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SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS, COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS PLAINTIFF: Stefan Castillo DEFENDANT: Los Santos County Sheriff's Department CASE NUMBER: LCS-CV-2024-001 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW _______________________________________________ This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff Stefan Castillo's Motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law. For the reasons stated herein, the aforementioned motion is GRANTED. OVERVIEW OF ACTION A. Factual Background Plaintiff Stefan Castillo worked as a sergeant for the Defendant, the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department. Defendant is a law enforcement agency duly organized, existing, and operating under the laws of the State of San Andreas. This case disputes the legality of Plaintiff Stefan Castillo's detention during the aftermath of a deputy-involved shooting incident. A. Procedural History The case is an action brought by Stefan Castillo (hereinafter "Plaintiff") against the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department (hereinafter "Defendant") on June 30th, 2024, alleging deprivation of rights under color of law. Plaintiff challenges the adequacy of the interview he has been taken on June 26th. On July 10th, a Motion to Modify Counsel was forwarded by Mr Donald J. Wright on behalf of the Plaintiff, which was granted. On the same day, a Motion for Summary Judgement was also forwarded by the Plaintiff, which was denied. A reconsieration was also requested, which was denied as well. Trial commenced with witness examination. During the examination of then-Sgt Elise Crawford, the Court noted the failure of the aforementioned witness to answer questions after a certain point. A request for spoliation was forwarded by the Plaintiff on September 23rd, which was replaced by a renewal of the Motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law on September 27th, 2024. The Court held a hearing for this last Motion, which is now ripe for review. FINDINGS OF FACTS During the night of June 25th, Plaintiff observed Mr Deandre Lawrence pursuing Mr Franklin Mejora with a baseball bat in their hand. Mr Lawrence proceeded to takle Mr Mejora on the ground, assaulting him with the aforementioned baseball bat. Plaintiff took action, discharging their service weapon at Mr Lawrence in an act of usage of force. Mr Lawrence was then detained successfully by Plaintiff and administered aid. Both Mr Lawrence and Mr Mejora were transported to medical facilities by the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department deputies. During the aftermath of the shooting, Plaintiff was questiond by the corresponding internal affairs structure of the department. The interview concludes with the placement of Plaintiff of administrative leave until June 30th. LEGAL STANDARD A. Judgement as a Matter of Law Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when “a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue. . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000). The court “should review all of the evidence in the record," but "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Id. see also Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F. 3d 1050, 1062. The court should give credence to the evidence favoring the non-moving party, as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted or unimpeached, to the extent that it comes from disinterested witnesses. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151. The test applied is whether the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury's verdict. Josephs, 443 F.3d at 1062. The verdict must be upheld if the evidence is adequate to support the jury's conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion from the same evidence. Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227. However, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when the jury could have relied only on speculation to reach its verdict. Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah County, 556 F.3d 797, 803. The standard for judgment as a matter of law “mirrors” that for granting summary judgment. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150. Such judgement should be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1147 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248. A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. B. Basis for Motion Based on the presented arguments, witness examinations and other exhibits, the Court understands that the interview of Plaintiff that has occurred on June 26th was in relation to the shooting that has happened one day before. During this interrogation, the Plaintiff was administered a Garrity warning. The Court ackwnoledges law enforcement personnel "do not receive a watered down version of Constitutional Rights." Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493. Furthermore, the Court distinguishes between the Garrity Rights, utilized in administrative proceedings, and Miranda Rights, used in criminal ones. Corroborating these facts, due to the criminal nature of the acts committed by Plaintiff, the Court finds it reasonable that Plaintiff should have been administered the Miranda admonishment in the same way as any other person of the public would have been. In regard to the nature of the interrogation, the Court hence finds it to be custodial. In order to draw such a conclusion, the Court makes use of the test established by precent: "(1) a person is in custody or feels that their otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, (2) was questioned." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444. "A reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112. Derriving from the above-referenced facts, while it is uncontested that the Miranda admonishment does not constitute a costitutional requirement, equal protection of rights does. When it comes to the allegations related to deprivation of Due Process via refusal to answer questions upon the Court's instruction to do so and questionable attitude in regard to negotiations, the Court finds the deprivation of Due Process to be existent and hereby issues fines to both Sophie Thyne and Elise Crawford (( Considering the holiday of Michael and the real-life issues of Kayayday, I understand the need to prioritize real life over a game. The fines are symbolic and shall be used for roleplay purposes, however, no actual punishments will be issued due to the above-referenced considerations )). DAMAGES AND FEES A. Compensatory damages The purpose of damages is to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in if the tort had not been committed — restitutio in integrum. Damages are not awarded to over-enrich a plaintiff far beyond his actual losses. The reverse is also the case — the plaintiff should not get far less than his actual loss. Furthermore, a wide range of reporting about both public officials and candidates is protected. Certainly, the conduct of official duties by public officials is subject to the widest scrutiny and criticism. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85. But the Court has held as well that criticism that reflects generally upon an official’s integrity and honesty is protected. According to different statutes, the term “public official” means, inter alia, "any elected official, appointed official, or employee of a Federal, State, or local unit of government in the United States". Plaintiff would be entitled to overtime lost wages, however, no documents have been forwarded to the Court that would prove such a loss. As such, the Court will evaluate these damages to the best of its ability. Due to the fact that administrative leave was issued for four days, the Court finds it reasonable to award $12,500 per day, meaning $50,000. B. Emotional damages and distress Taking into consideration stress caused by an unproper investigative process and violation of Due Process during multiple instances, the Court finds the requested sum of $500,000 to be more than reasonable. As such, the Court awards the said sum of $500,000 under this category. C. Attorney fees The court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. A prevailing party is one who succeeds on "any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit...." Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 788, quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79. For there to be liability there must be a violation of a federal rights, not merely a violation of federal law. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Santos 493 U.S. 103, 106.. In Blessing v. Freestone, et al. 520 U.S. 329, the Court discussed the elements needed for a finding of a violation of a federal right: “[T]he provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory." The Court finds a violation of such federal rights. Under Hensley, 461 U.S. 424, the starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is reached by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate. This figure is known as the "lodestar." Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934. Attorneys must exercise reasonable billing judgment, and public interest attorneys must exercise the reasonable billing judgment used in the private sector. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Outrageous lack of billing judgment may result in no fees. Lewis v. Kendrick 940 F.2d 25. However, given the circumstances of the case, regardless that the fees seem to be lacking judgement, they will be lowered by the Court accordingly. Considering the length of the case, its complexity, number of motions, nature of witness examinations, the Court finds an hourly rate of $10,000 to be multiplied by 20 billable hours, totalling to $200,000 in attorney fees. In addition to that, the Court entitles Plaintiff to costs of travel of $50,000 considering the aforementioned factors. Attorney fees should total at $250,000. ORDER Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED THAT: Plaintiff's Motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law is GRANTED. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages in the sum of $50,000; emotional and distress damages in the sum of $500,000; and attorney fees in the sum of $250,000. Plaintiff's administrative leave is to be expunged from his record. Then-Sergeant Elise Crawford is recommended to be investigated for the conduct during the interview of Plaintiff. Both Ms Sophie Thyne and Ms Elise Crawford shall be fined for contempt of court (( see above )); _______________________________________________ IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: OCTOBER 3, 2024 Hon. Sergio Robleto Judge Superior Court of Los Santos (( @Michael @Kayayday @Kotwica @ScubaStef - It is more of a rushed judgement. My apologies but my free time has become limited. ))

"Recess until the Court rules on the motion." (( @Kotwica @Michael ))

"Due to the given circumstances and continous unncessary delay, the Defendant is granted 24 hours to provide a response to this motion. Then we'll have a recess until the Court renders a judgement on this motion." (( @Michael @Kotwica ))

"Opposing counsel, anything in response to Mister Wright's request?" (( Since tomorrow's the 25th, we'll wait as common courtesy and then we'll hopefully get this moving at a proper speed. Our apologies for all the inconviniences. @Michael @Kotwica ))

@Kayayday

COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE PLAINTIFF: Michelle Jefferson DEFENDANT: Los Santos Police Department et. al. CASE NUMBER: B19736 Appellant, ORDER GRANTING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND PETITION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION _______________________________________________ This matter is before the Court for consideration of Ms Michelle Jefferson, through and by Mr Jacob E. Rabinowitz III's and Mr Donald J. Wright's (hereinafter "Appellant") for an emergency interlocutory appeal of an immediately reviewable matter occurring within Case 24-CV-1034 and Appellant's petition for a permanent injunction enjoining the trial court from restricting further appointment of counsel. For the reasons stated herein, the above-referenced emergency interlocutory appeal and petition for permanent injunction are GRANTED insofar as the Court finds them necessary to address the legal deficiencies arrising through the interlocutory orders issued by the trial court. OVERVIEW OF ACTION The case is a class action brought by Michelle Jefferson against the Los Santos Police Department under 42 U.S.C § 1983 on September 14th, 2024, alleging violations of the fundamental rights of the United States Constitution and laws. Plaintiff challenges the adequacy of the her arrests and citations issued to her throughout the months of August and September of this year. On September 16th, a Motion for Addition of Counsel was forwarded by Mr Jacob E. Rabinowitz III and Mr Donald J. Wright pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1654 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 44. The Motion was denied on the same day by the Honorable Judge Martin Hockenbeyer. On September 17th, a Motion to Stay was filed by the aforementioned attorneys, which was also denied by Judge Hockenbeyer. An interlocutory appeal was lastly forwarded to this Court on September 19th. SUMMARY OF DECISION Under the the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 28 U.S.C. §1654 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 44, the Plaintiff has the right to appoint counsel. As such, the Plaintiff the right to appoint, supplement, or dismiss counsel using her own judgement and discretion. Limiting this right, the trial court stated that it "possess broad discretion to make determinations that preserve the integrity of the judicial process, including the authority to limit the participation of counsel when it is necessary to prevent potential conflicts, confusion, or delay". The Court acknowledges the usage of discretion in order to guarantee the preservation of the judicial process' integrity, including, under very limited and exigent circumstances, the limitation of of participating counsel. However, based on the presented facts, the complex nature of the case and the lack of hearings on the matters, the Court finds no objective reason to believe risk of prejudice exists and hence, due to the vitality of this fundamental rights, the Court find imposing such a limitation without proper basis to be abuse of discretion. The Court finds that a permanent injunction is necessary to force the trial court to adequately safeguard the fundamental rights of the Plaintiff, having found no solid legal basis for the denial of additional counsel given the circumstances. ORDER The Court finds that trial court has been deliberately indifferent towards the protection of fundamental right to counsel of the Plaintiff within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment of the United States. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal and petition for permanent injunction are GRANTED. The Court further finds the Plaintiff have established by a preponderance of the evidence that a permanent injunction is appropriate and necessary. The Court specifically finds that Plaintiff have suffered or will suffer irreparable injury if a permanent injunction is not issued. The permanent injunction enjoins the trial court from restricting further appointment of counsel. Appellant factually has a right to appoint counsel of her choosing in the enumeration she so chooses, _______________________________________________ IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: SEPTEMBER 20, 2024 Hon. Michael Rouker Associate Justice Court of Appeals, Second District, Division One (( @Kotwica @Jacob Rabinowitz @almightybounter @John Gilbane @nfr.ai @Userone ))

COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE PLAINTIFF: Michelle Jefferson DEFENDANT: Los Santos Police Department et. al. CASE NUMBER: B19736 Appellant, ORDER GRANTING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND PETITION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION _______________________________________________ This matter is before the Court for consideration of Ms Michelle Jefferson, through and by Mr Jacob E. Rabinowitz III's and Mr Donald J. Wright's (hereinafter "Appellant") for an emergency interlocutory appeal of an immediately reviewable matter occurring within Case 24-CV-1034 and Appellant's petition for a permanent injunction enjoining the trial court from restricting further appointment of counsel. For the reasons stated herein, the above-referenced emergency interlocutory appeal and petition for permanent injunction are GRANTED insofar as the Court finds them necessary to address the legal deficiencies arrising through the interlocutory orders issued by the trial court. OVERVIEW OF ACTION The case is a class action brought by Michelle Jefferson against the Los Santos Police Department under 42 U.S.C § 1983 on September 14th, 2024, alleging violations of the fundamental rights of the United States Constitution and laws. Plaintiff challenges the adequacy of the her arrests and citations issued to her throughout the months of August and September of this year. On September 16th, a Motion for Addition of Counsel was forwarded by Mr Jacob E. Rabinowitz III and Mr Donald J. Wright pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1654 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 44. The Motion was denied on the same day by the Honorable Judge Martin Hockenbeyer. On September 17th, a Motion to Stay was filed by the aforementioned attorneys, which was also denied by Judge Hockenbeyer. An interlocutory appeal was lastly forwarded to this Court on September 19th. SUMMARY OF DECISION Under the the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 28 U.S.C. §1654 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 44, the Plaintiff has the right to appoint counsel. As such, the Plaintiff the right to appoint, supplement, or dismiss counsel using her own judgement and discretion. Limiting this right, the trial court stated that it "possess broad discretion to make determinations that preserve the integrity of the judicial process, including the authority to limit the participation of counsel when it is necessary to prevent potential conflicts, confusion, or delay". The Court acknowledges the usage of discretion in order to guarantee the preservation of the judicial process' integrity, including, under very limited and exigent circumstances, the limitation of of participating counsel. However, based on the presented facts, the complex nature of the case and the lack of hearings on the matters, the Court finds no objective reason to believe risk of prejudice exists and hence, due to the vitality of this fundamental rights, the Court find imposing such a limitation without proper basis to be abuse of discretion. The Court finds that a permanent injunction is necessary to force the trial court to adequately safeguard the fundamental rights of the Plaintiff, having found no solid legal basis for the denial of additional counsel given the circumstances. ORDER The Court finds that trial court has been deliberately indifferent towards the protection of fundamental right to counsel of the Plaintiff within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment of the United States. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal and petition for permanent injunction are GRANTED. The Court further finds the Plaintiff have established by a preponderance of the evidence that a permanent injunction is appropriate and necessary. The Court specifically finds that Plaintiff have suffered or will suffer irreparable injury if a permanent injunction is not issued. The permanent injunction enjoins the trial court from restricting further appointment of counsel. Appellant factually has a right to appoint counsel of her choosing in the enumeration she so chooses, _______________________________________________ IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: SEPTEMBER 20, 2024 Hon. Michael Rouker Associate Justice Court of Appeals, Second District, Division One

COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE PLAINTIFF: Michelle Jefferson DEFENDANT: Los Santos Police Department et. al. CASE NUMBER: B19736 Appellant, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION _______________________________________________ This matter is before the Court for consideration of Ms Michelle Jefferson, through and by Mr Jacob E. Rabinowitz III's and Mr Donald J. Wright's (hereinafter "Appellant") for an emergency interlocutory appeal of an immediately reviewable matter occurring within Case 24-CV-1034. After considering the submissions of the parties and the applicable law, the Court will grant the petiton for a temporary injunction granting a stay of the trial court proceedings, pending the final order of the Court. ORDER The Court finds that the Appellant has met the burden of proof necessary for requesting a temporary stay of proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The petition requesting that the trial court proceeding is stayed until the Court rules on the remaining listed prayer for relief forwarded by the Appellant is GRANTED. _______________________________________________ IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: SEPTEMBER 19, 2024 Hon. Michael Rouker Associate Justice Court of Appeals, Second District, Division One (( Tags handled in the other topic. ))

COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE PLAINTIFF: Michelle Jefferson DEFENDANT: Los Santos Police Department et. al. CASE NUMBER: B19736 Appellant, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION _______________________________________________ This matter is before the Court for consideration of Ms Michelle Jefferson, through and by Mr Jacob E. Rabinowitz III's and Mr Donald J. Wright's (hereinafter "Appellant") for an emergency interlocutory appeal of an immediately reviewable matter occurring within Case 24-CV-1034. After considering the submissions of the parties and the applicable law, the Court will grant the petiton for a temporary injunction granting a stay of the trial court proceedings, pending the final order of the Court. ORDER The Court finds that the Appellant has met the burden of proof necessary for requesting a temporary stay of proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The petition requesting that the trial court proceeding is stayed until the Court rules on the remaining listed prayer for relief forwarded by the Appellant is GRANTED. _______________________________________________ IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: SEPTEMBER 19, 2024 Hon. Michael Rouker Associate Justice Court of Appeals, Second District, Division One (( @Kotwica @Jacob Rabinowitz @almightybounter @John Gilbane @nfr.ai @Userone ))

"Miss Crawford, please answer the given questions. And any upcoming ones." (( @Kayayday @Kotwica @Michael ))

** Sergio Robleto briefly bops his head. ** "That is fine, counselor. You may do so." (( @Kayayday @Michael @Kotwica ))

"Very well. This Court recalls Miss Crawford for the purpose of examination. Begin with the aforementioned questions, meaning questions 29-to-37." (( @Kayayday @Michael @Kotwica ))

"Counselor Wright, I have already ruled on the incident of contempt and I shall maintain my decision, hence your motion is hereby denied. Ths includes the request for damages. Additionally, this Court does not find the aforementioned writing as an admission to improper conduct per se, due to the lack of basis for such an action. This is the last time I am going to request you to file your motion to compel you've mentioned or we are going to move forward with the witness examinations. (( @Michael @Kotwica ))

"Counselor Thyne, I do not really understand how the document that has been sent to the Plaintiff constitutes intra-departmental correspondence, looking at Plaintiff's Exhibit two. It is reasonable to believe that it is a settlement officer sent to Mister Castillo. Out of courtesy, I will only issue an admonishment to the counsel for the Defendant, on the record, for contemptous conduct by violating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11(b). Further similar conduct will result in a citation for contempt. Counselor Wright, please file your motion. (( @Kotwica @Michael ))

* Sergio Robleto accepts the copy from the bailiff, darting his eyes around its contents briefly before settling it on his bench. He sighs, pinching the bridge of his nose. * We're going to pause on the witness examination until we conclude with all issues related to the alleged settlement negotiations, as I do not wish this to turn into chaos. Counselor Thyne, please provide your response to the Plaintiff's attorney. Counselor Wright, your requests regarding Plaintiff's exhibits one and two are granted. Do you still wish to pursue a reconsideration for your motion to compel? If so, I'd ask that you opt to amend the motion and re-file it so we avoid any further confusion in regard to what you wish to compel. Should you wish to now abandon the reconsideration, please state so accordingly, for the record. (( @Michael @Kotwica ))

"I find it reasonable to believe that the Defendant's counsel didn't word that initial phrase -- "we are negotiating an out of court settlement with Mister Castillo" -- accordingly, therefore resulting in confusion. But as a result of the given explanations and especially due to the provided document in good faith, I find the motion to compel unnecessary hence it will be denied. The Plaintiff can file a request for reconsideration or another motion if they deem it necessary, however, from my current understanding, no negotiations have been conducted with Mister Castillo ex parte. Moving on, the witness is instructed to answer questions 31-to-35. Should there be any other requests or motions, not related to the witness examination, please file them as soon as we conclude with the aforementioned questions, as they have been pending for too long... unless, of course, they require urgency. (( @Kotwica @Michael @Kayayday Questions on the previous page ))

* The case is reassigned to the docket of Judge Sergio Robleto. * I'm Judge Robleto and I have been reassigned to preside over the matter of Stefan Castillo versus the LSSD. Counselors, please re-state your appearances for the record and re-file any motions or requests that are still pending and you do not wish to abandon. @Kotwica @Michael

COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE PLAINTIFF: Stefan Castillo DEFENDANT: Los Santos County Sheriff's Department CASE NUMBER: B19495 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE _______________________________________________ I. BACKGROUND On September 12th, 2024, counsel for plaintiff moved to disqualify the judge randomly assigned to preside over their civil matter. In support of the motion, counsel filed a sworn declaration. Being an emergency motion and having an ex parte nature, justified by its seriousness and urgency, no statements were solicited from the Defendant. The motion is based on allegations of negligent handling and the inability or unwillingness of the judge to timely address the civil issues before the court, and was randomly assigned to me, pursuant to San Andreas law. The urgency of the motion is warranted on the basis of a lenghty absence of the presiding judge, hereby affecting the administration of justice and integrity of the judicial system. II. FINDINGS OF FACTS 1. The judge assigned to the case registered as LCS-CV-2024-001 is the Hon. Martin Hockenbeyer of the Los Santos County Superior Court. He was randomly assigned to preside over the matter on June 30, 2024. 2. On August 28, 2024, Judge Hockenbeyer stated, among other things, the following: "I must remind you that your client's active participation is essential for these discussions to proceed effectively. If you are unable to reach your client and facilitate their involvement in these negotiations, the court may consider dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute." *** 3. Starting from the above-referenced date, Judge Hockenbeyer also halted to further address the civil issue up to the date of this order. 4. Thereafter, the attorney-complainant filed an emergency motion to disqualify the judge, arising out of the aforementioned facts and circumstances. III. ANALYSIS 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 455(a) contain the following applicable provisions: 28 U.S.C. § 144: Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): Any judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. *** In the absence of binding state-level case law regarding such matters, this Court recognizes the persuasive authority of all federal courts. Courts often apply these pronouncements broadly, because “it is a general rule that the appearance of partiality is as dangerous as the fact of it.” United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 881 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980). “Quite simply and quite universally, recusal [is] required whenever ‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned,’” even in the absence of actual bias or prejudice. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). As stated in United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 576 (3d. Cir. 1995), “If there is an appearance of partiality, that ends the matter.” The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has also "recognized that it is essential to avoid even the appearance of impropriety because it is as important in developing the public confidence in our judicial system as avoiding the impropriety itself. [United States v.] Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 155-56.” It is true that in this unusual situation there are factors that are inconsistent with an appearance of partiality on the part of the judge. Thus, the above-referenced comments of the judge were extremely questionable. Furthermore, as a result of developments occurring after this lawsuit was filed (i.e. the unjustified absence of the judge from the proceedings), a reasonable person might reasonably question the ability of the trial judge to discharge his duties without prejudice to the parties. Under the presented circumstances, this Court has been shown good cause for the failure to file the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists within the time period imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 144. In short, the district judge now is subject to continuous and heightened scrutiny resulting from him being placed in a position that casts doubt on his ability proceed without prejudicing the parties. IV. CONCLUSIONS Under the foregoing authorities and for the foregoing reasons, the attorney-complainant has met the burden of proof required to establish grounds for disqualification under San Andreas law due to the judge's negligent handling of the case and failure to address significant legal issues in a timely manner. The Court finds that the judge's actions (or lack thereof) have compromised the integrity of the judicial process and have resulted in a substantial risk that the movant will not receive a fair trial. Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, it is hereby ordered that: The emergency motion to disqualify the Honorable Martin Hockenbeyer is GRANTED. The case shall be reassigned to another judge in accordance with the procedures outlined in the San Andreas statutes. The Presiding Judge of the Los Santos County Superior Court shall take the necessary steps to reassign the case. Any pending motions shall be addressed by the newly assigned judge without further delay. _______________________________________________ IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: SEPTEMBER 13, 2024 Hon. Gregory Yarborough Administrative Presiding Justice Court of Appeals, Second District, Division One (( Will handle a replacement as soon as possible @Kotwica @Michael @almightybounter ))

* The clerk's office would process the motion under docket number "B19495", docket of Hon. Gregory Yarborough. Registered as an emergency motion hence being classified as ex parte. (( Will do my best to rule on it today. @Kotwica @Michael @almightybounter ))

"The motion is granted. The plaintiff is asked to re-file if need be." @Harlow_Fletcher @Michael

"There is not much to say to that. Counsellor, do you wish to combat the motion to dismiss in any way or would you like the opportunity to re-file this? @Harlow_Fletcher

The Defendant or his counsel is ordered to enter a plea on or before August 1st, 2024 at 11:00 AM (( server time )) or a default judgment shall issue to the Plaintiff.7 @Michael @Harlow_Fletcher

"It's been determined by the Court that cause of action exists under the presented circumstances. As such, I'm mandating the plaintiff to serve the opposing party or their counsel and provide proof of the notification to the court. I'll be expecting an update in a maximum of 48 hours regarding this." (( Please make sure to inform the party at an OOC level as well and attach proof accordingly. Thank you! @Harlow_Fletcher ))

* The clerk's office would process the cover sheet. The case would be registered under docket "BCV24003", docket of Hon. Sergio Robleto. The plaintiff would be informed to forward the Case Brief accordingly. * @Harlow_Fletcher

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS, COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS PLAINTIFF: George Nixon DEFENDANT: San Andreas Network CASE NUMBER: BCV24001 JUDGEMENT BY DEFAULT _______________________________________________ I. BACKGROUND The factual background surrounding Mr George Nixon’s libel by the San Andreas Network is summarized below, followed by an overview of the procedural history of this case. The factual background is based upon the detailed case brief submitted by the Plaintiff in support of their motion for default judgment, as well as attached exhibits. II. FINDINGS OF FACTS 1. Plaintiff George Nixon has standing to pursue this action. Mr Nixon is an Associate Warden with the San Andreas Department of Correction and Rehabilitation. 2. Defendant San Andreas Network is a public corporation duly organized, existing, and operating under the laws of the State of San Andreas. 3. On June 22nd, 2024, the San Andreas Network published an article redacted by one of their journalists, Ms Catherine Church, regarding the activity of the Plaintiff and the alleged fact he was "abusing inmates [and] endangering correctional officers". See Ex. 1. 4. In the aforementioned news article, an attached video recording evidentiates the Plaintiff engaging in a physical altercation with now-identified Mr Ignacio Huerta. 5. According to the presented disciplinary segragration report (hereinafter "report"), on the night of June 18th, 2024, Mr Ignacio Huerta confronted the Plaintiff by verbally assaulting him, being uncooperative and eventually grasping at his uniform shirt. See Ex. 2. Due to the uncontested nature of this official report, this Court presumes its contents to be veridic. 6. Mr Ignacio Huerta was subdued through use of force, precisely physical force, less-than-letal weaponry and OC spray. See Ex. 1 and 2. No further details are presented regarding his medical condition ex post. III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff Mr George Nixon filed this lawsuit against the Defendant, the San Andreas Network, on June 22, 2024. See Cover sheet. Mr Nixon served the San Andreas Network in accordance with state statutes on civil procedure. After the expiration of the five-day period granted to the defendant to answer, the Plaintiff sought entry of default and instantly requested a default judgement, supported by the case brief and presented exhibits. The Plaintiff's motion for default judgment is now ripe for review. IV. LEGAL STANDARD In the absence of binding state-level case law regarding such matters, this Court recognizes the persuasive authority of all federal courts. A court may consider entering a default judgment when a party applies for that relief. “Strong policies favor resolution of disputes on their merits,” and therefore, “‘the default judgment must normally be viewed as available only when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.’” Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Notwithstanding its appropriateness in some circumstances, “entry of a default judgment is not automatic.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Thus, the procedural posture of a default does not relieve a court of its “affirmative obligation” to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Additionally, “a court should satisfy itself that it has personal jurisdiction before entering judgment against an absent defendant.” Mwani, 417 F.3d at 6. The “plaintiffs retain ‘the burden of proving personal jurisdiction, [and] they can satisfy that burden with a prima facie showing.’”. In doing so, “they may rest their argument on their pleadings, bolstered by such affidavits and other written materials as they can otherwise obtain.” Id. at 7. This Court has found all aforementioned requirements to be met. V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. This Court has general subject-matter and personal jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to state statutes. 2. To prevail on a claim of defamation under San Andreas law, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: 1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; 2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; 3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and 4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. 3. This Court finds that the statements made by the Defendant about the Plaintiff were false and defamatory, constituting libel per se. No explanatory matter is necessary to establish the defamatory character of the statements due to this being a default judgement. The Defendant failed to contest the claims of the Plaintiff. VI. DAMAGES AND FEES The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory damages due to suffered emotional distress and attorney fees. See Cover sheet. The damages to which the plaintiff is entitled are described below. A. Compensatory damages The purpose of damages is to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in if the tort had not been committed — restitutio in integrum. Damages are not awarded to over-enrich a plaintiff far beyond his actual losses. The reverse is also the case — the plaintiff should not get far less than his actual loss. Furthermore, a wide range of reporting about both public officials and candidates is protected. Certainly, the conduct of official duties by public officials is subject to the widest scrutiny and criticism. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). But the Court has held as well that criticism that reflects generally upon an official’s integrity and honesty is protected. According to different statutes, the term “public official” means, inter alia, "any elected official, appointed official, or employee of a Federal, State, or local unit of government in the United States". Substantial damages may be awarded in tort for presumed injury to reputation merely upon a showing of publication. But this discretion has the potential to inhibit the exercise of freedom of the press, and moreover permitted the penalization of unpopular opinion through the awarding of damages. Therefore, defamation plaintiffs who do not prove actual malice — that is, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth — will be limited to compensation for actual provable injuries, such as out-of-pocket loss, impairment of reputation and standing, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. A plaintiff who proves actual malice will be entitled as well to collect punitive damages. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) at 348-50. Therefore, this Courts disapproves on the presence of actual malice and will limit the compensation as deemed reasonable. Having examined closely the facts of this particular case, George Nixon is entitled to $75,000, to account for the suffered emotional distress. B. Attorney fees The general rule of law known as the "American rule" is that attorney’s fees and ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowed to the successful party absent a contractual or statutory exception. This rule is generally followed throughout the country, including the State of San Andreas. There are few exceptions. For example, a specific contractual term may provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs or a statute may confer such rights. It has also been recognized that bad faith is an exception to the American rule, which permits a court to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party on the basis of bad faith conduct of the other party or the other party’s attorney. This Court has found no exceptions to be incident hence no attorney fees will be awarded in this matter. VII. CONCLUSIONS For the reasons outlined above, the Plaintiff's motion for default judgment is granted. The San Andreas Network is liable for the defemation through libel of Mr George Nixon. The plaintiff is entitled to $75,000 in general damages as emotional distress. _______________________________________________ IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: JULY 9, 2024 /s/ SERGIO ROBLETO San Andreas Superior Court Judge (( Thank you for your patience! @Levy @Levy, Bell & Weinstein @Cashew @Yaffa ))