25-LSC-04117 - Pre-Trial – Montblanc v. Shakhzadov, Los Santos Police Department, et al.

[Kotwica]

Montblanc v. Shakhzadov, Los Santos Police Department, et al.
 

Case Number: 25-LSC-04117

Prepared by: Juan Tzompaxtle
 

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S ANSWER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION.

The defense has responded with an array of statements that the plaintiff thoroughly denies. Among these are that (1) internal affair records are not discoverable; (2) plaintiff’s requests are overly broad and unduly burdensome; (2) personnel records and application files implicate privacy interests. The responds as follows:

(1) Internal Affair Records Are Discoverable
Opposing counsel is disingenuous in filing the argument that they believe internal affair records are not discoverable when they later claim that a Pitchess motion is required to obtain “confidential internal affairs records.” It is an established principle borrowing from the invocation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(3)(B) that if the court orders the disclosure of documents and tangible things, the only items protected against disclosure are (i) mental impressions; (ii) conclusions; (iii) opinions; or (iv) legal theories of the party’s attorney or other representative concerning the litigation. Internal affairs reports are discoverable under Upjohn Co v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The precedent that follows that case establishes that internal investigations are only privileged if the primary purpose is to obtain legal advice. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root Inc. 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014). See also Harding v. Dana Transport, Inc. 914 F. Supp. 1084 (D.N.J. 1996).

(2) Plaintiff’s Requests are Not Overly Broad or Burdensome.
The plaintiff firmly establishes that they believe the request is unduly broad and burdensome.  The main requirements for determining an unduly broad request is relevance and proportionality.

(i) All SWAT deployments and newsworthy incidents from April 18 to present is not unduly broad or burdensome, the volume of the documents or information is not “enormous.” The denial of the plaintiff’s media card prohibits her from attending SWAT deployments and other incidents of significance and this request directly corresponds to the damages alleged. If the defense concedes that the plaintiff suffered damages on not reporting on incidents because of this denial, the plaintiff can and will strike this request.

(ii) All media cards applications and determinations are not unduly broad or burdensome, this is information available to the department through applications. A determination of if a license was issued or not is not burdensome or overly broad. This request is relevant because it permits the plaintiff to determine what the pattern of approval or denials are, and what additional factors are accounted for. The plaintiff is asserting that the denial of her media card is retaliatory. The facts of this case will show that her application was denied even when the same information was provided on a previous application that was accepted. Only two items changed during that time (1) the plaintiffs employer; (2) the lawsuit filed against the LSPD. Denying the plaintiff on either of these grounds would be a Constitutional violation.

(iii) All policies and procedures related to the Freedom of the Press. This request is self-evident, is not overly burdensome and is relevant to the case.
The defense then asserts wrongly asserts the Ashcroft v. Iqbal standard. Ashcroft v. Iqbal requires a plausible cause of action, not an action with specificity.

(3) Personnel Records and Application Files Implicate Privacy Interests:
The defendant cites to 6254(c) of the Constitution. This would be a relevant standard if this case was not the subject of litigation. The purpose of the constitutional right is to safeguard privacy and confidentiality concerns. However, as an officer of the court I have alleged that the requested items are relevant to ongoing litigation. Courts have held that the need for discovery generally outweighs privacy concerns in civil litigation. Schiavone v. Town of Wappinger, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109702 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2015). The proper remedy (if one is appropriate at all) would be for the court to order a Rule 26(c) protective order.

In the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the defense emphasizes that Officer Shakhzadov’s termination (which has not yet been proven) by the Los Santos Police Department somehow alleviates them of all responsibilities related to his conduct while a police officer for the Los Santos Police Department, this theory is interwoven with the rejection of the Monell applicability.
 

This motion to dismiss raises additional concerns for the plaintiff as to why the Los Santos Police Department did not seek to charge Officer Shakhzadov criminally if the opportunity for an internal affairs investigation was terminated upon his alleged departure.

(4) Monell Standard is Appropriate:

The Los Santos Police Department has been sued six times in the past two weeks where different officers have displayed the same unlawful, unconstitutional behaviors. The defense either does not know, or willfully withheld from the court that Monell is applicable for violations resulting from official policies OR CUSTOMS, and the toleration of a policy or custom that causes the violation. The Los Santos Police Department was served with multiple subpoenas, and court orders requiring them to provide their training records on an array of constitutional issues, they have refused and are still refusing to comply even with this cases subpoena request. If this court were to consider the Motion to Dismiss, the court would have to consider the discovery not provided as spoliated. If relevant evidence is destroyed or withheld, courts apply an adverse inference standard, that the destroyed or withheld evidence would impact the claims or defenses of the party who destroyed or withheld the evidence. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2001); Breast Cancer Fund v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 264 F.R.D. 56 (D.D.C. 2010). The Los Santos Police Department by failing to provide this relevant information is self-defeating in their claim that there is no Monell liability.

The plaintiff does not oppose a summary judgment motion on the grounds that the defendant’s unwillingness to share the discovered information would defeat all defenses and claims they have asserted.

(5) Officer Shakhzadov's Alleged Termination Does Not Overcome Respondeat Superior.
The defense spends the rest of their brief arguing that Respondeat Superior is not an established legal principle. This court knows that the mere termination of an employee does not alleviate the Department’s responsibility in the actions both generally but also under Monell, the Supreme Court has ruled in support of the plaintiff’s position in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), where the City of Independence was held liable for constitutional violations even when the employee was not an employee of the city at the time of the violation.

(6) The Denial of Media Cards:
The fact that the defendant claims that their process is neutral, standardize, and applied consistently does not make it true. The defense is required to elaborate on that process, and the determination is made by the court. The defense cites to Nieves, which they contain supports their argument because “the denial off [sic] credentials, without more, is insufficient to establish a constitutional claim […]” the plaintiff has contended that this has unduly impacted the plaintiff’s livelihood as a reporter, and again the subpoena which the defense has failed to comply with would establish damages. The plaintiff is correct that you do not need a media card for reporting, recording, publishing, or speaking. However, the media card permits members of the public who meet some sort of arbitrary police standard the right to attend “high risk” events, as described in the media card application process.

The defense is not incorrect that the LSPD is not the White House (albeit this is self-evidence). However, the defense is seemingly unaware of how precedent is applied in the legal system. The Sherill v. Knight case establishes that even the federal government while dealing with the national security have to apply a neutral, standardized, and consistently applied standard when choosing to deny a party the right to report. If any department or agency would be given deference by the courts, it would be the White House. The Court did not grant deference to the White House, rather the Court established the standard that the plaintiff is requesting the Los Santos Police Department to follow. If the White House is required to follow this requirement there is no excuse why the Los Santos Police Department should not. If the Los Santos Police Department is claiming that they are complying with the precedent they have an obligation to prove that compliance. Facially it appears the Los Santos Police Department denied the same application an individual submitted previously when only two factors changed, who they were employed by, and that they sued the Los Santos Police Department.

(7) Conclusion:

In conclusion, the defense is not opposed to a summary judgment motion if the court agrees that the refusal to provide the requested information amounts to a spoliation of evidence. That spoliation of evidence would thereby invalidate all defenses by the Los Santos Police Department and would return a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff does believe there is a genuine dispute of material fact and that the Los Santos Police Department is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

 

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Juan Tzompaxtle
Juan Tzompaxtle
Attorney for the Plaintiff

Edited May 7 by Kotwica

[Justitiae]

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF SAN ANDREAS FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS     LAURA MONTBLANC,   Plaintiff,                                   v.         AKHMAD SHAKHZADOV, LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al,   Defendants.                       Case No. 25-LSC-04117    ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO COMPEL, MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT   Date: May 9, 2025 Time: 6:09 pm Department: 1

ᅠᅠ  The Court, having reviewed the pleadings on file, including Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, Defendant’s Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiff’s responsive filings and Motion for Summary Judgment, IT IS ORDERED: Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in its entirety; Plaintiff’s Request for Summary Judgment is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.   STANDARD ᅠᅠ  Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint survives dismissal when the well-pleaded facts “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” (Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) 556 U.S. 662, 681; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544, 570.) The Court disregards rote legal conclusions, but assumes the veracity of factual averments and draws every reasonable inference in the plaintiff’s favor. (See Knievel v. ESPN 9th Cir. 2005 393 F.3d 1068, 1072.) ᅠᅠ  A government agency is liable only when an official policy, long standing practice, or ratification by a final policymaker causes the deprivation. (Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 690–691; AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare (9th Cir. 2010) 666 F.3d 631, 636-638.) A municipality may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for a single officer’s misconduct on a theory of respondeat superior. (City of Canton v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378, 385). ᅠᅠ  Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery “relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case,” unless protected by privilege or otherwise restricted for good cause. Balancing privacy interests against litigants’ need for information, the Court may order redaction, in-camera review, or protective conditions. (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); San. An. Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.020(a); cf. Kelly v. City of San Jose (N.D. San.An. 1987) 114 F.R.D. 653.) In the absence of codified Pitchess statutes, peace officer personnel and internal affairs records are reviewed under a balancing framework grounded in privilege, due process, and the need for judicial oversight. ᅠᅠ  A finding of spoliation requires evidence of intentional destruction or alteration of relevant evidence and resulting prejudice. (Silvestri v. General Motors Corp. (4th Cir. 2001) 271 F.3d 583, 590-593.) Sanctions under Rule 37 include preclusion or terminating relief, but only upon a predicate showing of willfulness or bad faith (Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 San.An.4th 1, 11-12; Williams v. Russ (2008) 167 San.An.App.4th 1215.).     ANALYSIS ᅠᅠ  Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing: (1) Plaintiff fails to plead a plausible claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658; (2) the denial of Plaintiff’s Media Card was not retaliatory; and (3) the resignation of Officer Shakhzadov precludes agency liability for his actions. ᅠᅠ  Plaintiff opposes the motion and contends that the Complaint sufficiently pleads a pattern of unconstitutional conduct and retaliatory intent on the part of the Department, especially against outspoken critics of the Los Santos Police Department (“LSPD”); that the denial was undertaken pursuant to a department policy or custom; and that senior officials ratified the decision. Accepting those allegations as true, the Complaint plausibly alleges an institutional custom of retaliatory credentialing. Such allegations suffice at the pleadings stage to pass Monell’s policy-or-practice filter. Whether the proof ultimately substantiates these contentions is a question for summary judgment or trial, nor Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. ᅠᅠ  Plaintiff alleges she engaged in protected expression—filming arrest, vlogging criticism of LSPD tactics, and filing a prior public-records lawsuit—after which her Media Card application was uniquely denied. The chronology supports a plausible inference of retaliatory animus under Nieves v. Bartlett (2019) 139 S.Ct. 1715, 1723. The motion thus fails as to the First Amendment claim. ᅠᅠ  Defendants’ argue that because Officer Shakhzadov resigned, municipal exposure evaporates. The argument misconstrues Monell: a municipality’s liability flows from its policy, not the tenure of the offending employee. If Plaintiff proves that decision-makers condoned or turned a blind eye to the retaliation, or employs an unconstitutional policy or custom resulting in the violation of the Plaintiff’s rights, the municipality/agency remains answerable. The resignation or continued employment of Officer Shakhzadov has no bearing on this legal framework. (See Long v. County of Los Santos (9th Cir. 1990) 442 F.3d 1178, 1186.) ᅠᅠ  Plaintiff’s reliance on Owen v. City of Independence (1980) 445 U.S. 622 is misplaced. Owen held that municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity, but did not alter Monell's core requirement that municipal liability under § 1983 must be based on institutional action or omission. Local municipal agencies remain liable only when the Plaintiff pleads and ultimately proves that a policy, custom, or ratification by a final policymaker caused the constitutional injury. Thus, respondeat superior is unavailable for § 1983 liability. As for the Defendants’, reliance on qualified immunity is also misplaced. Qualified immunity shields individual officers sued for damages; it is unavailable to municipal entities. The Department therefore cannot avoid suit by arguing that “no clearly established right to a press credential exists.” Its only two proper defenses under § 1983 should be (a) that no constitutional violation occurred, and (b) that no policy, custom, or ratification caused the alleged violation—both of which must be substantiated through discovery. ᅠᅠ  The requested documents speak directly to Plaintiff’s theory that retaliatory measures were condoned or ratified. Whilst Defendants' concern about third-party privacy is legitimate, assertion of a nebulous “law-enforcement privilege” is unavailing absent a specific statutory basis and does not bar disclosure altogether. Privacy interests may be adequately protected by redaction and a protective order under Rule 26(c) (See Britt v. Superior Court, 20 San.An.3d 844 (1978); Board of Trustees v. Superior Court, 119 San.An.App.3d 516 (1981).) The Court orders production with redaction of personal data and is subject to a two-tier protective order limiting dissemination to counsel, experts, and the Court. ᅠᅠ  Plaintiff seeks credential applications from 1 January 2025 through 30 April 2025, including outcomes. The Court finds that documents related to press credential applications are discoverable. To the extent privacy concerns exist, those concerns may be addressed through appropriate redaction of identifying information. Comparator data may be essential to establishing disparate treatment, and the relevance of such evidence outweighs any minimal privacy intrusion under the circumstances. Defendants’ may also substitute unique numeric identifiers for applicant names. ᅠᅠ  The Court orders the production of all current written directives governing press interaction, citizen filming, or credential issuance as they reflect official municipal policy. Objections premised on “public-safety sensitivity” are overruled where no specific operational details are implicated. ᅠᅠ  Plaintiff moves to compel records for every SWAT deployment since 18 April 2025, contending such data “may reveal” retaliatory patterns. The connection between tactical demployments and credential denials is too attenuated. The request is substantially overbroad. Without a narrowed showing—such as incidents where Plaintiff sought on-scene access and was excluded—the request is DENIED. ᅠᅠ  Plaintiff asserts that delayed production of documents evidences or constitutes spoliation. Delay alone, absent a showing of destruction or alteration, does not warrant sanctions. The Court admonishes Defendants that continued dilatory tactics could support Rule 37 sanctions, including evidence preclusion, but the present record is insufficient for such relief. ᅠᅠ  Plaintiff requested summary judgment “on the undisputed constitutional violation.” Discovery has only recently begun; numerous factual issues—policy existence, causation, damages—remain unresolved. Consistent with Rule 56(d), the request is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renewal after completion of core discovery and compliance with the Court’s scheduling order. ᅠᅠ  While the Court declines to impose sanctions, it will not countenance continued stonewalling. Should Defendants’ fail to meet the production deadlines or file a deficient privilege log, Plaintiff may move ex parte for monetary and evidentiary sanctions. The Court specifically reserves authority under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) and San Andreas Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(h) to adverse-inference instructions, or issue preclusion upon a showing of bad-faith non-compliance.     ORDER ᅠᅠ  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED as to all claims. However, the Court emphasizes that any theory of respondeat superior liability under § 1983 is foreclosed as a matter of law, and Plaintiff’s claims against the Department must ultimately rest on proof of an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice. ᅠᅠ  Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.  Defendants shall produce all internal affairs records and investigative materials pertaining to Officer Akhmad Shakhzadov and any personnel materially involved in the denial of Plaintiff’s Media Card. Such records are discoverable and relevant to the claims of constitutional deprivation and potential retaliation. Any claimed privileges shall be supported by a detailed privilege log. The Court reserves the right to conduct in camera review if necessary. Defendants shall produce a list of all Media Card applications submitted between January 1, 2025 and April 30, 2025, including the outcome (granted or denied). Names may be redacted subject to a protective order to be issued separately by the Court. Defendants shall also produce all current written policies, procedures, and training materials regarding the issuance of Media Cards and engagement with the press. These are facially relevant and proportional to the claims at issue. Plaintiff’s request for records of SWAT deployments, gang interactions, and other “newsworthy incidents” from April 18 to present is DENIED on the grounds of overbreadth and insufficient nexus to the specific harms alleged in this matter. ᅠᅠ  To the extent Defendants seeks summary judgment, such motion is premature. The Court will not entertain dispositive relief until completion of initial discovery. ᅠᅠ  No sanctions are imposed at this time, though the Court notes that Defendants' non-compliance with earlier discovery requests came dangerously close to justifying remedial measures. Future failures may result in sanctions under Rule 37 and San Andreas Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(h). The Court will not impose adverse evidentiary inferences or preclude summary judgment on the basis of discovery disputes absent a showing of bad faith or actual destruction of evidence.   ᅠᅠ  All production compelled herein shall be completed no later than May 16, 2025. Defendants shall comply with the production deadlines and in camera submission schedule as set forth herein.   ᅠᅠ    IT IS SO ORDERED.   DATED:  May 09, 2025                                    By:                  /s/ Francis J. Stoessel                                                     THE HONORABLE FRANCIS J. STOESSEL                                    Presiding Judge of the Superior Court,                                    State of San Andreas, County of Los Santos

[elgreco]

Subject:  Request for In Camera Review

From: [email protected]

CC: Juan Tzompaxtle, Esq.

 

Dear Judge Stoessel,

 

I write on behalf of Defendant Los Santos Police Department ("LSPD") in the matter of Montblanc v. Shakhzadov, Case No. 25-LSC-04117, currently pending before Your Honor.

 

Pursuant to Court's May 9, 2025 Order granting in part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, the Department is preparing to produce certain sensitive materials including:

• Internal Affairs investigation files concerning former Officer A. Shakhzadov and personnel involved in the Media Card decision;
• Application records for News Media Identification Cards submitted between January 1, 2025 and April 30, 2025;
• Current department policies, procedures and training materials on citizen recording, press interaction, and credentialing processes.

These records contain personal identifiers, preliminary investigatory notes, and deliberative content that implicate legitimate privacy and safety interests. To protect these interests while fully complying with Court's directive, the Department respectfully requests permission to submit these documents in camera for Your Honor's review. We will deliver a sealed package to the Clerk's Office (or upload via a secure electronic portal) by May 16, 2025.

 

Should the Court require any specific filing format or protective protocols for in camera review, please advice and we will implement them immediately.

 

Thank you for Your Honor's time and consideration 

 

Respectfully submitted,

 

/s/ Ibraheem A. Davis

Ibraheem Davis

Chief Counsel

LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT

 

REF: 25-LSC-04117

[Justitiae]

The Court is in receipt of Defendants' correspondence requesting leave to submit for in camera review documents subject to the Court's May 9, 2025 Order granting in part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. The Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' request for in camera review of the aforementioned documents. Materials must be delivered via secure electronic upload immediately, provided the Department coordinates access credentials with the Clerk's Office (( Forum PM )).

Edited May 17 by Justitiae

[Kotwica]

Subject:  RE: Request for In Camera Review

To: Judge Stoessel
From: [email protected]

CC: [email protected]

Your honor, for the purpose of appeal we object to determination that an in camera review is applicable. United States v. Zolin 491 U.S. 554 (1989), which deals with the question of whether in-camera reviews is appropriate. None of the information identified is attorney-client privileged or otherwise privileged in a manner that would make it non-discoverable in a civil proceeding.

This tactic, and I use that word purposefully seeks to elongate the proceeding which increases the cost to the plaintiff.

/s/ Juan Tzompaxtle.

[n0de101]

(( As per the recent announcement from LFM, courts are being placed on an indefinite hold effective immediately. As such all ongoing court proceedings are being terminated. ))