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24-CV-1034 - Trial - Jefferson vs City of Los Santos, et al.


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Donald Wright rises.

"Do you hear yourself?
You are raising arguments on behalf of the Defense that they failed to raise during their initial filing. As my co-counsel has stated multiple times, we have met all requirements under Rule 8, full stop. Your bickering is doing nothing but prejudicing our client and our position. By these actions you showing that this court cannot handle a simple tortfeasor case. 

To your statement of taking an issue under advisement, no one made a legal argument to you, or requested you to take any item under advisement. You improperly raised an issue on your own accord and have now set it out for an unknown period of time, improperly and in doing so you are attacking the complaint well after it's filing, while there is a justiciable argument presented to the court. 

Look at what has been offered, a deposit slip from 2019 that establishes a payment history, payments are at issue in this case. We have alerted the court that we plan on issuing subpoenas like the majority of other tort cases to prove the controversial amount at issue. That initial payment meets the Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) plausibility standard where the United States Supreme Court only requires an initial filing to be "plausible" on it's face. I challenge the court to find any case where damages are pled that have not been modified from filing, to the use of subpoenas, to judgment. 

As for your statement of "damages are distinct from liability." What does that even mean? If a party is not liable they do not owe anyone any damages, that is a basic concept of tort law. In light of this statement the plaintiff requests for the record that the court rephrase and cite to a case that proves that statement. The plaintiff is concerned that the court will misapply precedent and requests the court to clarify that statement.

Additionally, what is the court referencing when it uses the term "consideration?" Consideration has a legal definition that is found in contract law that is wholly unapplicable to the case before this court. The court should be aware for purposes of the record that they should refrain from using terminology that has an established legal definition and use."

(( @almightybounter, @NotCraft, @Jacob Rabinowitz ))


 

Edited by Kotwica
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Juan Tzompaxtle, Esq.
Partner of Tzompaxtle, Goldmann, and Barbieri LLP.
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“Mr. Wright, your recent comments against this Court cannot only be described as improper but distasteful. Let me say this quite clearly: there is no magistrate in this Court who is willing to tolerate such disrespect from any advocate, however passionately they argue for their case. As an advocate, you are required to sponsor the arguments of your client — not undermine the respect of the Court or disturb the proceedings in an arranged manner. This court has no time for blame games.

Now, concerning your complaints, let us get to them apropos.
 

First, you claim that the Court raised some issues that were in favor of the Defense. This is a very serious violation of this Court’s role. It is not within the province of this Court to be asked to ‘advocate’ for anyone in this case. The role of the Court is to rule and administer law that exists as is. Why would you make such outrageous accusations? If your case is valid then it will be proven valid and the legal boundaries will not be crossed in such idiotic pronouncements.
 

The Court also questions its jurisdiction even over matters which have to be determined. Let me recall a well known fact for you, Mr. Wright, that nothing precludes the Court from formulating its position on the merits of the case which it exercises last for legal and factual justifications, especially when justice so dictates. There will be no hurry and pressure in the pursuance of that process in this Court.
 

As an aside, with regard to your citation of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, I must say that the plausibility standard is available where pleadings are being evaluated, however, this particular weakness with regard to this stage of the litigation does not relieve you of the burden of proving your claims at the right time. This looks like a deposit slip that you are sure is relevant but stands alone and is worlds away from satisfying the egregious damage that is sought if any at all. One financial paper such as one from the year 2019 is grossly insufficient, and it is quite clear why that is the case. As you have pointed out, subpoenas may provide more insight into the issue, but until that time, the value of the evidence that you present is questionable.
 

Let us consider the topics of liability and damages. Yes, you are right. A defendant in a court case cannot be held liable in damages simpliciter without having been first found liable. The statement of the Court was aimed at stressing the two-fold aspect in which liability is the precursor to the award of damages. These are basic tenets on tort. Should this particular idea be hard to comprehend, I would recommend going back to the provisions on tort litigation.
 

To conclude, your comments regarding the consideration of "consideration" have no bearing. The Court did not use the term contemplation in the context of breach of contract claim. Rather it was used in the meaning of the process or thought about something. This is quite right and proper for the situation in which it was employed. I think it will be better for you not to seek to antagonize this Court on matters of definitions of legal terms.
 

Mr. Wright, let this serve as a final warning: Such behavior will be dealt with in accordance with this Court’s Policy and any further not only disrespectful actions on your part or that of any member of your team will not be tolerated. This Court requires all counsels to observe absolute decorum and respect, and any such contrary conduct shall attract sanctions.
 

If you think that I would withdraw my arguments, there is no such possibility in this court because everyone is bound by order, respect, and law. Don’t confuse your duty as an attorney with a free hand to disturb these proceedings.

 

Defense, are there any requests or motions before we proceed into trial with this case?”

@Kotwica @NotCraft

Edited by almightybounter
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Michelle Jefferson

Plaintiff,

vs.

City of Los Santos, Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzales, Sheriff of the County of Los Santos, Roderick H. Hayward, in their official position, Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low, in their individual and official position

Defendants.

Case No.: 24-CV-1034


INTERIM ORDER CUSTODIAL PROVISIONS IN RESPECT OF THE DEFENSE’S FAILURE IN REPLY AND A NOTICE OF POTENTIAL DEFAULT JUDGEMENT
 

The Defense counsel has been defaulting in complying with this Court's orders and in taking part in the proceedings, the Court notes with concern. Despite this continuing situation from the Defense, where no arguments have been offered, this Court is forced to make a decision regarding what is to be done as is provided for under the Constitution of the United States of America, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures as well as the law.
 

The Court admits that there are two potential courses of action as already indicated in the beginning;

 

Even in the event where the Defense is silent, the Court has the option of going on with the trial. Still, in light of the present circumstances where the Defense does not take any active step, it would all the same lead to a lopsided proceeding, foregoing any contest to the Plaintiff’s claims. Even though this enables the Plaintiff to have the opportunity and present her case in full, it is still subverts the essence of an equitable jousting system whereby a Defense fails to show up.

 

The alternative within which the Court can act under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the awarding of the judgment in favour of the Plaintiff and this is called default judgment. There are no circumstances under which a default judgment can be issued except where one party fails to meet the deadline complying, or participating in a trimming process issued out by the Court. Due to the non-intervention of the said action by the Defense, such a judgment is sure to hold the Defendants liable automatically, the only issue fetching about being the issue of damages liable.
 

Given the situation, this Court is more likely than not to issue the default judgment by the end of the specified court date if no substantial ground is shown by the Defense. As the Plaintiff has adduced evidence in compliance with her orders from this Court, it would be unreasonable to keep stalling the matter further because of the inertia of the Defense.
 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
 

Last and final extension is given to the Defense to communicate with the Court through a outline made and filed within two days from the date of this Order. Otherwise in the event that this time is elapsed without any action on this response from the Defense, the Court will move ahead and enter a default judgment against the Defense who is evading the Plaintiff.

In the event a punitive order is given in this regard, the Plaintiff will in the award stage of the proceedings be required to give sufficient evidence to prove her loss assessed in monetary terms including loss of earning capacity discussed above.

If the Defense fails to do so, any further defense will be waived, and the Court will do as it considers appropriate in accordance with Rule 55 and the law.

 

SO ORDERED.

Honorable Martin Hockenbeyer

Dated 16-10-2024;

 

@Jacob Rabinowitz @Kotwica @Userone @NotCraft

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"Very well so. The Court is now in session, and we are officially commencing the trial in the matter of Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, et al., Case Number 24-CV-1034. Both the Plaintiff and Defense are instructed to prepare their opening statements and be ready to present their respective cases. Plaintiff, you may begin whenever ready." 

@Kotwica @Jacob Rabinowitz @NotCraft

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Donald Wright rises again.

"Thank you for the long, profound, eloquent, albeit it circular admonishment. Three items the plaintiff wishes to raise.

First, the plaintiff is informing the court for a fourth time that we plan on utilizing subpoenas which is a pre-trial filing, commencing the court case is premature. The court was put on ample notice of our intent.

Second, the plaintiff is requesting clarification based off of the courts previous statement regarding liability and damages, or outline this two-fold approach. 

Third, the plaintiff also requests the court to outline how damages would be allocated if we are plaintiff is successful as there are differing theories.

Thank you."

(( @almightybounter, @NotCraft, @Jacob Rabinowitz ))

Edited by Kotwica
Juan Tzompaxtle, Esq.
Partner of Tzompaxtle, Goldmann, and Barbieri LLP.
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6 minutes ago, Kotwica said:

Donald Wright rises again.

"Thank you for the long, profound, eloquent, albeit it circular admonishment. Three items the plaintiff wishes to raise.

First, the plaintiff is informing the court for a fourth time that we plan on utilizing subpoenas which is a pre-trial filing, commencing the court case is premature. The court was put on ample notice of our intent.

Second, the plaintiff is requesting clarification based off of the courts previous statement regarding liability and damages, or outline this two-fold approach. 

Third, the plaintiff also requests the court to outline how damages would be allocated if we are plaintiff is successful as there are differing theories.

Thank you."

(( @almightybounter, @NotCraft, @Jacob Rabinowitz ))



The defense for LSSD does not have a problem with any of the plaintiffs requests as it is standard for any civil case. 

@Jacob Rabinowitz @Kotwica @almightybounter

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“With respect to your concerns Mr. Wright, I shall try to respond to them in the following manner.

 

To begin with, in regards to the issue of subpoenas which you have raised several times, the Court has already taken note of your intention to file subpoenas on a number of times. But the issuance of subpoenas coupled with the pre-trial stage have not affected our ability to proceed with this trial. Certainly sufficient efforts should have been made to issue the subpoenas as part of your case in the discovery phase. The trial proceeds and now, all subpoenas are to be dealt with in the context of the trial. The Court will in response to your numerous notices of intention to file subpoena plaits not postpone the trial any further.

 

Secondly, with respect to the Court’s differences between liability and damages, this is not a novel or difficult concept. Liability means the part which seeks an answer to the question; was the Defendant in Tort who caused tortious harm. Damages are distinct, and are only considered once the legal liability has been established. Once liability is established we are then concerned with the determination of the quantum of liability the Plaintiff is to be paid. There are two steps to this process; we do not award damages without first establishing liability. You do not need to ask for any clarification on this point as it is trite and applicable to all tort law situations.

 

Also, let me remind you that a default judgment has already been made against the Defendant, which is the Los Santos Police Department, for not responding at first. Let us come back to this competency and explain its significance for understanding the context: For Jefferson, the LSPD is liable for the claims advanced by the plaintiff. The current activities relate to assessing the damages to be awarded. I have, however, proposed that the plaintiff explain why he should be allowed to claim as much as 10,000 dollars an hour in the present circumstances. So far evidence is scant that explains the rationality of this demand. Supporting documentation is not sufficient: when you provide a single deposit slip dated 2019-all these materials do not correspond to the level of evidentiary support required to maintain your client's claims for so-called ongoing damages at the amount of 10,000 dollars an hour. Should you want to support their particulars in the way that they devised it, but in the proportionality that they require a considerable amount of strong and unitary evidence.

 

Last but not least, as for the distribution of damages should the plaintiff win the case, this will be determined by the amount of evidence the parties provide during the trial. The Court will assess compensatory damages from losses or harms established by the Plaintiff and if applicable may award punitive damages. The distribution will be made in accordance with the established legal practice with taking into account the circumstances of harm, the Plaintiff’s material and case law applicable in this case.”

 

@Kotwica

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"It is a barrier to proceeding to trial as any case theory relies on what is received from a subpoena. Also, it would unfairly prejudice the defense if we proceeded to trial without giving them notice of our findings under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26. 

This case is still well within discovery. 

As for your response to allocation, I will assist the court in narrowing my question. It appears this is a novel issue, and the legislative branch is silent - what theory of negligence does this court adopt?"

(( @NotCraft @almightybounter @Jacob Rabinowitz ))

Edited by Kotwica
Juan Tzompaxtle, Esq.
Partner of Tzompaxtle, Goldmann, and Barbieri LLP.
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“Mr. Wright and Mr. Rabinowitz, I see your latest submissions not only as a persistent misapprehension about this Court’s past processes but also as an unfortunate departure from the usual practice. To start with, Mr. Wright, you contend that having to comply with subpoenas is a hurdle in proceeding to the trial because they are integral in your theory of the case. However, as I have already pointed out, this should not have been the case as the discovery process, including subpoenas, should have been completed prior to the commencement of the trial. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 US Codes or Policies and Standards, requires that all necessary information be provided ahead of the court’s hearing, while the same rules, 16(f), allow this court to impose sanctions for failure to adhere to rules of the same section. This court will also not extend the dates of trial to allow you time to get ready or to cover the discovery stage as matters should have been ‘timed’ correctly.
 

Also, according to you, going to trial would further exacerbate the harm to the defense in that the findings which would be obtained from permitting such subpoenas would be of little use. But, the defense has been in default and cannot suffer prejudice by findings that could have been sought in the course of discovery. This is not supported by any evidence. The Federal Rules leave no room for doubt – Discovery is not wide opened in the midst of a trial – Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) provides for a hearing on damages after default and to wit, a default has already been entered.

Moreover, your assertion that this matter is still within the stage of pre-trial discovery is also wrong, and it is an indication of a lack of comprehension of the order of events and the stage of the proceedings in this trial. This Court has fixed a timetable for the trial. This period has elapsed for the purposes of discovery. You cannot disobey the orders of this Court and then contend that you have a right to cause more delay in the case.
 

Now, with respect to your request regarding the negligence theory of the Court, you say this is a ‘new legal issue’. I have to say this to you – negligence law has been developed in detail in the United States of America due to its common law system, and this Court does not embrace a new idea in relation to such a fundamental legal concept. The standard principles of negligence – duty, breach, causation, and damages – are what will be applied here. This is simply wrong and evil. How can the accused be allowed to even argue such a thing? It suggests either an active attempt to mislead the court or ignorance of principles that are very basic in law practice. Also for your reference, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N. Y. 339 (1928) remains an important decision that is usually cited for the holding that a tort is actionable only if it was reasonable to foresee in determining the extent of duty owed by the defendant. One would expect no less of your proposals to this court which are rather more provocative then most attempts in asking the courts to abandon established law.
 

Now, let’s focus on Mr. Rabinowitz’s rejoinder. You still maintained a position that your assertion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) is that of a well pleaded complaint as it does not obligate you to prove the claim for damages until after the judgment has been pronounced. While this complement is correct in a normative sense that a complaint is only required to state a plausible case for relief, it does not relieve you from the duty to adduce evidence once default judgment has been granted against the defendant. According to Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts have the power to require evidence of the amount of the damages claimed. The standards set by this rule can certainly not be satisfied with your bare averments as to hourly rates and your vague estimates as to the amount of compensation that you sought.

In addition, the manner in which you attempted to procure the evidence of the additional witness at this late stage ought to have been procured in good time and should have been avoided since it goes to the disorganized strategy you have taken with these court proceedings. This Court made scheduling orders at a preliminary stage and case management order as per rule 16(b) may only be altered for good cause shown. Delay in naming the witnesses which was clearly a consequence of your failure to prepare for quite a simple case does not qualify as good cause.
 

I dare say both of you need to remember that when this case began, I specifically told you that I would not allow you to represent the Plaintiff pro bono because you do not seem to be organized, prepared or prompt enough. Unfortunately, it appears that these worries have indeed been vindicated during the course of this trial. The same allegations as regards the non-compliance to the orders and scheduling of the Court have been made against you all the time and your persistently twisted understanding and application of the law and procedural concepts only reflect back on your client’s image.
 

Now, to bring everything together for the purpose of making the record clearer:

Subpoenas were supposed to be issued during the period of the discovery process. The fact that you have not done so will not further ait the trial.

Liability and damages are two distinct questions of law, and it has already been established as a matter of default that the Los Santos Police Department is the one that bears liability. What this Court has to deal with is the measure of damages which you have not been able to prove satisfactorily so far.

No new witnesses will be allowed during this period unless a valid reason has been given for why the witness was not presented earlier. This Court will not entertain any further interruptions to the trial schedule owing to your lack of readiness for the trial.
 

Last but not least, I would like to take this opportunity to say to you, let us begin with an admonition: You do not want to disregard this Court’s order, or fail to comply with the rules of the procedure, or advance idiotic legal theories. If you do so, it will not be a problem for me to use the sanctions allowed by Fed . R. Civ. P. 11 which deals with absurd and improper litigations. Court rooms such as this one are governed by norms of order and decorum, as well as the expectation that you will practice such conduct."

 

@Kotwica @Jacob Rabinowitz 

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"Firstly, your honor, you mistake what I have said in reference to our well-pleaded complaint under Rule 8(a). I have stated that this particular evidence is not a necessity at this point because it is not integral to discovery of evidence relevant to the facts of this case. We say this in order to inform the court that it need not wait for this evidence, because we have demonstrated that our client is entitled to a trial in this matter even if there is evidence still pending. Furthermore, this evidence is needed only to substantiate the award amount and a hearing can be held at the conclusion of trial if liability is found by this court.

 

Secondly, to make an additional record, I believe it is highly improper for this court to admonish myself and Mr. Wright publicly on the record for our insistence that procedure be correctly followed. Your honor has, on numerous occasions, attempted to act as counsel for the government in such a manner that we ought to move for mistrial. However, in the interest of public accountability, we intend to move forward and to appeal any elements of the final ruling we believe to be rooted in bias toward counsel for the plaintiff. Your honor has also improperly slandered both of us, thereby further demonstrating bias toward us personally. You say we are not organized, prepared, or prompt enough, but it is your honor that has failed on multiple occasions to adhere to this court's own procedural time-tables. According to the record, we were supposed to proceed to trial more than a week ago but your honor has unduly delayed that process. Your honor states that its initial belief has been vindicated, thereby disrespecting the order of the appellate court that forced this court to permit additional counsel for the Plaintiff and, in so doing, asserted the rights of the Plaintiff in this matter.

 

Thirdly, your honor states that no new witnesses will be permitted during the post-trial phase, but your honor fails to understand that these are not witnesses material to the cause of action. The witnesses we intend to introduce in post-trial are able to testify to the amount to which Ms. Jefferson is entitled as a billable rate that is honored by the many adult entertainment establishes that hire her on a regular basis. We have, for example, one witness that will testify to the fact that Ms. Jefferson is regularly paid a rate of $30,000 per hour. This, however, does not relate to the cause of action against the defendants but to the award. Therefore, a separate hearing is warranted during post-trial to ascertain and substantiate an award amount to which Ms. Jefferson is entitled as compensatory damages and punitive damages to follow. If your honor wishes to refuse us the ability to introduce these witnesses in post-trial or allow us to show cause for the damages we have claimed in our amended complaint, we will deal with the same on appeal following issuance of this court's final judgment.

 

Finally, your honor improperly submits to the record an implied belief that either myself or Mr. Wright would submit what you refer to as 'idiotic legal theories'. In so doing, your honor shows bias toward counsel once more and already has created grounds for a new trial to be granted on appeal. As members of the bar, it is highly irregular and inappropriate for your honor to openly admonish counsel by inferring that we would ever submit legal theories that are 'idiotic' or, to use another term, frivolous. To submit frivolous legal theories would be grounds for admonishment by the state bar including disbarment – we have no intention of doing so, and your honor should refrain from disparaging counsel in this way without substantive cause. If there is reason to believe we've acted in a way that violates this court's orders, we would respectfully ask that this court adhere to the procedural rules regarding contempt of court and hold a proper hearing on the matter so that myself and Mr. Wright may have an opportunity to show cause before this court unduly admonishes us.

 

With this, I will say once again that we are ready to proceed to trial."

 

(( @almightybounter @Kotwica @NotCraft ))

(( I wrote this all by myself without the need of AI tools ))

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jacob ezekiel rabinowitz III, esq.
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"Mr. Rabinowitz - after carefully reviewing your submission, I will address your concerns systematically to ensure that the emergent issues are clear and at the same time consistent with the legal procedure.
 

  • Rule 8(a) and Discovery:

Your current reliance on Rule 8(a) is acknowledged and indeed a well-pleaded complaint must first meet the standard of stating a claim upon which relief can be granted. Howsoever, the current evidence you refer to is irrelevant at this state for the sole fact that it relates to damages. Even if the primary concern of the trial at hand is liability, the court reserves the right to request all the relevant documentation to make sure that both liability and potential damages are definitely properly substantiated. It is not unusual for the courts to seek clarity during the pre-trial phase, however-and particularly if there are gaps in the evidence presented that may influence the flow of the trial or any settlement discussions.

More so ever, Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do require a full and timely disclosure of evidence, including that which will be used to substantiate all the damages. Delaying or withholding key information until post-trial does not align with the disclosure obligations that we have at hand. 

  • Procedural Timelines and Allegations of Delay:

You have stated that the court has delayed proceedings and improperly balanced its judgment towards the Defense. I must remind you that any delays were the result of necessary procedural deliberations and course not due to any intent to obstruct the case at hand. It is and always has been critical for the Court to ensure that all elements of the current case are carefully considered in the interest of Justice. Your allegations that this Court has acted inappropriately by following procedure are unfounded and I can assure you, Mr. Rabinowitz, that the court's actions are consistent with both the law and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As you have previously stated (related to the decisions that you have taken in regards of Appeals), any appeals or assertions regarding bias should be based on objective and demonstrable evidence rather than perceived grievances.

  • Admissibility of Post-Trial Witnesses

Your so-to-be request that new witnesses be introduced post-trial to testify to Ms. Jefferson's alleged rate is to be noted that: introducing new witnesses during the post-trial phase and especially if their testimony pertains to key facts that should have been established during the trial itself is not permitted. In your own submissions, you acknowledge that this witness's testimony relates to compensatory damages. Do you see the drift that this is taking, Mr. Rabinowitz? If such testimony is indeed critical to proving Ms. Jefferson's claims, it should have been brought forward during discovery. Mr. Rabinowitz, as you may clearly be aware of, introducing new witnesses after a verdict has been reached undermines the integrity of the trial process. As such, your request for post-trial witness testimony on damages at the end of the trial will be denied at this stage.

  • Claims of Bias and Improper Admonishment

You have raised concerns about perceived bias and improper conduct on the Court's side, particularly with respect to comments made on the record. I have to remind you, Mr. Rabinowitz, that the role of this Court is to remain neutral and ensure that proceedings are however conducted fairly. 

 

With everything being clarified so far, we are ready to move to trial. Plaintiff, you may begin with your opening statements."

 

(( @Jacob Rabinowitz @Kotwica )) 

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"Thank you, your honor. We will proceed.

 

We have laid out a series of twenty-five counts, charging the defendants with violating the Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The facts are undisputed, and we have made our arguments in our complaint as amended. In keeping with the arguments therein, Plaintiff is entitled to compensation on the grounds that her first, fourth, and fifth amendment rights were violated.

This whole case flows from a one legal question that this court must answer: Does the Plaintiff have the constitutional right to protest, without a permit, in front of the LSPD Headquarters in Pershing Square?


We would direct this court to the table of authorities we've submitted in our brief, specifically to Cox, Grace, Hague, Lutz, and Gitlow, which together lay out a definition of what constitutes a traditional public forum versus a limited public forum, and which spell out the restrictions that may be imposed upon each. We assert that the location of Plaintiff's protests, the sidewalk in front of the LSPD Headquarters or even the stairs themselves, provided there is no bona fide impediment to the egress or exit thereof. Following from this, we assert that the LSPD, the LSSD, and their employees had no right to detain Ms. Jefferson at any point in time, and certainly had no right to cite her or to order her or any of the participants to disperse. There was no crime in Ms. Jefferson's actions, and it is improper for Ms. Jefferson to be charged with a crime because another person in her crowd - which did not require tickets or screening prior to attendance - committed a crime. The defense will likely raise the point that Ms. Jefferson's actions were a disturbance of the peace, but we would postulate otherwise, citing Feiner from the authorities to assert that Ms. Jefferson's conduct did not meet the Supreme Court's description of civil unrest or disorder and therefore Ms. Jefferson could not have been charged for such conduct. Absent justification for charging her or any members of her group, for whom we do not speak, there was no reason to disrupt the assembly and therefore the Los Santos Police Department, and the officers employed thereby, engaged in an unlawful dispersion of the crowd in violation of the first amendment.

We also charge this court to answer an additional question: Did the Deputies – Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low – have a duty to give truthful testimony on the scene to Officer Amber Moore of the Los Santos Police Department?

We would direct this court to our arguments in Count Two, in which we assert that there is an implied common law responsibility from the crime of Perjury, pursuant to Penal Code section 606(b), which states: 'A peace officer who knowingly and intentionally makes or causes to be made any material statement in an official report or to another peace officer and the statement is included in an official report, knowing the statement to be false, is guilty of a felony'. The defendants Kaminski and Low have essentially admitted as much, having recanted their original testimony. However, that testimony was used to substantiate the probable cause necessary for arresting Ms. Jefferson and she did in fact spend time in jail because of their testimony. Even if Kaminski and Low are entitled to qualified immunity under Heien, this court must conclude that Kaminski and Low had no qualified right to submit the false testimony to Officer Moore who filed an official report to arrest Ms. Jefferson. We assert that this is exactly the kind of conduct 606(b) is intended to cover, and that it was unlawful. We postulate that any statement that is not one hundred percent truthful is in fact a lie, if even only by omission or misunderstanding. The testimony given by Kaminski and Low had massive gravity upon Ms. Jefferson's life – it resulted in her being charged with a crime and imprisoned falsely. Accordingly, this court ought to find for the Plaintiff in this regard and also forward the matter to the District Attorney for levying of criminal charges against the Deputies. Lying on official records mustn't be tolerated by government agents, else the integrity of our entire justice system would be at risk.

The majority of issues before this court have been decided already by the Supreme Court. If a person is detained without reasonable suspicion or arrested without probable cause, it follows that the person has endured an unlawful seizure of their person under the meaning of the fourth amendment. We direct the court to apply the Graham factors to determine if, any point, Ms. Jefferson's conduct was unlawful. If Ms. Jefferson's conduct at the protest was not unlawful then it follows that, under Graham, Ms. Jefferson could not have been detained or arrested because to do so would be an application of force, even if de minimus. The Graham test is structured such that the lack of a crime at issue provides that no amount of force would be appropriate.

We also raise an issue of unlawful search and seizure on the grounds that Ms. Jefferson's home was unlawfully searched, absent a warrant. The Defendants have claimed exigent circumstances were present, but we assert that no such exigency was present because Ms. Jefferson was not fleeing or potentially destroying evidence and there was no reason to believe a crime of violence was actively being committed within her properties. Lacking substantive proof of exigency, this court must find that no such exigent circumstances were present and therefore, lacking a warrant or consent, the searches were unlawful. Any evidence therefore discovered is inadmissible against her, and any charges stemming from the evidence discovered are therefore null and void under Mapp as fruit of the poisonous tree.

 

We raise a Monell claim as well, asserting that the Los Santos Police Department did not adequately train their officers or provide policy guidance on the issues of traditional public fora. On numerous repeated occasions, Ms. Jefferson's protests were dispersed and she was subject to citation and arrest for organizing them. But, since she was on a part of public property traditionally understood as a public forum - the sidewalk - and because the sidewalk is not a government building reserved for specific administrative duties, she was protesting within a traditional public forum. We direct this court to Gitlow, wherein the Supreme Court ruled on the restrictions that may be applied to traditional public fora. The Los Santos Police Department, as an employer, failed to train its officers correctly on which types of assemblies may be restricted or dispersed - this resulted in numerous arrests, and a pattern of dispersing protests taking place on traditional public fora. The arresting officer, Defendant Moore, was able to patrol on her own without a backing partner which signals that the Department viewed her as competent enough or sufficiently trained so as to understand the laws to an appropriate degree to warrant trust. The Department clearly erred, however, given the repeated legal errors made by Officer Moore and we assert that, under Monell, they ought to be held accountable for their failure to train officers correctly.

Finally, we raise a breach of duty claim asserting that the Sheriff's Department had a duty to inform this court and counsel for the Plaintiff of any past instances of perjury. As admitted by the Sheriff's Department in a settlement agreement, submitted as evidence of record, Kaminski and Low both erred in their understanding of what happened but they gave false testimony regardless. Their false testimony is factually, by the definition of 606(b), perjury. Under Brady, we are entitled to be notified and this court must apply exceeding scrutiny to any testimony submitted by them because they've demonstrated a propensity to give false statements, either intentionally or with reckless disregard for the administration of public justice, on official records.

Conclusively, we direct this court to the full, unabridged, legal arguments of our amended complaint which is made in conjunction with the submitted table of authorities and ask that this court find in favor of the plaintiff on all counts. We stand prepared to answer any specific, clarifying questions this court may choose to ask for its own knowledge in interpreting the law or any of the authorities we've submitted."

 

(( Link to Brief: 

))

 

(( I wrote this all by myself without the need of AI tools ))

Edited by Jacob Rabinowitz
  • Strong 1

jacob ezekiel rabinowitz III, esq.
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Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzales, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, and Roderick Hayward, in their official capacities,
Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low, in their individual and official capacities

Case Number: 24-CV-1034

Prepared by: Donald J. Wright
 

MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF DUCES TECUM SUBPEONAS

_______________________________________________
 

Comes now, the plaintiff requests this court in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 45(c) to issue the following subpoenas against the Los Santos Sheriffs Department:
 

I. Full unredacted internal affairs files/personnel files/training files for:
(1) Roderick Hayward
(2) Christopher Kaminski
(3) Marvin Low

 

II. Training documents related to Constitutional Rights.

 

III. Procedures related to Constitutional Rights.

 

IV. Training documents related to arrest procedures.

 

V. Procedures related to arrest procedures.

 

VI. Dates of when each procedure went into effect.

 

VII. All eyewitness accounts.

 

VIII. All arrest records relating to Michelle Jefferson’s arrests stemming from these events.

 

IX. All inventory records from custodial searches on Michelle Jefferson stemming from these events.

 

X. All CCTV/video tapes of Pershing Square on the applicable dates.

 

XI. Any and all dashcam footage from LSSD vehicles stemming from these events.


The court is hereby requested to develop and deliver the order with notice to all parties.

 

_______________________________________________

Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge.

 

Sworn this 19 day of October, 2024

 

/s/ dj47
Donald J. Wright

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this Motion for Issuance of Subpoena was served on all parties involved in this case on October 19, 2024. 
/s/ dj47

(( @NotCraft, @almightybounter, @Jacob Rabinowitz ))

Edited by Kotwica
Juan Tzompaxtle, Esq.
Partner of Tzompaxtle, Goldmann, and Barbieri LLP.
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Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzales, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, and Roderick Hayward, in their official capacities,
Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low, in their individual and official capacities

Case Number: 24-CV-1034

Prepared by: Donald J. Wright
 

MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS FOR TESTIMONY

_______________________________________________
 

Comes now, the plaintiff requests this court in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 45(c) to issue the following subpoenas for the testimony of the following employees of the Los Santos Sheriff's Department:
(1) Roderick Hayward
(2) Christopher Kaminski
(3) Marvin Low

 

Additionally, the same request aforementioned is requested for the following employees of Octopussy Gentlemen's Club:

(1) Michelle Jefferson
(2) Kimberly Washington
(3) Adir Havshush

The court is hereby requested to develop and deliver the order with notice to all parties.

_______________________________________________

Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge.

 

Sworn this 19 day of October, 2024

 

/s/ dj47
Donald J. Wright

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this Motion for Issuance of Subpoena was served on all parties involved in this case on October 19, 2024. 
/s/ dj47

(( @NotCraft, @almightybounter, @Jacob Rabinowitz ))

Edited by Kotwica
Juan Tzompaxtle, Esq.
Partner of Tzompaxtle, Goldmann, and Barbieri LLP.
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  • Tungsten changed the title to 24-CV-1034 - Trial - Jefferson vs City of Los Santos, et al.
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