almightybounter

hey risen what's Kickin homie ?

"Mr. Rabinowitz - after carefully reviewing your submission, I will address your concerns systematically to ensure that the emergent issues are clear and at the same time consistent with the legal procedure. Rule 8(a) and Discovery: Your current reliance on Rule 8(a) is acknowledged and indeed a well-pleaded complaint must first meet the standard of stating a claim upon which relief can be granted. Howsoever, the current evidence you refer to is irrelevant at this state for the sole fact that it relates to damages. Even if the primary concern of the trial at hand is liability, the court reserves the right to request all the relevant documentation to make sure that both liability and potential damages are definitely properly substantiated. It is not unusual for the courts to seek clarity during the pre-trial phase, however-and particularly if there are gaps in the evidence presented that may influence the flow of the trial or any settlement discussions. More so ever, Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do require a full and timely disclosure of evidence, including that which will be used to substantiate all the damages. Delaying or withholding key information until post-trial does not align with the disclosure obligations that we have at hand. Procedural Timelines and Allegations of Delay: You have stated that the court has delayed proceedings and improperly balanced its judgment towards the Defense. I must remind you that any delays were the result of necessary procedural deliberations and course not due to any intent to obstruct the case at hand. It is and always has been critical for the Court to ensure that all elements of the current case are carefully considered in the interest of Justice. Your allegations that this Court has acted inappropriately by following procedure are unfounded and I can assure you, Mr. Rabinowitz, that the court's actions are consistent with both the law and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As you have previously stated (related to the decisions that you have taken in regards of Appeals), any appeals or assertions regarding bias should be based on objective and demonstrable evidence rather than perceived grievances. Admissibility of Post-Trial Witnesses Your so-to-be request that new witnesses be introduced post-trial to testify to Ms. Jefferson's alleged rate is to be noted that: introducing new witnesses during the post-trial phase and especially if their testimony pertains to key facts that should have been established during the trial itself is not permitted. In your own submissions, you acknowledge that this witness's testimony relates to compensatory damages. Do you see the drift that this is taking, Mr. Rabinowitz? If such testimony is indeed critical to proving Ms. Jefferson's claims, it should have been brought forward during discovery. Mr. Rabinowitz, as you may clearly be aware of, introducing new witnesses after a verdict has been reached undermines the integrity of the trial process. As such, your request for post-trial witness testimony on damages at the end of the trial will be denied at this stage. Claims of Bias and Improper Admonishment You have raised concerns about perceived bias and improper conduct on the Court's side, particularly with respect to comments made on the record. I have to remind you, Mr. Rabinowitz, that the role of this Court is to remain neutral and ensure that proceedings are however conducted fairly. With everything being clarified so far, we are ready to move to trial. Plaintiff, you may begin with your opening statements." (( @Jacob Rabinowitz @Kotwica ))

“Mr. Wright and Mr. Rabinowitz, I see your latest submissions not only as a persistent misapprehension about this Court’s past processes but also as an unfortunate departure from the usual practice. To start with, Mr. Wright, you contend that having to comply with subpoenas is a hurdle in proceeding to the trial because they are integral in your theory of the case. However, as I have already pointed out, this should not have been the case as the discovery process, including subpoenas, should have been completed prior to the commencement of the trial. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 US Codes or Policies and Standards, requires that all necessary information be provided ahead of the court’s hearing, while the same rules, 16(f), allow this court to impose sanctions for failure to adhere to rules of the same section. This court will also not extend the dates of trial to allow you time to get ready or to cover the discovery stage as matters should have been ‘timed’ correctly. Also, according to you, going to trial would further exacerbate the harm to the defense in that the findings which would be obtained from permitting such subpoenas would be of little use. But, the defense has been in default and cannot suffer prejudice by findings that could have been sought in the course of discovery. This is not supported by any evidence. The Federal Rules leave no room for doubt – Discovery is not wide opened in the midst of a trial – Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) provides for a hearing on damages after default and to wit, a default has already been entered. Moreover, your assertion that this matter is still within the stage of pre-trial discovery is also wrong, and it is an indication of a lack of comprehension of the order of events and the stage of the proceedings in this trial. This Court has fixed a timetable for the trial. This period has elapsed for the purposes of discovery. You cannot disobey the orders of this Court and then contend that you have a right to cause more delay in the case. Now, with respect to your request regarding the negligence theory of the Court, you say this is a ‘new legal issue’. I have to say this to you – negligence law has been developed in detail in the United States of America due to its common law system, and this Court does not embrace a new idea in relation to such a fundamental legal concept. The standard principles of negligence – duty, breach, causation, and damages – are what will be applied here. This is simply wrong and evil. How can the accused be allowed to even argue such a thing? It suggests either an active attempt to mislead the court or ignorance of principles that are very basic in law practice. Also for your reference, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N. Y. 339 (1928) remains an important decision that is usually cited for the holding that a tort is actionable only if it was reasonable to foresee in determining the extent of duty owed by the defendant. One would expect no less of your proposals to this court which are rather more provocative then most attempts in asking the courts to abandon established law. Now, let’s focus on Mr. Rabinowitz’s rejoinder. You still maintained a position that your assertion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) is that of a well pleaded complaint as it does not obligate you to prove the claim for damages until after the judgment has been pronounced. While this complement is correct in a normative sense that a complaint is only required to state a plausible case for relief, it does not relieve you from the duty to adduce evidence once default judgment has been granted against the defendant. According to Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts have the power to require evidence of the amount of the damages claimed. The standards set by this rule can certainly not be satisfied with your bare averments as to hourly rates and your vague estimates as to the amount of compensation that you sought. In addition, the manner in which you attempted to procure the evidence of the additional witness at this late stage ought to have been procured in good time and should have been avoided since it goes to the disorganized strategy you have taken with these court proceedings. This Court made scheduling orders at a preliminary stage and case management order as per rule 16(b) may only be altered for good cause shown. Delay in naming the witnesses which was clearly a consequence of your failure to prepare for quite a simple case does not qualify as good cause. I dare say both of you need to remember that when this case began, I specifically told you that I would not allow you to represent the Plaintiff pro bono because you do not seem to be organized, prepared or prompt enough. Unfortunately, it appears that these worries have indeed been vindicated during the course of this trial. The same allegations as regards the non-compliance to the orders and scheduling of the Court have been made against you all the time and your persistently twisted understanding and application of the law and procedural concepts only reflect back on your client’s image. Now, to bring everything together for the purpose of making the record clearer: Subpoenas were supposed to be issued during the period of the discovery process. The fact that you have not done so will not further ait the trial. Liability and damages are two distinct questions of law, and it has already been established as a matter of default that the Los Santos Police Department is the one that bears liability. What this Court has to deal with is the measure of damages which you have not been able to prove satisfactorily so far. No new witnesses will be allowed during this period unless a valid reason has been given for why the witness was not presented earlier. This Court will not entertain any further interruptions to the trial schedule owing to your lack of readiness for the trial. Last but not least, I would like to take this opportunity to say to you, let us begin with an admonition: You do not want to disregard this Court’s order, or fail to comply with the rules of the procedure, or advance idiotic legal theories. If you do so, it will not be a problem for me to use the sanctions allowed by Fed . R. Civ. P. 11 which deals with absurd and improper litigations. Court rooms such as this one are governed by norms of order and decorum, as well as the expectation that you will practice such conduct." @Kotwica @Jacob Rabinowitz

“With respect to your concerns Mr. Wright, I shall try to respond to them in the following manner. To begin with, in regards to the issue of subpoenas which you have raised several times, the Court has already taken note of your intention to file subpoenas on a number of times. But the issuance of subpoenas coupled with the pre-trial stage have not affected our ability to proceed with this trial. Certainly sufficient efforts should have been made to issue the subpoenas as part of your case in the discovery phase. The trial proceeds and now, all subpoenas are to be dealt with in the context of the trial. The Court will in response to your numerous notices of intention to file subpoena plaits not postpone the trial any further. Secondly, with respect to the Court’s differences between liability and damages, this is not a novel or difficult concept. Liability means the part which seeks an answer to the question; was the Defendant in Tort who caused tortious harm. Damages are distinct, and are only considered once the legal liability has been established. Once liability is established we are then concerned with the determination of the quantum of liability the Plaintiff is to be paid. There are two steps to this process; we do not award damages without first establishing liability. You do not need to ask for any clarification on this point as it is trite and applicable to all tort law situations. Also, let me remind you that a default judgment has already been made against the Defendant, which is the Los Santos Police Department, for not responding at first. Let us come back to this competency and explain its significance for understanding the context: For Jefferson, the LSPD is liable for the claims advanced by the plaintiff. The current activities relate to assessing the damages to be awarded. I have, however, proposed that the plaintiff explain why he should be allowed to claim as much as 10,000 dollars an hour in the present circumstances. So far evidence is scant that explains the rationality of this demand. Supporting documentation is not sufficient: when you provide a single deposit slip dated 2019-all these materials do not correspond to the level of evidentiary support required to maintain your client's claims for so-called ongoing damages at the amount of 10,000 dollars an hour. Should you want to support their particulars in the way that they devised it, but in the proportionality that they require a considerable amount of strong and unitary evidence. Last but not least, as for the distribution of damages should the plaintiff win the case, this will be determined by the amount of evidence the parties provide during the trial. The Court will assess compensatory damages from losses or harms established by the Plaintiff and if applicable may award punitive damages. The distribution will be made in accordance with the established legal practice with taking into account the circumstances of harm, the Plaintiff’s material and case law applicable in this case.” @Kotwica

"Very well so. The Court is now in session, and we are officially commencing the trial in the matter of Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, et al., Case Number 24-CV-1034. Both the Plaintiff and Defense are instructed to prepare their opening statements and be ready to present their respective cases. Plaintiff, you may begin whenever ready." @Kotwica @Jacob Rabinowitz @NotCraft

* Martin Hockenbeyer strolls into the courtroom, scanning the room and beginning to speak. "Good morning. I see that the case was previously adjudicated and an order was issued awarding damages to the Plaintiff. How are we getting along with that? Plaintiff, you may approach the bench." @Kotwica

Michelle Jefferson Plaintiff, vs. City of Los Santos, Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzales, Sheriff of the County of Los Santos, Roderick H. Hayward, in their official position, Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low, in their individual and official position Defendants. Case No.: 24-CV-1034 INTERIM ORDER CUSTODIAL PROVISIONS IN RESPECT OF THE DEFENSE’S FAILURE IN REPLY AND A NOTICE OF POTENTIAL DEFAULT JUDGEMENT The Defense counsel has been defaulting in complying with this Court's orders and in taking part in the proceedings, the Court notes with concern. Despite this continuing situation from the Defense, where no arguments have been offered, this Court is forced to make a decision regarding what is to be done as is provided for under the Constitution of the United States of America, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures as well as the law. The Court admits that there are two potential courses of action as already indicated in the beginning; Even in the event where the Defense is silent, the Court has the option of going on with the trial. Still, in light of the present circumstances where the Defense does not take any active step, it would all the same lead to a lopsided proceeding, foregoing any contest to the Plaintiff’s claims. Even though this enables the Plaintiff to have the opportunity and present her case in full, it is still subverts the essence of an equitable jousting system whereby a Defense fails to show up. The alternative within which the Court can act under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the awarding of the judgment in favour of the Plaintiff and this is called default judgment. There are no circumstances under which a default judgment can be issued except where one party fails to meet the deadline complying, or participating in a trimming process issued out by the Court. Due to the non-intervention of the said action by the Defense, such a judgment is sure to hold the Defendants liable automatically, the only issue fetching about being the issue of damages liable. Given the situation, this Court is more likely than not to issue the default judgment by the end of the specified court date if no substantial ground is shown by the Defense. As the Plaintiff has adduced evidence in compliance with her orders from this Court, it would be unreasonable to keep stalling the matter further because of the inertia of the Defense. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED: Last and final extension is given to the Defense to communicate with the Court through a outline made and filed within two days from the date of this Order. Otherwise in the event that this time is elapsed without any action on this response from the Defense, the Court will move ahead and enter a default judgment against the Defense who is evading the Plaintiff. In the event a punitive order is given in this regard, the Plaintiff will in the award stage of the proceedings be required to give sufficient evidence to prove her loss assessed in monetary terms including loss of earning capacity discussed above. If the Defense fails to do so, any further defense will be waived, and the Court will do as it considers appropriate in accordance with Rule 55 and the law. SO ORDERED. Honorable Martin Hockenbeyer Dated 16-10-2024; @Jacob Rabinowitz @Kotwica @Userone @NotCraft

“Mr. Wright, your recent comments against this Court cannot only be described as improper but distasteful. Let me say this quite clearly: there is no magistrate in this Court who is willing to tolerate such disrespect from any advocate, however passionately they argue for their case. As an advocate, you are required to sponsor the arguments of your client — not undermine the respect of the Court or disturb the proceedings in an arranged manner. This court has no time for blame games. Now, concerning your complaints, let us get to them apropos. First, you claim that the Court raised some issues that were in favor of the Defense. This is a very serious violation of this Court’s role. It is not within the province of this Court to be asked to ‘advocate’ for anyone in this case. The role of the Court is to rule and administer law that exists as is. Why would you make such outrageous accusations? If your case is valid then it will be proven valid and the legal boundaries will not be crossed in such idiotic pronouncements. The Court also questions its jurisdiction even over matters which have to be determined. Let me recall a well known fact for you, Mr. Wright, that nothing precludes the Court from formulating its position on the merits of the case which it exercises last for legal and factual justifications, especially when justice so dictates. There will be no hurry and pressure in the pursuance of that process in this Court. As an aside, with regard to your citation of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, I must say that the plausibility standard is available where pleadings are being evaluated, however, this particular weakness with regard to this stage of the litigation does not relieve you of the burden of proving your claims at the right time. This looks like a deposit slip that you are sure is relevant but stands alone and is worlds away from satisfying the egregious damage that is sought if any at all. One financial paper such as one from the year 2019 is grossly insufficient, and it is quite clear why that is the case. As you have pointed out, subpoenas may provide more insight into the issue, but until that time, the value of the evidence that you present is questionable. Let us consider the topics of liability and damages. Yes, you are right. A defendant in a court case cannot be held liable in damages simpliciter without having been first found liable. The statement of the Court was aimed at stressing the two-fold aspect in which liability is the precursor to the award of damages. These are basic tenets on tort. Should this particular idea be hard to comprehend, I would recommend going back to the provisions on tort litigation. To conclude, your comments regarding the consideration of "consideration" have no bearing. The Court did not use the term contemplation in the context of breach of contract claim. Rather it was used in the meaning of the process or thought about something. This is quite right and proper for the situation in which it was employed. I think it will be better for you not to seek to antagonize this Court on matters of definitions of legal terms. Mr. Wright, let this serve as a final warning: Such behavior will be dealt with in accordance with this Court’s Policy and any further not only disrespectful actions on your part or that of any member of your team will not be tolerated. This Court requires all counsels to observe absolute decorum and respect, and any such contrary conduct shall attract sanctions. If you think that I would withdraw my arguments, there is no such possibility in this court because everyone is bound by order, respect, and law. Don’t confuse your duty as an attorney with a free hand to disturb these proceedings. Defense, are there any requests or motions before we proceed into trial with this case?” @Kotwica @NotCraft

"As we prepare to move forward with the trial proceedings in Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, et al., the Court asks both parties if there are any additional matters or concerns that need to be addressed before we proceed. If there are any outstanding motions, requests, or issues that have yet to be raised, please do so now to ensure we move into the trial with full clarity and readiness." @NotCraft @Jacob Rabinowitz @Kotwica @Userone

"Mr. Rabinowitz, the court has once again reviewed your submission of the deposit notice dated... October 6th, 2019. It only reflects a one time deposit of $15,000. While this document has been entered into the record, the Court notes that the claim in question involves an alleged hourly rate of $10,000, not a singular deposit. The submission is relevant to the potential damages, but it does not provide the consistent documentation necessary to substantiate an hourly rate of $10,000 as claimed. The Court will take it under advisement during the award phase. Additionally, the Court does remind the parties that this consideration relates to the default judgment entered against the Los Santos Police Department. The issue of liability remains distinct from determination of damages those which will be addressed separately in the award phase of the case." @Jacob Rabinowitz

"After considerable examination of the Defense's motion for dismissal based on sovereign immunity and the Plaintiff's response to said motion, the Court finds that the motion for dismissal cannot be granted. The Plaintiff has successfully demonstrated that exemptions under Senate Bill 025-18, more exactly Sections 3(A), (B)2, (B)3 prevent the application of sovereign immunity in this case. Additionally, the Court finds that the Defendant's motion was filed too late. Sovereign immunity, as an alternative defense, should have been raised in the initial pleadings as per the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c). For the abovementioned reasons, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied and the case will move forward to trial." @Kotwica @Jacob Rabinowitz @NotCraft

"Mr. Rabinowitz, the Court acknowledges the receipt of your correspondence concerning Ms. Jefferson’s pursuit of compensatory damages pegged at an extraordinary rate of $10,000 per hour. However, the Court necessitates factual evidence of the so claimed amount. The Court will have to be provided any form of employment records, income statements, or any other relevant financial documentation that can demonstrate an established pattern of earnings in amount of $10,000 per hour. Sincerely, Judge Martin Hockenbeyer" @Jacob Rabinowitz

(( REF: https://community.ls-rp.com/forums/topic/19539-michelle-jefferson-vs-los-santos-police-department/?do=findComment&comment=190783 )) (( Case is currently on hold. ))

(( The case is currently on hold. A continuous rule breaking has been done, including the terms of metagaming, common courtesy and such. None of the Plaintiff defending characters exist at all in the SA:MP universe and I'm currently weighting the current options that we have. If the case is decided to be nulled, it is due to the recently brought-to-my-attention fact that none of the characters exist. There are explanations to be done, and I'm currently busy and not have the necessary resources and tools at my hand to deal with it in this moment. It'll be reviewed throughout the week and/or weekend by me and get back with a decision. All the procedures are on hold. ))

MICHELLE JEFFERSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LOS SANTOS, ALEXANDER BLAIR, LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT, SAMUEL GONZALEZ, and AMBER MOORE, Defendants. Case No.: 24-CV-1034 ORDER GRANTING DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS ALEXANDER BLAIR, LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT, SAMUEL GONZALEZ, AND AMBER MOORE ORDER This matter is presented before the Court on the Plaintiff, Michelle Jefferson’s, Motion for Default Judgment directed at Defendants Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzalez, both in his individual and official capacities, and Amber Moore, likewise in her individual and official capacities. These Defendants were duly served with the Complaint, yet have neglected to respond or mount a defense within the timeframe mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A. Rule 55 Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 empowers a plaintiff to seek a default judgment when a defendant has failed to timely respond to the action. Following the entry of default, the Court is authorized to render judgment in favor of the plaintiff, provided that the absence of a response is not attributable to excusable neglect, and the plaintiff's claims are substantiated by adequate evidence. B. Service and Failure to Respond The Court has meticulously examined the case file and verifies that Defendants Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzalez, and Amber Moore were served in strict compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Defendants were afforded a reasonable period to respond to the complaint, yet no response or appearance has been recorded within the stipulated timeframe. C. Liability and Damages Upon the establishment of default, the well-pleaded factual assertions within the complaint, excluding those related to the determination of damages, are accepted as accurate. Nevertheless, the Court must evaluate the sufficiency of the allegations and confirm the legal validity of the Plaintiff’s claims. In this instance, the assertions against the Defendants appear to be sufficiently corroborated by the documentation on file. Given that a default judgment constitutes a severe remedy, the Court shall arrange a hearing to ascertain the extent of damages and any other suitable relief to which the Plaintiff may be entitled. The Plaintiff is instructed to present evidence concerning the specific damages sought in this instance. D. Conclusion In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED: The Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment against Defendants Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzalez, and Amber Moore is GRANTED with respect to liability. A hearing to determine damages is scheduled for 07/10/2024. The Plaintiff is to provide evidence of damages within six days following this Order. SO ORDERED. Dated: 04/10/2024 Hon. Martin Hockenbeyer (( @Kotwica @Jacob Rabinowitz ))

Order Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment The Court considered Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Opposition. After reviewing the evidence and applicable law, the Court finds genuine disputes of material fact that preclude summary judgment. I. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate only when there's no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court must view the evidence favorably to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. II. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact The following material factual disputes exist: Probable Cause: The parties disagree about whether probable cause existed for Plaintiff's arrests and citations. Contributory Negligence: Defendants assert contributory negligence, but Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of this defense. Exigent Circumstances and Lawful Search: Defendants claim the search of Plaintiff's property was lawful due to exigent circumstances, which Plaintiff disputes. Restrictions on Public Assembly: Plaintiff questions the constitutionality of restrictions imposed on her public assembly. Ill Will or Malice: Defendants deny ill will or malice, but Plaintiff alleges such conduct. Conclusion These factual disputes require resolution at trial. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The parties should proceed with discovery to prepare for trial. SO ORDERED. 03.10.2024, Hon. Judge Hockenbeyer (( @Kotwica @NotCraft ))

“The Court has reviewed the filings from both parties regarding the timing of the Defense’s Reply Brief and the Plaintiff’s subsequent motion for default judgment. I) It is noted that the Defense filed its reply brief after the deadline of September 30th, 2024, as ordered by the Court. While the Defense’s response was indeed filed late, the delay appears to have been a matter of a few hours and not a significant or willful disregard for the Court’s deadline. Given that this is not a case of prolonged delay or bad faith on the part of the Defense, the Court finds that default judgment under Rule 55 is not warranted in this instance. The lateness of the filing does not, in itself, result in undue prejudice to the Plaintiff or significantly impact the progression of the case. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is denied. II) The Defense has requested summary judgment based on the arguments presented in their reply brief. While the Court acknowledges the Defense’s position, fairness requires that the Plaintiff be given the opportunity to respond to the Defense’s motion for summary judgment. The issues at hand—particularly involving questions of probable cause, First and Fourth Amendment rights, and contributory negligence—are significant and require thorough examination of both parties’ arguments. Therefore, the Court grants the Plaintiff the opportunity to file a response to the Defense’s motion for summary judgment. The Plaintiff is given three (3) days from the date of this ruling to submit their response, after which the Court will evaluate both the Defense’s motion and the Plaintiff’s counterarguments before rendering a decision on summary judgment. The Court seeks to ensure that the case is resolved based on a full consideration of the facts and arguments from both sides, without resorting to procedural shortcuts. As such, the request for default judgment is denied, but the Plaintiff’s right to respond is upheld to maintain fairness in these proceedings.” Signed, Judge Hockenbeyer

"After reviewing the request for a five-day continuance submitted by counsel for the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department (LSSD), as well as the Plaintiff's response, the Court has carefully considered the interests of both parties. While I understand the Defense's need for time to gather information and fully respond, the Plaintiff’s point regarding the timely resolution of this case and the prior internal investigation conducted by LSSD is well-taken. It's important to ensure that proceedings continue without undue delay. Therefore, in the interest of fairness and to maintain the orderly flow of litigation, I am granting the Defense an additional three (3) days beyond the original deadline. The Defense must file its reply brief on or before September 30th, 2024. This extension should provide adequate time for the Defense to conduct its review and prepare its response while preventing unnecessary delays in the discovery process. This extension is granted with the understanding that no further delays will be permitted unless exceptional circumstances arise." Signed, Judge Hockenbeyer (( @NotCraft @Jacob Rabinowitz ))

"Thank you, counsel. In the interest of efficiency and to ensure a smooth progression of this case, I direct the Defense to respond to the Plaintiff's amended civil case brief within 3 business days. Regarding the subpoenas duces tecum, I will allow them to be filed collectively for efficiency, provided they are organized and clearly identify the witnesses and the documents requested. This will help expedite the discovery process. If any issues arise from the subpoenas, we can address them at the upcoming discovery conference." (( @Kotwica @John Gilbane @nfr.ai @Userone ))

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department Case No: 24-CV-1034 ORDER REGARDING NCSUD RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR ADDITION OF COUNSEL The Court acknowledges the submission by Meredith A. Farnsworth on behalf of the National Council for Sustainable Urban Development (NCSUD) in response to the Court’s prior ruling on the Motion for Addition of Counsel. The NCSUD expresses concerns that the ongoing legal proceedings could negatively affect the administration of city resources, infrastructure projects, and urban development initiatives. The Court has carefully considered the concerns raised by the NCSUD and appreciates the broader context of urban governance and city development in which this case unfolds. RULING: The Court recognizes the importance of balancing the Plaintiff's constitutional right to adequate legal representation with the practical needs of the City of Los Santos and the ongoing infrastructure projects. However, it is fundamental that constitutional rights, particularly the right to counsel, take precedence in matters of legal adjudication. While the strain on municipal resources may be a legitimate concern, it cannot be used to limit or undermine the Plaintiff's access to justice. Civil rights litigation, by its nature, often challenges existing governmental structures, and the resulting impact on municipal operations is not uncommon. These proceedings are critical to ensuring accountability, and the legal system must be prepared to accommodate these challenges, even if they create temporary burdens on city governance. The NCSUD asserts that the Court has dismissed its concerns as "speculative" and failed to appreciate the potential impacts on urban planning. This characterization misinterprets the Court's ruling. The Court did not ignore these concerns but determined that they are, in this case, secondary to the constitutional rights at issue. The Court is aware of the interconnected nature of legal challenges and city administration. However, any potential delays or resource allocation shifts related to urban development do not outweigh the Plaintiff's right to a full and fair trial, which includes the ability to appoint and supplement legal counsel. Furthermore, the Court is confident that the City of Los Santos can manage its legal obligations alongside its urban development agenda. The NCSUD argues that prioritizing civil rights claims could set a dangerous precedent for obstructing city functions. The Court, however, views this case as falling squarely within the long-established legal framework that protects the right to counsel in civil rights litigation, particularly against government agencies. Courts across the country have routinely held that constitutional protections must not be compromised for administrative convenience. Urban development is essential, but it is equally critical to ensure that city institutions operate within the bounds of the law, including respecting the rights of individuals to challenge governmental action through litigation. Civil rights claims are inherently public interest matters, and this Court is committed to upholding that principle. The Court appreciates the NCSUD's vigilance in protecting the interests of the City of Los Santos, but the potential administrative or budgetary strain cannot justify limiting the Plaintiff’s fundamental rights. The addition of counsel, as previously ruled, is both warranted and necessary for the proper adjudication of this case. The Court will continue to monitor this case closely to ensure that the proceedings move forward efficiently. However, the balancing of constitutional rights and municipal concerns has already been considered, and the Court will not reconsider its prior ruling at this time. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: September 20, 2024 JUDGE: Hon. Martin Hockenbeyer Superior Court of Los Santos (( @Lutica ))

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department Case No: 24-CV-1034 ORDER ON REQUEST FOR RECESS PENDING STRATEGY MEETING AND ADDITIONAL PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCES The Court has received a request from Mr. Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq., counsel for the Plaintiff, seeking a recess to allow for a strategy conference and the filing of an amended complaint that will include additional plaintiffs and revised statutory claims. The Court acknowledges the Plaintiff's intention to amend the complaint and the need for coordination with potential additional plaintiffs. RULING: The Court finds that the request for a recess is reasonable in light of the significant developments proposed by Plaintiff's counsel, including the drafting and filing of an amended complaint, and the necessity of serving notice upon the newly added plaintiffs. However, this Court is also mindful of its duty to ensure that the litigation proceeds in a timely and orderly manner. While the Court will grant a short recess, it will not allow any undue delays that might prejudice either party or disrupt the court's docket. The recess is granted under the following conditions: Plaintiff's counsel shall file the amended complaint no later than 3 business days from the date of this Order. Plaintiff’s counsel must serve notice to all additional plaintiffs within 2 business days after the filing of the amended complaint, and file a certificate of service with the Court. Plaintiff's counsel shall engage in any necessary pre-trial conferences and submit a status report to the Court within 3 business days. The recess shall not interfere with the overall pre-trial schedule, and the parties are expected to adhere to all existing deadlines unless otherwise modified by Court order. This Court reiterates the importance of maintaining efficient and fair proceedings. Plaintiff’s counsel is reminded that while the addition of new plaintiffs and statutory claims is within their rights, the process must not result in unnecessary delays. Any further requests for extensions must be fully justified with specific reasons. Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby grants Plaintiff's request for a recess under the stated conditions. Both parties should continue to be prepared for trial in accordance with the modified schedule once the amended complaint is filed. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: 20 September, 2024 JUDGE: Hon. Martin Hockenbeyer Superior Court of Los Santos (( @Jacob Rabinowitz ))

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department Case No: 24-CV-1034 ORDER ON MOTION FOR ADDITION OF COUNSEL AND RESPONSE BY NCSUD This Court has reviewed the Motion for Addition of Counsel submitted by Mr. Donald J. Wright and Mr. Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, as well as the response submitted by counsel for the National Council for Sustainable Urban Development (NCSUD), Ms. Meredith A. Farnsworth, regarding concerns about urban development and its potential impact on city planning initiatives in Los Santos. RULING: First and foremost, this Court recognizes the constitutional right of the Plaintiff, Michelle Jefferson, to appoint counsel of her choosing. This right is enshrined in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and further protected by 28 U.S.C. § 1654, as well as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44. The Court of Appeals, Second District, has already provided clear guidance in its recent order, granting the interlocutory appeal and confirming that the Plaintiff has a fundamental right to add counsel to her legal team. There is no legal or procedural basis for this Court to deny the Plaintiff’s right to appoint additional counsel. This Court is bound by the appellate decision, which explicitly confirmed that denying the Motion for Addition of Counsel without proper justification would constitute an abuse of discretion. The concerns raised by NCSUD, while relevant to broader public interest, do not directly pertain to the legal merits of this case. NCSUD asserts that the addition of counsel could delay ongoing urban development projects, including zoning ordinances and transportation initiatives in Los Santos. While the Court acknowledges the importance of these urban planning initiatives, NCSUD’s concerns are speculative in nature and do not constitute valid legal grounds to interfere with the Plaintiff’s right to appoint counsel. The Plaintiff’s civil rights claims and the legal proceedings related thereto have no demonstrated or factual connection to the city’s infrastructure programs. NCSUD has failed to provide any concrete evidence that suggests how adding counsel to the Plaintiff’s legal team will materially impact the city’s development projects. As such, these concerns, while noted, are legally irrelevant to the issue before the Court. Furthermore, the reference to City of Avalon v. Community Land Trust is inapposite. That case involved specific legal matters related to land use and zoning disputes, which are not at issue here. This case concerns civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and any potential delays caused by legal strategies do not present a sufficient basis to override the Plaintiff's right to counsel. This Court is entrusted with safeguarding the constitutional rights of all litigants, including the right to counsel. The procedural integrity of this litigation must be maintained, and it is the role of this Court to ensure that the Plaintiff can adequately represent her claims, particularly in a civil rights case of this nature. The potential impact on municipal infrastructure, as raised by NCSUD, falls outside the scope of this Court’s adjudication in the present matter. This Court’s duty is to ensure a fair trial and to protect the constitutional and statutory rights of the parties involved. Urban planning concerns cannot and should not be used as a tool to restrict these fundamental rights. Based on the foregoing: The Plaintiff’s Motion for Addition of Counsel is hereby GRANTED. The Plaintiff shall have the right to appoint Mr. Donald J. Wright and Mr. Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, or any other counsel of her choosing, to represent her in this matter. The concerns raised by NCSUD regarding urban development projects in Los Santos are not grounds for denying the Plaintiff's motion, as they are speculative and unrelated to the legal issues before this Court. This Court will proceed to trial while ensuring that the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights are fully protected. Any future motions or objections must be grounded in applicable law and facts directly relevant to this case. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: September 20, 2024 JUDGE: Hon. Martin Hockenbeyer Superior Court of Los Santos

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department Case No: 24-CV-1034 ORDER FOLLOWING THE COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING ON INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION The Plaintiff, Michelle Jefferson, filed an interlocutory appeal regarding this court's prior denial of the Motion for Addition of Counsel and subsequent denial of a Motion to Stay. On September 20, 2024, the Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division One, issued an order granting the Plaintiff's appeal and issuing a permanent injunction. The appellate court determined that this court's prior actions constituted an abuse of discretion, specifically concerning the Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as outlined under 28 U.S.C. §1654 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44. The Court of Appeals found that the Plaintiff has an absolute right to appoint, supplement, or dismiss counsel at her discretion. The appellate court concluded that no factual basis existed to support limiting Plaintiff's right to additional counsel, and no objective risk of prejudice, delay, or confusion was established. Furthermore, the appellate court issued a permanent injunction preventing this court from imposing restrictions on the Plaintiff’s right to appoint counsel. ORDER: This court acknowledges and complies with the Court of Appeals’ ruling dated September 20, 2024, in Case No. B19736. This court will no longer restrict or deny the Plaintiff's right to appoint additional counsel in this matter. All prior orders limiting or denying such counsel are vacated. Pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ permanent injunction, this court is enjoined from imposing any further restrictions or limitations on the Plaintiff’s right to appoint additional counsel. The Plaintiff may continue to appoint, supplement, or dismiss counsel at her sole discretion, in accordance with her constitutional rights and the governing statutes. This court will continue to exercise its duty to manage the docket in a manner that preserves the orderly administration of justice. However, in compliance with the appellate ruling, any concerns related to potential conflicts, confusion, or delay must be addressed through appropriate procedural motions and hearings rather than preemptive restrictions on counsel. This court is bound by the appellate court’s decision and will ensure that the Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment rights are fully safeguarded. The Plaintiff is entitled to representation by the counsel of her choosing, and this court will facilitate the fair and timely progression of the case within these constraints. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: September 20, 2024 Judge: Martin Hockenbeyer Superior Court of San Andreas

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department Case No: 24-CV-1034 ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson has filed a Motion to Compel Production of Evidence, specifically requesting the production of bodycam and dash cam footage from Officer Sergeant Amber Moore. The Plaintiff alleges that these materials are crucial to the case and that multiple discovery requests submitted on various dates have gone unanswered by the Los Santos Police Department (LSPD). The Plaintiff now seeks a court order compelling the production of this evidence. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery is permitted for materials that are relevant to any party's claim or defense. The court acknowledges that bodycam and dash cam footage from Sergeant Amber Moore may contain information pertinent to the incidents in question and may be material to the Plaintiff’s case. Therefore, the requested evidence appears to meet the threshold for relevance under discovery rules. The Plaintiff has submitted evidence (Exhibit A) showing formal discovery requests were made on specific dates. Exhibits B and C indicate attempts to follow up with the LSPD and resolve the matter without court intervention. The court finds that the Plaintiff has complied with the procedural requirements to seek discovery and has made reasonable efforts to obtain the requested materials without involving the court. The Defendant, LSPD, has not provided the requested evidence or responded to the discovery requests, nor has it submitted any objection or motion for a protective order to this court. Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(a), a party is obligated to either comply with discovery requests or formally object within a specified period. Failure to do so may result in the court compelling the production of evidence. The court must also consider the Defendant's position, including any possible justifications for non-production, such as privacy concerns, ongoing investigations, or claims of privilege. Since the LSPD has not responded or articulated any objections to this court, these factors cannot be weighed in the current motion. However, should the LSPD provide legitimate reasons for non-compliance, the court remains open to reconsideration of this order. Based on the information presented, the court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to the production of the requested evidence. The Defendant, Los Santos Police Department, is hereby ORDERED to produce the following evidence within 3 days of this order: Bodycam footage from Sergeant Amber Moore, including all recordings related to incidents occurring on August 17, 23, 26, 28, 30, and September 2, 9, 10, 12, and 14. Dash cam footage from the police vehicle occupied by Sergeant Amber Moore, including all recordings related to incidents occurring on August 17, 23, 26, 28, 30, and September 2, 9, 10, 12, and 14. Failure to comply with this order may result in sanctions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b), which may include but are not limited to adverse inferences, exclusion of evidence, or monetary penalties. The LSPD retains the right to object to this order by submitting a written response within 2 days if there are substantial grounds for withholding the requested evidence, including claims of privilege or other justifiable reasons. Should such objections be filed, the court will schedule a hearing to address these concerns. So Ordered. Dated: September 19, 2024 Judge: Martin Hockenbeyer Superior Court of San Andreas (( @nfr.ai @John Gilbane ))

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department Case No: 24-CV-1034 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING APPEAL The court has reviewed the Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal submitted by Mr. Donald J. Wright and Mr. Jacob E. Rabinowitz III. The movants argue that the denial of their previous motion to act as co-counsel for the Plaintiff constitutes an abuse of discretion and warrants an interlocutory appeal. They further assert that this court's decision deprived the Plaintiff of her right to counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The movants seek to stay the current proceedings pending the outcome of an appeal to the appellate court. The court reiterates its previous determination that it possesses the inherent authority to manage the proceedings before it in a manner that ensures fairness, orderliness, and efficiency. The authority to manage cases includes regulating the participation of counsel to prevent potential conflicts, confusion, or delays, as supported by long-standing principles of judicial administration. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-631 (1962) ("The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an 'inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases"). The court recognizes the Plaintiff's right to be represented by counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which provides that parties may plead and conduct their cases personally or by counsel. This right, however, does not extend to an absolute entitlement to an unlimited number of attorneys or co-counsel. Courts have discretion to limit the participation of counsel when necessary to maintain the efficient and fair administration of justice. Here, the court's decision was made in the context of managing the procedural posture of this litigation, ensuring that the introduction of additional counsel does not unnecessarily complicate or delay the proceedings. This action falls within the court's discretionary authority and does not infringe upon the Plaintiff's fundamental right to counsel. The movants contend that the denial of the motion for additional counsel constitutes a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, thus warranting an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). However, an interlocutory appeal is an exception rather than the norm, reserved for "extraordinary circumstances" where immediate appeal may "materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 921 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990). The court finds that this case does not present such exceptional circumstances. The central issue concerns the court's discretion in managing its docket, not a novel or complex question of law that would alter the course of the litigation in a manner requiring immediate appellate intervention. Movants argue that denying the stay would result in irreparable harm to the Plaintiff's ability to have effective representation. This assertion is speculative and unsubstantiated. The Plaintiff is currently represented by competent counsel, and the denial of additional counsel does not impair her ability to pursue her claims or defenses. The court's decision was made with the explicit consideration of avoiding undue prejudice or delay. Furthermore, the possibility of success on appeal is not sufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm, as courts require a showing of concrete and immediate injury to justify a stay of proceedings. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (A party seeking a stay must demonstrate that irreparable injury is "likely in the absence of an injunction"). The movants mischaracterize this court’s reference to Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936), suggesting the court erroneously relied on it to justify a sua sponte stay. The court did not cite Landis to justify its discretion in staying proceedings but rather to demonstrate its inherent power in managing complex litigation. The court has acted within the bounds of its authority to ensure orderly proceedings, and the refusal to permit additional counsel was grounded in a careful assessment of the potential impact on case management. The movants’ reliance on alleged procedural errors to support an interlocutory appeal is unavailing, as this court's decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious. While movants suggest that the court lacks jurisdiction to prevent the filing of an interlocutory appeal, it is within this court's discretion to deny a stay pending such an appeal. An interlocutory appeal is not automatic, and the court's order does not foreclose the appellate court's review. However, granting a stay is a discretionary act that must be predicated on a clear showing of substantial grounds for relief. Movants have not demonstrated the necessity for a stay, nor have they established that proceeding without a stay would result in substantial injustice. The Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal is DENIED. The court reaffirms its earlier ruling that the litigation process must continue in an orderly and efficient manner. The Plaintiff retains her right to appeal this decision through the proper channels, but this matter will proceed without delay in the interim. So Ordered. Dated: September 19, 2024 Judge: Martin Hockenbeyer Superior Court of San Andreas