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24-CV-1034 - Trial - Jefferson vs City of Los Santos, et al.


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Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment


The Court considered Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Opposition. After reviewing the evidence and applicable law, the Court finds genuine disputes of material fact that preclude summary judgment.
 

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there's no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court must view the evidence favorably to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor.
 

II. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact

The following material factual disputes exist:

  • Probable Cause: The parties disagree about whether probable cause existed for Plaintiff's arrests and citations.
  • Contributory Negligence: Defendants assert contributory negligence, but Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of this defense.
  • Exigent Circumstances and Lawful Search: Defendants claim the search of Plaintiff's property was lawful due to exigent circumstances, which Plaintiff disputes.
  • Restrictions on Public Assembly: Plaintiff questions the constitutionality of restrictions imposed on her public assembly.
  • Ill Will or Malice: Defendants deny ill will or malice, but Plaintiff alleges such conduct.
     

Conclusion

These factual disputes require resolution at trial. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The parties should proceed with discovery to prepare for trial.
 

SO ORDERED.

03.10.2024,

Hon. Judge Hockenbeyer

 

(( @Kotwica @NotCraft )) 

Edited by almightybounter
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Michelle Jefferson

v.

City of Los Santos, Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzales, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, and Roderick Hayward, in their official capacities,
Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low, in their individual and official capacities

 

Case Number: 24-CV-1034

Prepared by: Plaintiff or Attorney Name
 

MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS AGAINST ALEXANDER BLAIR, THE LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT, SAMUEL GONZALEZ IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND AMBER MOORE IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY.

_______________________________________________
 

Comes now, through her counsel, the plaintiff Michelle Jefferson moves for default judgment against the above mentioned parties for failing to respond to the complaint in a timely manner. The above mentioned were duly served notice of this case and Ms. Jefferson is entitled to judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(v).
 

_______________________________________________

Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge.

 

Sworn this 3 day of October, 2024 by:

 

/s/ Donald J. Wright

DONALD J. WRIGHT

Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

 

JACOB E. RABINOWITZ

Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

 

XAVIER CASTENDAS

Lead Counsel for Plaintiff

(( @almightybounter, @Cashew, @Michael, @Eren ))

Edited by Kotwica
Juan Tzompaxtle, Esq.
Partner of Tzompaxtle, Goldmann, and Barbieri LLP.
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MICHELLE JEFFERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF LOS SANTOS, ALEXANDER BLAIR, LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT, SAMUEL GONZALEZ, and AMBER MOORE,

Defendants.

Case No.: 24-CV-1034


ORDER GRANTING DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS ALEXANDER BLAIR, LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT, SAMUEL GONZALEZ, AND AMBER MOORE


ORDER

 

This matter is presented before the Court on the Plaintiff, Michelle Jefferson’s, Motion for Default Judgment directed at Defendants Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzalez, both in his individual and official capacities, and Amber Moore, likewise in her individual and official capacities. These Defendants were duly served with the Complaint, yet have neglected to respond or mount a defense within the timeframe mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
 

A. Rule 55 Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 empowers a plaintiff to seek a default judgment when a defendant has failed to timely respond to the action. Following the entry of default, the Court is authorized to render judgment in favor of the plaintiff, provided that the absence of a response is not attributable to excusable neglect, and the plaintiff's claims are substantiated by adequate evidence.

 

B. Service and Failure to Respond
The Court has meticulously examined the case file and verifies that Defendants Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzalez, and Amber Moore were served in strict compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Defendants were afforded a reasonable period to respond to the complaint, yet no response or appearance has been recorded within the stipulated timeframe.
 

C. Liability and Damages
Upon the establishment of default, the well-pleaded factual assertions within the complaint, excluding those related to the determination of damages, are accepted as accurate. Nevertheless, the Court must evaluate the sufficiency of the allegations and confirm the legal validity of the Plaintiff’s claims. In this instance, the assertions against the Defendants appear to be sufficiently corroborated by the documentation on file.

Given that a default judgment constitutes a severe remedy, the Court shall arrange a hearing to ascertain the extent of damages and any other suitable relief to which the Plaintiff may be entitled. The Plaintiff is instructed to present evidence concerning the specific damages sought in this instance.
 

D. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED:

  1. The Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment against Defendants Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzalez, and Amber Moore is GRANTED with respect to liability.
  2. A hearing to determine damages is scheduled for 07/10/2024.
  3. The Plaintiff is to provide evidence of damages within six days following this Order.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: 04/10/2024

Hon. Martin Hockenbeyer

 

(( @Kotwica @Jacob Rabinowitz )) 

Edited by almightybounter
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Michelle Jefferson

v.

City of Los Santos, Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzales, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, and Roderick Hayward, in their official capacities,
Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low, in their individual and official capacities

 

Case Number: 24-CV-1034

Prepared by: Yeshua Silvermen
 

MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, THE LOS SANTOS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE , ET Al 

_______________________________________________
 

Comes now, through their counsel, the defense moves for the dismissal of the case against the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department and their employees in accordance with Senate Bill No. 025-18. "Sovereign Immunity Act of 2018"  the case above meets the criteria as outlined in Section 2 of the bill. Therefore it is the duty of this court to dismiss the case under Section 4 of the guidelines of the law. 
 

_______________________________________________

Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge.

 

Sworn this 5th day of October, 2024 by:

 

Yeshua Silverman

Silverman and Goldstein Law Firm

(( @almightybounter @Kotwica ))

 

 

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TO: Court Clerk; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson
FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq.

DATE: October 5th, 2024

RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Amendment of Complaint

-----

 

Judge Hockenbeyer,

 

Ms. Michelle Jefferson is employed as a business manager at the businesses aforementioned in the complaint, including as the manager of an adult entertainment establishment with an irregular income that often exceeds $10,000 per hour open. We have based our calculations for damages on a rate valuing an hour of Ms. Jefferson's time at $10,000. Applying this rate, we reached the calculated values for compensatory damages as she ought to be compensated for the time she wrongly spent imprisoned.

 

In determining the amount of damages due for the pain and suffering endured by Ms. Jefferson, we ask this court to determine an amount that is fair and proportionate to the suffering endured. Our nation is underpinned by a strong emphasis on the notion that liberty must not be infringed upon without due process. Here Ms. Jefferson's rights were violated in a repeated and egregious manner that draws near to an intentional violation of her civil rights. One might even dare to call such violations inherently un-American. We believe it is imperative that this court award an amount that accounts for the repeated nature of the civil rights violations herein and the egregious nature of the lies entered into the record by defendants Kaminski and Low that underpinned felony charges.

 

Ultimately, the total amount awarded by this court will need to have an apportioned responsibility based on which defendants are found liable. Since there is a determination of liability still outstanding for the defendants Los Santos County Sheriff's Department, Roderick Hayward, City of Los Santos, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low, it would be improper at the current point in time to determine which of these defendants should pay. Rather, we recommend that these particular defendants have default judgments entered against them with maximal liability attached until final judgment is entered concerning the other defendants.

 

With all of this in mind, we respectfully ask this court to preserve the default judgment against the aforementioned defendants Los Santos Police Department, Alexander Blair, Amber Moore, and Samuel Gonzales. We are prepared to proceed with trial proceedings in the matter of the remaining defendants as we have significant disagreements with the position entered by counsel for the defendants. When judgment is entered for all defendants, we would request at that time a hearing on damages and apportionment be held to determine the manner in which liability should be shared between the defendants. When such a hearing is reached, we would ask that the aforementioned defendants against whom default judgment is entered be treated with a maximal degree of liability.

 

Signed,

 

Jacob E. Rabinowitz III

Counsel for Plaintiff

 

(( @Kotwica @almightybounter ))

Edited by Jacob Rabinowitz

jacob ezekiel rabinowitz III, esq.
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Michelle Jefferson

v.

City of Los Santos, Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzales, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, and Roderick Hayward, in their official capacities,
Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low, in their individual and official capacities

 

Case Number: 24-CV-1034

Prepared by: Jacob Rabinowitz, Donald Wright
 

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR DISMISSAL ON GROUNDS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

 

(1) The Sovereign Immunity Act bars the application of sovereign immunity in this matter.

 

The Sovereign Immunity Act of 2018, Senate Bill (SB) 025-18, hereafter the “Act”, bars the application of sovereign immunity in this matter under Section 3, “Exemptions to Sovereign Immunity”.

 

SB 025-18(3)(B)2 provides that Sovereign Immunity shall not apply “where the action(s) was committed by violating some defined legal standard or law”, and “the agency may be held responsible”. According to this section of the Act, sovereign immunity shall not apply where the Plaintiff can reasonably demonstrate that there is a clearly-established legal standard. Therefore, this court may not dismiss the case on such grounds during pre-trial motions as long as Plaintiff can reasonably demonstrate there is a clearly-established standard.

 

SB 025-18(3)(A) provides that “Sovereign immunity does not apply when an employee commits any illegal or tortious action in accordance with his duty”. Under this section, Plaintiff’s tort claims are sheltered from sovereign immunity and the claim is permissible. This would include Count Twenty-Five, detailing a charge of Breach of Duty since Breach of Duty is a negligence tort.

 

SB 025-18(3)(B)3 provides that Sovereign Immunity shall not apply “where the action(s) was committed by violating some defined legal standard or law, and that action was not in accordance to an established policy”, and in such cases “the actor(s) may be held responsible”. This section of the Act shelters Plaintiff’s individual claims against Defendants Moore, Kaminski, and Low if Plaintiff can demonstrate that their respective agencies did not have a policy requiring them to commit such acts under penalty of potential administrative sanction by their respective employers. Here, Plaintiff need only demonstrate that there is no policy mandated by either the Los Santos Police Department or the Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department that runs afoul of the clearly-established standards that are cited in Counts 1 through 25 as binding and persuasive precedent. According to the Act, “Sovereign immunity shall apply to the agency, but not its actor(s).” Under SB 025-18(2)(A), employees “shall be given the full protections of sovereign immunity when acting within the course of their duties”. It therefore follows that if an employee is not acting “within the course of their duties”, they shall not receive “the full protections of sovereign immunity”. In cross-referencing 025-18(2)(A) with 025-18(3)(B)3, it stands to reason that any action performed “not in accordance with established policies” would be an action that is not “within the course of [an employee’s] duties”. If Plaintiff can therefore show that an action was not sanctioned by the employing agency, then the employee may not receive the protections of sovereign immunity.

 

SB 025-18(3)(C) provides a limitation on the amount payable in sovereign immunity claims where it applies. However, if Plaintiff has shown that sovereign immunity does not apply, then this court need not respect any such limitation on damages.

 

In Counts 1 through 25, we define a litany of clearly-established legal standards. Since in each count the applicable binding and persuasive precedents we cite would tend to qualify as “some defined legal standard or law”, sovereign immunity shall not apply. Plaintiff has explained how each such standard applies to the conduct alleged, and has submitted a mix of both binding and persuasive precedent which this court is either obliged to accept as a premise or is strongly encouraged to accept by the very nature of such persuasive precedents’ analysis by federal appellate courts other than the 9th Circuit. Since such precedents clearly exist, there is a “defined legal standard or law” and SB 025-18(3)(B)2 applies, thereby mandating that sovereign immunity does not apply. In Count 25, this court must additionally accept that breach of duty is a negligence tort and sovereign immunity does not apply under SB 025-18(3)(A).

 

Furthermore, the defendants sued in their individual capacities may not make claims of sovereign immunity if their conduct is in violation of clearly-established standards unless they were required to do so by department policy. If the department required that a Defendant perform the actions under penalty of potential administrative sanction, then they may make an individual claim of immunity but the employing agency may not; and, in such a case, the agency must indemnify the employee against any damages incurred by the actions that violate clearly-established precedential standards. In reverse, the same is true: if an employee violated a clearly-established standard but department policy did place them in jeopardy of potential administrative sanction, then the employee is wholly individually responsible. In this suit, we make claims against specific named defendants Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low each in their individual capacity and in their official capacity. Plaintiff argues that they will be held liable either officially and indemnified by their employing agency if there is a binding departmental policy that required their particular conduct, or held liable in their individual capacity if no such policy existed. In either case, Plaintiff argues that the conduct was in violation of clearly-established precedents that require this court to treat the conduct as facially unconstitutional, thereby further invoking 025-18(3)(B)2.

 

If this court accepts as a premise that the defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity under 025-18(3)(A), (B)2, or (B)3, then 025-18(3)(C) does not apply since such provision only applies if a defendant is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Act.

 

Plaintiff submits that, under the aforementioned sections of the Act, sovereign immunity does not apply. We therefore respectfully implore this court to overrule the defense’s motion to dismiss.

 

(2) Even if the Court Accepts That Sovereign Immunity Does Apply, the Court Must Deny the Motion as the Defenses Motion is Untimely and Therefore Waived.

 

The Los Santos Sheriffs Department’s (“LSSD”) motion for dismissal on the grounds of sovereign immunity is untimely. Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense identified in Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Prot. Dist., 7 Cal. 5th 798 (2019).  Affirmative defenses must be pled in the answer to the original complaint as required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c). The LSSD by not raising this affirmative defense in their answer, have waived their ability to raise it in this proceeding, and further appeals stemming from this decision. Bennett v. U.S., 201 F.3d 450 (2000). Bennett explicitly highlights that the United States Government waived its claim to sovereign immunity by failing to raise the claim in its initial pleadings. 

 

This court is obligated to deny the motion, and deny any further motions of affirmative defenses that were not pled in their answer due to the Supreme Court’s binding precedent. The Defense by not raising this affirmative defense in their answer under a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion have effectively waived the defense.

 

(3) Attorney Silverman’s Conduct By Representing All Defendants is An Ethical Concern.

 

An attorney's role is to zealously advocate for his clients, Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.3 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2020), here Attorney Silverman will be put in a predicament that will make that next to impossible as they are being held joint and severally liable for the illegal and tortious alleged against Ms. Jefferson during internal discussions amongst the defense regarding apportionment of liability. Courts have addressed similar issues in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (1979) see also United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (1975), Selsor v. Kaiser, 81 F.3d 1492 (1996), McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

 

(( @NotCraft @Kotwica @almightybounter ))

Edited by Jacob Rabinowitz

jacob ezekiel rabinowitz III, esq.
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** The Court Clerk receives a fax from the Office of Jacob E. Rabinowitz, Esq.

 

TO: Court Clerk; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson
FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq.

DATE: October 9th, 2024

RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Procedural Delays

-----

 

Judge Hockenbeyer,

 

We write today in an effort to discover the reasons for the procedural delay our client has been forced to endure. There are a number of motions that your honor has not yet ruled on and this matter seems to have stalled in pre-trial motions. It is very much our intention to litigate this matter to the fullest extent of the law. If your honor has health concerns or personal obligations that presently bar him from the ability to effectively adjudicate this matter, we would respectfully ask that the matter be transferred into the care of another judge. We make no formal request for this, but rather ask that your honor uses his best judgment to determine what is best in the interests of public justice.

 

Signed,

 

Jacob E. Rabinowitz III

Counsel for Plaintiff

(( @almightybounter ))

jacob ezekiel rabinowitz III, esq.
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(( The case is currently on hold. A continuous rule breaking has been done, including the terms of metagaming, common courtesy and such. None of the Plaintiff defending characters exist at all in the SA:MP universe and I'm currently weighting the current options that we have. If the case is decided to be nulled, it is due to the recently brought-to-my-attention fact that none of the characters exist. There are explanations to be done, and I'm currently busy and not have the necessary resources and tools at my hand to deal with it in this moment. It'll be reviewed throughout the week and/or weekend by me and get back with a decision. All the procedures are on hold. ))

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(( Update on this;

 

The case of Michelle Jefferson V Los Santos Police Department and Sheriff's Department will not be paused. Characters do not need to exist at the time of the court case being made on the forums and are only ever needed should the court case be taken in-game. There will be no rule changing and both court cases will resume as normal.

 

Slight edit to this; the only person(s) who needs to have an in-game character is the Plaintiff and Defendant. If you don't have an in-game character as either, you will not be able to take someone to court. ))

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  • izumi unlocked this topic

"Mr. Rabinowitz, the Court acknowledges the receipt of your correspondence concerning Ms. Jefferson’s pursuit of compensatory damages pegged at an extraordinary rate of $10,000 per hour. However, the Court necessitates factual evidence of the so claimed amount. The Court will have to be provided any form of employment records, income statements, or any other relevant financial documentation that can demonstrate an established pattern of earnings in amount of $10,000 per hour.

 

Sincerely,

Judge Martin Hockenbeyer"

 

@Jacob Rabinowitz

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"After considerable examination of the Defense's motion for dismissal based on sovereign immunity and the Plaintiff's response to said motion, the Court finds that the motion for dismissal cannot be granted. The Plaintiff has successfully demonstrated that exemptions under Senate Bill 025-18, more exactly Sections 3(A), (B)2, (B)3 prevent the application of sovereign immunity in this case. Additionally, the Court finds that the Defendant's motion was filed too late. Sovereign immunity, as an alternative defense, should have been raised in the initial pleadings as per the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c).

For the abovementioned reasons, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied and the case will move forward to trial."

 

 @Kotwica @Jacob Rabinowitz @NotCraft 

Edited by almightybounter
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TO: Court Clerk; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson
FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq.

DATE: October 12th, 2024

RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Proof of Income

-----

 

Judge Hockenbeyer,

 

Please see the attached deposit notice dated for October 6th, 2024 2019, specifying a deposit amount of $15,000 on this date by Michelle Jefferson to her bank account. We submit that this deposit followed immediately or shortly after receiving payment from an employer, the Octopussy Gentlemen's Club, for her services as an adult entertainment performer.

 

We intend to issue multiple subpoenas duces tecum pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 with prior authorization granted under clause (a)3 therein as attorneys admitted to practice in before this court. However, this is evidence that is relevant to the award phase of this trial and need not be received by the court at this time as the amended complaint meets the definition of a well-pleaded complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)1-3. Our pleading has made a statement of this court's jurisdiction, demonstrated entitlement to relief under various legal standards, and made a relevant demand. Any further substantiation of the amounts within the demand are subject to scrutiny within the award phase following a final judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.

 

Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq.

Counsel for Plaintiff

 

** An electronically scanned copy of the applicable deposit slip from 2019 is attached.

Edited by Jacob Rabinowitz
change year from 2024 to 2019, oops

jacob ezekiel rabinowitz III, esq.
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"Mr. Rabinowitz, the court has once again reviewed your submission of the deposit notice dated... October 6th, 2019. It only reflects a one time deposit of $15,000. While this document has been entered into the record, the Court notes that the claim in question involves an alleged hourly rate of $10,000, not a singular deposit. 

 

The submission is relevant to the potential damages, but it does not provide the consistent documentation necessary to substantiate an hourly rate of $10,000 as claimed. The Court will take it under advisement during the award phase.

 

Additionally, the Court does remind the parties that this consideration relates to the default judgment entered against the Los Santos Police Department. The issue of liability remains distinct from determination of damages those which will be addressed separately in the award phase of the case." 

 

@Jacob Rabinowitz

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"As we prepare to move forward with the trial proceedings in Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, et al., the Court asks both parties if there are any additional matters or concerns that need to be addressed before we proceed.

 

If there are any outstanding motions, requests, or issues that have yet to be raised, please do so now to ensure we move into the trial with full clarity and readiness."

 

@NotCraft @Jacob Rabinowitz @Kotwica @Userone

 

Edited by almightybounter
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“We would first like to make a record.

 

The police department bears several liability in this matter given a default judgment against them. The remaining several liability is upon the remaining defendants from whom compensation is sought.

 

This court has asserted that substantive proof of entitlement to compensatory damages has not been received. Under Fed R. Civ P. 8(a)1-3, Plaintiff has made a well-pleaded claim and is not required to substantiate award at this time. When final judgment is rendered, we intend to introduce evidence that substantiates the amount due Ms. Jefferson, including the hourly rate. In order to substantiate this, we wish to add one additional witness to our list: Mr. Adir Havshush. This person will testify to having paid Ms. Jefferson at this billable rate per hour worked.

 

With these records made, Plaintiff is ready to proceed to trial.”

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  • Tungsten changed the title to 24-CV-1034 - Trial - Jefferson vs City of Los Santos, et al.
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