24-CV-1034 - Trial - Jefferson vs City of Los Santos, et al.

[almightybounter]

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS
COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS

Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department
Case No: 24-CV-1034

 

ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE

Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson has filed a Motion to Compel Production of Evidence, specifically requesting the production of bodycam and dash cam footage from Officer Sergeant Amber Moore. The Plaintiff alleges that these materials are crucial to the case and that multiple discovery requests submitted on various dates have gone unanswered by the Los Santos Police Department (LSPD). The Plaintiff now seeks a court order compelling the production of this evidence.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery is permitted for materials that are relevant to any party's claim or defense. The court acknowledges that bodycam and dash cam footage from Sergeant Amber Moore may contain information pertinent to the incidents in question and may be material to the Plaintiff’s case. Therefore, the requested evidence appears to meet the threshold for relevance under discovery rules.

The Plaintiff has submitted evidence (Exhibit A) showing formal discovery requests were made on specific dates. Exhibits B and C indicate attempts to follow up with the LSPD and resolve the matter without court intervention. The court finds that the Plaintiff has complied with the procedural requirements to seek discovery and has made reasonable efforts to obtain the requested materials without involving the court.

The Defendant, LSPD, has not provided the requested evidence or responded to the discovery requests, nor has it submitted any objection or motion for a protective order to this court. Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(a), a party is obligated to either comply with discovery requests or formally object within a specified period. Failure to do so may result in the court compelling the production of evidence.

The court must also consider the Defendant's position, including any possible justifications for non-production, such as privacy concerns, ongoing investigations, or claims of privilege. Since the LSPD has not responded or articulated any objections to this court, these factors cannot be weighed in the current motion. However, should the LSPD provide legitimate reasons for non-compliance, the court remains open to reconsideration of this order.

Based on the information presented, the court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to the production of the requested evidence. The Defendant, Los Santos Police Department, is hereby ORDERED to produce the following evidence within 3 days of this order:

1. Bodycam footage from Sergeant Amber Moore, including all recordings related to incidents occurring on August 17, 23, 26, 28, 30, and September 2, 9, 10, 12, and 14.
2. Dash cam footage from the police vehicle occupied by Sergeant Amber Moore, including all recordings related to incidents occurring on August 17, 23, 26, 28, 30, and September 2, 9, 10, 12, and 14.

Failure to comply with this order may result in sanctions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b), which may include but are not limited to adverse inferences, exclusion of evidence, or monetary penalties.

The LSPD retains the right to object to this order by submitting a written response within 2 days if there are substantial grounds for withholding the requested evidence, including claims of privilege or other justifiable reasons. Should such objections be filed, the court will schedule a hearing to address these concerns.
 

So Ordered.

Dated: September 19, 2024
Judge: Martin Hockenbeyer
Superior Court of San Andreas

 

(( @nfr.ai @John Gilbane )) 

Edited September 19, 2024 by almightybounter

[John Gilbane]

** John Gilbane stands, he adjusts his fedora once again before speaking out **

 

"Your Honor,

 

You are giving me and my client just dates with no time or what vehicle it was? This unreasonable. Can you give us more information to work with? So my team and I can figure it out, Your Honor.

 

We are ready for cooperation."

 

(( @Userone @almightybounter @nfr.ai ))

Edited September 19, 2024 by John Gilbane

[Jacob Rabinowitz]

** The Court Clerk receives a fax from the Office of Jacob E. Rabinowitz, Esq.

 

TO: Court Clerk;

CC: Court Reporter; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson
FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq.

DATE: September 19th, 2024

RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Notice of in re Interlocutory Appeal

-----

 

Madam Court Clerk:

 

Please be advised that counsel for Plaintiff has filed an emergency appeal of the previous orders denying Plaintiff of her right to appoint co-counsel, and the responsive orders denying a stay of proceedings pending an answer to such question. This notice is to create a record in the docket for 24-CV-1034 that an in re appeal has been lodged on behalf of Plaintiff that may have an effect on the outcome of this matter.

 

(( Link to Appeal Topic ))

 

Signed,

 

Jacob E. Rabinowitz III

Counsel for Plaintiff

(( @almightybounter ))

Edited September 19, 2024 by Jacob Rabinowitz

[Fabi]

COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

 

PLAINTIFF: Michelle Jefferson

DEFENDANT: Los Santos Police Department et. al.

 

CASE NUMBER: B19736

 

 

 

Appellant,
 

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

_______________________________________________
 

This matter is before the Court for consideration of Ms Michelle Jefferson, through and by Mr Jacob E. Rabinowitz III's and Mr Donald J. Wright's (hereinafter "Appellant") for an emergency interlocutory appeal of an immediately reviewable matter occurring within Case 24-CV-1034. After considering the submissions of the parties and the applicable law, the Court will grant the petiton for a temporary injunction granting a stay of the trial court proceedings, pending the final order of the Court.

 

ORDER

 

The Court finds that the Appellant has met the burden of proof necessary for requesting a temporary stay of proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The petition requesting that the trial court proceeding is stayed until the Court rules on the remaining listed prayer for relief forwarded by the Appellant is GRANTED.

 

_______________________________________________

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

DATE: SEPTEMBER 19, 2024

 

 

Hon. Michael Rouker 

Associate Justice

Court of Appeals, Second District, Division One

 

 

(( Tags handled in the other topic. ))

Edited September 19, 2024 by Fabi

[Fabi]

COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

 

PLAINTIFF: Michelle Jefferson

DEFENDANT: Los Santos Police Department et. al.

 

CASE NUMBER: B19736

 

 

 

Appellant,
 

ORDER GRANTING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND PETITION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION

_______________________________________________
 

This matter is before the Court for consideration of Ms Michelle Jefferson, through and by Mr Jacob E. Rabinowitz III's and Mr Donald J. Wright's (hereinafter "Appellant") for an emergency interlocutory appeal of an immediately reviewable matter occurring within Case 24-CV-1034 and Appellant's petition for a permanent injunction enjoining the trial court from restricting further appointment of counsel. For the reasons stated herein, the above-referenced emergency interlocutory appeal and petition for permanent injunction are GRANTED insofar as the Court finds them necessary to address the legal deficiencies arrising through the interlocutory orders issued by the trial court. 

 

OVERVIEW OF ACTION

 

The case is a class action brought by Michelle Jefferson against the Los Santos Police Department under 42 U.S.C § 1983 on September 14th, 2024, alleging violations of the fundamental rights of the United States Constitution and laws. Plaintiff challenges the adequacy of the her arrests and citations issued to her throughout the months of August and September of this year. On September 16th, a Motion for Addition of Counsel was forwarded by Mr Jacob E. Rabinowitz III and Mr Donald J. Wright pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1654 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 44. The Motion was denied on the same day by the Honorable Judge Martin Hockenbeyer. On September 17th, a Motion to Stay was filed by the aforementioned attorneys, which was also denied by Judge Hockenbeyer. An interlocutory appeal was lastly forwarded to this Court on September 19th.

 

SUMMARY OF DECISION

 

Under the the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 28 U.S.C. §1654 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 44, the Plaintiff has the right to appoint counsel. As such, the Plaintiff the right to appoint, supplement, or dismiss counsel using her own judgement and discretion. Limiting this right, the trial court stated that it "possess broad discretion to make determinations that preserve the integrity of the judicial process, including the authority to limit the participation of counsel when it is necessary to prevent potential conflicts, confusion, or delay". The Court acknowledges the usage of discretion in order to guarantee the preservation of the judicial process' integrity, including, under very limited and exigent circumstances, the limitation of of participating counsel. However, based on the presented facts, the complex nature of the case and the lack of hearings on the matters, the Court finds no objective reason to believe risk of prejudice exists and hence, due to the vitality of this fundamental rights, the Court find imposing such a limitation without proper basis to be abuse of discretion.

 

The Court finds that a permanent injunction is necessary to force the trial court to adequately safeguard the fundamental rights of the Plaintiff, having found no solid legal basis for the denial of additional counsel given the circumstances.

 

ORDER

 

The Court finds that trial court has been deliberately indifferent towards the protection of fundamental right to counsel of the Plaintiff within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment of the United States. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal and petition for permanent injunction are GRANTED. The Court further finds the Plaintiff have established by a preponderance of the evidence that a permanent injunction is appropriate and necessary. The Court specifically finds that Plaintiff have suffered or will suffer irreparable injury if a permanent injunction is not issued.

 

The permanent injunction enjoins the trial court from restricting further appointment of counsel. Appellant factually has a right to appoint counsel of her choosing in the enumeration she so chooses,

 

_______________________________________________

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

DATE: SEPTEMBER 20, 2024

 

 

Hon. Michael Rouker 

Associate Justice

Court of Appeals, Second District, Division One

 

 

(( @Kotwica @Jacob Rabinowitz @almightybounter @John Gilbane @nfr.ai @Userone ))

[Jacob Rabinowitz]

Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department
 

Case Number: 24-CV-1034

Prepared by: Donald J. Wright and Jacob Ezekiel Rabinowitz III.
 

MOTION FOR ADDITION OF COUNSEL

_______________________________________________
 

Comes now, Donald J. Wright and Jacob E. Rabinowitz III after approval from the plaintiff, request the court record reflect the addition of counsel.

 

Mr. Wright and Mr. Rabinowitz have been retained by Plaintiff for the purpose of addressing additional complexities involving a specific subject matter which lead counsel requires assistance in litigating. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1654 and a permanent injunction issued by the appellate court having jurisdiction over this court, movants request that the record reflect the addition of counsel and that this court grant full rights, privileges, and permissions to the additional counsel to make filings, submit briefs and evidence, issue subpoenas, and move this court for further action.

Mr. Wright and Mr. Rabinowitz are acting pro bono in this matter for the sole purpose of protecting the citizens of the United States who choose to express their dissatisfaction with their government, including that of protesting.

Movants have received advance permission from lead counsel and Plaintiff.

 

_______________________________________________

Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge.

 

Sworn this 18 day of September, 2024 by:

 

/s/ Jacob E. Rabinowitz
Jacob E. Rabinowitz III on behalf of himself and Donald J. Wright, attorneys for plaintiff.

(( @almightybounter ))

[Kotwica]

"Honorable Clerk, the document that was filed notates "Motion for" that should be struck and replaced with "Notice of" as the Court of Appeals has ruled in our favor. With that, good afternoon Donald J. Wright from Wright and Wong Law Firm for Ms. Jefferson."

Edited September 20, 2024 by Kotwica

[Lutica]

Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department
 

Case Number: 24-CV-1034

Prepared by: Meredith A. Farnsworth

 

MOTION FOR ADDITION OF COUNSEL

_______________________________________________
 

Comes now, Gregory P. Swanson, counsel for the National Council for Sustainable Urban Development (NCSUD), and submits this Response to the Motion for Addition of Counsel filed by Mr. Donald J. Wright and Mr. Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, stating the following:

The proposed addition of counsel raises concerns regarding the broader consequences for urban development in the Los Santos region. The plaintiff's motion omits any discussion of how the potential outcome of this case may impact local infrastructure projects, including zoning ordinances and public transportation initiatives currently under review by the city council. These issues are of significant importance to NCSUD. Los Santos has recently introduced several green space initiatives aimed at revitalizing urban areas while promoting environmental sustainability. The possible legal ramifications of this case, particularly if multiple counsel pursue divergent strategies, could inadvertently delay or derail these initiatives. The city’s interests in sustainable development must be taken into consideration. In City of Avalon v. Community Land Trust, the court ruled that the addition of counsel in civil rights cases involving municipal entities must account for ongoing urban planning initiatives. It would be prudent for this court to evaluate the potential conflicts between any newly introduced legal strategies and the broader interests of the city’s development programs.

Given these concerns, the National Council for Sustainable Urban Development respectfully requests that the court carefully consider the wider implications on urban infrastructure before ruling on the Motion for Addition of Counsel.

 

_______________________________________________

Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge.

 

Sworn this 18 day of September, 2024 by:

 

/s/ Meredith A. Farnsworth.

[almightybounter]

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS
COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS

Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department
Case No: 24-CV-1034

ORDER FOLLOWING THE COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING ON INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION

The Plaintiff, Michelle Jefferson, filed an interlocutory appeal regarding this court's prior denial of the Motion for Addition of Counsel and subsequent denial of a Motion to Stay. On September 20, 2024, the Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Division One, issued an order granting the Plaintiff's appeal and issuing a permanent injunction. The appellate court determined that this court's prior actions constituted an abuse of discretion, specifically concerning the Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as outlined under 28 U.S.C. §1654 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.

The Court of Appeals found that the Plaintiff has an absolute right to appoint, supplement, or dismiss counsel at her discretion. The appellate court concluded that no factual basis existed to support limiting Plaintiff's right to additional counsel, and no objective risk of prejudice, delay, or confusion was established. Furthermore, the appellate court issued a permanent injunction preventing this court from imposing restrictions on the Plaintiff’s right to appoint counsel.

---

ORDER:

1. This court acknowledges and complies with the Court of Appeals’ ruling dated September 20, 2024, in Case No. B19736. This court will no longer restrict or deny the Plaintiff's right to appoint additional counsel in this matter. All prior orders limiting or denying such counsel are vacated.

2. Pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ permanent injunction, this court is enjoined from imposing any further restrictions or limitations on the Plaintiff’s right to appoint additional counsel. The Plaintiff may continue to appoint, supplement, or dismiss counsel at her sole discretion, in accordance with her constitutional rights and the governing statutes.

3. This court will continue to exercise its duty to manage the docket in a manner that preserves the orderly administration of justice. However, in compliance with the appellate ruling, any concerns related to potential conflicts, confusion, or delay must be addressed through appropriate procedural motions and hearings rather than preemptive restrictions on counsel.

---

This court is bound by the appellate court’s decision and will ensure that the Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment rights are fully safeguarded. The Plaintiff is entitled to representation by the counsel of her choosing, and this court will facilitate the fair and timely progression of the case within these constraints.
 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2024
Judge: Martin Hockenbeyer
Superior Court of San Andreas

[almightybounter]

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS
COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS

Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department
Case No: 24-CV-1034

 

ORDER ON MOTION FOR ADDITION OF COUNSEL AND RESPONSE BY NCSUD

 

This Court has reviewed the Motion for Addition of Counsel submitted by Mr. Donald J. Wright and Mr. Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, as well as the response submitted by counsel for the National Council for Sustainable Urban Development (NCSUD), Ms. Meredith A. Farnsworth, regarding concerns about urban development and its potential impact on city planning initiatives in Los Santos.

RULING:
 

First and foremost, this Court recognizes the constitutional right of the Plaintiff, Michelle Jefferson, to appoint counsel of her choosing. This right is enshrined in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and further protected by 28 U.S.C. § 1654, as well as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44. The Court of Appeals, Second District, has already provided clear guidance in its recent order, granting the interlocutory appeal and confirming that the Plaintiff has a fundamental right to add counsel to her legal team.

There is no legal or procedural basis for this Court to deny the Plaintiff’s right to appoint additional counsel. This Court is bound by the appellate decision, which explicitly confirmed that denying the Motion for Addition of Counsel without proper justification would constitute an abuse of discretion.
 

The concerns raised by NCSUD, while relevant to broader public interest, do not directly pertain to the legal merits of this case. NCSUD asserts that the addition of counsel could delay ongoing urban development projects, including zoning ordinances and transportation initiatives in Los Santos. While the Court acknowledges the importance of these urban planning initiatives, NCSUD’s concerns are speculative in nature and do not constitute valid legal grounds to interfere with the Plaintiff’s right to appoint counsel.

The Plaintiff’s civil rights claims and the legal proceedings related thereto have no demonstrated or factual connection to the city’s infrastructure programs. NCSUD has failed to provide any concrete evidence that suggests how adding counsel to the Plaintiff’s legal team will materially impact the city’s development projects. As such, these concerns, while noted, are legally irrelevant to the issue before the Court.

Furthermore, the reference to City of Avalon v. Community Land Trust is inapposite. That case involved specific legal matters related to land use and zoning disputes, which are not at issue here. This case concerns civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and any potential delays caused by legal strategies do not present a sufficient basis to override the Plaintiff's right to counsel.
 

This Court is entrusted with safeguarding the constitutional rights of all litigants, including the right to counsel. The procedural integrity of this litigation must be maintained, and it is the role of this Court to ensure that the Plaintiff can adequately represent her claims, particularly in a civil rights case of this nature.

The potential impact on municipal infrastructure, as raised by NCSUD, falls outside the scope of this Court’s adjudication in the present matter. This Court’s duty is to ensure a fair trial and to protect the constitutional and statutory rights of the parties involved. Urban planning concerns cannot and should not be used as a tool to restrict these fundamental rights.
 

Based on the foregoing:

1. The Plaintiff’s Motion for Addition of Counsel is hereby GRANTED. The Plaintiff shall have the right to appoint Mr. Donald J. Wright and Mr. Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, or any other counsel of her choosing, to represent her in this matter.

2. The concerns raised by NCSUD regarding urban development projects in Los Santos are not grounds for denying the Plaintiff's motion, as they are speculative and unrelated to the legal issues before this Court.

3. This Court will proceed to trial while ensuring that the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights are fully protected. Any future motions or objections must be grounded in applicable law and facts directly relevant to this case.

---

 
 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: September 20, 2024
JUDGE: Hon. Martin Hockenbeyer
Superior Court of Los Santos

[Jacob Rabinowitz]

** The Court Clerk receives a fax from the Office of Jacob E. Rabinowitz, Esq.

 

TO: Court Clerk; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson
FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq.

DATE: September 20th, 2024

RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Request for Recess Pending Strategy Meeting and Additional Pre-Trial Conferences

-----

 

Judge Hockenbeyer,

 

I write to ask for a brief recess while we attempt to conduct a strategy conference.

 

We have drafted an amended complaint that requires review for legal accuracy, naming additional plaintiffs and alleging an amended set of statutory violations and applicable damages. We will be filing this amended complaint this evening, and after which we would need time to serve notice upon the additional plaintiffs and engage in pre-trial conferences with them if they are amiable.

 

Signed,

 

Jacob E. Rabinowitz III

Counsel for Plaintiff

(( @almightybounter ))

Edited September 20, 2024 by Jacob Rabinowitz

[Lutica]

Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department
 

Case Number: 24-CV-1034

Prepared by: Meredith A. Farnsworth

 

RESPONSE TO COURT'S ORDER ON MOTION FOR ADDITION OF COUNSEL

_______________________________________________
 

Comes now, Meredith A. Farnsworth, on behalf of the National Council for Sustainable Urban Development (NCSUD), and respectfully submits the following response to the Court’s Order granting the Plaintiff's Motion for Addition of Counsel:

 

While this Court has appropriately cited constitutional provisions ensuring the Plaintiff's right to counsel, it has neglected to consider the immediate and tangible effects this ruling may have on the governance and administration of the City of Los Santos. The NCSUD maintains that the introduction of additional counsel, particularly in a highly publicized civil rights case, risks diverting critical municipal resources. Legal proceedings of this magnitude strain the city's capacity to simultaneously manage vital infrastructure projects and city services, all of which are essential for the community’s well-being. The Court’s characterization of NCSUD’s concerns as "speculative" ignores the very real impact that complex legal battles can have on city planning. This Court has not demonstrated any effort to understand the substantial overlap between legal challenges against municipal institutions and their practical implications on city projects. The strain on city personnel, legal resources, and budgetary reallocations is far from speculative—it is a well-documented consequence of high-profile litigation. Moreover, urban development often moves at a glacial pace precisely because of bureaucratic entanglements such as this, and the Court’s dismissal of these concerns as irrelevant is premature and uninformed. The NCSUD takes issue with the Court's suggestion that urban development concerns are simply “public interest” matters detached from the legal proceedings. The interconnectedness of civil rights litigation and municipal administration is well-established in numerous judicial precedents, particularly in cases involving government agencies. Civil rights claims often touch on public policy issues, and the failure to recognize that this case could have a profound impact on city operations shows a lack of foresight by the Court. While the Court may view these concerns as irrelevant to the narrow legal issues at hand, the reality is that the citizens of Los Santos will bear the brunt of any inefficiencies that arise from prolonged litigation. With due respect, the NCSUD questions whether this Court has given sufficient weight to the broader societal consequences of its ruling. Prioritizing the Plaintiff's right to additional counsel—while important—should not come at the expense of the city’s progress. We urge the Court to consider that safeguarding constitutional rights does not exist in a vacuum; it must be balanced with the practical needs of the community and the functioning of local government. The court’s decision risks setting a dangerous precedent where the protection of civil rights claims is allowed to obstruct essential city functions, a consequence that this Court has chosen to overlook. NCSUD is disappointed by the Court's summary dismissal of its valid concerns and respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its stance. While we fully respect the Plaintiff’s right to counsel, we urge the Court to acknowledge the importance of maintaining the balance between individual rights and collective civic needs. We expect the Court to give greater consideration to the potential delays and complications that could arise in the development projects currently under way in Los Santos.

 

Failure to do so will not only impede progress in urban development but could lead to a larger public outcry as city residents begin to experience the fallout from delays in critical infrastructure. The NCSUD intends to monitor these proceedings closely and, if necessary, escalate this issue through additional motions or, if appropriate, through appeals to higher judicial bodies if the effects on city development are inadequately addressed.

 

_______________________________________________

Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge.

 

Sworn this 20 day of September, 2024 by:

 

/s/ Meredith A. Farnsworth.

Edited September 20, 2024 by Lutica

[almightybounter]

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS
COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS

Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department
Case No: 24-CV-1034

---

ORDER ON REQUEST FOR RECESS PENDING STRATEGY MEETING AND ADDITIONAL PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCES
 

 

The Court has received a request from Mr. Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq., counsel for the Plaintiff, seeking a recess to allow for a strategy conference and the filing of an amended complaint that will include additional plaintiffs and revised statutory claims. The Court acknowledges the Plaintiff's intention to amend the complaint and the need for coordination with potential additional plaintiffs.
 

RULING:
 

The Court finds that the request for a recess is reasonable in light of the significant developments proposed by Plaintiff's counsel, including the drafting and filing of an amended complaint, and the necessity of serving notice upon the newly added plaintiffs.

However, this Court is also mindful of its duty to ensure that the litigation proceeds in a timely and orderly manner. While the Court will grant a short recess, it will not allow any undue delays that might prejudice either party or disrupt the court's docket.
 

The recess is granted under the following conditions:

• Plaintiff's counsel shall file the amended complaint no later than 3 business days from the date of this Order.
• Plaintiff’s counsel must serve notice to all additional plaintiffs within 2 business days after the filing of the amended complaint, and file a certificate of service with the Court.
• Plaintiff's counsel shall engage in any necessary pre-trial conferences and submit a status report to the Court within 3 business days.
• The recess shall not interfere with the overall pre-trial schedule, and the parties are expected to adhere to all existing deadlines unless otherwise modified by Court order.

This Court reiterates the importance of maintaining efficient and fair proceedings. Plaintiff’s counsel is reminded that while the addition of new plaintiffs and statutory claims is within their rights, the process must not result in unnecessary delays. Any further requests for extensions must be fully justified with specific reasons.
 

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby grants Plaintiff's request for a recess under the stated conditions. Both parties should continue to be prepared for trial in accordance with the modified schedule once the amended complaint is filed.

---

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: 20 September, 2024
JUDGE: Hon. Martin Hockenbeyer
Superior Court of Los Santos

 

(( @Jacob Rabinowitz ))

[almightybounter]

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS
COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS

Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department
Case No: 24-CV-1034

ORDER REGARDING NCSUD RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR ADDITION OF COUNSEL

 

The Court acknowledges the submission by Meredith A. Farnsworth on behalf of the National Council for Sustainable Urban Development (NCSUD) in response to the Court’s prior ruling on the Motion for Addition of Counsel. The NCSUD expresses concerns that the ongoing legal proceedings could negatively affect the administration of city resources, infrastructure projects, and urban development initiatives.

The Court has carefully considered the concerns raised by the NCSUD and appreciates the broader context of urban governance and city development in which this case unfolds.
 

RULING:
 

The Court recognizes the importance of balancing the Plaintiff's constitutional right to adequate legal representation with the practical needs of the City of Los Santos and the ongoing infrastructure projects. However, it is fundamental that constitutional rights, particularly the right to counsel, take precedence in matters of legal adjudication. While the strain on municipal resources may be a legitimate concern, it cannot be used to limit or undermine the Plaintiff's access to justice.

Civil rights litigation, by its nature, often challenges existing governmental structures, and the resulting impact on municipal operations is not uncommon. These proceedings are critical to ensuring accountability, and the legal system must be prepared to accommodate these challenges, even if they create temporary burdens on city governance.
 

The NCSUD asserts that the Court has dismissed its concerns as "speculative" and failed to appreciate the potential impacts on urban planning. This characterization misinterprets the Court's ruling. The Court did not ignore these concerns but determined that they are, in this case, secondary to the constitutional rights at issue.

The Court is aware of the interconnected nature of legal challenges and city administration. However, any potential delays or resource allocation shifts related to urban development do not outweigh the Plaintiff's right to a full and fair trial, which includes the ability to appoint and supplement legal counsel. Furthermore, the Court is confident that the City of Los Santos can manage its legal obligations alongside its urban development agenda.
 

The NCSUD argues that prioritizing civil rights claims could set a dangerous precedent for obstructing city functions. The Court, however, views this case as falling squarely within the long-established legal framework that protects the right to counsel in civil rights litigation, particularly against government agencies. Courts across the country have routinely held that constitutional protections must not be compromised for administrative convenience.

Urban development is essential, but it is equally critical to ensure that city institutions operate within the bounds of the law, including respecting the rights of individuals to challenge governmental action through litigation. Civil rights claims are inherently public interest matters, and this Court is committed to upholding that principle.
 

The Court appreciates the NCSUD's vigilance in protecting the interests of the City of Los Santos, but the potential administrative or budgetary strain cannot justify limiting the Plaintiff’s fundamental rights. The addition of counsel, as previously ruled, is both warranted and necessary for the proper adjudication of this case.

The Court will continue to monitor this case closely to ensure that the proceedings move forward efficiently. However, the balancing of constitutional rights and municipal concerns has already been considered, and the Court will not reconsider its prior ruling at this time.

---

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: September 20, 2024
JUDGE: Hon. Martin Hockenbeyer
Superior Court of Los Santos

(( @Lutica )) 

[Jacob Rabinowitz]

(( See

))

Michelle Jefferson

v.

City of Los Santos, Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzales, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, and Roderick Hayward, in their official capacities,
Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low, in their individual and official capacities,
 

Case Number: 24-CV-1034

Prepared by: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq., and Donald J. Wright, Esq., Supplementary Counsel for Plaintiff.

Short Title: Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, Los Santos Police Department, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, et al.

 

AMENDED CIVIL CASE BRIEF FOR MICHELLE JEFFERSON V. LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT

_______________________________________________

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

• Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)
• Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014)

• United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983)

• Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)

• Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)

• Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)

• Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990)

• Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)

• Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)

• Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951)

• Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983)

• Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)

• Thomas v. Cook Cty Sheriff's Dept, 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2009)

• McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 2009)

 

 

PARTIES TO ACTION

1. Michelle Jefferson is a natural person with primary residence in the State of San Andreas. She is the chief executive of a non-profit organization called “Anti-Corruption Group”, “ACG” for short.
    
2. City of Los Santos is a municipal corporation of the State of San Andreas, sued in its official capacity as an entity responsible for the orderly management of all agencies organized within its geographic area of incorporation.
    
3. Alexander Blair is a natural person serving as Mayor of the City of Los Santos, sued in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Los Santos.
    
4. Los Santos Police Department is a municipal agency and state agency in the service of the City of Los Santos, sued in its official capacity as an entity responsible for the orderly management of all employees and resources organized under it.
    
5. Samuel Gonzales is a natural person serving as Chief of Police for the Los Santos Police Department, sued in his official capacity as the chief executive of the Los Santos Police Department.
    
6. Los Santos County Sheriff's Department is a municipal agency and state agency in service of the City of Los Santos and the unincorporated areas surrounding the incorporated region of Los Santos, sued in its official capacity as an entity responsible for the orderly management of all employees and resources organized under it.
    
7. Roderick Hayward is a natural person serving as Sheriff for the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department, sued in his official capacity as the chief executive of the Los Santos Police Department.
    
8. Amber Moore is a natural person and sworn law enforcement officer employed by the Los Santos Police Department during the dates relevant to this claim.
    
9. Christopher Kaminski is a natural person and sworn law enforcement officer employed by the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department during the dates relevant to this claim.
    
10. Marvin Low is a natural person and sworn law enforcement officer employed by the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department during the dates relevant to this claim.

 

 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This court has general jurisdiction over the parties named due to their organization within the geographic boundaries of the State of San Andreas.
    
2. This court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over the natural persons in this case as all natural persons are domicile within the geographic boundaries of the State of San Andreas.

 

BACKGROUND

 

1. On August 15th, 2024, Plaintiff engaged in protected speech activities, while located on public property, in the vicinity of the Los Santos Police Department Headquarters in Pershing Square, Los Santos, San Andreas. Plaintiff was speaking about the fundamental nature of the second amendment and advocating to others that the policies of the Firearms Licensing Division of the Los Santos Police Department were excessive and unconstitutional.
    
2. Defendant Amber Moore was present on August 15th, 2024, at the same location at Plaintiff, and spoke to her directly to inquire about Plaintiff’s criminal history but did not detain Plaintiff or conduct an arrest.
    
3. On August 17th, 2024, Plaintiff returned to the same location to engage in protected speech activities. She was joined by a volunteer associate of ACG, Michael “Mike” Walters, who was helping her to find a photographer for the event.
    
4. On the scene, there were many people including several deputies of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff and two deputies, Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low, engaged in a verbal altercation, arguing about some of the topics Plaintiff was engaged in protected speech about.
    
5. While verbally engaged with two deputies of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department, Plaintiff and Mr. Walters identified a potential photographer, identified only as “Frank”, and they attempted to make a verbal contract with him. Plaintiff paid “Frank” a sum of $10,000 United States Dollars by inserting the bills directly into his pocket. This was witnessed directly by the two deputies, Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low.
    
6. The photographer, “Frank”, demanded that Plaintiff pay an additional sum of $140,000 for his services. When Plaintiff refused, “Frank” made a report of inappropriate sexual contact to Officer Amber Moore, who had recently arrived and had not witnessed any of the prior events including the initial payment of $10,000 by Plaintiff to “Frank”.
    
7. Deputies Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low gave false testimony to Officer Moore that Plaintiff had slapped the rear end of “Frank” when in fact they had not witnessed any such act. In fact, the deputies had witnessed Plaintiff pay “Frank” by slotting the cash payment directly into the man’s back pocket; there was no inappropriate sexual touching committed upon the person of “Frank” at any time, neither by Plaintiff nor by anyone else at that time or place.
    
8. A settlement agreement was reached between Plaintiff and the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department in which the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Christopher Kaminski, and Deputy Marvin Low admitted a mistake of fact and nullified any outstanding charges lodged by their department upon Plaintiff. The settlement agreement lacked monetary or other lawful consideration and is therefore unenforceable, however the written admissions of fault contained therein are admissible in this court as evidence of the deputies’ true observations as they were misrepresented to Officer Moore.
    
9. Officer Moore, upon receiving the report from “Frank” and the two deputies, did not investigate further. Officer Moore did not review the relevant dashcam or bodycam footage available from nearby cruiser-based recording devices, nor did she review the CCTV footage available in the CCTV system of the LSPD Headquarters building and its exterior. Officer Moore instead placed Plaintiff under arrest on a charge of Sexual Battery, pursuant to Penal Code § 220(a).
    
10. While Officer Moore was in the process of handcuffing Plaintiff, a person unknown to Plaintiff attacked Moore from behind and struck her several times. Moore responded with lethal force, killing the unknown person. Shocked and terrified by the events she had witnessed in her vicinity, Plaintiff made statements emphasizing the brutality of the Los Santos Police Department and stated “violence will continue to happen”. Officer Moore then transported Plaintiff to a nearby station for processing.
     
11. While discussing the circumstances of the arrest with Plaintiff, Officer Moore represented that she was lawfully able to order dispersion of the crowd because Plaintiff lacked a permit to protest, and that a failure to disperse was grounds for a citation under Penal Code section 401.
     
12. On August 23rd, 2024, Plaintiff returned to the same location to engage in constitutionally-protected speech activities. She was joined by several others who had gathered to listen to Plaintiff speak about topics ranging from speech to firearms rights, the right to remain secure in one’s papers, house, and effects, and other constitutional topics. The assembly was conducted on public sidewalks and other public property, and did not abridge or otherwise obstruct roads or public pathways in any manner not ordinary to their regular and ordinary usage.
     
13. Officer Moore arrived and asked Plaintiff if she had a permit to conduct an assembly. In response, Plaintiff responded that she did not have a permit. Without more, Officer Moore then issued a citation to Plaintiff on a charge of Unlawful Assembly pursuant to Penal Code § 401(b).
     
14. Without more, Officer Moore used her megaphone to order the people in attendance to disperse. Plaintiff peacefully protested this order, refusing to leave, but did not communicate any type of encouragement to the crowd to damage property, harm others, or commit any crime of violence or destruction. To the contrary, Plaintiff urged the crowd to not engage in any such acts because of the event’s nature as a civil protest. She further urged that violence was not necessary. Plaintiff’s intention behind the event was to show a pathway to civil discourse as a means of solving the city’s problems, but her attempts at peaceful and articulate debate were unfortunately interrupted by Officer Moore.
     
15. Officer Moore then proceeded to arrest and charge Plaintiff on charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot, pursuant to Penal Code § 402 and § 403 respectively.
     
16. The events of August 26th, August 28th, August 30th, September 2nd, September 9th, September 10th, September 12th, and September 14th all mirrored the events of August 23rd, with the exception that Officer Moore did not inquire as to whether Plaintiff possessed a permit on these additional days. Officer Moore did, however, on each day issue a citation for the same charge, order dispersion of the crowd, and then arrest Plaintiff when the crowd did not disperse, thereafter charging her with the offenses of Incitement to Riot and Riot.
     
17. On September 10th, September 12th, and September 14th, Plaintiff refused to take the citations from Officer Moore when issued. As a result, Officer Moore charged Plaintiff with Obstruction of Justice, pursuant to Penal Code § 610, in addition to the charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot.
     
18. In total, over the above-cited date range, Plaintiff has been issued nine citations of $2,000 United States Dollars each, totaling $18,000. She has been arrested and incarcerated over these same dates on a total of 11 misdemeanor offenses and 10 felony offenses. She has bonded out of jail each time.

 

COUNT ONE – DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER FOURTH AMENDMENT ARISING FROM FALSE TESTIMONY AND FOLLOWING ARREST LACKING PROBABLE CAUSE, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 

1. Plaintiff was arrested on a charge of Sexual Battery pursuant to Penal Code § 220(a). The applicable subsection contains one constructive element: the presence of unwanted touching or sexual contact by a person upon another person.
    
2. The arrest conducted by Officer Moore was wholly substantiated by her reliance on the false testimony of the reporting party and the false testimony of the deputies who she spoke with.
    
3. The settlement agreement issued by the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department constitutes an admission that the deputies misrepresented their observations in an official capacity, thereby submitting an unlawful
    
4. Deputies of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department gave false testimony to Officer Moore, which served as a primary evidentiary basis leading to Officer Moore’s reasonable belief of having probable cause.
    
5. Officer Moore made no attempt to collect additional evidence, even though it was available to her in the form of cruiser dashcam footage and closed circuit television footage from the Police Headquarters. Furthermore, Officer Moore made no attempt to collect the witness testimony of others on the scene.
    
6. Officer Moore did not herself witness the events underlying the charge of Sexual Battery and therefore cannot assert a claim of her own witnessing of a crime as evidence for the crime.
    
7. Deputies Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low made no attempt to correct Officer Moore’s understanding of the events. By introducing false testimony to an official record, both officers committed the crime of Perjury pursuant to Penal Code § 606(b), which provides “A peace officer who knowingly and intentionally makes or causes to be made any material statement in an official report or to another peace officer and the statement is included in an official report, knowing the statement to be false, is guilty of a felony”. Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low may assert absolute immunity from civil liability under Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), but their employing agency has no such immunity and therefore must indemnify Plaintiff for the officers’ actions.
    
8. Lacking the testimony given by Kaminski and Low, and without more, Officer Moore would not have had the requisite basis to establish probable cause. Since additional evidence was available but not sought by Moore, she neglected to perform her duties in a manner consistent with a reasonable police officer.
    
9. Officer Moore’s failure to collect this evidence further constitutes a deprivation of Plaintiff’s right to discovery of exculpatory evidence during any criminal prosecution.
    
10. Conducting an arrest without probable cause implicates the Fourth Amendment’s seizure clause, which provides that a person has a right to security in their person and may not be unreasonably seized. Under common law understood at the time the fourth amendment was adopted, an arrest and subsequent incarceration was understood to be a seizure under the meaning of the fourth amendment.
     
11. Defendants Kaminski and Low have admitted fault in this matter, as shown in the unenforceable settlement agreement contained in evidence.
     
12. Defendant Moore may assert qualified immunity under Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014), shielding herself from liability arising from the mistake of fact alone, but is not shielded by Heien on the issue of failing to investigate the matter, lacking probable cause for arrest, or failing to collect evidence that may have proven exculpatory.
     

COUNTS TWO THROUGH ELEVEN– DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER FIRST AMENDMENT ARISING FROM PRIOR RESTRAINT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF PEACEFUL PROTEST, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 

1. Plaintiff was cited for Unlawful Assembly on August 23rd, August 26th, August 28th, August 30th, September 2nd, September 9th, September 10th, September 12th, and September 14th for Unlawful Assembly pursuant to Penal Code § 401(b). The applicable subsection contains two constructive elements: (1) that a group failed to protest or demonstrate peacefully, and; (2) that the group did not have a permit or authorization from the city.
    
2. Where protests are conducted in a traditional public forum, and are therein peaceful in nature, congress cannot restrain the right of persons to protest or display picket signs, under United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
    
3. Under Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the first amendment is incorporated onto state governments. Given this and applying Grace, state governments may not priorly restrain the free expression of the people by peacefully protest by requiring a permit to do so in a traditional public forum.
    
4. Under common law, traditional public fora are locations such as public parks, street, sidewalks, city plazas, town squares, outdoor pedestrian malls, steps in front of city hall, front lawns of county office buildings, city-maintained alleyways, and any other location in which a person at common law may have expected to be able to speak without the restrictions of administrative regulation. In contrast, a limited public forum, under Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), is any property of another wherein the government may enforce time, place, and manner restrictions upon the speech of another.
    
5. Under Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), as applied and cited in Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (1990), “individuals coming into or going about a city upon their lawful concerns must be allowed free locomotion upon the streets and public places”.
    
6. Pershing Square in the City of Los Santos is a traditional public forum because it is a city plaza and town square. Furthermore, the Los Santos Police Department Headquarters is public property. While the interior of the building is a limited public forum subject to time, place, and manner restrictions under Cox, the stairs outside of the building are traditional public fora in much the same way as the interior of City Hall is a limited public forum while the stairs outside of it is a traditional public forum. The stairs on the exterior of a building is not a place where specific government business is conducted, and therefore is not subject to the reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions that govern limited public fora.
    
7. Penal Code § 401(b) is facially unconstitutional under Cox, and both the enforcement thereof by the City of Los Santos through its permitting process and by the Los Santos Police Department through issuance of citations to those lacking permits while protesting in traditional public fora constitutes a violation of clearly established law that is grounds for suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
    
8. Officer Amber Moore may not assert qualified immunity in this matter because the corpus of law involving traditional public fora, including, but not limited to, Cox, Grace, Hague, Lutz, and Gitlow are all clearly established precedents that she has a duty to know and to apply in the course of her duties, as held in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), this court must apply the objective reasonable test prescribed therein, which requires an analysis of the existing corpus of law and whether an officer would be reasonably noticed of the unconstitutional nature of their conduct. Applying this test, Moore is not entitled to qualified immunity and is therefore personally liable for her actions.
    
9. The City of Los Santos and Los Santos Police Department are also jointly liable for their constructive violations of Cox, Grace, Hague, Lutz, and Gitlow, and must indemnify Plaintiff for her losses as a result of the arrests and citations that arose from these acts.
    
10. Counts 2 through 11 constitute a series of repeated violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights with each consisting of the unlawful issuance of a citation and unlawful dispersion of an otherwise-lawfully gathered and peaceful protest within a traditional public forum.

 

COUNTS TWELVE THROUGH TWENTY-ONE – DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENT ARISING FROM UNLAWFUL ARREST FOR EXERCISING FREE SPEECH THROUGH PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. §1983
 

1. Plaintiff, after refusing to disperse when ordered to do so by Officer Moore, was arrested for Incitement to Riot and Riot, pursuant to Penal Code § 402 and § 403 respectively. Section 402 contains two constructive elements. The first element requires a single overt act or attempt therein: the deliberate agitation or intention to agitate a crowd or large group of people. The second element requires that the crowd or large group is located in a public or private area in order to promote acts of violence or civil unrest.
    
2. Plaintiff did not communicate any messages that a reasonable person would be agitated, and did not intend to do so in any way. To the contrary, Plaintiff has alleged her intent to be an expression of free speech for the purpose of demonstrating a mode of civil discourse through which others may express their grievances constructively.
    
3. Furthermore, the group was not gathered in the traditional public forum of Pershing Square for the purpose of promoting acts of violence or civil unrest. A failure to disperse does not, without explicit calls for violence or civil unrest, constitute an incitement to riot even if the organizer of the group tells others not to disperse. Under this same logic, we would have expected figures such as Martin Luther King, Jr., and his compatriots, to have been charged with felony acts of incitement to riot rather than the public order offenses they were in fact charged with during their protests that led to the passing of the 1963 Civil Rights Act.
    
4. As discussed in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), a person may be convicted of breaching the peace if the direct result of his speech is civil unrest or disorder. Here, Plaintiff did not call for unrest or disorder, or violence of any kind, and her speech did not result in civil unrest, disorder, or a breach of the peace beyond continued protest and civil disobedience of officers by the participants of the protest.
    
5. The charges under Penal Code § 402 are unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff because her actions did not satisfy the elements of the crime, and Defendants Los Santos Police Department and Moore lack the probable cause necessary to substantiate an arrest.
    
6. The charges under Penal Code § 403 are unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff because her actions did not constitute a riot. Lacking civil unrest, disorder, or a breach of peace exceeding civil disobedience, the elements of the crime have not been satisfied and Defendants Los Santos Police Department and Moore lack the probable cause to substantiate an arrest.
    
7. Lacking probable cause for an arrest, Defendants Los Santos Police Department and Moore have engaged in an unlawful seizure of the person of Plaintiff, and in so doing have violated her right to be free of such unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment.
    
8. Under Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), punitive damages are recoverable where a defendant’s actions are reckless or callously indifferent to the rights of a plaintiff. Defendants Moore and Los Santos Police Department were callously indifferent to the rights of Plaintiff through assertion of incorrect criminal charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot, pursuant to Penal Code § 402 and § 403 respectively, where the elements of the crime were not met.
    
9. Counts 12 through 21 constitute a series of repeated violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights with each consisting of an unlawful arrest and incarceration where Plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected speech.

 

COUNT TWENTY-TWO – MONELL CLAIM FOR A PATTERN OR PRACTICE OF DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE IN TRAINING OF POLICE OFFICERS, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983
 

1. Under Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a municipal agency may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for official acts constituting a pattern or practice that results in a systemic violation of a plaintiff’s civil rights.
    
2. The elements of a Monell claim are: (1) deprivation of a clearly-established federal right; (2) that specific government action can be traced to the deprivation; (3) presence of a pattern or practice demonstrating fault or deliberate indifference to the risks therein, and; (4) municipal action, or inaction, was the driving force behind the deprivation.
    
3. Under Thomas v. Cook Cty Sheriff's Dept, 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2009), a municipal department’s awareness of some risk to plaintiffs by a custom or practice constitutes deliberate indifference under the requirements of the test in Monell.
    
4. Under McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 2009), the municipal policies of an agency are legal conclusions where not factually supported. As reasoned in McTigue, if a municipal agency’s policy, where followed appropriately, results in a constitutional violation, the municipal agency may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
    
5. Defendant Los Santos Police Department failed to provide Defendant Moore the appropriate level of training in the clearly-established laws concerning protesting. As a result, Moore conducted false arrests on numerous occasions.
    
6. In failing to provide the necessary training for Defendant Moore, Defendant Los Santos Police Department was deliberately indifferent to the first amendment rights of the public in a manner that was likely to lead to the violation of citizens’ rights to protest and speak in traditional public fora.
    
7. Defendant Los Santos Police Department has a duty to train officers appropriately before permitting them to patrol or conduct arrests on their own. Defendant Moore was able to conduct the multiple arrests of Plaintiff without any such supervision, therein suggesting that she was considered by the Department to be a fully trained and capable officer with all the rights and privileges of law enforcement officers in this State. However, her actions suggest otherwise. Her own personal indifference to the rights affirmed in Cox, Grace, Hague, Lutz, and Gitlow suggest that the department did not conduct an appropriate level of training before granting her the statuses common to fully trained officers.
    
8. Applying Monell, Thomas, and McTigue, Defendant Los Santos Police Department is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to indemnify Plaintiff for the losses resulting from her incarceration. Defendant’s lack of policies requiring that officers be trained in the clearly-established law relevant to the performance of their duties as they pertain to maintenance of public order demonstrates deliberate indifference to preventing such risks,

 

DAMAGES AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

 

Compensatory damages in the amount of:

•   $10,000 per hour spent incarcerated for charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot (252 hours), for a total of $2,520,000.
•   Compensatory damages in the amount of $10,000 per hour spent incarcerated for the charge of Sexual Battery (30 hours), for a total of $300,000.
•   Compensatory damages in the amount of $18,000 for the citations under Penal Code §401 that were paid by Plaintiff.

 

Punitive Damages in the amounts:

•   Treble the applicable compensatory damages for unlawful incarceration resulting from the charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot, totaling $7,560,000.
•   Punitive Damages in the amount treble the applicable compensatory damages for unlawful incarceration resulting from the charge of Sexual Battery, totaling $900,000.
   

Dismissal of all charges stemming from the actions on the dates referenced in this claim.

Reasonable attorney fees awarded to attorneys Xavier Castendas, Donald J. Wright, and Jacob E. Rabinowitz. While Mr. Wright and Mr. Rabinowitz are acting pro bono without charge to Plaintiff, their services are recompensable from Defendants by this court. As a reference point, all three attorneys bill for their services at a rate of $5,000 per hour.

 

 

WITNESS LIST

Michael Walters
Manuel Caldera, Chief of Police, Los Santos Police Department
Amber Moore, Employee of the Los Santos Police Department
Deputy Christopher Kaminski, Employee of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department
Deputy Marvin Low, Employee of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department
Captain Elise Crawford, Employee of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department

 

_______________________________________________

Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge.

 

Sworn this 20th day of September, 2024 by:

 

/s/ Jacob E. Rabinowitz

JACOB E. RABINOWITZ

Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

[email protected]
 

DONALD J. WRIGHT

Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

 

XAVIER CASTENDAS

Lead Counsel for Plaintiff

 

 

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Edited September 22, 2024 by Jacob Rabinowitz
Manuel Caldera -> Samuel Gonzales