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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF SAN ANDREAS RE: MENDOZA v. LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al. RENEWED RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ------------------------------------- Jurisdiction and Procedural Impropriety: Redundant Filing Against Non-Involved Parties: As in the original motion, the plaintiff erroneously names the Los Santos Sheriff's Department (LSSD) and San Andreas Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (SADCR), although there is no connection with the incident and both these agencies. Declaratory relief necessitates a "justiciable controversy" between specific parties (Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270). They were not represented by any officers, exercised no jurisdiction over the place of the supposed conduct, and had no administrative authority over Officer Love. Such insistence upon inclusion is judicial waste and intentional misdirection. The Video Evidence and it's Contextual Clarification: Officer Love's Conduct Was Lawful and Proportionate: The video confirms Officer Love told Ms. Mendoza to "move to the other side of the street" and included the words: "Or you could join them." This language, even forceful in its rhetoric, was followed by no prior physical action, detention, or escalation, and Mendoza did move accordingly without protest. There had been no constitutional violation. The police may direct people to move in the public interest or to prevent obstruction to justice, even in a place of public resort, according to Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). No detention, arrest, or deprivation of liberty took place. The encounter ended peacefully, undermining allegations of coercion or violations of rights. Recording in Public; First Amendment Not Absolute: Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions Apply: Glik v. Cunniffe (1st Cir. 2011) recognized the right to record police in public, but continued to remark that the right is "not without limits" and needs to be balanced against public safety and scene control. Officer Love's directive was content-neutral, meant for clearing the active arrest scene, not suppressing Mendoza's speech. As per Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989): "Even in a public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech." The instruction was brief, peaceful, and reasonable, consistent with safety procedure. Declaratory Relief – No Continuing Threat, Not Standing: No Live Case or Controversy: Declaratory relief under 28 U.S. Code § 2201 or state equivalents needs a continuing or threatened future legal injury. Mendoza: Was not arrested Was not charged Faces no ongoing harm or police interference The case lacks the immediacy or stakes required for declaratory judgment. Courts decline jurisdiction in such abstract disputes (Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452). Mendoza has not demonstrated a legitimate threat of future enforcement action against her recording activity. The Court Cannot Legislate: There are no grounds for expansive judicial rulemaking: The plaintiff asks the court to set general policies on the behaviour of all law enforcement agencies towards civilian recorders. This is not a judicial but a legislative role. Courts decide individual violations, not policy guidelines. This request is vague, poses separation of powers conflict, and invites uneven enforcement across jurisdictions. The Accident Video Footage, Internal Affairs Report Becomes Obsolete, Not Evidence of Misconduct: New Video Overrides Earlier IA Finding, But Doesn't Create Misconduct: Yes, the video establishes the incident did indeed happen, which upholds against the earlier conclusion by the LSPD Internal Affairs that it "didn't occur." However: This doesn't retroactively constitute constitutional wrongdoing. The IA misreport can be an example of administrative failure, and not of legal fault. Courts do not issue declaratory relief based on bureaucratic incompetence alone (Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288) The video creates a situation that an incident did indeed take place, not that Mendoza's rights were being violated. IN CONCLUSION: The plaintiff pleads no constitutional violation, no threat of continuation, and no fact basis for declaratory relief. The new video shows no unlawful activity on the part of Officer Love and instead confirms again that Mendoza's rights were not infringed upon. The defense respectfully requests the petition be denied in its entirety, with prejudice as to all non-involved law enforcement agencies. ---------------------- Respectfully submitted, Alexander Cornelius Braithwaite IV Office of the District Attorney | County of Los Santos State of San Andreas April 07th, 2025

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF SAN ANDREAS COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS COUNTERARGUMENT TO PLAINTIFF’S CIVIL COMPLAINT Submitted by: Alexander Cornelius Braithwaite IV District Attorney | County of Los Santos Case No.: 25-LSC-04109 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Preliminary Statement: This is a case regarding a declaratory judgment brought by the Plaintiff, Gloria Mendoza, where she requests the Court to formally adjudicate that her alleged encounter with a police officer was a violation of her First and Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also requests the Court to impose judicial standards that would restrict law enforcement discretion in future encounters with civilians recording police while in public spaces. The complaint, though emotionally compelling and calling forth powerful constitutional principles, is essentially flawed both factually and legally. It lacks definite charges against all but a few of the parties named, misuses constitutional precedent, ignores jurisdictional realities, and seeks an expansive declaratory judgment outside the function of the Court and the aim of the Declaratory Judgment Act. The defence contends the following: The Plaintiff's account is uncorroborated and self-contradictory. There is no factual basis to make the Los Santos Sheriff's Department and San Andreas Department of Corrections, or "any other law enforcement agency," defendants. Plaintiff misapplies First Circuit precedent in a Ninth Circuit state (California), where this issue remains unresolved. The Plaintiff seeks a declaratory order without legal injury sufficient to warrant such relief. The Plaintiff seeks to redefine and narrow the definition of "obstruction" so as to detract from public safety and be beyond judicial authority. Clarifications and Omissions: The incident reported occurred on March 25, 2025, near the Idlewood Gas Station in a highly documented crime area of ambushes of police officers and gang activity. Plaintiff Mendoza walked up to what she described as a "large group of detained individuals," and admits that she did so with no knowledge of the situation or of any imminent threats to officer safety. She asserts that Officer Love instructed her to move and warned that if she did not, she would "join them." The LSPD Internal Affairs unit has found no indication that this incident occurred. Improper Inclusion of Non Involved Agencies: The Plaintiff names: The Los Santos Sheriff’s Department (LSSD), The San Andreas Department of Corrections (SADOC), and “Any other law enforcement agency within the State of San Andreas”. This is patently improper. Neither the LSSD nor SADOC were present at the location or involved in any aspect of the alleged incident. There are no factual allegations whatsoever supporting any claim against these entities. Under San Andreas Code of Civil Procedure § 430.30(e) and (f), the Defence demurs as to these Defendants on the following grounds: (e) The Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against these agencies. (f) The pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible regarding these agencies’ alleged involvement. Such overbroad naming of government agencies without factual basis is prejudicial, wasteful of judicial resources, and unjustly burdens public institutions with unnecessary litigation. Misapplication of First Amendment Doctrine: Plaintiff refers to a series of cases — United States v. Grace, Glik v. Cunniffe, Mills v. Alabama, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada — in support of her First Amendment right to film the police. While said cases are indeed supportive of the public's interest in scrutiny, their invocation here is selective, out of context, and most critically, non-binding within the jurisdiction of San Andreas, which is aligned with that of the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit has not finally determined whether or not there is a First Amendment right to videotape police officers in public. Certain district courts within the Ninth Circuit have held that there could be such a right, but these holdings are not settled appellate precedent and must not be treated as such. Moreover, when public safety itself is threatened, courts have routinely discovered a governmental interest in officer safety and maintaining order, even in public settings. Officer Safety and discretion in High-Risk areas: It is taken for granted in constitutional law that First Amendment rights are never absolute. Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permitted, particularly in dangerous or fluid circumstances in which the police must make split-second judgments. Idlewood and the surrounding areas are typical sites for officer ambushes, shootings, and civilian interference. Officers are instructed to manage perimeters and limit bystander interference for their own safety and the safety of others. Even taking Plaintiff's allegations at face value, the officer's request that she move away from an active detention scene is reasonable and does not constitute a First Amendment violation. Plaintiff’s Lack of Legal Injury: The Plaintiff is not seeking monetary damages, nor does she allege any concrete harm or constitutional deprivation. She was not arrested, detained, or charged. The Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief is therefore speculative and fails to meet the standard for Article III standing, as she has not demonstrated: An actual legal injury, A threat of future harm, or A real and immediate controversy. Her petition attempts to manufacture precedent through judicial fiat, without the presence of a real legal conflict. The role of the court is not to issue abstract declarations of policy, but to resolve live controversies with tangible injuries. Improper Use of Declaratory Judgment: The relief requested by the Plaintiff would bypass police discretion, establish confusing and potentially dangerous proximity standards for bystanders, and invite future suits based on misinterpreted encounters. Courts cannot issue blanket prescriptions on behalf of all law enforcement agencies in a state through a single declaratory judgment based upon a disputed and unverified incident. The judiciary is a reactive institution, not a legislative one. In Conclusion: This case lacks factual basis, jurisdictional alignment, legal injury, and justiciability. It is a misguided attempt to secure precedent through abstract grievance, and in doing so, it drags uninvolved public agencies and servants into litigation at public expense. The Defence respectfully requests the following: Dismissal with prejudice of all claims against LSSD, SADOC, and “all other agencies” under CCP § 430.30(e) and (f); Denial of the declaratory judgment on grounds of insufficient injury and improper legal foundation; That this Court uphold law enforcement discretion in preserving public safety under existing constitutional standards. ---------------------------------- Respectfully submitted, Alexander Cornelius Braithwaite IV Office of the District Attorney | County of Los Santos State of San Andreas April 6, 2025

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