Tungsten

** The clerk updates this case's docket with a notice that it has been joined into Case 25-LSC-04117, Montblanc v. Los Santos Police Department. (( ))

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS, <CRIMINAL/CIVIL/PROBATE> DIVISION Case No. 25-LSC-04117 In the Matter of Montblanc v. Los Santos Police Department _____________________________________________________________________________ COURT ORDER Pursuant to San Andreas Court Rule 3.300, Related Cases, this court finds sufficient relation in the matters of this case and of Montblanc v. Los Santos Police Department, 25-LSC-04115. By order of this court and with authorization of the Clerk of Courts, this court declares the two Related Cases and joins these two matters into a single case under the docket 25-LSC-04117, Montblanc v. Los Santos Police Department, et al. Signed, FLORENCE WEATHERS-PETERSON Judge Superior Court of San Andreas, County of Los Santos ENTERED: April 22nd, 2025 01:13 AM

** The court filing is accepted and assigned docket number 25-LSC-04117; Florence Weathers-Peterson, Presiding

** The clerk accepts the case filing and assigns docket number 25-LSC-04116. ** The clerk assigns Judge Augustus E. Rosewater as the presiding judicial officer.

** The clerk accepts the case filing and assigns docket number 25-LSC-04115. ** The clerk assigns Judge Trent Caldwell as the presiding judicial officer.

** The clerk adds a docket note: Application of order to all law enforcement agencies reversed in Los Santos Sheriff's Department v. Superior Court, 25-1A-04110.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF SAN ANDREAS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE LOS SANTOS COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Petitioner and Appellant, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS, Respondent. Court of Appeal Case No. 25-A1-04110 (Superior Court Case No. 25-LSC-04111) On Appeal From the Superior Court for the State of San Andreas, County of Los Santos, Case No. 25-LSC-04111, Hon. Florence Weathers-Peterson, Judge ───────────── OPINION AND ORDER delivered by Maria J. Vespasiano, A.P.J. 1st District SYLLABUS On Appeal from the Superior Court, County of Los Santos ("Superior Court"), Plaintiff contests the issuance of Declaratory Judgment as applied to the Los Santos Sheriff's Department ("LSSD") and, by extension, all [other] named defendants than the named defendant Los Santos Police Department ("LSPD"). The Superior Court issued Declaratory Judgment in the court of first instance in order to establish a set-in-stone rule as to the enforcement of Penal Code § 610, Obstruction of Justice. The underlying controversy thereof was whether a law enforcement officer may treat as obstruction a non-physical act, such as recording a police officer conducting their duties, while on public property themselves. The Superior Court answered "no", explaining that obstruction is a physical act that prevents or delays an officer from conducting duties or the failure to obey a lawful order. The court held that the enforcement of Penal Code § 610 in such a way is facially unconstitutional due to the chilling effect upon the exercise of free speech arising from the recording of a police officer for potentially press-related or public accountability purposes. Following the declaration of such a rule, the Superior Court enjoined "all law enforcement agencies" in the State of San Andreas from engaging in similar conduct and imposed a specific injunction upon the LSPD for violating that order. The court similarly enjoined all other law enforcement agencies and imposed the risk of fines upon any agency that violates the order. Appellant presents six questions of law, summarized here: 1. Is there a justiciable controversy that exists between the plaintiff in the trial court and the Appellant here? By extension, may the court exercise its discretion to issue declaratory judgment upon a party that was not directly involved in the underlying controversy? 2. Did the trial court err in denying the motion for demurrer raised by the LSSD pursuant to Civil Code of Procedure § 379? 3. Did the trial court issue a "sweeping injunction" that constitutes an advisory opinion? By extension, may the court do so? 4. Does public policy override jurisdictional and procedural defects? 5. Did the trial court "sidestep the fundamental requirement of a genuine controversy"? By extension, must a defendant be personally involved in such a genuine controversy for the court to have general or subject-matter jurisdiction over them? This court has appellant jurisdiction over all named defendants due to their collective location within the First Judicial District. Appellant makes a claim that the trial court abused is discretion and errantly asserts that this court must apply a de novo standard of review. This court instead must extend deference in cases of such allegations of abuse of discretion. Appellant gives no argument as to why they are entitled to the retrying of facts and this court cannot find a genuine factual dispute either in this or the trial court brief submitted. However, Appellant does make an argument that the order issued by the trial court incorrectly enjoined directly conduct that was purely speculative. It is for this reason that this court upholds in part and reverses in part the decision of the trial court. ANALYSIS I. Does there exist a justiciable controversy between Ms. Mendoza and Appellant in the trial court? And, if not, may the trial court issue declaratory relief where there is no justiciable controversy? San Andreas Code of Civil Procedure § 1060 specifies that a court may only rule on actual controversies. Appellant argues that there is no actual controversy because the LSSD was not directly involved in the matter that gave rise to such actual controversy. While the LSSD was not directly involved, however, a plaintiff need not expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution in order to have standing. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2013). In Pacific Legal Foundation v. San Andreas Coastal Commission, supra, 33 San.3d, the court held that there is a "ripeness requirement" in issues brought before court and forecloses adjudication of speculative of future injuries that may never materialize. Further, a plaintiff lacks standing where there is no injury-in-fact that was concrete, particularized, and imminent. Considering these requirements, the court must ask whether direct involvement is required in order to establish a claim against the defendant in such an action and whether direct involvement is required to satisfy the "ripeness requirement". This court holds that there is no personal jurisdiction over Appellant due to the lack of injury-in-fact and the trial court may not enjoin directly speculative conduct where there is no personal jurisdiction. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). However, the LSSD also engages in daily law enforcement activities and such activities may result in improper arrests for conduct similar to the conduct of Plaintiff. The court has subject matter jurisdiction over the enforcement of criminal laws, particularly because the LSSD enforces laws within the confines of the City and County of Los Santos. Since there exists no current precedent that enjoins the enforcement of Penal Code § 610, the trial court was well within its jurisdiction to establish such a precedent, but errantly included Appellant in a direct injunction with threat of fines. Appellant also errantly asserts that the trial court errantly issues an advisory opinion, but the trial court did no such thing – the trial court issued a declaratory judgment in order to resolve an actual controversy. Declaratory judgments intend to resolve an actual controversy and therefore foreclose future civil lawsuits, but advisory opinions do no such thing. This distinction is enough to dismiss the argument that the trial court erred in issued an advisory opinion because it clearly did not. II. Did the trial court err in denying the motion for demurrer raised by the LSSD pursuant to Civil Code of Procedure § 379? Appellant raised a motion for demurrer in the trial court, seeking to dismiss the claim as applied to itself. San Andreas Code of Civil Procedure § 379(b) states: "It is not necessary that each defendant be interested as to every cause of action or as to all relief prayed for. Judgment may be given against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities." Appellant is not personally interested in this cause of action and has no liability therefore. As stated in Part I of this analysis, there is no personal jurisdiction but there is subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellant. However, the San Andreas Supreme Court has stated that joinder is improper in cases where defendants are merely alleged to have engaged in similar conduct. There must be some factual link between each named Defendant and the conduct directly alleged by the plaintiff. Landau v. Salam, 4 San.3d 901, 904 (1971). This court therefore finds that the trial court issued its order based on speculation and did in fact err in denial of the motion for demurrer, but not in its declaration of facial unconstitutionality of enforcing Penal Code § 610 that chills the right to record the police found in the first amendment to the United States Constitution. This court is therefore forced to reverse in this denial on the grounds that the trial court erred in its application of judicial discretion. III. Did the trial court issue a "sweeping injunction" that constitutes an advisory opinion? By extension, may the court do so? As addressed in Part I, the ruling of the trial court does not constitute an advisory opinion. People ex rel Lynch v. Superior Court, 1 San.3d 910, 912 (1970); Salazar v. Eastin, 9 San.4th 836 (1995). A declaratory judgment is not an advisory opinion but rather an attempt by the court to resolve an actual controversy that forecloses future civil lawsuits. Lockyer v. City and County of San Fierro, 33 San.4th 1055, 1082 (2004). IV. Does public policy override jurisdictional and procedural defects? As explained in Part III of this analysis, the trial court did not issue an advisory opinion but a declaratory judgment. The trial court is not limited by Code of Civil Procedure 1060(b). However, this court need not further analyze this question because motion for demurrer was, as explained in Part II, was errantly overruled by the trial court and the appellant may not therefore be subject to a declaratory judgment. V. Did the trial court "sidestep the fundamental requirement of a genuine controversy"? By extension, must a defendant be personally involved in such a genuine controversy for the court to have general or subject-matter jurisdiction over them? This court has analyzed this question in Parts I and II of this analysis. This court finds that the lack of genuine controversy does in fact foreclose the inclusion of Appellant in the order itself but does not limit the ability of the trial court to find that the act of issuing precedent on the matter was and is proper. This court therefore affirms the trial court's creation of precedent while still releasing Appellant from the action raised in the trial court. ORDER 1. The trial court erred in its denial of the motion for demurrer raised by Appellant. All defendants other than the LSPD are released from the direct injunction. The order, as applied to the LSPD, is not reversed. 2. The trial court's decision to establish a precedent that recording the police is a right is upheld and naturalized to this court. (( OOC Errata )) Part of Landau v. Salam, 4 San.3d 901, 904 (1971), is impossible to apply because it provides that a court does not have the jurisdiction to issue summary judgment during trial where there is no dispute over facts – this is a question for the jury. On LS-RP there is no jury and all cases are handled as bench trials, so this precedent cannot be applied – the judge acts as both judge and jury for gameplay reasons. However, the remainder of this opinion can be adequately applied and has been. DATED: April 17, 2025 By: _____/s/ Maria J. Vespasiano Maria J. Vespasiano Administrative Presiding Justice First Appellate District

cheese and rice, guys. big injunction

** The clerk updates the docket and assigns Judge Augustus E Rosewater as the hearing officer.

(( Edited title of document to "Petition for Civil Gang Injunction" due to likely mistake. )) ** The clerk accepts the filing and assigns docket number: 25-LSC-04113

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS, CIVIL DIVISION Case No. 25-LSC-04111 In the Matter of Gloria Mendoza v. Los Santos Police Department, Los Santos Sheriff's Department, San Andreas Department of Corrections _____________________________________________________________________________ OPINION AND ORDER delivered by Judge Florence Weathers-Peterson of the Superior Court Syllabus Plaintiff submitted a petition under the Declaratory Judgment Act requesting declaratory judgment against the named defendants for alleged constitutional rights violations. Quoting from the syllabus in Gloria Mendoza v. Los Santos Police Department, et al., 25-LSC-04109: On March 25th, 2025, Plaintiff Gloria Mendoza lawfully parked and proceeded to a public sidewalk upon seeing a large group of people detained in the Idlewood area. She began to record the interaction, endorsing afterward that she was approximately fifty feet away from the scene. Plaintiff endorses that she was approached by Officer Love of the Los Santos Police Department who asked what Ms. Mendoza was doing, to which she replied that she was recording the scene. Plaintiff further endorses that she was then instructed by Officer Love to leave the scene and, after a brief verbal dispute, Officer Love implied a threat of arrest by making a statement to the effect of "[Mendoza] would join them [if she did not leave the area]". The evidence presented in the petition for declaratory judgment includes a video that shows only part of the encounter. (( OOC NOTE: Screenshots of the exact actions taken or words said are required as OOC evidence in order for a video to be roleplayed. )) Plaintiff asserts that "law enforcement agencies of San Andreas have long ran wild with the idea that any citizen, videotaping any law enforcement officer, at anytime, can be detained or arrested" and that this has "chilled the First Amendment" by "prevent[ing] news outlets both official and unofficial from flourishing in the City of Los Santos" and "has resulted in the wrongful detention, or diminishment in the free exercise of the First Amendment". Plaintiff submitted a complaint to the Los Santos Police Department Internal Affairs Group and received a disposition that "the reported event did not occur". Plaintiff argues that the alleged threat of arrest for recording in public is a violation of the first amendment, citing Gilk v. Cunnife, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011), and United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). Plaintiff further contends that this court is implored to apply a strict scrutiny test under Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), with deference being given to the citizen video recording an officer's duties whilst within a traditional public forum. Plaintiff argues that the gathering of information about public officials is a constitutionally-protected activity under the first amendment, citing Mills v. Alabama; 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 777 n. 11; Cf. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev.; 501 U.S. 1030, 1035–36 (1991), and; Press–Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 at 8 (1986). Plaintiff does not argue that the fourth amendment is implicated. Applying precedent, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief in the form of an order of this court enjoining all law enforcement agencies within the jurisdiction of this court from deprivation of first amendment rights in the manner presupposed. Further, Plaintiff wishes this court to establish precedent in San Andreas jurisprudence by establishing a test for what constitutes "obstruction", presumably as it pertains to the crime of Obstruction of Justice as defined in § 610 of the San Andreas Penal Code. Plaintiff believes that receiving both of these in declaratory relief will "resolve the controversy of this case". In reply, the three named defendant agencies (collectively "Defendant") claims that Plaintiff's narrative of the incident is "is uncorroborated and self-contradictory", and that there is no cause of action against the Los Santos Sheriff's Department or the San Andreas Department of Corrections. Defendant contends that there is no legal injury warranting declaratory relief and that to establish a test for obstruction as requested would be beyond this court's authority. Defendant argues that the incident occurred in a high-crime area involving a "large group of detained individuals" and that Plaintiff did not have knowledge of any active threats to officer safety that may be present. Defendant endorses the conclusion of the Los Santos Police Department's Internal Affairs Group. Plaintiff submits a motion for demurrer of the named defendants Los Santos Sheriff's Department and San Andreas Department of Corrections on the grounds that they were neither present nor involved in the situation and that, under Rule 430.10(e) and (f) (( OOC NOTE: this reference is corrected due to an OOC note via DM after the topic was locked )), the pleadings do not substantiate a cause of action against these defendants and that the pleadings against such defendants is uncertain due to this lack of presence or involvement. Plaintiff errantly argues that this court is not bound by precedent arising out of Grace, Mills, and Gentile but correctly states that this court is not bound by precedent set in Glik. Plaintiff argues that courts have discovered a governmental interest in maintaining public order, implying that this court should apply a rational basis test to determine whether actions taken by officers is proscribed. Finally, Plaintiff argues that there is no legal injury, threat of future harm, or any real or immediate controversy, requesting dismissal with prejudice of the underlying action. Plaintiff, in renewing the petition, introduces an additional argument invoking Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Quoting from Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936), a controversy at issue in a petition for declaratory judgment must be "of a justiciable nature, thus excluding an advisory decree upon a hypothetical state of facts" under Rule 57. Plaintiff also introduces an argument invoking precedent set in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.C. 452 (1974), asserting that a Federal court has the authority to hear challenges to state law and implying that this court does as well. Defense, renewing their contest to the petition, introduces a counter-argument under Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), asserting that the interference with an officer's duties constitutes a crime. Plaintiff asserts that this declaratory judgment will be a sufficient measure to resolve the controversy without need for a civil lawsuit. Analysis This court begins with an analysis of the evidence to determine whether further analysis is required. In requesting declaratory judgment in this matter, Plaintiff must show clear and convincing evidence that the events in question occurred. Plaintiff originally submitted incomplete evidence to this court in 25-LSC-04109, but has since corrected this issue. Therefore, the court may continue with evidentiary analysis to determine if there is a controversy at issue in order to satisfy the requirements of Rule 57 as asserted by Ashwander. This court, upon analysis of the evidence, finds that the evidence is sufficient to establish a controversy. Evaluating the argument introduced invoking Steffel, the precedent held that federal courts have jurisdiction over state penal matters. The facts of the case as recounted in the syllabus are a near match, however the holding is neither applicable nor binding upon this court as it concerns federal courts. However, this court recognizes that it does have jurisdiction over this matter as it directly concerns at least one party within its jurisdiction, the Los Santos Police Department, which is the party directly involved. Considering the motion for demurrer introduced by the defense, this court recognizes that defendants other than the Los Santos Police Department are not directly involved. However, these other defendants are indeed still subject to the orders of this court but are immediately appealable to the respective superior courts of their local jurisdictions. Evaluating whether the first amendment is implicated we look to Grace primarily, which holds that public sidewalks are a traditional public forum subject to strict scrutiny. As applied to the first amendment, strict scrutiny requires that a government entity may not restrict speech in a particular manner unless it demonstrates a compelling government interest, that the policy is narrowly tailored to achieve the goal, and that no other policy would satisfactorily achieve the desired result – all three conditions must be present. Cf. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F. 3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). Looking to Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995), it is clearly established that there is a first amendment right to gather information on public officials. Further, this court looks to Meinecke v. City of Seattle, 678 F. Supp. 3d 1309 (W.D. Wash. 2023), for further applications to the first amendment. In Meinecke, the City of Seattle's restriction on religious speech in public areas was challenged and the Ninth Circuit found it unconstitutional. Mills has a similar holding protecting the right of free press and commentary on government affairs, even on election day. Further, looking to First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), this there is clearly established precedent that discussion of certain topics may not be subjected to prior restraint, a holding very similar to Cohen v. San Andreas, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (( OOC Note: Cohen v. California has been changed to Cohen v. San Andreas because San Andreas replaces California in the game universe )). Cohen established that restrictions of first amendment speech rights must be content neutral, closely relating to the holding in First Nat'l Bank. Finally, this court looks to Press-Enter Co., which establishes that government functions operate better under public scrutiny – an objective achievable by recording of the police for use in public scrutiny. The defense argues, invoking Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), that Plaintiff's conduct was criminal because it was a disruption to the police. This court fervently disagrees given the shear number of officers on scene and the fact that none of the arrested suspects appeared to be resisting in any way that would require the immediate or emergent attention of either Officer Love or his partner. With all of this considered, this court finds that there is sufficient precedent here to find a right to recording the police in public areas within the penumbra of existing precedent; while it has not yet been ruled upon within the Ninth Circuit, the existing case law establishes a sufficient breadth of protections of the first amendment in traditional public forums to suggest that this right is clearly established as well. With this right recognized as clearly established, this court must apply a strict scrutiny test to determine if the police department's policies regarding the application of the charge of Obstruction of Justice satisfy three key elements: (1) a compelling government interest, (2) a narrow tailoring so as to limit the scope of the restriction as much as possible, and (3) that no other policy would be sufficient in achieving the desired effect. The defense argues that there is a compelling government interest in protecting officer safety in high-crime areas. This court recognizes there is in fact a compelling government interest in protecting officers from harm, but does this warrant restriction of the right to record the police while on a public sidewalk? This court disagrees. The policy also does not seem to be narrowly tailored, but rather entirely subjective to an officer's perception of how far a person must step away. This court therefore finds that the implied policy, as enacted by the officer in question, is arbitrary and capricious. The public must be placed on clear notice as to the exact boundaries under restriction within the traditional public forum. As established by the Supreme Court of San Andreas in Morrison v. Los Santos Police Department, these boundaries must be clearly marked such as with police tape, emergency vehicles, or the officers themselves. Police may not extend the boundary of restriction arbitrarily beyond that which is clearly marked. Finally, looking to whether alternatives would or would not be effective, this court cannot evaluate such an argument because no information or argument has been presented on the matter. Returning to the required elements of the strict scrutiny test, this court finds that the government has not satisfied two of the elements and this court cannot rule on the third. Since strict scrutiny requires that all three are true, the policy fails the test and is therefore an unconstitutional restriction upon free speech. Further, police may not utilize a charge of Obstruction of Justice as a catch-all for conduct that is entirely subjective, since to do so would call into question whether a citizen was on clear notice that their conduct was unlawful – in such cases, this court would be required to apply the rule of lenity and rule in the interests of the citizen who was not properly noticed of the illegality of such conduct. Moving into an analysis of the order itself, this court establishes that the underlying policy was itself unconstitutional but was the conduct by Officer Love? This court considers whether the officer's conduct more generally would make a reasonable person feel as if they are detained. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994). In this matter, Plaintiff was threatened with arrest if she did not cease the recording of police officers. Applying these as well as First Nat'l Bank and Cohen, this court finds that Officer Love's conduct constituted a prior restraint upon Plaintiff Mendoza's recording of police while in a public place. The officers made neither an attempt to cordon off an area with police tape or emergency vehicles, nor made an attempt to marshal individuals away by establishing a clear boundary with their own bodies – quite the contrary, as a matter of fact, since they walked away from Plaintiff after making their threat of arrest. Plaintiff argues that such conduct has a chilling effect upon the exercise of the first amendment. This court agrees emphatically. Finally, this court moves into an analysis of the constitutionality of the de-facto seizure of the Plaintiff by Officer Love's prior restraint of her conduct. Officer Love's threat of arrest constitutes verbal force under the fourth amendment since, more generally, such orders have the effect of putting a person on notice that certain conduct may result in arrest. Accordingly, this court must apply the three-prong test established in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). First, this court must consider whether the force was appropriate given the severity of the crime at issue. Second, this court must consider if there was an active threat to the officer conducting a valid arrest, accepting that suspects have an established right to resist unlawful arrests. See also John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900). Third, this court must consider whether the arrestee is engaging in active resistance or an attempt to evade arrest. This court need not look any further than the first requirement – the proportionality of force to the severity of the crime at issue. Looking to Penal Code § 622(a), there are two elements that must be satisfied: (1) the officer involved was engaged in duties pertinent to their policing powers or responsibilities, and (2) the conduct of another prevents or delays that officer from conducting the underlying duties. Looking to Penal Code § 622(b), there are two elements: (1) the presence of a lawful order by the officer, and (2) the willful disobeying of that order by another. This court, in analyzing the meaning of the words prevent and delay to mean an actual physical obstruction that comes between the officer and their duties such that the officer cannot conduct those duties. Speech cannot constitute a prevention or delay because officers are easily capable of ignoring speech. Recording the police similarly cannot constitute a prevention or delay except where a recording party is directly in the path of an officer attempting to conduct lawful duties. In analyzing the meaning of lawful order, finds that such an order must be particularly supported by a specific statute or ordinance making some conduct unlawful. The charge of Obstruction may not be used as a catch-all for conduct that an officer finds objectionable or disruptive to their own personal peace. To allow this would be to allow an officer to enforce the law according to their own subjective feelings and not according to the law. Therefore, since the order itself was unlawful under Morrison, the charge of Obstruction of Justice does not apply and therefore there is no crime at issue at all. Failing this first prong, the Graham test is not satisfied and therefore even this verbal force by Officer Love was excessive force. This court finds that the conduct of these officers of the Los Santos Police was clearly objectionable and in flagrant violation of the first and fourth amendments. Order This court having general jurisdiction over the Los Santos Police Department and subject matter jurisdiction over violations of constitutional rights by peace officers within this state, the following order is made: This court grants declaratory judgment in this matter and establishes that recording the police while standing in a public area or private area, on which a person has a right or privilege of presence, and which has not been established as a clearly restricted boundary. Clearly restricted boundaries shall constitute those areas of public or private property which are clearly marked as a crime scene or an emergency scene and shall be marked with police tape, emergency vehicles, clearly marked signage with writing in English, or peace officers preventing access to an area by means of blocking a sidewalk or other point of egress or entry to a particular area. The subjective application of Obstruction of Justice, pursuant to Penal Code § 610, is facially unconstitutional. This court finds that § 622(a) is only applicable where there is actual physical obstruction of an officer. Merely speaking to or recording an officer conducting his duties shall not constitute a violation. This court further finds that § 622(b) requires that a lawful order be made and that such orders may not be subjective, arbitrary, or capricious in nature – such an order must be underpinned by a specific statute or ordinance of which a citizen has been placed on notice that they are violating. The charge of Obstruction of Justice requires some other crime and may not justify an arrest in and of itself. The Los Santos Police Department is directly enjoined from threatening or conducting arrests of persons recording the police whilst those people are standing an area described in item (1) of this order. All peace officers and law enforcement agencies are similarly enjoined. Violation of this order may accrue fines as deemed appropriate by a court having jurisdiction to enforce this order and shall constitute a cause of action for further civil actions. Furthermore, deliberate violations of this order by officers having actual knowledge of it shall constitute a criminal act under Penal Code § 622, Contempt of Court. --- /s/ FLORENCE WEATHERS-PETERSON Florence Weathers-Peterson Superior Court Judge, County of Los Santos ENTERED: April 7th, 2025 at 23:52

** The clerk of courts files the case and assigns docket number 25-LSC-04111.

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS, CIVIL DIVISION Case No. 25-LSC-04109 In the Matter of Gloria Mendoza v. Los Santos Police Department, Los Santos Sheriff's Department, San Andreas Department of Corrections _____________________________________________________________________________ OPINION AND ORDER delivered by Judge Florence Weathers-Peterson of the Superior Court Syllabus Plaintiff submitted a petition under the Declaratory Judgment Act requesting declaratory judgment against the named defendants for alleged constitutional rights violations. On March 25th, 2025, Plaintiff Gloria Mendoza lawfully parked and proceeded to a public sidewalk upon seeing a large group of people detained in the Idlewood area. She began to record the interaction, endorsing afterward that she was approximately fifty feet away from the scene. Plaintiff endorses that she was approached by Officer Love of the Los Santos Police Department who asked what Ms. Mendoza was doing, to which she replied that she was recording the scene. Plaintiff further endorses that she was then instructed by Officer Love to leave the scene and, after a brief verbal dispute, Officer Love implied a threat of arrest by making a statement to the effect of "[Mendoza] would join them [if she did not leave the area]". The evidence presented in the petition for declaratory judgment includes a video that shows only part of the encounter. (( OOC NOTE: Screenshots of the exact actions taken or words said are required as OOC evidence in order for a video to be roleplayed. )) Plaintiff asserts that "law enforcement agencies of San Andreas have long ran wild with the idea that any citizen, videotaping any law enforcement officer, at anytime, can be detained or arrested" and that this has "chilled the First Amendment" by "prevent[ing] news outlets both official and unofficial from flourishing in the City of Los Santos" and "has resulted in the wrongful detention, or diminishment in the free exercise of the First Amendment". Plaintiff submitted a complaint to the Los Santos Police Department Internal Affairs Group and received a disposition that "the reported event did not occur". Plaintiff argues that the alleged threat of arrest for recording in public is a violation of the first amendment, citing Gilk v. Cunnife, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011), and United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). Plaintiff further contends that this court is implored to apply a strict scrutiny test under Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), with deference being given to the citizen video recording an officer's duties whilst within a traditional public forum. Plaintiff argues that the gathering of information about public officials is a constitutionally-protected activity under the first amendment, citing Mills v. Alabama; 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 777 n. 11; Cf. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev.; 501 U.S. 1030, 1035–36 (1991), and; Press–Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 at 8 (1986). Plaintiff does not argue that the fourth amendment is implicated. Applying precedent, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief in the form of an order of this court enjoining all law enforcement agencies within the jurisdiction of this court from deprivation of first amendment rights in the manner presupposed. Further, Plaintiff wishes this court to establish precedent in San Andreas jurisprudence by establishing a test for what constitutes "obstruction", presumably as it pertains to the crime of Obstruction of Justice as defined in § 610 of the San Andreas Penal Code. Plaintiff believes that receiving both of these in declaratory relief will "resolve the controversy of this case". In reply, the three named defendant agencies (collectively "Defendant") claims that Plaintiff's narrative of the incident is "is uncorroborated and self-contradictory", and that there is no cause of action against the Los Santos Sheriff's Department or the San Andreas Department of Corrections. Defendant contends that there is no legal injury warranting declaratory relief and that to establish a test for obstruction as requested would be beyond this court's authority. Defendant argues that the incident occurred in a high-crime area involving a "large group of detained individuals" and that Plaintiff did not have knowledge of any active threats to officer safety that may be present. Defendant endorses the conclusion of the Los Santos Police Department's Internal Affairs Group. Plaintiff submits a motion for demurrer of the named defendants Los Santos Sheriff's Department and San Andreas Department of Corrections on the grounds that they were neither present nor involved in the situation and that, under Rule 430.10(e) and (f) (( OOC NOTE: this reference is corrected due to an OOC note via DM after the topic was locked )), the pleadings do not substantiate a cause of action against these defendants and that the pleadings against such defendants is uncertain due to this lack of presence or involvement. Plaintiff errantly argues that this court is not bound by precedent arising out of Grace, Mills, and Gentile but correctly states that this court is not bound by precedent set in Glik. Plaintiff argues that courts have discovered a governmental interest in maintaining public order, implying that this court should apply a rational basis test to determine whether actions taken by officers is proscribed. Finally, Plaintiff argues that there is no legal injury, threat of future harm, or any real or immediate controversy, requesting dismissal with prejudice of the underlying action. Analysis This court begins with an analysis of the evidence to determine whether further analysis is required. In requesting declaratory judgment in this matter, Plaintiff must show clear and convincing evidence that the events in question occurred. Plaintiff has submitted incomplete video evidence to substantiate this claim and request for declaratory relief, and presumably did so as well when submitting a complaint to the Los Santos Police Department's Internal Affairs Group. Without a complete video account or some other substantiation of the event, the Plaintiff has failed to meet their burden of clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, no further analysis is required. This court finds that there is no clear and convincing evidence that the events in question occurred. This court is unable to ascertain whether or not the events occurred. It would be inappropriate for this court to issue declaratory relief for a claim that is, according to the evidentiary record, hypothetical. (( It is long-standing OOC precedent that any use of "video evidence" in court proceedings requires a full set of screenshots that show the entire event, not just select portions. Here, we cannot just assume the truth of a matter based on an emote that says "records the detainment" – we must have some form of confirming evidence such as a chatlog, other screenshots/video, etc. This is not a rule that I am now establishing or have recently established, it is one that has existed since as early as 2012 to my knowledge but probably earlier. Above, during the syllabus, it is said in character by the court that the video is incomplete – that is the presumption to be made in character when there is no further screenshots to tell us what is seen. After all, video recordings in this way are unsupported by the script and therefore considered NPC in a way unless both parties agree to a set of facts or there is screenshot/video evidence to show what happened. )) Order This court finds that the requisite burden of proof has not been satisfied and therefore no ruling can be made on the issue. The petition is dismissed without prejudice so that the Plaintiff may resubmit a petition at a future date. --- /s/ FLORENCE WEATHERS-PETERSON Florence Weathers-Peterson Superior Court Judge, County of Los Santos ENTERED: April 6th, 2025 at 22:05

** The docket is closed for further updates by the Clerk of Courts and the status is changed to PENDING REVIEW.

** The case is accepted by the clerk of court and assigned docket number 25-LSC-04109. (( All further docket updates and scheduling will take place on Discord. Additional briefs, attachments, documents, and the final decision may be posted here. See the following thread on the County discord: https://discord.com/channels/887354427378380891/1358172776908980264 ))

SAN ANDREAS COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT Case No. 25-1A-03107 In the Matter of Philip Quinteloy v. Superior Court of San Andreas, County of Los Santos _____________________________________________________________________________ COURT ORDER Synopsis 1. Jurisdiction. The Superior Court of San Andreas in the County of Los Santos heard arguments in a probable cause hearing before Judge Florence Weathers-Peterson on March 30th, 2025 at 22:18, concluding after approximately ninety minutes. This court has appellate jurisdiction over the aforementioned court because the First Appellate District hears appeals that arise from courts in the Counties of Los Santos, Red, and Flint, and the court in question is within the County of Los Santos. 2. The court of first instance, overseen by Judge Weathers-Peterson, found that probable cause existed in full for two charges: Grand Theft and Resisting a Peace Officer. The court of first instance dismissed the charge of Possession of a Prohibited Weapon. In the matter of the final charge, Reckless Evasion of a Peace Officer, the court of first instance reduced the charge to a lesser included offense of Evasion of a Peace Officer, a misdemeanor, and dismissed the more severe felony charge. 3. The court of first instance erred in reducing the charge, exceeding the limits of its judicial discretion. While a court may, during sentencing following conviction, reduce a charge for which one has been convicted into a lesser included offense therein, a court may not do so during the probable cause hearing process. This violated the separation of powers required of the court. Order 4. The decision of the lower court is reversed in part. The charge of Evading a Peace Officer, being the lesser-included offense to which the original and more serious felony was reduced to by Judge Weathers-Peterson, is dismissed without prejudice. It is within the discretion of the prosecution to reintroduce this charge if they see fit to do so according to the evidence. The matter is remanded back to the court of first instance for re-hearing on the presence of probable cause for any charges the prosecution may choose to reintroduce. The court of first instance is ordered to begin trial when scheduled and without unnecessary delay. Signed, MARIA J. VESPASIANO Administrative Presiding Justice First Appellate District San Andreas Court of Appeals ENTERED: March 31st, 2025 22:56

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS, PROBATE DIVISION Case No. LCS-2025-P-0310 In the Matter of Thomas McLoughlin, Ex Parte _____________________________________________________________________________ CIVIL PROTECTIVE ORDER A preponderance of the evidence having been presented by Thomas McLoughlin before me, I hereby find that the following person [ ] has engaged in ongoing harassment [X] is a danger to the petitioner. PERSON TO BE RESTRAINED: ARDI HOXHA Sex: [X] M [ ] F Height: 5' 11" Weight: 187 lbs. Hair Color: Brown Eye Color: Green Race: Caucasian Age: __________ Date of Birth: __/__/____ This person is to: [X] have no contact with the petitioner including phone, email, social media, and second-hand contact through shared friends, family, and associates; [X] refrain from knowingly being present and remaining within 500 feet of the petitioner, the petitioner's home, or the petitioner's known place of work. Judicial Notes: The petitioner's "known place of work" shall be construed to include his police patrol vehicle. Violation of this order shall be punishable under Penal Code § 115, Stalking, and Penal Code § 622, Contempt of Court. This proceeding was heard on March 19th, 2025 at 22:00 at the Superior Court of San Andreas, County of Los Santos, Courtroom 1 before Judge Florence Weathers-Peterson. The subject of this order may appeal the order of this court within 30 days of issuance. This order shall take effect upon service of the order upon the subject of the order by a peace officer or other process server permitted by law. Signed, FLORENCE WEATHERS-PETERSON Judge, Criminal Division County of Los Santos Superior Court of San Andreas

I like handling the meat in the Star Street Butcher Shop. 😜

** The case is closed administratively by the Clerk for Department 440.

** The docket is closed and the order is finalized.

** The court resumes proceedings before Judge Harold Weingarten, whose clerk calls the case. "Uhh-- alright, Wright versus Hockenbeyer. The clerk will record that 23 hours have passed since our last proceeding. Mr. Wright has performed the necessary service of process and the clerk has attempted to make contact with the former judge Mr. Hockenbeyer. I am now prepared to proceed with a default judgment." "First, we will examine the facts as presented by Mr. Wright. Since these facts have not been duly challenged by Mr. Hockenbeyer in the form of a reply brief, they will be afforded additional deference." "In examining whether the Plaintiff has a cause of action for suit, we look Mireles as cited in the authorities. It is clear that Mr. Hockenbeyer, when acting in his judicial capacity, is immune from both suit and money damages. As the court said, 'it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself'. Therefore, we must examine next whether Mr. Hockenbeyer's actions exceeded his judicial authority and stepped into a non-judicial capacity. This court is bound by Mireles." "Moving into an analysis of whether Mr. Hockenbeyer's actions exceeded his judicial authority, thereby becoming non-judicial, this court must examine two elements. First, this court considers whether Mr. Hockenbeyer's actions were 'de facto' unreasonable or in violation of his mandate. Second, this court must examine whether the actions of Mr. Hockenbeyer transferred from 'judicial' authority to 'executive' authority in a test outlined by Mireles. This court has examined the remainder of the authorities cited and finds no cause for consideration of any except Mireles and Murchison." "In considering whether Mr. Hockenbeyer's actions were 'de facto' unreasonable, this court finds that the former judge's inattentiveness to the case at hand were in fact unreasonable. Mr. Hockenbeyer, while he was a judge, was required by the applicable professional standards set out in the Canons of Judicial Conduct. However, Mr. Hockenbeyer is immune from both suit and assessment of money damages under the framework set out in Mireles unless it can be demonstrated that his conduct departed from judicial authority and became either executive or personal. If the judge's conduct is executive in nature, this court must lessen Mr. Hockenbeyer's immunity to that of qualified immunity. If the judge's conduct is personal in nature, he receives no immunity. Therefore, this court must examine whether Mr. Hockenbeyer's actions as a judge were personal or executive in nature. Applying Murchison, this court finds that trial and conviction 'sua sponte' during the proceedings of Jefferson versus City of Los Santos, et alia, violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment as incorporated by the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. This court is bound by Miranda v. Johnson, as incorporated, to enforce the fifth amendment guarantees afforded by the equal protection clause. Therefore, Mr. Hockenbeyer's actions in fact exceeded his judicial authority. This court finds that the actions taken by Mr. Hockenbeyer were mixed in nature – acting as both prosecutor, judge, and executioner – and therefore we must treat his actions as having been performed with executive authority. Therefore, under Mireles, Mr. Hockenbeyer is entitled to qualified immunity only. In order to determine whether Mr. Hockenbeyer receives immunity, this court must then examine whether Mr. Hockenbeyer's actions were 'de facto' unreasonable and whether existing case law placed Mr. Hockenbeyer on notice that such actions were unlawful. This court returns to Murchison in this examination and finds that Mr. Hockenbeyer is not entitled to qualified immunity. He is therefore liable for personal damages in this particular instance. However, this court also finds that the intrusion of the 'sua sponte' contempt proceeding was a 'de minimis' digression on the case at hand and had essentially no effect other than minor delays. Minor delays in trial proceedings do not warrant money damages, therefore this court does not award the special damages requested by Mr. Wright." "Plaintiff Mr. Wright has also made an assertion that he is therefore entitled to recover damages in the amount that he would have recovered upon successful suit. However, Plaintiff has not shown sufficiently that his representation of Ms. Michelle Jefferson would have resulted in a victory for his client in Jefferson versus City of Los Santos, et alia. However, Mr. Wright achieved a win for his client Mr. Stefan Castillo in Castillo versus Los Santos Sheriff's Department. Therefore, this court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover money damages from Mr. Hockenbeyer in either case, however will affirm the right to recover money damages from Mr. Castillo. In doing so, Mr. Wright's compensation will be entirely dependent on the terms of his representation agreement with Mr. Castillo. Since this is not the suit at hand, this court will not award any damages here. Plaintiff is encouraged to make a reasonable attempt to collect payment from Mr. Castillo and to bring suit against him if collection is unsuccessful. This court also affirms the right to recover money damages from Ms. Jefferson at the contracted rate as permitted in the terms therein." "Therefore the final order of default judgment issued by this court is as follows." "Firstly, Mr. Wright is entitled to recover regular attorney fees from both Mr. Castillo and Ms. Jefferson according to the terms of his contract with each of them. If collection is unsuccessful, he may bring suit against them in order to collect such fees and this court will enforce that agreement as written and assented to. Secondly, Mr. Wright is not entitled to recovery of money damages in any amount from Mr. Hockenbeyer. Thirdly, Mr. Hockenbeyer will be forwarded to both the Judicial Commission and to the State Bar of San Andreas for both sanction proceedings and consideration of disbarment for his actions. This court is not able to rule on that issue and therefore forwards the matter to the proper authorities." "If you believe I have erred in this decision, speak now or forever hold your peace – or, of course feel free to file a notice of appeal with this court within thirty days and I will grant leave. Are there any questions, comments, or concerns, counselors?" ** Judge Weingarten waits for any replies. (( @Kotwica @almightybounter )) (( Closing in 24 hours from now if no replies received. ))

“Understood, Mr. Wright, we’ll adjourn for now and my clerk will make one last attempt to establish contact with Mr. Hockenbeyer before I enter a default judgment. We’ll resume proceedings tomorrow— if there’s no word by then, I’ll honor your request.” ** Judge Weingarten bangs the gavel and adjourns the court. ** The clerk attempts later to make contact. (( @almightybounter @Kotwica )) (( 24 hours from right now is 18:20 Eastern on 1/16/25 ))

** The case is transferred to the court of Judge Harold Weingarten, Civil Division, 1st Judicial District. ** The case is called and proceedings resume. "Are the parties prepared to proceed?" (( Activity warning: This case will be closed out OOC on January 22nd if no responses are received. )) (( @Raven @ImperiumXVII ))

** The case is called and proceedings begin before Judge Harold Weingarten, Civil Division, 1st Judicial District. "Are the parties prepared to proceed? I assume service of process has been distributed?" (( Activity warning: This case will be closed out OOC on January 22nd if no responses are received. )) (( @Kotwica @almightybounter ))

(( This case is closed for player inactivity reasons. Award is vacated and the losing party will no longer be required to pay it. See screenshot for proof of inactivity. ))