the action against LSSD with prejudice. This approach reaffirms longstanding principles that courts are not vested with the power to issue advisory opinions or to invent controversies where none exist. Although Ms. Mendoza may well have a justiciable dispute with LSPD, any such dispute does not automatically create grounds for retaining other agencies with no actual or alleged involvement. II. JURISDICTION ᅠᅠ This Court has jurisdiction over the LSSD’s timely appeal of the trial court’s final judgment and orders granting declaratory and injunctive relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subds. (a)(1), (a)(6).) III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ᅠᅠ A. Summary of Facts. ᅠᅠ On April 6, 2025, Plaintiff and Respondent Gloria Mendoza initiated this action by filing a verified complaint in the Los Santos County Superior Court. She named multiple defendants, including LSPD, LSSD, and the San Andreas Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (SADCR). Central to her complaint is an alleged incident involving only LSPD and its officers. Ms. Mendoza alleged that she was standing on a public sidewalk, approximately 50 feet from an active police scene, when an LSPD officer—identified as Officer Love—demanded that she move farther away and threatened to arrest her if she did not comply. ᅠᅠ That alleged threat rested upon an asserted application of Penal Code section 610, which Ms. Mendoza claims prohibits or restricts filming of police activity at close range. According to Ms. Mendoza, she feared being arrested under the statute and therefore moved farther back. However, she was neither arrested nor cited, and none of her belongings were confiscated. She continued to film from a greater distance, albeit with reservations about the officer's ultimatum. The complaint concedes that LSSD deputies did not appear at the scene and played no part in the officer's alleged threats. 2. Ms. Mendoza's Claims Against Multiple Law Enforcement Agencies. ᅠᅠ Despite identifying an LSPD officer as the singular source of her alleged injury, Ms. Mendoza named LSSD, SADCR, and potentially any other law enforcement entity within the State of San Andreas as additional defendants. She sought declaratory judgment that section 610 is unconstitutional or, at minimum, unenforceable "as applied" to filming. She further requested a permanent injunction prohibiting all named agencies—regardless of their presence at the scene or participating in the events—from enforcing or threatening to enforce section 610 to restrict filming of on-duty police officers. ᅠᅠ Ms. Mendoza also cited 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in her complaint but did not appear to seek monetary damages, focusing her prayer instead on equitable relief designed to curtail anticipated future applications of section 610. In essence, she framed a broad potential conflict by speculating that any law enforcement agency in the state "could" interpret section 610 as LSPD allegedly did. She did not, however, allege any specific acts by LSSD or its employees. Nor did she claim that LSSD had a policy or practice of enforcing section 610 against individuals recording police activity. 3. Proceedings in the Trial Court and the Denial of LSSD's Demurrer. ᅠᅠ On April 7, 2025, LSSD demurred to Ms. Mendoza's complaint. The Department argued that the complaint failed to set forth any facts indicating LSSD involvement in the alleged incident and that no actual controversy existed with Ms. Mendoza. In particular, LSSD emphasized that the justiciable controversy requirement under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 is not satisfied by mere speculation concerning some future possibility that an agency might enforce a statute. LSSD also pointed out that Code of Civil Procedure section 379, governing joinder, imposes limits that bar the inclusion of defendants wholly disconnected from the relevant transaction or occurrence. ᅠᅠ Ms. Mendoza's opposition rested on the theoretical premise that, because LSSD is authorized to enforce state laws, it might one day enforce section 610 in a manner she contends is overbroad. She urged that judicial efficiency favored binding every major law enforcement agency to a single judicial ruling rather than requiring separate suits. The trial court accepted Ms. Mendoza's arguments, denied LSSD's demurrer, and thereafter granted sweeping declaratory and injunctive relief against all names defendants—including LSSD—on the rationale that all such agencies share the potential to enforce or threaten enforcement of section 610. ᅠᅠ The final judgment permanently enjoins every named agency from applying section 610 to restrict filming of police officers under the circumstances Ms. Mendoza described. Notably, the court did not reference any specific policy of LSSD. Nor did it find that LSSD had actually enforced or threatened to enforce section 610 in a similar way. Nonetheless, the broad order encompasses LSSD. LSSD now appeals, seeking reversal of the judgment and dismissal of all claims as to LSSD. IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW ᅠᅠ The standard of review for orders overruling a demurrer is well established; an appellate court reviews the complaint de novo, determining whether the facts alleged are sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 San.3d 311, 318). In doing so, the Court takes as true all properly pleaded factual allegations but does not accept legal conclusions, opinions, or speculative inferences as true. (San Andreas Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. Superior Court (2016) 244 San.App.4th 1135, 1142.) ᅠᅠ Furthermore, this appeal challenges the trial court's issuance of declaratory and injunctive relief as to LSSD. Where declaratory relief hinges on whether an "actual controversy" exists, courts employ a de novo standard to determine whether the dispute meets the legal test for justiciability. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 San.4th 69, 79.) The propriety of injunctive relief also generally depends on whether a legally cognizable harm or threat is alleged. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. San Andreas Coastal Com., supra, 33 San.3d at p. 170.) Accordingly, this Court independently reviews the trial court's rulings to ascertain whether there was a genuine controversy with respect to LSSD and, if not, whether the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss LSSD and in granting an injunction binding it. ᅠᅠ If the allegations in Ms. Mendoza's complaint fail on their face to establish that LSSD engaged in any cognizable wrongdoing or threated future conduct, then the complaint does not state a cause of action against LSSD, and the demurrer should have been sustained without leave to amend. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10 [prescribing demurrer grounds].) The complaint’s generalized fears about how LSSD “could” apply or interpret section 610 at some future date do not supply the specific factual basis necessary to proceed. V. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. No Justiciable Controversy Exists Between Ms. Mendoza and LSSD. 1. Declaratory Relief Requires an Actual Controversy. ᅠᅠ San Andreas courts, consistent with constitutional limitations on judicial power, are precluded from rendering any advisory opinions. (City of Cotati v. Cashman, supra, 29 San.4th at p. 79; Environmental Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra (2008) 158 San.App.4th 877, 885.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 requires an "actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties," emphasizing that the dispute must be both concrete and ripe. Courts are constrained to decide actual conflicts, rather than hypothetical or potential ones. ᅠᅠ San Andreas follows a traditional rule mirroring the federal limitation of judicial power under Article III of the United States Constitution; namely, it forbids adjudication of speculative or future injuries that may never materialize. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. San Andreas Coastal Com., supra, 33 San.3d at p. 170.) Absent a real, present dispute over enforceable rights or obligations ("ripeness requirement"), any decision the court renders would cross the line into the realm of mere prophecy or conjecture. 2. Ms. Mendoza Alleges No Enforcement or Threat by LSSD. ᅠᅠ Ms. Mendoza's complaint does not allege that LSSD participated in the events giving rise to the purported constitutional or statutory violation. She acknowledges that the only officer who threatened to enforce section 610 was an employee of LSPD. Indeed, by Ms. Mendoza's own account, LSSD deputies never arrived at the scene of the incident or threatened her in any way. Nor does Ms. Mendoza claim that LSSD directed or supervised LSPD's officers or had any joint law enforcement operation with LSPD. On the face of the complaint, then, LSSD did not figure into the relevant "transaction or occurrence" at all. 3. A Purely Hypothetical Future Dispute Does Not Satisfy Section 1060. ᅠᅠ In pre-enforcement cases—where a plaintiff asserts a chilling effect or prospective harm—courts require a plausible showing that the defendant is poised to enforce the disputed policy or statute. (Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) 573 U.S. 149, 158.) The plaintiff must demonstrate a "substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality." (Ibid.) A purely speculative or hypothetical possibility of enforcement is not enough. (See Clapper v. Amnesty International USA (2013) 568 U.S. 398, 409; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) 504 U.S. 555, 560-561.) ᅠᅠ Ms. Mendoza's theory rests on the notion that LSSD "could" invoke section 610 in a similarly unconstitutional manner if she were to film one of its deputies at some unspecified future date. However, the complaint does not allege, for example, that LSSD promulgated a training bulletin, a policy, a memo or a directive instructing deputies to arrest individuals recording them in public, or that LSSD has a track record of restricting such filming. Without evidence of an existing policy or past action pointing to future enforcement, Ms. Mendoza's fear of LSSD's hypothetical enforcement is far too attenuated to supply the "actual controversy" required. 4. The Constitutional Ban on Advisory Opinions. ᅠᅠ The San Andreas Supreme Court has consistently held that courts may not issue opinions on a statute's constitutionality in a factual vacuum. (People v. Slayton, supra, 26 San.4th at p. 1083, 1084; People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court (1970) 1 San.3d 910, 912 [83 San. Rptr. 670, 464 P.2d 126] ["The rendering of advisory opinions falls within neither the functions nor the jurisdiction of this court."]; Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 San.4th 836, 861 [stating that courts resolve actual controversies rather than declaring abstract principles].) ᅠᅠ Nothing in Ms. Mendoza's allegations suggest that LSSD was about to violate her rights or ever had enforced section 610 in a manner that might infringe her right to record police activity. Consequently, the trial court was effectively compelled to rule on hypothetical future conduct by LSSD, or to issue a prophylactic order that forbade LSSD from adopting a misinterpretation of section 610 at some later date. This is a paradigmatic advisory opinion. The law does not permit such sweeping judicial oversight absent a live dispute or a demonstrated likelihood that a dispute will arise imminently. ᅠᅠ For these reasons, the trial court's refusal to dismiss LSSD was legally untenable. The complaint fails to establish any immediate or genuine controversy, rendering the suit against LSSD nonjusticiable. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the order denying LSSD's demurrer and direct the trial court to dismiss the complaint as to LSSD with prejudice. ᅠᅠ B. The Trial Court Erred in Denying LSSD's Demurrer Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 379 (Improper Joinder). ᅠᅠ Apart from the absence of any substantive claim, Ms. Mendoza's inclusion of LSSD also violates joinder rules. Code of Civil Procedure section 379 provides that multiple defendants may be joined in one action only if (1) the right to relief asserted against them arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and (2) there exists a common question of law or fact. This statute prevents plaintiffs from bringing unrelated defendants into a single suit based on purely speculative or tangential legal theories. 1. No Factual Nexus Tying LSSD to the Same "Transaction or Occurrence". ᅠᅠ Ms. Mendoza's complaint makes clear that the "transaction or occurrence" giving rise to the alleged violation occurred on March 25, 2025, when Officer Love of LSPD threatened Ms. Mendoza under section 610. LSSD played no part. There is no claim that LSSD deputies were present, that they directed or commanded the LSPD officer's actions, or that they collaborated in any manner. The complaint simply asserts that LSSD is also a law enforcement entity within the State of San Andreas with the authority to enforce state law. ᅠᅠ In Landau v. Salam (1971) 4 San.3d 901, 904, the San Andreas Supreme Court explained that multiple defendants cannot be joined in a single lawsuit merely because the same legal issue might apply; there must be a factual link. In that case, plaintiffs had attempted to sue different defendants over distinct automobile accidents, arguing that a common question—liability for personal injuries—united them. The Supreme Court rejected that approach as an improper stretching of the joinder rules. Similarly, in Curtis v. County of Los Santos (1985) 172 San.App.3d 1243, plaintiffs sued the County of Los Santos for injuries on a road that belong solely to the City of Palos Verdes Estates. The County successfully moved for summary judgment by showing it had no ownership or maintenance responsibility over the roadway. The court held the claim was "totally without merity" and noted that naming a jurisdictionally uninvolved agency was improper. Here, Ms. Mendoza's attempt to bind all law enforcement agencies to a single lawsuit likewise runs afoul of section 379's requirement that each defendant be factually linked to the same underlying transaction or occurrence. 2. No Overlap of "Law or Fact" Sufficient to Cure the Missing Factual Connection. ᅠᅠ Although Ms. Mendoza posits that a "common question of law" arises—the constitutionality of section 610—there remains a fundamental deficiency: LSSD is not alleged to have contributed to the underlying factual scenario. A common question of law, by itself, cannot unify defendants when they are unrelated to the essential transaction that prompted the suit. (Landau, supra, 4 San.3d at p. 905.) Indeed, it would contravene judicial efficiency if plaintiffs were allowed to name every conceivable enforcement agency in a single action just because all of them might theoretically apply a certain statute in ways that the plaintiff fears. Such a sweeping approach would create confusion, hamper the orderly administration of justice, and spur litigation on hypothetical possibilities. ᅠᅠ Thus, the trial court erred in rejecting LSSD's demurrer, as Ms. Mendoza's complaint flouts both the "actual controversy" rule and the statutory joinder limitations. No valid cause of action existed against LSSD, and the entire matter should have been dismissed at the demurrer stage. ᅠᅠ C. The Trial Court's Sweeping Injunction Constitutes an Advisory Opinion as to LSSD. 1. The Injunction Enjoins Purely Speculative Conduct. ᅠᅠ In addition to the statutory and procedural deficiencies, the injunction is itself improper as to LSSD because it prohibits conduct that LSSD never undertook or threatened to undertake. The trial court's order enjoins "all police officers and law enforcement agencies" from enforcing or threatening to enforce section 610 to curb the filming of officers. This extraordinary relief amounts to a generalized proclamation that extends beyond any actual or imminent threat posed by LSSD. The purpose of injunctive relief is to prevent ongoing or future wrongdoing that is reasonable certain to occur, not to address hypothetical scenarios that the parties themselves do not genuinely anticipate. ᅠᅠ San Andreas courts have long understood the principle that an injunction must be premised on the likelihood of continuing or recurring harm. (See McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 San.5th 945, 953 [injunctive relief requires a showing of likely future harm].) Because LSSD's alleged wrongdoing is non-existent, and there is no evidence that LSSD has threatened Ms. Mendoza or indicated a policy of restricting filming with reference to section 610, the trial court's order is nothing more than an abstract directive. 2. Desire for a Broad Ruling Does Not Relax the Standing Requirement. ᅠᅠ By enjoining LSSD's hypothetical future actions, the trial court stepped beyond its proper role of adjudicating actual controversies. Courts protect litigants by ensuring that judicial decrees follow actual wrongdoing or imminent harm, not hypothetical policy disputes. Where there is no actual controversy, the San Andreas Supreme Court has observed, the rendering of a declaratory judgment is beyond the power of the court. (City of Cotati, supra, 29 San.4th at p. 79.) Extending that same logic to injunctions is a natural corollary: a court cannot enjoin a defendant who never engaged in the disputed conduct and is not reasonably likely to do so. 3. Contradiction of the Separation of Powers. ᅠᅠ An overly expansive injunction that purports to instruct any law enforcement agency on how it may or may not enforce a particular statute contravenes separation-of-powers principles by inserting courts into a legislative or administrative function. Courts are entrusted to decide concrete cases, not to operate as general overseers of how agencies might interpret penal laws. Permitting Ms. Mendoza to bind every major law enforcement department in the state based on the acts of one city police officer transforms the judiciary into a regulator of hypothetical scenarios. ᅠᅠ The separation-of-powers doctrine, though not explicitly mentioned in every state constitution, underpins the structural design of government and judicial review, ensuring that courts do not exercise raw legislative or executive power. The trial court’s approach here—pre-emptively enjoining LSSD absent any factual nexus—runs afoul of those structural boundaries. ᅠᅠ D. Public Policy Does Not Override Jurisdictional and Procedural Defects 1. Judicial Efficiency Does Not Justify an Advisory Opinion. ᅠᅠ The trial court’s order invoked considerations of “judicial efficiency,” claiming that it was more efficient to resolve the legality of section 610 in a single proceeding. While efficiency is a laudable goal, it cannot override the constitutional and statutory thresholds that require an actual, present controversy. (City of Cotati, supra, 29 San.4th at p. 80 [rejecting attempts to sidestep justiciability requirements for the sake of uniformity or convenience].) ᅠᅠ The notion that it would be simpler to bind all law enforcement agencies in one action ignores each defendant’s separate rights, defenses, and factual circumstances. Traditional jurisdictional prerequisites, like standing and justiciability, are precisely designed to safeguard against turning courts into legislative bodies issuing broad edicts on purely hypothetical conflicts. 2. The Right to Record Police Officers Does Not Displace Basic Justiciability Rules. ᅠᅠ While the right to record police activity in public is an important constitutional concern, it does not empower trial courts to adopt prophylactic measures that disregard the requirement of an actual controversy. Courts do not expand their jurisdiction simply because the underlying right is important or warrants robust protection. Constitutional litigation still demands that a plaintiff name defendants genuinely involved in or connected to the challenged harm. According to West’s editorial summary of Lockyer v. City and County of San Fierro (2004) 33 San.4th 1055, 1082 [“[W]hen a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, a present or threatened injury is required.”].) ᅠᅠ Ms. Mendoza’s effort to rope in LSSD as an additional defendant, without any alleged incident involving that department, undermines these bedrock principles. If courts were to accept her approach, any plaintiff claiming a violation of a constitutional right by one agency could name all other agencies on the basis that they too “might” commit a similar violation at some indeterminate point. That expansion would risk unleashing a flood of speculative lawsuits and hamper the traditional litigation model in which concrete disputes between particular parties are resolved. 3. The Limitations of Declaratory Relief. ᅠᅠ Declaratory relief is an extraordinary remedy intended to afford litigants clarity about their present legal positions in actual disputes. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) The remedy remains tethered to the requirement of a real and immediate controversy. Here, the trial court’s declaration held that section 610 could not be invoked in certain circumstances, and it specifically subjected LSSD to that declaration even though the Department had nothing to do with Ms. Mendoza’s alleged harm. Such a universal ruling strains the boundaries of declaratory relief and turns it into a vehicle for issuing advisory pronouncements. San Andreas’s declaratory relief statutes do not allow a plaintiff to obtain a generalized edict against all conceivable enforcement agencies in the absence of an immediate controversy. ᅠᅠ Even where a statute’s constitutionality is placed at issue, the parties contesting the matter must have adverse legal interests. Courts do not assume the posture of deciding a statute’s lawfulness/constitutional in the abstract. Where, as here, only one police department is alleged to have misapplied the statute, other agencies remain purely theoretical defendants, lacking a distinct interest that triggers judicial intervention. ᅠᅠ E. Conclusion on the Merits of the Trial Court's Rulings. ᅠᅠ Ms. Mendoza’s dispute with LSPD may well present a cognizable claim. But that claim does not automatically incorporate every other law enforcement agency in the state. Courts cannot sidestep the fundamental requirement of a genuine controversy simply because a plaintiff asserts that a particular statute might be broadly misapplied. The trial court’s decision to enjoin LSSD, and its refusal to grant LSSD’s demurrer, contravene both the statutory scheme governing joinder and the foundational principles limiting judicial power to the resolution of actual controversies. V. CONCLUSION ᅠᅠ For the foregoing reasons, the LSSD respectfully asks this Court to reverse the portion of the judgment denying LSSD's demurrer and granting declaratory and injunctive relief against the Department. Because Ms. Mendoza has not alleged any participating or threatened enforcement by LSSD, her complaint fails to establish justiciability prerequisites vital to any lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive remedies against it. Moreover, adding LSSD as a defendant runs afoul of Code of Civil Procedure section 379, which precludes sweeping into a single lawsuit unrelated defendants who lack any factual link to the core incident. ᅠᅠ Constitutional and procedural safeguards exist to ensure that judicial power is exercised only where there is an actual dispute. When a trial court oversteps those limits, as occurred here, it creates a precedent that undermines the principle of separation of powers and effectively transforms the court into a policy-making body. The issuance of a broad, prophylactic injunction ordering LSSD not to enforce a statute it never threatened to enforce is precisely the sort of advisory pronouncement the state's courts have consistently disallowed. ᅠᅠ Such relief will restore adherence to the rule that parties must present a concrete, justiciable controversy before a court may exercise its remedial powers. The result will also reaffirm that constitutional adjudication is not an avenue to obtain hypothetical rulings or to subject uninvolved agencies to judicially mandated obligations. DATED: April 14, 2025 By: /s/ Eugene K. Stahl Eugene K. Stahl Attorney for Appellant LOS SANTOS COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

All this from a slice of gabagool?

Straight fire, GND too cold with it. Keep up the wicked work!

Good stuff!

New year and no legal faction update? 🤔

I'm going to go ahead and lock this thread, people just fanning the fire creating new threads to cause more drama isn't helping. Leaving this for the admins to handle.

Let’s goooooooo!