Jacob Rabinowitz

Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzales, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, and Roderick Hayward, in their official capacities, Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low, in their individual and official capacities Case Number: 24-CV-1034 Prepared by: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III MOTION FOR DISCRETIONARY RECUSAL _______________________________________________ Comes now, Jacob E. Rabinowitz for the Plaintiff, respectfully moves this court for recusal of the honorable Judge Hockenbeyer. The grounds for our motion are as follows, and are joined in spirit by the defendants. 1. His honor has failed to meet several procedural deadlines; 2. His honor has failed to rule on several motions within a timely manner; 3. His honor is reasonably believed to have used AI-assisted tools for both legal analysis and writing decisions and opinions; As such, in the interest of public justice, we believe it is in order, and are joined in spirit by the defendants, in this motion for voluntary recusal his honor on his own discretion, pursuant to 28 CFR § 2200.68(a). If his honor does not rule on this motion in a timely manner, we intend to file an emergency appeal with the appellate jurisdiction for disqualification and mistrial.

Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzales, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, and Roderick Hayward, in their official capacities, Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low, in their individual and official capacities Case Number: 24-CV-1034 Prepared by: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III MOTION TO COMPEL _______________________________________________ Comes now, Jacob E. Rabinowitz for the Plaintiff, respectfully moves this court to compel the defense to produce documents in keeping with an issued subpoena duces tecum. In keeping with Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)3, clause 2 ("An attorney also may issue and sign a subpoena if the attorney is authorized to practice in the issuing court"), both counsel of record are permitted to sign and issue subpoenas duces tecum. Having done so, and requested prompt production thereof, we move for enforcement of this order under penalty of contempt pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(g). Production of the following items has been requested: I. Full unredacted internal affairs files/personnel files/training files for: (1) Roderick Hayward (2) Christopher Kaminski (3) Marvin Low II. Training documents related to Constitutional Rights. III. Procedures related to Constitutional Rights. IV. Training documents related to arrest procedures. V. Procedures related to arrest procedures. VI. Dates of when each procedure went into effect. VII. All eyewitness accounts. VIII. All arrest records relating to Michelle Jefferson’s arrests stemming from these events. IX. All inventory records from custodial searches on Michelle Jefferson stemming from these events. X. All CCTV/video tapes of Pershing Square on the applicable dates. XI. Any and all dashcam footage from LSSD vehicles stemming from these events.

"Thank you, your honor. We will proceed. We have laid out a series of twenty-five counts, charging the defendants with violating the Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The facts are undisputed, and we have made our arguments in our complaint as amended. In keeping with the arguments therein, Plaintiff is entitled to compensation on the grounds that her first, fourth, and fifth amendment rights were violated. This whole case flows from a one legal question that this court must answer: Does the Plaintiff have the constitutional right to protest, without a permit, in front of the LSPD Headquarters in Pershing Square? We would direct this court to the table of authorities we've submitted in our brief, specifically to Cox, Grace, Hague, Lutz, and Gitlow, which together lay out a definition of what constitutes a traditional public forum versus a limited public forum, and which spell out the restrictions that may be imposed upon each. We assert that the location of Plaintiff's protests, the sidewalk in front of the LSPD Headquarters or even the stairs themselves, provided there is no bona fide impediment to the egress or exit thereof. Following from this, we assert that the LSPD, the LSSD, and their employees had no right to detain Ms. Jefferson at any point in time, and certainly had no right to cite her or to order her or any of the participants to disperse. There was no crime in Ms. Jefferson's actions, and it is improper for Ms. Jefferson to be charged with a crime because another person in her crowd - which did not require tickets or screening prior to attendance - committed a crime. The defense will likely raise the point that Ms. Jefferson's actions were a disturbance of the peace, but we would postulate otherwise, citing Feiner from the authorities to assert that Ms. Jefferson's conduct did not meet the Supreme Court's description of civil unrest or disorder and therefore Ms. Jefferson could not have been charged for such conduct. Absent justification for charging her or any members of her group, for whom we do not speak, there was no reason to disrupt the assembly and therefore the Los Santos Police Department, and the officers employed thereby, engaged in an unlawful dispersion of the crowd in violation of the first amendment. We also charge this court to answer an additional question: Did the Deputies – Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low – have a duty to give truthful testimony on the scene to Officer Amber Moore of the Los Santos Police Department? We would direct this court to our arguments in Count Two, in which we assert that there is an implied common law responsibility from the crime of Perjury, pursuant to Penal Code section 606(b), which states: 'A peace officer who knowingly and intentionally makes or causes to be made any material statement in an official report or to another peace officer and the statement is included in an official report, knowing the statement to be false, is guilty of a felony'. The defendants Kaminski and Low have essentially admitted as much, having recanted their original testimony. However, that testimony was used to substantiate the probable cause necessary for arresting Ms. Jefferson and she did in fact spend time in jail because of their testimony. Even if Kaminski and Low are entitled to qualified immunity under Heien, this court must conclude that Kaminski and Low had no qualified right to submit the false testimony to Officer Moore who filed an official report to arrest Ms. Jefferson. We assert that this is exactly the kind of conduct 606(b) is intended to cover, and that it was unlawful. We postulate that any statement that is not one hundred percent truthful is in fact a lie, if even only by omission or misunderstanding. The testimony given by Kaminski and Low had massive gravity upon Ms. Jefferson's life – it resulted in her being charged with a crime and imprisoned falsely. Accordingly, this court ought to find for the Plaintiff in this regard and also forward the matter to the District Attorney for levying of criminal charges against the Deputies. Lying on official records mustn't be tolerated by government agents, else the integrity of our entire justice system would be at risk. The majority of issues before this court have been decided already by the Supreme Court. If a person is detained without reasonable suspicion or arrested without probable cause, it follows that the person has endured an unlawful seizure of their person under the meaning of the fourth amendment. We direct the court to apply the Graham factors to determine if, any point, Ms. Jefferson's conduct was unlawful. If Ms. Jefferson's conduct at the protest was not unlawful then it follows that, under Graham, Ms. Jefferson could not have been detained or arrested because to do so would be an application of force, even if de minimus. The Graham test is structured such that the lack of a crime at issue provides that no amount of force would be appropriate. We also raise an issue of unlawful search and seizure on the grounds that Ms. Jefferson's home was unlawfully searched, absent a warrant. The Defendants have claimed exigent circumstances were present, but we assert that no such exigency was present because Ms. Jefferson was not fleeing or potentially destroying evidence and there was no reason to believe a crime of violence was actively being committed within her properties. Lacking substantive proof of exigency, this court must find that no such exigent circumstances were present and therefore, lacking a warrant or consent, the searches were unlawful. Any evidence therefore discovered is inadmissible against her, and any charges stemming from the evidence discovered are therefore null and void under Mapp as fruit of the poisonous tree. We raise a Monell claim as well, asserting that the Los Santos Police Department did not adequately train their officers or provide policy guidance on the issues of traditional public fora. On numerous repeated occasions, Ms. Jefferson's protests were dispersed and she was subject to citation and arrest for organizing them. But, since she was on a part of public property traditionally understood as a public forum - the sidewalk - and because the sidewalk is not a government building reserved for specific administrative duties, she was protesting within a traditional public forum. We direct this court to Gitlow, wherein the Supreme Court ruled on the restrictions that may be applied to traditional public fora. The Los Santos Police Department, as an employer, failed to train its officers correctly on which types of assemblies may be restricted or dispersed - this resulted in numerous arrests, and a pattern of dispersing protests taking place on traditional public fora. The arresting officer, Defendant Moore, was able to patrol on her own without a backing partner which signals that the Department viewed her as competent enough or sufficiently trained so as to understand the laws to an appropriate degree to warrant trust. The Department clearly erred, however, given the repeated legal errors made by Officer Moore and we assert that, under Monell, they ought to be held accountable for their failure to train officers correctly. Finally, we raise a breach of duty claim asserting that the Sheriff's Department had a duty to inform this court and counsel for the Plaintiff of any past instances of perjury. As admitted by the Sheriff's Department in a settlement agreement, submitted as evidence of record, Kaminski and Low both erred in their understanding of what happened but they gave false testimony regardless. Their false testimony is factually, by the definition of 606(b), perjury. Under Brady, we are entitled to be notified and this court must apply exceeding scrutiny to any testimony submitted by them because they've demonstrated a propensity to give false statements, either intentionally or with reckless disregard for the administration of public justice, on official records. Conclusively, we direct this court to the full, unabridged, legal arguments of our amended complaint which is made in conjunction with the submitted table of authorities and ask that this court find in favor of the plaintiff on all counts. We stand prepared to answer any specific, clarifying questions this court may choose to ask for its own knowledge in interpreting the law or any of the authorities we've submitted." (( Link to Brief: )) (( I wrote this all by myself without the need of AI tools ))

"Firstly, your honor, you mistake what I have said in reference to our well-pleaded complaint under Rule 8(a). I have stated that this particular evidence is not a necessity at this point because it is not integral to discovery of evidence relevant to the facts of this case. We say this in order to inform the court that it need not wait for this evidence, because we have demonstrated that our client is entitled to a trial in this matter even if there is evidence still pending. Furthermore, this evidence is needed only to substantiate the award amount and a hearing can be held at the conclusion of trial if liability is found by this court. Secondly, to make an additional record, I believe it is highly improper for this court to admonish myself and Mr. Wright publicly on the record for our insistence that procedure be correctly followed. Your honor has, on numerous occasions, attempted to act as counsel for the government in such a manner that we ought to move for mistrial. However, in the interest of public accountability, we intend to move forward and to appeal any elements of the final ruling we believe to be rooted in bias toward counsel for the plaintiff. Your honor has also improperly slandered both of us, thereby further demonstrating bias toward us personally. You say we are not organized, prepared, or prompt enough, but it is your honor that has failed on multiple occasions to adhere to this court's own procedural time-tables. According to the record, we were supposed to proceed to trial more than a week ago but your honor has unduly delayed that process. Your honor states that its initial belief has been vindicated, thereby disrespecting the order of the appellate court that forced this court to permit additional counsel for the Plaintiff and, in so doing, asserted the rights of the Plaintiff in this matter. Thirdly, your honor states that no new witnesses will be permitted during the post-trial phase, but your honor fails to understand that these are not witnesses material to the cause of action. The witnesses we intend to introduce in post-trial are able to testify to the amount to which Ms. Jefferson is entitled as a billable rate that is honored by the many adult entertainment establishes that hire her on a regular basis. We have, for example, one witness that will testify to the fact that Ms. Jefferson is regularly paid a rate of $30,000 per hour. This, however, does not relate to the cause of action against the defendants but to the award. Therefore, a separate hearing is warranted during post-trial to ascertain and substantiate an award amount to which Ms. Jefferson is entitled as compensatory damages and punitive damages to follow. If your honor wishes to refuse us the ability to introduce these witnesses in post-trial or allow us to show cause for the damages we have claimed in our amended complaint, we will deal with the same on appeal following issuance of this court's final judgment. Finally, your honor improperly submits to the record an implied belief that either myself or Mr. Wright would submit what you refer to as 'idiotic legal theories'. In so doing, your honor shows bias toward counsel once more and already has created grounds for a new trial to be granted on appeal. As members of the bar, it is highly irregular and inappropriate for your honor to openly admonish counsel by inferring that we would ever submit legal theories that are 'idiotic' or, to use another term, frivolous. To submit frivolous legal theories would be grounds for admonishment by the state bar including disbarment – we have no intention of doing so, and your honor should refrain from disparaging counsel in this way without substantive cause. If there is reason to believe we've acted in a way that violates this court's orders, we would respectfully ask that this court adhere to the procedural rules regarding contempt of court and hold a proper hearing on the matter so that myself and Mr. Wright may have an opportunity to show cause before this court unduly admonishes us. With this, I will say once again that we are ready to proceed to trial." (( @almightybounter @Kotwica @NotCraft )) (( I wrote this all by myself without the need of AI tools ))

“We would first like to make a record. The police department bears several liability in this matter given a default judgment against them. The remaining several liability is upon the remaining defendants from whom compensation is sought. This court has asserted that substantive proof of entitlement to compensatory damages has not been received. Under Fed R. Civ P. 8(a)1-3, Plaintiff has made a well-pleaded claim and is not required to substantiate award at this time. When final judgment is rendered, we intend to introduce evidence that substantiates the amount due Ms. Jefferson, including the hourly rate. In order to substantiate this, we wish to add one additional witness to our list: Mr. Adir Havshush. This person will testify to having paid Ms. Jefferson at this billable rate per hour worked. With these records made, Plaintiff is ready to proceed to trial.”

TO: Court Clerk; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq. DATE: October 12th, 2024 RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Proof of Income ----- Judge Hockenbeyer, Please see the attached deposit notice dated for October 6th, 2024 2019, specifying a deposit amount of $15,000 on this date by Michelle Jefferson to her bank account. We submit that this deposit followed immediately or shortly after receiving payment from an employer, the Octopussy Gentlemen's Club, for her services as an adult entertainment performer. We intend to issue multiple subpoenas duces tecum pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 with prior authorization granted under clause (a)3 therein as attorneys admitted to practice in before this court. However, this is evidence that is relevant to the award phase of this trial and need not be received by the court at this time as the amended complaint meets the definition of a well-pleaded complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)1-3. Our pleading has made a statement of this court's jurisdiction, demonstrated entitlement to relief under various legal standards, and made a relevant demand. Any further substantiation of the amounts within the demand are subject to scrutiny within the award phase following a final judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq. Counsel for Plaintiff ** An electronically scanned copy of the applicable deposit slip from 2019 is attached.

** The Court Clerk receives a fax from the Office of Jacob E. Rabinowitz, Esq. TO: Court Clerk; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq. DATE: October 9th, 2024 RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Procedural Delays ----- Judge Hockenbeyer, We write today in an effort to discover the reasons for the procedural delay our client has been forced to endure. There are a number of motions that your honor has not yet ruled on and this matter seems to have stalled in pre-trial motions. It is very much our intention to litigate this matter to the fullest extent of the law. If your honor has health concerns or personal obligations that presently bar him from the ability to effectively adjudicate this matter, we would respectfully ask that the matter be transferred into the care of another judge. We make no formal request for this, but rather ask that your honor uses his best judgment to determine what is best in the interests of public justice. Signed, Jacob E. Rabinowitz III Counsel for Plaintiff (( @almightybounter ))

Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzales, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, and Roderick Hayward, in their official capacities, Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low, in their individual and official capacities Case Number: 24-CV-1034 Prepared by: Jacob Rabinowitz, Donald Wright RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR DISMISSAL ON GROUNDS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1) The Sovereign Immunity Act bars the application of sovereign immunity in this matter. The Sovereign Immunity Act of 2018, Senate Bill (SB) 025-18, hereafter the “Act”, bars the application of sovereign immunity in this matter under Section 3, “Exemptions to Sovereign Immunity”. SB 025-18(3)(B)2 provides that Sovereign Immunity shall not apply “where the action(s) was committed by violating some defined legal standard or law”, and “the agency may be held responsible”. According to this section of the Act, sovereign immunity shall not apply where the Plaintiff can reasonably demonstrate that there is a clearly-established legal standard. Therefore, this court may not dismiss the case on such grounds during pre-trial motions as long as Plaintiff can reasonably demonstrate there is a clearly-established standard. SB 025-18(3)(A) provides that “Sovereign immunity does not apply when an employee commits any illegal or tortious action in accordance with his duty”. Under this section, Plaintiff’s tort claims are sheltered from sovereign immunity and the claim is permissible. This would include Count Twenty-Five, detailing a charge of Breach of Duty since Breach of Duty is a negligence tort. SB 025-18(3)(B)3 provides that Sovereign Immunity shall not apply “where the action(s) was committed by violating some defined legal standard or law, and that action was not in accordance to an established policy”, and in such cases “the actor(s) may be held responsible”. This section of the Act shelters Plaintiff’s individual claims against Defendants Moore, Kaminski, and Low if Plaintiff can demonstrate that their respective agencies did not have a policy requiring them to commit such acts under penalty of potential administrative sanction by their respective employers. Here, Plaintiff need only demonstrate that there is no policy mandated by either the Los Santos Police Department or the Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department that runs afoul of the clearly-established standards that are cited in Counts 1 through 25 as binding and persuasive precedent. According to the Act, “Sovereign immunity shall apply to the agency, but not its actor(s).” Under SB 025-18(2)(A), employees “shall be given the full protections of sovereign immunity when acting within the course of their duties”. It therefore follows that if an employee is not acting “within the course of their duties”, they shall not receive “the full protections of sovereign immunity”. In cross-referencing 025-18(2)(A) with 025-18(3)(B)3, it stands to reason that any action performed “not in accordance with established policies” would be an action that is not “within the course of [an employee’s] duties”. If Plaintiff can therefore show that an action was not sanctioned by the employing agency, then the employee may not receive the protections of sovereign immunity. SB 025-18(3)(C) provides a limitation on the amount payable in sovereign immunity claims where it applies. However, if Plaintiff has shown that sovereign immunity does not apply, then this court need not respect any such limitation on damages. In Counts 1 through 25, we define a litany of clearly-established legal standards. Since in each count the applicable binding and persuasive precedents we cite would tend to qualify as “some defined legal standard or law”, sovereign immunity shall not apply. Plaintiff has explained how each such standard applies to the conduct alleged, and has submitted a mix of both binding and persuasive precedent which this court is either obliged to accept as a premise or is strongly encouraged to accept by the very nature of such persuasive precedents’ analysis by federal appellate courts other than the 9th Circuit. Since such precedents clearly exist, there is a “defined legal standard or law” and SB 025-18(3)(B)2 applies, thereby mandating that sovereign immunity does not apply. In Count 25, this court must additionally accept that breach of duty is a negligence tort and sovereign immunity does not apply under SB 025-18(3)(A). Furthermore, the defendants sued in their individual capacities may not make claims of sovereign immunity if their conduct is in violation of clearly-established standards unless they were required to do so by department policy. If the department required that a Defendant perform the actions under penalty of potential administrative sanction, then they may make an individual claim of immunity but the employing agency may not; and, in such a case, the agency must indemnify the employee against any damages incurred by the actions that violate clearly-established precedential standards. In reverse, the same is true: if an employee violated a clearly-established standard but department policy did place them in jeopardy of potential administrative sanction, then the employee is wholly individually responsible. In this suit, we make claims against specific named defendants Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low each in their individual capacity and in their official capacity. Plaintiff argues that they will be held liable either officially and indemnified by their employing agency if there is a binding departmental policy that required their particular conduct, or held liable in their individual capacity if no such policy existed. In either case, Plaintiff argues that the conduct was in violation of clearly-established precedents that require this court to treat the conduct as facially unconstitutional, thereby further invoking 025-18(3)(B)2. If this court accepts as a premise that the defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity under 025-18(3)(A), (B)2, or (B)3, then 025-18(3)(C) does not apply since such provision only applies if a defendant is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Act. Plaintiff submits that, under the aforementioned sections of the Act, sovereign immunity does not apply. We therefore respectfully implore this court to overrule the defense’s motion to dismiss. (2) Even if the Court Accepts That Sovereign Immunity Does Apply, the Court Must Deny the Motion as the Defenses Motion is Untimely and Therefore Waived. The Los Santos Sheriffs Department’s (“LSSD”) motion for dismissal on the grounds of sovereign immunity is untimely. Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense identified in Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Prot. Dist., 7 Cal. 5th 798 (2019). Affirmative defenses must be pled in the answer to the original complaint as required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c). The LSSD by not raising this affirmative defense in their answer, have waived their ability to raise it in this proceeding, and further appeals stemming from this decision. Bennett v. U.S., 201 F.3d 450 (2000). Bennett explicitly highlights that the United States Government waived its claim to sovereign immunity by failing to raise the claim in its initial pleadings. This court is obligated to deny the motion, and deny any further motions of affirmative defenses that were not pled in their answer due to the Supreme Court’s binding precedent. The Defense by not raising this affirmative defense in their answer under a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion have effectively waived the defense. (3) Attorney Silverman’s Conduct By Representing All Defendants is An Ethical Concern. An attorney's role is to zealously advocate for his clients, Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.3 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2020), here Attorney Silverman will be put in a predicament that will make that next to impossible as they are being held joint and severally liable for the illegal and tortious alleged against Ms. Jefferson during internal discussions amongst the defense regarding apportionment of liability. Courts have addressed similar issues in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (1979) see also United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (1975), Selsor v. Kaiser, 81 F.3d 1492 (1996), McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). (( @NotCraft @Kotwica @almightybounter ))

TO: Court Clerk; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq. DATE: October 5th, 2024 RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Amendment of Complaint ----- Judge Hockenbeyer, Ms. Michelle Jefferson is employed as a business manager at the businesses aforementioned in the complaint, including as the manager of an adult entertainment establishment with an irregular income that often exceeds $10,000 per hour open. We have based our calculations for damages on a rate valuing an hour of Ms. Jefferson's time at $10,000. Applying this rate, we reached the calculated values for compensatory damages as she ought to be compensated for the time she wrongly spent imprisoned. In determining the amount of damages due for the pain and suffering endured by Ms. Jefferson, we ask this court to determine an amount that is fair and proportionate to the suffering endured. Our nation is underpinned by a strong emphasis on the notion that liberty must not be infringed upon without due process. Here Ms. Jefferson's rights were violated in a repeated and egregious manner that draws near to an intentional violation of her civil rights. One might even dare to call such violations inherently un-American. We believe it is imperative that this court award an amount that accounts for the repeated nature of the civil rights violations herein and the egregious nature of the lies entered into the record by defendants Kaminski and Low that underpinned felony charges. Ultimately, the total amount awarded by this court will need to have an apportioned responsibility based on which defendants are found liable. Since there is a determination of liability still outstanding for the defendants Los Santos County Sheriff's Department, Roderick Hayward, City of Los Santos, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low, it would be improper at the current point in time to determine which of these defendants should pay. Rather, we recommend that these particular defendants have default judgments entered against them with maximal liability attached until final judgment is entered concerning the other defendants. With all of this in mind, we respectfully ask this court to preserve the default judgment against the aforementioned defendants Los Santos Police Department, Alexander Blair, Amber Moore, and Samuel Gonzales. We are prepared to proceed with trial proceedings in the matter of the remaining defendants as we have significant disagreements with the position entered by counsel for the defendants. When judgment is entered for all defendants, we would request at that time a hearing on damages and apportionment be held to determine the manner in which liability should be shared between the defendants. When such a hearing is reached, we would ask that the aforementioned defendants against whom default judgment is entered be treated with a maximal degree of liability. Signed, Jacob E. Rabinowitz III Counsel for Plaintiff (( @Kotwica @almightybounter ))

** Jacob makes a record. "I may have misspoken here. It is our understanding that the investigation of the first matter, relating to the Defendant-Deputies' testimony to Defendant Moore about having witnessed our client make unwanted sexual contact with another, had been completed. I misspoke by extending this to mean that the investigation of the remaining matters had also been completed. Please accept my apologies for this mistake, counsel, and know it was not intentional. We look forward to your response brief. If, after investigation, you feel it is prudent to engage in settlement discussions we are open to the prospect." (( @almightybounter @NotCraft ))

** The Court Clerk receives a fax from the Office of Jacob E. Rabinowitz, Esq. TO: Court Clerk; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq. DATE: September 22nd, 2024 RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Reply to Request for Postponement by Counsel for Defendant Los Santos County Sheriff's Department ----- To Judge Hockenbeyer: We write in reply to the request for postponement submitted by counsel for the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department. Under your continued order, the defendant is already given 5 days from the date of service to submit a reply brief. We respectfully disagree with postponement beyond this point because, as your honor has stated, it is the court’s duty to ensure that the litigation process remains fair, orderly, and free from undue delays or procedural complications. It is the position of the Plaintiff that to delay the response brief and, by extension, additionally delay the discovery process would be an undue delay. Furthermore, the matter for which Defendant Los Santos County Sheriff's Department, Defendant-Sheriff Roderick Hayward, and Defendant-Deputies Kaminski and Low are being sued has been fully investigated by the Los Santos County Sheriff Department's Internal Affairs Division, thereby further lessening the degree to which additional time is necessary. We respectfully request that your honor order the defendants to submit their reply briefs on or before September 27th, 2024, so that we may begin the discovery process. Signed, Jacob E. Rabinowitz III Counsel for Plaintiff (( @almightybounter @NotCraft ))

** The Court Clerk receives a fax from the Office of Jacob E. Rabinowitz, Esq. TO: Court Clerk; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq. DATE: September 22nd, 2024 RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Notification of Parties ----- Mister or Madam Court Clerk: Please be advised that we have dispatched certified priority mail to Defendants City of Los Santos, Los Santos Police Department, and Los Santos Sheriff's Department, for additional service by such parties upon any additional parties named in official capacity as officers or representative of the same. Please see the attached document, a copy of the letter we have dispatched. Signed, Jacob E. Rabinowitz III Counsel for Plaintiff (( @almightybounter )) (( I do not know how to find out who owns the characters listed - Alexander Blair, Samuel Gonzales, Roderick Hayward, Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, or Marvin Low. )) --- attachments

** The Court Clerk receives a fax from the Office of Jacob E. Rabinowitz, Esq. TO: Court Clerk; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq. DATE: September 21st, 2024 RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Amendment of Complaint ----- Judge Hockenbeyer, Please be advised that we have once more amended the complaint to correct an error in identification of the Chief of Police, whom we believed at the time of our first amended complaint to be Manuel Caldera. After further research, we have identified our error and changed the defendant from Manuel Caldera to Samuel Gonzales, the current Chief of Police. Additionally, after conducting a strategy session, we have renumbered the counts listed therein and added an additional claim of excessive force as it is alleged to have been conducted by Defendant Deputies Kaminski and Low. This will be our final amendment to the complaint and we are in the process of notifying all applicable defendants. Signed, Jacob E. Rabinowitz III Counsel for Plaintiff (( @almightybounter ))

Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzales, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, and Roderick Hayward, in their official capacities, Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low, in their individual and official capacities, Case Number: 24-CV-1034 Prepared by: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq., and Donald J. Wright, Esq., Supplementary Counsel for Plaintiff. Short Title: Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, Los Santos Police Department, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, et al. AMENDED CIVIL CASE BRIEF FOR MICHELLE JEFFERSON V. LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT _______________________________________________ TABLE OF AUTHORITIES United States v. Duarte, No. 22-50048 (9th Cir. Jul. 17, 2024) Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. ___ (2021) Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014) United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990) Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) Thomas v. Cook Cty Sheriff's Dept, 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2009) McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 2009) Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) Armstrong v. Toler, 24 U.S. 258 (1826) PARTIES TO ACTION Michelle Jefferson is a natural person with primary residence in the State of San Andreas. She is the chief executive of a non-profit organization called “Anti-Corruption Group”, “ACG” for short. City of Los Santos is a municipal corporation of the State of San Andreas, sued in its official capacity as an entity responsible for the orderly management of all agencies organized within its geographic area of incorporation. Alexander Blair is a natural person serving as Mayor of the City of Los Santos, sued in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Los Santos. Los Santos Police Department is a municipal agency and state agency in the service of the City of Los Santos, sued in its official capacity as an entity responsible for the orderly management of all employees and resources organized under it. Samuel Gonzales is a natural person serving as Chief of Police for the Los Santos Police Department, sued in his official capacity as the chief executive of the Los Santos Police Department. Los Santos County Sheriff's Department is a municipal agency and state agency in service of the City of Los Santos and the unincorporated areas surrounding the incorporated region of Los Santos, sued in its official capacity as an entity responsible for the orderly management of all employees and resources organized under it. Roderick Hayward is a natural person serving as Sheriff for the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department, sued in his official capacity as the chief executive of the Los Santos Police Department. Amber Moore is a natural person and sworn law enforcement officer employed by the Los Santos Police Department during the dates relevant to this claim. Christopher Kaminski is a natural person and sworn law enforcement officer employed by the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department during the dates relevant to this claim. Marvin Low is a natural person and sworn law enforcement officer employed by the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department during the dates relevant to this claim. JURISDICTION AND VENUE This court has general jurisdiction over the parties named due to their organization within the geographic boundaries of the State of San Andreas. This court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over the natural persons in this case as all natural persons are domicile within the geographic boundaries of the State of San Andreas. BACKGROUND On August 15th, 2024, Plaintiff engaged in protected speech activities, while located on public property, in the vicinity of the Los Santos Police Department Headquarters in Pershing Square, Los Santos, San Andreas. Plaintiff was speaking about the fundamental nature of the second amendment and advocating to others that the policies of the Firearms Licensing Division of the Los Santos Police Department were excessive and unconstitutional. Defendant Amber Moore was present on August 15th, 2024, at the same location at Plaintiff, and spoke to her directly to inquire about Plaintiff’s criminal history but did not detain Plaintiff or conduct an arrest. On August 17th, 2024, Plaintiff returned to the same location to engage in protected speech activities. She was joined by a volunteer associate of ACG, Michael “Mike” Walters, who was helping her to find a photographer for the event. Two deputies, Defendants Kaminski and Low were present on scene and Deputy Kaminski was brandishing a less-than-lethal firearm. The Penal Code of the State of San Andreas prescribes no definition for the term "firearm", so we look to the federal firearms laws for a presumptive definition. According to 18 U.S.C. 921(a)3, "The term 'firearm' means (A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device. Such term does not include an antique firearm." A less-than-lethal firearm, such as a rubber bullet launcher, operates by expulsion of a projectile by the action of an explosive primer, usually silver nitrate or a comparable compound that ignites powder. The definition makes no prescription about the material from which a projectile must be composed in order for the discharging device to be considered a firearm, so the fact that a projectile is rubber versus copper, brass, or lead makes no difference under this definition. As such, a less-than-lethal firearm qualifies as a firearm. Deputy Kaminski pointed the firearm in an unsafe direction, toward Plaintiff, and Plaintiff responded by informing Kaminski of his error in generally-accepted firearm safety. Defendants Kaminski and Low then verbally engaged by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff told them they should neither have such firearms nor have them pointed in an unsafe direction. In response, Deputies Kaminski and Low approached Plaintiff and began to argue with her. Notably, Defendant Kaminski falsely stated that a less-than-lethal firearm "does not count as a firearm under the law", implying that he could point it anywhere he wanted without legal consequence. An argument ensued between Plaintiff and Defendants Kaminski and Low about this issue. While verbally engaged with two deputies of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department, Plaintiff and Mr. Walters identified a potential photographer, identified only as “Frank”, and they attempted to make a verbal contract with him. Plaintiff paid “Frank” a sum of $10,000 United States Dollars by inserting the bills directly into his pocket. This was witnessed directly by the two deputies, Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low. The photographer, “Frank”, demanded that Plaintiff pay an additional sum of $140,000 for his services. When Plaintiff refused, “Frank” made a report of inappropriate sexual contact to Defendant Amber Moore, who had recently arrived and had not witnessed any of the prior events including the initial payment of $10,000 by Plaintiff to “Frank”. Defendants Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low gave false testimony to Defendant Moore that Plaintiff had slapped the rear end of “Frank” when in fact they had not witnessed any such act. In fact, the deputies had witnessed Plaintiff pay “Frank” by slotting the cash payment directly into the man’s back pocket; there was no inappropriate sexual touching committed upon the person of “Frank” at any time, neither by Plaintiff nor by anyone else at that time or place. A settlement agreement was reached between Plaintiff and the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department in which the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Christopher Kaminski, and Deputy Marvin Low admitted a mistake of fact and nullified any outstanding charges lodged by their department upon Plaintiff. The settlement agreement lacked monetary or other lawful consideration and is therefore unenforceable, however the written admissions of fault contained therein are admissible in this court as evidence of the deputies’ true observations as they were misrepresented to Defendant Moore. Defendant Moore, upon receiving the report from “Frank” and the two deputies, did not investigate further. Defendant Moore did not review the relevant dashcam or bodycam footage available from nearby cruiser-based recording devices, nor did she review the CCTV footage available in the CCTV system of the LSPD Headquarters building and its exterior. Defendant Moore instead placed Plaintiff under arrest on a charge of Sexual Battery, pursuant to Penal Code § 220(a). While Defendant Moore was in the process of handcuffing Plaintiff, a person unknown to Plaintiff attacked Moore from behind and struck her several times. Moore responded with lethal force, killing the unknown person. Shocked and terrified by the events she had witnessed in her vicinity, Plaintiff made statements emphasizing the brutality of the Los Santos Police Department and stated “violence will continue to happen”. Defendant Moore then transported Plaintiff to the Harbor Substation operated by the Los Santos Police Department for processing. While discussing the circumstances of the arrest with Plaintiff, Defendant Moore represented that she was lawfully able to order dispersion of the crowd because Plaintiff lacked a permit to protest, and that a failure to disperse was grounds for a citation under Penal Code section 401. On August 23rd, 2024, Plaintiff returned to the same location to engage in constitutionally-protected speech activities. She was joined by several others who had gathered to listen to Plaintiff speak about topics ranging from speech to firearms rights, the right to remain secure in one’s papers, house, and effects, and other constitutional topics. The assembly was conducted on public sidewalks and other public property, and did not abridge or otherwise obstruct roads or public pathways in any manner not ordinary to their regular and ordinary usage. Defendant Moore arrived and asked Plaintiff if she had a permit to conduct an assembly. In response, Plaintiff responded that she did not have a permit. Without more, Defendant Moore then issued a citation to Plaintiff on a charge of Unlawful Assembly pursuant to Penal Code § 401(b). Without more, Defendant Moore used her megaphone to order the people in attendance to disperse. Plaintiff peacefully protested this order, refusing to leave, but did not communicate any type of encouragement to the crowd to damage property, harm others, or commit any crime of violence or destruction. To the contrary, Plaintiff urged the crowd to not engage in any such acts because of the event’s nature as a civil protest. She further urged that violence was not necessary. Plaintiff’s intention behind the event was to show a pathway to civil discourse as a means of solving the city’s problems, but her attempts at peaceful and articulate debate were unfortunately interrupted by Defendant Moore. Defendant Moore then proceeded to arrest and charge Plaintiff on charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot, pursuant to Penal Code § 402 and § 403 respectively. The events of August 26th, August 28th, August 30th, September 2nd, September 9th, September 10th, September 12th, and September 14th all mirrored the events of August 23rd, with the exception that Defendant Moore did not inquire as to whether Plaintiff possessed a permit on these additional days. Defendant Moore did, however, on each day issue a citation for the same charge, order dispersion of the crowd, and then arrest Plaintiff when the crowd did not disperse, thereafter charging her with the offenses of Incitement to Riot and Riot. On September 10th, September 12th, and September 14th, Plaintiff refused to take the citations from Defendant Moore when issued. As a result, Defendant Moore charged Plaintiff with Obstruction of Justice, pursuant to Penal Code § 610, in addition to the charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot. In total, over the above-cited date range, Plaintiff has been issued nine citations of $2,000 United States Dollars each, totaling $18,000. She has been arrested and incarcerated over these same dates on a total of 11 misdemeanor offenses and 10 felony offenses. She has bonded out of jail each time. On August 30th, around 1:30 AM, Plaintiff was at her home located at 520 Halm Street. Upon getting home, and because she had been previously receiving death threats from an unknown source, Plaintiff armed herself with a concealed pistol upon arriving at her residence, and remained on her property at all times while armed with said pistol. Plaintiff was located outside, smoking a cigarette, when Defendants Kaminski and Low approached the residence and confronted Plaintiff outside of the home. Defendants Kaminski and Low informed Plaintiff that they had earlier been attempting to engage her in a traffic stop. They did not specify any violations of the Penal Code or Vehicle Code. Defendants Kaminski and Low informed Plaintiff that they would be seeking to search the premises. Plaintiff requested that they present a warrant to search the premises. Defendants Kaminski and Low then stated that they did not need to present a warrant because Plaintiff had allegedly evaded from them and entered the residence, thereby giving them reason to search the premises in hot pursuit. Defendants Kaminski and Low, in doing so, were invoking Title 0, Section 27, Subsection 1 of the Penal Code (Police Exigency and Hot Pursuit Policy), which states "Peace officers have the authority to follow suspects into private property if directly related to an ongoing pursuit. Entry related to investigations or other projects not in a direct pursuit of a suspect require a warrant." Plaintiff refused to allow Defendants Kaminski and Low to enter the premises without first presenting a search warrant authorizing entry to and search of the home. Upon her refusal, Defendants Kaminski and Low called for assistance. Soon thereafter, Defendant Moore arrived to assist the Defendant-Deputies. Another unknown Deputy Sheriff arrived and was ordered to conduct a cursory pat-down of Plaintiff's person. In order to do so, the unknown Deputy Sheriff ordered Plaintiff to step in front of a cruiser. Plaintiff did not consent to a search or pat-down of her person. During the pat-down of her person, the concealed pistol was discovered in a holster affixed to Plaintiff's thigh under her skirt. Immediately upon discovery, someone yelled that she has a gun. All of the law enforcement officers present backed away and trained their firearms upon her, ordering her to remove the firearm herself and throw it to the ground. Fearful of the consequences of grabbing a firearm whilst multiple firearms were aimed at her, Plaintiff refused and told law enforcement to remove the firearm themselves. Hesitantly, the law enforcement officers present removed the firearm from her person and placed her under detainment. While Plaintiff was detained, Defendants Kaminski and Low conducted a search of four properties under Plaintiff's ownership. Defendants did not at any time present a warrant authorizing them to search any of the four properties, including the residence at 520 Halm Street. While searching the residence at 520 Halm Street, deputies discovered a controlled substance but Plaintiff denies all knowledge of any such substance being in her home. Plaintiff makes an unsubstantiable claim that the controlled substance was introduced to her property by Defendants Kaminski and Low. While searching the other properties, deputies discovered a prescription opioid medication for which Plaintiff has a prescription. Plaintiff at no time operated a motor vehicle whilst under the influence of this medication. On August 30th, 2024, Plaintiff sent a version of an out-of-court settlement to the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department, proposing a monetary settlement in addition to the dropping of all charges stemming from the August 17th incident. On September 1, 2024, Defendants Kaminski and Low approached Plaintiff whilst not wearing their Sheriff's Department uniforms. They informed Plaintiff that they had been placed on administrative leave by Internal Affairs. Furthermore, Kaminski and Low themselves participated in a demonstration alongside Plaintiff on September 1st. Following the protest on September 1, 2024, Plaintiff went to the Internal Affairs office with Defendant Low. Defendant Low drafted his own version of a settlement agreement between Plaintiff and the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department. This agreement was signed by Plaintiff and the assigned Internal Affairs officer, Captain Elise Crawford. The agreement principally detailed that Plaintiff would release and hold harmless Defendant Los Santos County Sheriff's Department of any claims arising from the incident on August 17th, 2024, and also included many provisions requiring confidentiality. The agreement further detailed that Plaintiff may not speak about the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department during any protests or in public, assumedly in perpetuity because no time period is specified. In exchange for these, Defendant Los Santos County Sheriff's Department represented that it would "forward nolle prosequi to the prosecutors and shall drop all charges levied by the department from Marvin Low, Christopher Kaminski, or Darren Foster". Defendant Los Santos County Sheriff's Department further represented that the charges of Sexual Battery were not founded, and that any testimony given by Defendants Kaminski and Low to Defendant Moore on August 17th is "null and void". COUNT ONE – DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER FOURTH AMENDMENT ARISING FROM EXCESSIVE FORCE AND DE-FACTO DETAINMENT LACKING REASONABLE SUSPICION OF ANY CRIME, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiff was subjected to excessive force by Defendants Kaminski and Low when Defendant Low pointed a loaded firearm in her direction absent reasonable articulable suspicion of any crime. Pointing a firearm at a person is a form of force that police officers may typically employ only where there is a threat of a suspect possessing a firearm. The fact that a suspect has possessed one in the past, has a firearms permit, or that a suspect has a conviction history involving firearms is not sufficient grounds for assuming a suspect is armed. See United States v. Duarte, No. 22-50048 (9th Cir. Jul. 17, 2024). Plaintiff, while having a firearm aimed in her direction, had reason to believe that her freedom to leave was restrained, thereby making the application of force a de-facto detainment. Under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), uses of force must be objectively reasonable given the severity of the crime at issue, whether a suspect poses an immediate threat, and whether a suspect is actively resisting or attempting to evade by flight. The application, or threat, of physical force is a detainment under Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. ___ (2021). Such force need not be successful in order for it to qualify as an application of force. The pointing of a firearm at Plaintiff was an application of force and a de-facto detainment because a reasonable person would believe they are not free to leave if they are aware that there is a threat or chance of injury if they attempt to do so. Since Plaintiff had committed no crime and was simply engaging in protected speech activities, her actions could not have suggested criminality. As such, the pointing of any firearm violates the Graham factors specifically because the absence of a crime immediately causes any use of force to fail to objective reasonableness test required by Graham, therefore making any such use of force presumptively excessive and an unconstitutional breach of Plaintiff's fourth amendment right to be secure in her person and to be free of unnecessary seizure. COUNT TWO – DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER FOURTH AMENDMENT ARISING FROM FALSE TESTIMONY AND FOLLOWING ARREST LACKING PROBABLE CAUSE, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiff was arrested on a charge of Sexual Battery pursuant to Penal Code § 220(a). The applicable subsection contains one constructive element: the presence of unwanted touching or sexual contact by a person upon another person. The arrest conducted by Defendant Moore was wholly substantiated by her reliance on the false testimony of the reporting party and the false testimony of the deputies who she spoke with. The settlement agreement issued by the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department constitutes an admission that the deputies misrepresented their observations in an official capacity, thereby submitting an unlawful Deputies of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department gave false testimony to Defendant Moore, which served as a primary evidentiary basis leading to Defendant Moore’s reasonable belief of having probable cause. Defendant Moore made no attempt to collect additional evidence, even though it was available to her in the form of cruiser dashcam footage and closed circuit television footage from the Police Headquarters. Furthermore, Defendant Moore made no attempt to collect the witness testimony of others on the scene. Defendant Moore did not herself witness the events underlying the charge of Sexual Battery and therefore cannot assert a claim of her own witnessing of a crime as evidence for the crime. Deputies Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low made no attempt to correct Defendant Moore’s understanding of the events. By introducing false testimony to an official record, both officers committed the crime of Perjury pursuant to Penal Code § 606(b), which provides “A peace officer who knowingly and intentionally makes or causes to be made any material statement in an official report or to another peace officer and the statement is included in an official report, knowing the statement to be false, is guilty of a felony”. Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low may assert absolute immunity from civil liability under Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), but their employing agency has no such immunity and therefore must indemnify Plaintiff for the officers’ actions. Lacking the testimony given by Kaminski and Low, and without more, Defendant Moore would not have had the requisite basis to establish probable cause. Since additional evidence was available but not sought by Moore, she neglected to perform her duties in a manner consistent with a reasonable police officer. Defendant Moore’s failure to collect this evidence further constitutes a deprivation of Plaintiff’s right to discovery of exculpatory evidence during any criminal prosecution. Conducting an arrest without probable cause implicates the Fourth Amendment’s seizure clause, which provides that a person has a right to security in their person and may not be unreasonably seized. Under common law understood at the time the fourth amendment was adopted, an arrest and subsequent incarceration was understood to be a seizure under the meaning of the fourth amendment. Defendants Kaminski and Low have admitted fault in this matter, as shown in the unenforceable settlement agreement contained in evidence. Defendant Moore may assert qualified immunity under Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014), shielding herself from liability arising from the mistake of fact alone, but is not shielded by Heien on the issue of failing to investigate the matter, lacking probable cause for arrest, or failing to collect evidence that may have proven exculpatory. COUNTS THREE THROUGH TWELVE– DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER FIRST AMENDMENT ARISING FROM PRIOR RESTRAINT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF PEACEFUL PROTEST, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiff was cited for Unlawful Assembly on August 23rd, August 26th, August 28th, August 30th, September 2nd, September 9th, September 10th, September 12th, and September 14th for Unlawful Assembly pursuant to Penal Code § 401(b). The applicable subsection contains two constructive elements: (1) that a group failed to protest or demonstrate peacefully, and; (2) that the group did not have a permit or authorization from the city. Where protests are conducted in a traditional public forum, and are therein peaceful in nature, congress cannot restrain the right of persons to protest or display picket signs, under United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). Under Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the first amendment is incorporated onto state governments. Given this and applying Grace, state governments may not priorly restrain the free expression of the people by peacefully protest by requiring a permit to do so in a traditional public forum. Under common law, traditional public fora are locations such as public parks, street, sidewalks, city plazas, town squares, outdoor pedestrian malls, steps in front of city hall, front lawns of county office buildings, city-maintained alleyways, and any other location in which a person at common law may have expected to be able to speak without the restrictions of administrative regulation. In contrast, a limited public forum, under Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), is any property of another wherein the government may enforce time, place, and manner restrictions upon the speech of another. Under Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), as applied and cited in Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (1990), “individuals coming into or going about a city upon their lawful concerns must be allowed free locomotion upon the streets and public places”. Pershing Square in the City of Los Santos is a traditional public forum because it is a city plaza and town square. Furthermore, the Los Santos Police Department Headquarters is public property. While the interior of the building is a limited public forum subject to time, place, and manner restrictions under Cox, the stairs outside of the building are traditional public fora in much the same way as the interior of City Hall is a limited public forum while the stairs outside of it is a traditional public forum. The stairs on the exterior of a building is not a place where specific government business is conducted, and therefore is not subject to the reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions that govern limited public fora. Penal Code § 401(b) is facially unconstitutional under Cox, and both the enforcement thereof by the City of Los Santos through its permitting process and by the Los Santos Police Department through issuance of citations to those lacking permits while protesting in traditional public fora constitutes a violation of clearly established law that is grounds for suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Amber Moore may not assert qualified immunity in this matter because the corpus of law involving traditional public fora, including, but not limited to, Cox, Grace, Hague, Lutz, and Gitlow are all clearly established precedents that she has a duty to know and to apply in the course of her duties, as held in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), this court must apply the objective reasonable test prescribed therein, which requires an analysis of the existing corpus of law and whether an officer would be reasonably noticed of the unconstitutional nature of their conduct. Applying this test, Moore is not entitled to qualified immunity and is therefore personally liable for her actions. The City of Los Santos and Los Santos Police Department are also jointly liable for their constructive violations of Cox, Grace, Hague, Lutz, and Gitlow, and must indemnify Plaintiff for her losses as a result of the arrests and citations that arose from these acts. Counts 3 through 12 constitute a series of repeated violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights with each consisting of the unlawful issuance of a citation and unlawful dispersion of an otherwise-lawfully gathered and peaceful protest within a traditional public forum. COUNTS THIRTEEN THROUGH TWENTY-TWO – DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENT ARISING FROM UNLAWFUL ARREST FOR EXERCISING FREE SPEECH THROUGH PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. §1983 Plaintiff, after refusing to disperse when ordered to do so by Defendant Moore, was arrested for Incitement to Riot and Riot, pursuant to Penal Code § 402 and § 403 respectively. Section 402 contains two constructive elements. The first element requires a single overt act or attempt therein: the deliberate agitation or intention to agitate a crowd or large group of people. The second element requires that the crowd or large group is located in a public or private area in order to promote acts of violence or civil unrest. Plaintiff did not communicate any messages that a reasonable person would be agitated, and did not intend to do so in any way. To the contrary, Plaintiff has alleged her intent to be an expression of free speech for the purpose of demonstrating a mode of civil discourse through which others may express their grievances constructively. Furthermore, the group was not gathered in the traditional public forum of Pershing Square for the purpose of promoting acts of violence or civil unrest. A failure to disperse does not, without explicit calls for violence or civil unrest, constitute an incitement to riot even if the organizer of the group tells others not to disperse. Under this same logic, we would have expected figures such as Martin Luther King, Jr., and his compatriots, to have been charged with felony acts of incitement to riot rather than the public order offenses they were in fact charged with during their protests that led to the passing of the 1963 Civil Rights Act. As discussed in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), a person may be convicted of breaching the peace if the direct result of his speech is civil unrest or disorder. Here, Plaintiff did not call for unrest or disorder, or violence of any kind, and her speech did not result in civil unrest, disorder, or a breach of the peace beyond continued protest and civil disobedience of officers by the participants of the protest. The charges under Penal Code § 402 are unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff because her actions did not satisfy the elements of the crime, and Defendants Los Santos Police Department and Moore lack the probable cause necessary to substantiate an arrest. The charges under Penal Code § 403 are unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff because her actions did not constitute a riot. Lacking civil unrest, disorder, or a breach of peace exceeding civil disobedience, the elements of the crime have not been satisfied and Defendants Los Santos Police Department and Moore lack the probable cause to substantiate an arrest. Lacking probable cause for an arrest, Defendants Los Santos Police Department and Moore have engaged in an unlawful seizure of the person of Plaintiff, and in so doing have violated her right to be free of such unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment. Under Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), punitive damages are recoverable where a defendant’s actions are reckless or callously indifferent to the rights of a plaintiff. Defendants Moore and Los Santos Police Department were callously indifferent to the rights of Plaintiff through assertion of incorrect criminal charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot, pursuant to Penal Code § 402 and § 403 respectively, where the elements of the crime were not met. Counts 13 through 22 constitute a series of repeated violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights with each consisting of an unlawful arrest and incarceration where Plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected speech. COUNT TWENTY-THREE – MONELL CLAIM FOR A PATTERN OR PRACTICE OF DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE IN TRAINING OF POLICE OFFICERS, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Under Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a municipal agency may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for official acts constituting a pattern or practice that results in a systemic violation of a plaintiff’s civil rights. The elements of a Monell claim are: (1) deprivation of a clearly-established federal right; (2) that specific government action can be traced to the deprivation; (3) presence of a pattern or practice demonstrating fault or deliberate indifference to the risks therein, and; (4) municipal action, or inaction, was the driving force behind the deprivation. Under Thomas v. Cook Cty Sheriff's Dept, 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2009), a municipal department’s awareness of some risk to plaintiffs by a custom or practice constitutes deliberate indifference under the requirements of the test in Monell. Under McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 2009), the municipal policies of an agency are legal conclusions where not factually supported. As reasoned in McTigue, if a municipal agency’s policy, where followed appropriately, results in a constitutional violation, the municipal agency may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Los Santos Police Department failed to provide Defendant Moore the appropriate level of training in the clearly-established laws concerning protesting. As a result, Moore conducted false arrests on numerous occasions. In failing to provide the necessary training for Defendant Moore, Defendant Los Santos Police Department was deliberately indifferent to the first amendment rights of the public in a manner that was likely to lead to the violation of citizens’ rights to protest and speak in traditional public fora. Defendant Los Santos Police Department has a duty to train officers appropriately before permitting them to patrol or conduct arrests on their own. Defendant Moore was able to conduct the multiple arrests of Plaintiff without any such supervision, therein suggesting that she was considered by the Department to be a fully trained and capable officer with all the rights and privileges of law enforcement officers in this State. However, her actions suggest otherwise. Her own personal indifference to the rights affirmed in Cox, Grace, Hague, Lutz, and Gitlow suggest that the department did not conduct an appropriate level of training before granting her the statuses common to fully trained officers. Applying Monell, Thomas, and McTigue, Defendant Los Santos Police Department is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to indemnify Plaintiff for the losses resulting from her incarceration. Defendant’s lack of policies requiring that officers be trained in the clearly-established law relevant to the performance of their duties as they pertain to maintenance of public order demonstrates deliberate indifference to preventing such risks. COUNT TWENTY-FOUR – DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER FOURTH AMENDMENT ARISING FROM UNLAWFUL SEARCH OF PERSON AND PRIVATE PROPERTY WITHOUT CONSENT OR EXIGENCY, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. §1983 On August 30th, Plaintiff was located on her own private property within the curtilage of the property on the porch. Under Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), the front porch of a private residence is part of the home. Under Jardines, officers are granted the same license to approach the residence as any ordinary citizen. Defendants Kaminski and Low encountered Plaintiff on her porch. Defendants Kaminski and Low informed Plaintiff that they would be searching the home and, upon Plaintiff's request for a search warrant, failed to produce such warrant. In the absence of a search warrant, searches of a home without consent are presumptively unreasonable under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Defendants Kaminski and Low cited the Exigency and Hot Pursuit Policy of the Penal Code, codified in Title 0, Section 27. Under United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), exigent circumstances by hot pursuit are present if an arrest is actively being conducted when a suspect retreats into their home. Under this standard, a suspect must first be detained and informed that he is under arrest. Here, Plaintiff was not under arrest and did not retreat into her home while under arrest. Contrary to the claims made by Defendants Kaminski and Low, Plaintiff did not make any attempt to evade by flight from a traffic stop and was not therefore retreating into her home when she went indoors. Plaintiff refused Defendants Kaminski and Low access to her home, requiring that they first present a search warrant before she allowed them to enter. After backup had arrived, another Deputy Sheriff conducted a cursory pat-down upon the person of Plaintiff without consent. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), officers may conduct a cursory pat-down of a suspect if they have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous. Defendants and the unknown Deputy Sheriff had no such reasonable suspicion, and therefore a non-consensual cursory pat-down under Terry is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. While this is ordinarily a de minimus intrusion, this unreasonable pat-down resulted in the discovery of a firearm which was later used as evidence against her. Since the firearm, used as evidence, was discovered as the result of an unreasonable search and violation therein of the Fourth Amendment, it is inadmissible as evidence under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Defendants Kaminski and Low then proceeded to search four of Plaintiff's properties without a warrant and, applying Santana, without exigent circumstances under hot pursuit. Even if they did have exigent circumstances to enter Plaintiff's residence, which we contend they did not, they would not have been permitted to search the other three properties. Applying both Santana and Payton together, all four of these searches were presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a warrant or some demonstrable exigency. Defendants Kaminski and Low are not entitled to qualified immunity because there is clearly-established law, established in Santana, Jardines, and Payton, relating directly to the role of a front porch as curtilage to the property, and entered four separate properties to search them without a warrant and without consent of the property owner. COUNT TWENTY-FIVE – BREACH OF DUTY TO INFORM COUNSEL OF FALSE TESTIMONY, AND DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER FIFTH AMENDMENT PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff previously entered into a contractual settlement with Defendant Los Santos County Sheriff's Department. Plaintiff submits that this agreement is unenforceable by this or any court and is therefore null and void. In the agreed-upon settlement, Los Santos County Sheriff's Department made unlawful promises as consideration for a release of liability by Plaintiff. The powers and jurisdictions of the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department are enumerated in Addendum 2, Section 2 of the State Constitution. The enumerated powers do not include the power to "forward nolle prosequi". This power is reserved exclusively to the Office of the District Attorney and the District Attorney. The agreed-upon settlement also offered, as consideration for the contract, a remedy to prior perjury by Defendants Kaminski and Low in exchange for a release of liability. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Defendant Los Santos County Sheriff's Department, the government's withholding of evidence that is material to the determination of either guilt or punishment of a criminal defendant violates the defendant's constitutional right to due process. Defendant Los Santos County Sheriff's Department was required to reveal to both the prosecution and to the defense in Plaintiff's underlying criminal prosecution for Sexual Battery that Defendants Kaminski and Low had perjured themselves to Defendant Moore. In offering this as consideration, Los Santos County Sheriff's Department breached a legal duty they have to the defense and to the courts, and thereby deprived Plaintiff of her due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Under Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), there are three components to any claim under Brady. Firstly, there must be some evidence that would have been favorable to the defendant in a criminal matter either because the evidence is impeaching or because it is exculpatory. Secondly, the evidence must have been suppressed by the state either willfully or inadvertently. Thirdly, the presentation of such evidence may have reasonably produced a different outcome. Applying the test defined in Strickler, all three components of the test are met and Plaintiff therefore has a valid claim under Brady. Under Armstrong v. Toler, 24 U.S. 258 (1826), courts must not lend their aid to enforce contracts that grows immediately out of and is connected with an illegal act. If Plaintiff did not accept the settlement agreement, the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department may not have made the representation that it was aware of the falsity of statements made by Defendants Kaminski and Low. To fail to present such information would violate Plaintiff's rights under Brady, and would therefore be to deprive her of her due process rights. Applying Armstrong, the settlement agreement assented to by Plaintiff and Defendant Los Santos County Sheriff's Department is unenforceable and therefore null and void. DAMAGES AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 1. Compensatory damages in the amount of: $10,000 per hour spent incarcerated for charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot (252 hours), for a total of $2,520,000. Compensatory damages in the amount of $10,000 per hour spent incarcerated for the charge of Sexual Battery (30 hours), for a total of $300,000. Compensatory damages in the amount of $18,000 for the citations under Penal Code §401 that were paid by Plaintiff. $25,000 for pain, suffering, and mental anguish resulting from the application of excessive force. $10,000 per occurrence as compensation for the mental anguish arising from unlawful search and seizure, for a total of $40,000. 2. Punitive Damages in the amounts: Treble the applicable compensatory damages for unlawful incarceration resulting from the charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot, totaling $7,560,000. Treble the applicable compensatory damages for unlawful incarceration resulting from the charge of Sexual Battery, totaling $900,000 3. Dismissal of all charges stemming from the actions on the dates referenced in this claim. 4. A permanent injunction from this court, detailing that both Defendants Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low be listed as having perjured themselves in a past matter, as a means of preventing their testimony from being entered into evidence against future criminal defendants. 5. Reasonable attorney fees awarded to attorneys Xavier Castendas, Donald J. Wright, and Jacob E. Rabinowitz. While Mr. Wright and Mr. Rabinowitz are acting pro bono without charge to Plaintiff, their services are recompensable from Defendants by this court. As a reference point, all three attorneys bill for their services at a rate of $5,000 per hour. WITNESS LIST Michael Walters Samuel Gonzales, Chief of Police, Los Santos Police Department Amber Moore, Employee of the Los Santos Police Department Deputy Christopher Kaminski, Employee of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department Deputy Marvin Low, Employee of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department Captain Elise Crawford, Employee of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department _______________________________________________ Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge. Sworn this 20th day of September, 2024 by: /s/ Jacob E. Rabinowitz JACOB E. RABINOWITZ Co-Counsel for Plaintiff [email protected] DONALD J. WRIGHT Co-Counsel for Plaintiff XAVIER CASTENDAS Lead Counsel for Plaintiff -

(( See )) Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, Alexander Blair, Los Santos Police Department, Samuel Gonzales, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, and Roderick Hayward, in their official capacities, Amber Moore, Christopher Kaminski, and Marvin Low, in their individual and official capacities, Case Number: 24-CV-1034 Prepared by: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq., and Donald J. Wright, Esq., Supplementary Counsel for Plaintiff. Short Title: Michelle Jefferson v. City of Los Santos, Los Santos Police Department, Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department, et al. AMENDED CIVIL CASE BRIEF FOR MICHELLE JEFFERSON V. LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT _______________________________________________ TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014) United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990) Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) Thomas v. Cook Cty Sheriff's Dept, 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2009) McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 2009) PARTIES TO ACTION Michelle Jefferson is a natural person with primary residence in the State of San Andreas. She is the chief executive of a non-profit organization called “Anti-Corruption Group”, “ACG” for short. City of Los Santos is a municipal corporation of the State of San Andreas, sued in its official capacity as an entity responsible for the orderly management of all agencies organized within its geographic area of incorporation. Alexander Blair is a natural person serving as Mayor of the City of Los Santos, sued in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Los Santos. Los Santos Police Department is a municipal agency and state agency in the service of the City of Los Santos, sued in its official capacity as an entity responsible for the orderly management of all employees and resources organized under it. Samuel Gonzales is a natural person serving as Chief of Police for the Los Santos Police Department, sued in his official capacity as the chief executive of the Los Santos Police Department. Los Santos County Sheriff's Department is a municipal agency and state agency in service of the City of Los Santos and the unincorporated areas surrounding the incorporated region of Los Santos, sued in its official capacity as an entity responsible for the orderly management of all employees and resources organized under it. Roderick Hayward is a natural person serving as Sheriff for the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department, sued in his official capacity as the chief executive of the Los Santos Police Department. Amber Moore is a natural person and sworn law enforcement officer employed by the Los Santos Police Department during the dates relevant to this claim. Christopher Kaminski is a natural person and sworn law enforcement officer employed by the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department during the dates relevant to this claim. Marvin Low is a natural person and sworn law enforcement officer employed by the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department during the dates relevant to this claim. JURISDICTION AND VENUE This court has general jurisdiction over the parties named due to their organization within the geographic boundaries of the State of San Andreas. This court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over the natural persons in this case as all natural persons are domicile within the geographic boundaries of the State of San Andreas. BACKGROUND On August 15th, 2024, Plaintiff engaged in protected speech activities, while located on public property, in the vicinity of the Los Santos Police Department Headquarters in Pershing Square, Los Santos, San Andreas. Plaintiff was speaking about the fundamental nature of the second amendment and advocating to others that the policies of the Firearms Licensing Division of the Los Santos Police Department were excessive and unconstitutional. Defendant Amber Moore was present on August 15th, 2024, at the same location at Plaintiff, and spoke to her directly to inquire about Plaintiff’s criminal history but did not detain Plaintiff or conduct an arrest. On August 17th, 2024, Plaintiff returned to the same location to engage in protected speech activities. She was joined by a volunteer associate of ACG, Michael “Mike” Walters, who was helping her to find a photographer for the event. On the scene, there were many people including several deputies of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff and two deputies, Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low, engaged in a verbal altercation, arguing about some of the topics Plaintiff was engaged in protected speech about. While verbally engaged with two deputies of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department, Plaintiff and Mr. Walters identified a potential photographer, identified only as “Frank”, and they attempted to make a verbal contract with him. Plaintiff paid “Frank” a sum of $10,000 United States Dollars by inserting the bills directly into his pocket. This was witnessed directly by the two deputies, Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low. The photographer, “Frank”, demanded that Plaintiff pay an additional sum of $140,000 for his services. When Plaintiff refused, “Frank” made a report of inappropriate sexual contact to Officer Amber Moore, who had recently arrived and had not witnessed any of the prior events including the initial payment of $10,000 by Plaintiff to “Frank”. Deputies Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low gave false testimony to Officer Moore that Plaintiff had slapped the rear end of “Frank” when in fact they had not witnessed any such act. In fact, the deputies had witnessed Plaintiff pay “Frank” by slotting the cash payment directly into the man’s back pocket; there was no inappropriate sexual touching committed upon the person of “Frank” at any time, neither by Plaintiff nor by anyone else at that time or place. A settlement agreement was reached between Plaintiff and the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department in which the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Christopher Kaminski, and Deputy Marvin Low admitted a mistake of fact and nullified any outstanding charges lodged by their department upon Plaintiff. The settlement agreement lacked monetary or other lawful consideration and is therefore unenforceable, however the written admissions of fault contained therein are admissible in this court as evidence of the deputies’ true observations as they were misrepresented to Officer Moore. Officer Moore, upon receiving the report from “Frank” and the two deputies, did not investigate further. Officer Moore did not review the relevant dashcam or bodycam footage available from nearby cruiser-based recording devices, nor did she review the CCTV footage available in the CCTV system of the LSPD Headquarters building and its exterior. Officer Moore instead placed Plaintiff under arrest on a charge of Sexual Battery, pursuant to Penal Code § 220(a). While Officer Moore was in the process of handcuffing Plaintiff, a person unknown to Plaintiff attacked Moore from behind and struck her several times. Moore responded with lethal force, killing the unknown person. Shocked and terrified by the events she had witnessed in her vicinity, Plaintiff made statements emphasizing the brutality of the Los Santos Police Department and stated “violence will continue to happen”. Officer Moore then transported Plaintiff to a nearby station for processing. While discussing the circumstances of the arrest with Plaintiff, Officer Moore represented that she was lawfully able to order dispersion of the crowd because Plaintiff lacked a permit to protest, and that a failure to disperse was grounds for a citation under Penal Code section 401. On August 23rd, 2024, Plaintiff returned to the same location to engage in constitutionally-protected speech activities. She was joined by several others who had gathered to listen to Plaintiff speak about topics ranging from speech to firearms rights, the right to remain secure in one’s papers, house, and effects, and other constitutional topics. The assembly was conducted on public sidewalks and other public property, and did not abridge or otherwise obstruct roads or public pathways in any manner not ordinary to their regular and ordinary usage. Officer Moore arrived and asked Plaintiff if she had a permit to conduct an assembly. In response, Plaintiff responded that she did not have a permit. Without more, Officer Moore then issued a citation to Plaintiff on a charge of Unlawful Assembly pursuant to Penal Code § 401(b). Without more, Officer Moore used her megaphone to order the people in attendance to disperse. Plaintiff peacefully protested this order, refusing to leave, but did not communicate any type of encouragement to the crowd to damage property, harm others, or commit any crime of violence or destruction. To the contrary, Plaintiff urged the crowd to not engage in any such acts because of the event’s nature as a civil protest. She further urged that violence was not necessary. Plaintiff’s intention behind the event was to show a pathway to civil discourse as a means of solving the city’s problems, but her attempts at peaceful and articulate debate were unfortunately interrupted by Officer Moore. Officer Moore then proceeded to arrest and charge Plaintiff on charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot, pursuant to Penal Code § 402 and § 403 respectively. The events of August 26th, August 28th, August 30th, September 2nd, September 9th, September 10th, September 12th, and September 14th all mirrored the events of August 23rd, with the exception that Officer Moore did not inquire as to whether Plaintiff possessed a permit on these additional days. Officer Moore did, however, on each day issue a citation for the same charge, order dispersion of the crowd, and then arrest Plaintiff when the crowd did not disperse, thereafter charging her with the offenses of Incitement to Riot and Riot. On September 10th, September 12th, and September 14th, Plaintiff refused to take the citations from Officer Moore when issued. As a result, Officer Moore charged Plaintiff with Obstruction of Justice, pursuant to Penal Code § 610, in addition to the charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot. In total, over the above-cited date range, Plaintiff has been issued nine citations of $2,000 United States Dollars each, totaling $18,000. She has been arrested and incarcerated over these same dates on a total of 11 misdemeanor offenses and 10 felony offenses. She has bonded out of jail each time. COUNT ONE – DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER FOURTH AMENDMENT ARISING FROM FALSE TESTIMONY AND FOLLOWING ARREST LACKING PROBABLE CAUSE, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiff was arrested on a charge of Sexual Battery pursuant to Penal Code § 220(a). The applicable subsection contains one constructive element: the presence of unwanted touching or sexual contact by a person upon another person. The arrest conducted by Officer Moore was wholly substantiated by her reliance on the false testimony of the reporting party and the false testimony of the deputies who she spoke with. The settlement agreement issued by the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department constitutes an admission that the deputies misrepresented their observations in an official capacity, thereby submitting an unlawful Deputies of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department gave false testimony to Officer Moore, which served as a primary evidentiary basis leading to Officer Moore’s reasonable belief of having probable cause. Officer Moore made no attempt to collect additional evidence, even though it was available to her in the form of cruiser dashcam footage and closed circuit television footage from the Police Headquarters. Furthermore, Officer Moore made no attempt to collect the witness testimony of others on the scene. Officer Moore did not herself witness the events underlying the charge of Sexual Battery and therefore cannot assert a claim of her own witnessing of a crime as evidence for the crime. Deputies Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low made no attempt to correct Officer Moore’s understanding of the events. By introducing false testimony to an official record, both officers committed the crime of Perjury pursuant to Penal Code § 606(b), which provides “A peace officer who knowingly and intentionally makes or causes to be made any material statement in an official report or to another peace officer and the statement is included in an official report, knowing the statement to be false, is guilty of a felony”. Christopher Kaminski and Marvin Low may assert absolute immunity from civil liability under Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), but their employing agency has no such immunity and therefore must indemnify Plaintiff for the officers’ actions. Lacking the testimony given by Kaminski and Low, and without more, Officer Moore would not have had the requisite basis to establish probable cause. Since additional evidence was available but not sought by Moore, she neglected to perform her duties in a manner consistent with a reasonable police officer. Officer Moore’s failure to collect this evidence further constitutes a deprivation of Plaintiff’s right to discovery of exculpatory evidence during any criminal prosecution. Conducting an arrest without probable cause implicates the Fourth Amendment’s seizure clause, which provides that a person has a right to security in their person and may not be unreasonably seized. Under common law understood at the time the fourth amendment was adopted, an arrest and subsequent incarceration was understood to be a seizure under the meaning of the fourth amendment. Defendants Kaminski and Low have admitted fault in this matter, as shown in the unenforceable settlement agreement contained in evidence. Defendant Moore may assert qualified immunity under Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014), shielding herself from liability arising from the mistake of fact alone, but is not shielded by Heien on the issue of failing to investigate the matter, lacking probable cause for arrest, or failing to collect evidence that may have proven exculpatory. COUNTS TWO THROUGH ELEVEN– DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER FIRST AMENDMENT ARISING FROM PRIOR RESTRAINT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF PEACEFUL PROTEST, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiff was cited for Unlawful Assembly on August 23rd, August 26th, August 28th, August 30th, September 2nd, September 9th, September 10th, September 12th, and September 14th for Unlawful Assembly pursuant to Penal Code § 401(b). The applicable subsection contains two constructive elements: (1) that a group failed to protest or demonstrate peacefully, and; (2) that the group did not have a permit or authorization from the city. Where protests are conducted in a traditional public forum, and are therein peaceful in nature, congress cannot restrain the right of persons to protest or display picket signs, under United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). Under Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the first amendment is incorporated onto state governments. Given this and applying Grace, state governments may not priorly restrain the free expression of the people by peacefully protest by requiring a permit to do so in a traditional public forum. Under common law, traditional public fora are locations such as public parks, street, sidewalks, city plazas, town squares, outdoor pedestrian malls, steps in front of city hall, front lawns of county office buildings, city-maintained alleyways, and any other location in which a person at common law may have expected to be able to speak without the restrictions of administrative regulation. In contrast, a limited public forum, under Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), is any property of another wherein the government may enforce time, place, and manner restrictions upon the speech of another. Under Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), as applied and cited in Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (1990), “individuals coming into or going about a city upon their lawful concerns must be allowed free locomotion upon the streets and public places”. Pershing Square in the City of Los Santos is a traditional public forum because it is a city plaza and town square. Furthermore, the Los Santos Police Department Headquarters is public property. While the interior of the building is a limited public forum subject to time, place, and manner restrictions under Cox, the stairs outside of the building are traditional public fora in much the same way as the interior of City Hall is a limited public forum while the stairs outside of it is a traditional public forum. The stairs on the exterior of a building is not a place where specific government business is conducted, and therefore is not subject to the reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions that govern limited public fora. Penal Code § 401(b) is facially unconstitutional under Cox, and both the enforcement thereof by the City of Los Santos through its permitting process and by the Los Santos Police Department through issuance of citations to those lacking permits while protesting in traditional public fora constitutes a violation of clearly established law that is grounds for suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Officer Amber Moore may not assert qualified immunity in this matter because the corpus of law involving traditional public fora, including, but not limited to, Cox, Grace, Hague, Lutz, and Gitlow are all clearly established precedents that she has a duty to know and to apply in the course of her duties, as held in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), this court must apply the objective reasonable test prescribed therein, which requires an analysis of the existing corpus of law and whether an officer would be reasonably noticed of the unconstitutional nature of their conduct. Applying this test, Moore is not entitled to qualified immunity and is therefore personally liable for her actions. The City of Los Santos and Los Santos Police Department are also jointly liable for their constructive violations of Cox, Grace, Hague, Lutz, and Gitlow, and must indemnify Plaintiff for her losses as a result of the arrests and citations that arose from these acts. Counts 2 through 11 constitute a series of repeated violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights with each consisting of the unlawful issuance of a citation and unlawful dispersion of an otherwise-lawfully gathered and peaceful protest within a traditional public forum. COUNTS TWELVE THROUGH TWENTY-ONE – DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENT ARISING FROM UNLAWFUL ARREST FOR EXERCISING FREE SPEECH THROUGH PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. §1983 Plaintiff, after refusing to disperse when ordered to do so by Officer Moore, was arrested for Incitement to Riot and Riot, pursuant to Penal Code § 402 and § 403 respectively. Section 402 contains two constructive elements. The first element requires a single overt act or attempt therein: the deliberate agitation or intention to agitate a crowd or large group of people. The second element requires that the crowd or large group is located in a public or private area in order to promote acts of violence or civil unrest. Plaintiff did not communicate any messages that a reasonable person would be agitated, and did not intend to do so in any way. To the contrary, Plaintiff has alleged her intent to be an expression of free speech for the purpose of demonstrating a mode of civil discourse through which others may express their grievances constructively. Furthermore, the group was not gathered in the traditional public forum of Pershing Square for the purpose of promoting acts of violence or civil unrest. A failure to disperse does not, without explicit calls for violence or civil unrest, constitute an incitement to riot even if the organizer of the group tells others not to disperse. Under this same logic, we would have expected figures such as Martin Luther King, Jr., and his compatriots, to have been charged with felony acts of incitement to riot rather than the public order offenses they were in fact charged with during their protests that led to the passing of the 1963 Civil Rights Act. As discussed in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), a person may be convicted of breaching the peace if the direct result of his speech is civil unrest or disorder. Here, Plaintiff did not call for unrest or disorder, or violence of any kind, and her speech did not result in civil unrest, disorder, or a breach of the peace beyond continued protest and civil disobedience of officers by the participants of the protest. The charges under Penal Code § 402 are unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff because her actions did not satisfy the elements of the crime, and Defendants Los Santos Police Department and Moore lack the probable cause necessary to substantiate an arrest. The charges under Penal Code § 403 are unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff because her actions did not constitute a riot. Lacking civil unrest, disorder, or a breach of peace exceeding civil disobedience, the elements of the crime have not been satisfied and Defendants Los Santos Police Department and Moore lack the probable cause to substantiate an arrest. Lacking probable cause for an arrest, Defendants Los Santos Police Department and Moore have engaged in an unlawful seizure of the person of Plaintiff, and in so doing have violated her right to be free of such unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment. Under Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), punitive damages are recoverable where a defendant’s actions are reckless or callously indifferent to the rights of a plaintiff. Defendants Moore and Los Santos Police Department were callously indifferent to the rights of Plaintiff through assertion of incorrect criminal charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot, pursuant to Penal Code § 402 and § 403 respectively, where the elements of the crime were not met. Counts 12 through 21 constitute a series of repeated violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights with each consisting of an unlawful arrest and incarceration where Plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected speech. COUNT TWENTY-TWO – MONELL CLAIM FOR A PATTERN OR PRACTICE OF DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE IN TRAINING OF POLICE OFFICERS, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Under Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a municipal agency may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for official acts constituting a pattern or practice that results in a systemic violation of a plaintiff’s civil rights. The elements of a Monell claim are: (1) deprivation of a clearly-established federal right; (2) that specific government action can be traced to the deprivation; (3) presence of a pattern or practice demonstrating fault or deliberate indifference to the risks therein, and; (4) municipal action, or inaction, was the driving force behind the deprivation. Under Thomas v. Cook Cty Sheriff's Dept, 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2009), a municipal department’s awareness of some risk to plaintiffs by a custom or practice constitutes deliberate indifference under the requirements of the test in Monell. Under McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 2009), the municipal policies of an agency are legal conclusions where not factually supported. As reasoned in McTigue, if a municipal agency’s policy, where followed appropriately, results in a constitutional violation, the municipal agency may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Los Santos Police Department failed to provide Defendant Moore the appropriate level of training in the clearly-established laws concerning protesting. As a result, Moore conducted false arrests on numerous occasions. In failing to provide the necessary training for Defendant Moore, Defendant Los Santos Police Department was deliberately indifferent to the first amendment rights of the public in a manner that was likely to lead to the violation of citizens’ rights to protest and speak in traditional public fora. Defendant Los Santos Police Department has a duty to train officers appropriately before permitting them to patrol or conduct arrests on their own. Defendant Moore was able to conduct the multiple arrests of Plaintiff without any such supervision, therein suggesting that she was considered by the Department to be a fully trained and capable officer with all the rights and privileges of law enforcement officers in this State. However, her actions suggest otherwise. Her own personal indifference to the rights affirmed in Cox, Grace, Hague, Lutz, and Gitlow suggest that the department did not conduct an appropriate level of training before granting her the statuses common to fully trained officers. Applying Monell, Thomas, and McTigue, Defendant Los Santos Police Department is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to indemnify Plaintiff for the losses resulting from her incarceration. Defendant’s lack of policies requiring that officers be trained in the clearly-established law relevant to the performance of their duties as they pertain to maintenance of public order demonstrates deliberate indifference to preventing such risks, DAMAGES AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF Compensatory damages in the amount of: $10,000 per hour spent incarcerated for charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot (252 hours), for a total of $2,520,000. Compensatory damages in the amount of $10,000 per hour spent incarcerated for the charge of Sexual Battery (30 hours), for a total of $300,000. Compensatory damages in the amount of $18,000 for the citations under Penal Code §401 that were paid by Plaintiff. Punitive Damages in the amounts: Treble the applicable compensatory damages for unlawful incarceration resulting from the charges of Incitement to Riot and Riot, totaling $7,560,000. Punitive Damages in the amount treble the applicable compensatory damages for unlawful incarceration resulting from the charge of Sexual Battery, totaling $900,000. Dismissal of all charges stemming from the actions on the dates referenced in this claim. Reasonable attorney fees awarded to attorneys Xavier Castendas, Donald J. Wright, and Jacob E. Rabinowitz. While Mr. Wright and Mr. Rabinowitz are acting pro bono without charge to Plaintiff, their services are recompensable from Defendants by this court. As a reference point, all three attorneys bill for their services at a rate of $5,000 per hour. WITNESS LIST Michael Walters Manuel Caldera, Chief of Police, Los Santos Police Department Amber Moore, Employee of the Los Santos Police Department Deputy Christopher Kaminski, Employee of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department Deputy Marvin Low, Employee of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department Captain Elise Crawford, Employee of the Los Santos Sheriff’s Department _______________________________________________ Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge. Sworn this 20th day of September, 2024 by: /s/ Jacob E. Rabinowitz JACOB E. RABINOWITZ Co-Counsel for Plaintiff [email protected] DONALD J. WRIGHT Co-Counsel for Plaintiff XAVIER CASTENDAS Lead Counsel for Plaintiff -

** The Court Clerk receives a fax from the Office of Jacob E. Rabinowitz, Esq. TO: Court Clerk; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq. DATE: September 20th, 2024 RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Request for Recess Pending Strategy Meeting and Additional Pre-Trial Conferences ----- Judge Hockenbeyer, I write to ask for a brief recess while we attempt to conduct a strategy conference. We have drafted an amended complaint that requires review for legal accuracy, naming additional plaintiffs and alleging an amended set of statutory violations and applicable damages. We will be filing this amended complaint this evening, and after which we would need time to serve notice upon the additional plaintiffs and engage in pre-trial conferences with them if they are amiable. Signed, Jacob E. Rabinowitz III Counsel for Plaintiff (( @almightybounter ))

Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department Case Number: 24-CV-1034 Prepared by: Donald J. Wright and Jacob Ezekiel Rabinowitz III. MOTION FOR ADDITION OF COUNSEL _______________________________________________ Comes now, Donald J. Wright and Jacob E. Rabinowitz III after approval from the plaintiff, request the court record reflect the addition of counsel. Mr. Wright and Mr. Rabinowitz have been retained by Plaintiff for the purpose of addressing additional complexities involving a specific subject matter which lead counsel requires assistance in litigating. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1654 and a permanent injunction issued by the appellate court having jurisdiction over this court, movants request that the record reflect the addition of counsel and that this court grant full rights, privileges, and permissions to the additional counsel to make filings, submit briefs and evidence, issue subpoenas, and move this court for further action. Mr. Wright and Mr. Rabinowitz are acting pro bono in this matter for the sole purpose of protecting the citizens of the United States who choose to express their dissatisfaction with their government, including that of protesting. Movants have received advance permission from lead counsel and Plaintiff. _______________________________________________ Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge. Sworn this 18 day of September, 2024 by: /s/ Jacob E. Rabinowitz Jacob E. Rabinowitz III on behalf of himself and Donald J. Wright, attorneys for plaintiff. (( @almightybounter ))

** The Court Clerk receives a fax from the Office of Jacob E. Rabinowitz, Esq. TO: Court Clerk; CC: Court Reporter; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq. DATE: September 19th, 2024 RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Notice of in re Interlocutory Appeal ----- Madam Court Clerk: Please be advised that counsel for Plaintiff has filed an emergency appeal of the previous orders denying Plaintiff of her right to appoint co-counsel, and the responsive orders denying a stay of proceedings pending an answer to such question. This notice is to create a record in the docket for 24-CV-1034 that an in re appeal has been lodged on behalf of Plaintiff that may have an effect on the outcome of this matter. (( Link to Appeal Topic )) Signed, Jacob E. Rabinowitz III Counsel for Plaintiff (( @almightybounter ))

(( Unable to post in appeals section, and originally posted this in the RageMP area not here. Please delete the old topic and move this one to the appeals section. Thanks! )) In re Michelle Jefferson On Appeal from Superior Court Case Number: YY-XNNN Prepared by: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Donald J. Wright EMERGENCY INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND PETITION FOR INJUNCTION _______________________________________________ Appellant Michelle Jefferson, by and through attorneys Jacob E. Rabinowitz III and Donald J. Wright, makes application to the Appellate Division for an emergency interlocutory appeal of an immediately reviewable matter occurring within Case 24-CV-1034 under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) and 28 U.S.C. 1292(d)1. I. DENIAL OF APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHTS UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1654, ET SEQ. Movant submitted a motion for addition of co-counsel with the approval of the plaintiff, asserting her rights under Fed R. Civ. P. 44, Right to and Appointment of Counsel, and 28 U.S.C. § 1654. The trial court issued a responsive order denying the motion for addition of co-counsel. Movant possessed grounds for its original motion as movant has been retained by Plaintiff as substitutional or supplementary counsel for this matter. Furthermore, Movant possesses grounds for this motion as a result of the trial court's denial of the original motion for appointment of additional counsel. Plaintiff has a right to appoint counsel of her choosing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1654. By the gender/number canon of construction, the singular of any term used in law includes the plural. Here, the word "counsel" adopts the meaning of the plural "counsel" by the applicable canon of construction. In justifying its denial of the motion, the trial court is alleged to have abused its discretion in a manner that is subject to immediate review by an appellate court under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) and (d)1. The trial court's order is immediately appealable and eligible to interlocutory appeal to the appellate division if it involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The trial court's denial of the motion deprives Plaintiff of a fundamental right to appointment of counsel which is likely to deprive her of the ability to, through appointed counsel, submit the requisite motions and materials that would advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The trial court's responsive order impinges Plaintiff's ability to effectively represent her argument through appointed counsel. The trial court admits in its denial of the motion that Plaintiff has the right to appoint counsel, but qualifies this right by stating in its order "this right does not supersede the court’s duty to ensure that the litigation process remains fair, orderly, and free from undue delays or procedural complications". The trial court implies that the litigation process would be made unfair, disorderly, or unduly delayed, or procedurally complicated by the introduction of co-counsel in this matter. The trial court's order lacks a justification for its reasoning in making this determination. Neither movant nor plaintiff was given a hearing to determine whether the introduction of co-counsel would tend to introduce such unfairness, disorder, undue delays, or procedural complications. The nature of Plaintiff's case is a civil rights matter, which is a particular area of law with its own intricacies and precedents. Movant attorneys Donald J. Wright and Jacob E. Rabinowitz III are both trained and experienced civil rights attorneys whose combined experience exceeds fifty years. As such, any such complications introduced to the proceeding by movant's application, on behalf of the retaining client, are necessary and proper due to the subject matter involved. The trial court states in its responsive order, "The court's responsibility extends to managing the docket in a manner that avoids the potential for inefficiency or conflict among counsel, which could ultimately prejudice the Plaintiff or the proceedings as a whole." The trial court alleges, without justification or evidence, that the introduction of co-counsel would prejudice either the Plaintiff or the proceedings. Neither movant nor plaintiff was given a hearing to determine whether the introduction of co-counsel would tend to introduce such prejudice. In making such an order, the trial court has acted sua sponte in a manner that prejudices the proceeding in favor of Defendant. The trial court states in its responsive order that "Courts possess broad discretion to make determinations that preserve the integrity of the judicial process, including the authority to limit the participation of counsel when it is necessary to prevent potential conflicts, confusion, or delay." In making this claim, the trial court has failed to substantiate the statute or rule from which it derives this authority. The trial court errantly references Fed R. Civ. P. 1, which is a statement of purpose, as justification. However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 is not a substantive rule that is enforceable in this way. The rule does not grant the trial court discretion to take an action such as denying Plaintiff the right to appoint, supplement, or dismiss counsel at her own discretion. Instead, the court has attempted to define for Plaintiff what constitutes effective counsel. 28 U.S.C. §1654 states substantively, "In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 being an administrative regulation that is superseded by 28 U.S.C. §1654, it is subject to the restrictions imposed therein. The superseding statute states clearly that "the parties may... manage and conduct causes therein". The trial court has erred in its failure to substantiate not only a reason why Plaintiff does not possess this right, but has also failed to produce a substantive rule or statute granting the trial court discretion over this specific type of matter. While courts indeed possess discretion over how to apply many rules, this is not such a rule and the trial court is compelled by the sixth amendment as well as the superseding statute to permit Plaintiff her right to appoint counsel. The trial court acknowledges that its order will be subject to de novo review if abuse of discretion can be shown in an interlocutory appeal. The trial court errantly justifies its order by referencing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936), which held that a stay pending the decision of a case being tried in another district court was an abuse of discretion and that a court may not by its own discretion stay proceedings pending a matter being held in another district court. The precedent referenced is irrelevant to movant's application because there is no second case being tried in another district court. Rather, there is a question of law that must be answered and whose answer may significantly impact the outcome of the present matter being tried before the trial court. As such, the application of this precedent is prima facie erroneous. The reasoning that follows the trial court's errant application of Landis begins with a premise that it has discretion over whether to stay such matters. However, as referenced in [10] above, the trial court does not have such discretion under Landis. Rather, the trial court is impelled by the administration of proper justice to stay these proceedings pending appeal because the nature of the appeal to be filed is of a matter that, if the trial court is reversed, would have a substantial and irreparable impact on the ability for this case to proceed. Furthermore, if Plaintiff is denied the ability to have motions, depositions, arguments, evidence, or other items submitted by the co-counsel she intends to appoint, she will have been denied her rights under the fifth amendment and many other related, subsequent statutes. The trial court asserts that there is no grounds for interlocutory appeal, however the trial court lacks jurisdiction to prevent the filing of an interlocutory appeal of the responsive order. As such, movants intend to file an appeal immediately and to move the appellate court to enjoin the trial court from continuing proceedings until resolution of the appeal from the responsive order. The trial court further asserts that it finds no significant difference in opinion, but once more the trial court lacks jurisdiction over any interlocutory appeal that may follow. Even while the trial court may assert that it has a legitimate basis, movants have substantial legal basis for disagreement and therefore this matter is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). The trial court states in its responsive order that Plaintiff is "adequately represented" by counsel. However, neither movant nor existing counsel has been given a hearing to ascertain whether such counsel is adequate. The trial court has acted sua sponte without consulting Plaintiff's counsel of record concerning any inadequacies that may be present. In doing so, the trial court has erred and failed to adequately analyze whether such counsel is adequate given Plaintiff's argument and present legal challenges. The trial court states openly in its responsive order that it may reconsider the necessity of additional counsel "should circumstances evolve in a manner that justifies additional legal representation without compromising the integrity of the proceedings." In making this statement, the trial court reaffirms that it is acting sua sponte to impinge upon Plaintiff's right to "manage and conduct causes therein" as the right is substantiated in 28 U.S.C. §1654. The trial court states in its responsive order that proceedings will continue while any subsequent appeal of the order is pending. Movant intends to appeal this immediately reviewable order within the time period prescribed by law, and continuing this case while an appeal is pending would tend to cause irreparable harm to movant's ability as co-counsel to adequately represent Plaintiff, thereby disadvantaging Plaintiff. If movant is unable to timely file motions on behalf of Plaintiff, Plaintiff may not be able to represent her case in the best light. Where irreparable harm is likely and demonstrable, the trial court is impelled, by its duty to ensure equal justice under law, to stay proceedings pending review because a successful appeal is likely to do irreparable harm. If the trial court continues proceedings and the appellate court later overturns the order after Plaintiff's counsel has been unable to adequately represent her case, the entire proceeding will be subject to dismissal by the appellate jurisdiction, with a new trial to follow. The trial court has a duty to avoid unnecessary delays in the administration of justice, and an order for a new trial would certainly be such a delay that the trial court is duty-bound to avoid. Movant petitioned the district court for a stay of proceedings pending appeal, demonstrating that irreparable harm may ensue from the trial court’s failure to stay. The trial court issued a responsive motion denying the motion to stay proceedings, citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), (hereafter “Link”). The trial court erred in its application of Link because the cited matter ruled narrowly on the dismissal of actions, not motions, where there was reason for the court to believe a plaintiff was failing to adequately prosecute a case. In the matter underlying Link, the prosecution did not appear for required pretrial conferences and the trial court dismissed the case entirely due to this failure to prosecute. Appellants herein did not engage in any actions that are substantially similar to those described in the syllabus of Link. The trial court further contends in its order responsive to the motion to stay proceedings “[the right to counsel], however, does not extend to an absolute entitlement to an unlimited number of attorneys or co-counsel.” The trial court errs by failing to substantiate a legal basis, opinion, rule, or statute that authorizes it to exercise discretion over such a matter. The trial court, in justifying its order to deny the motion to stay proceedings, cites Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro (hereafter “Klinghoffer”). The trial court here errantly applies Klinghoffer in attempting to justify that that there is no controlling question of law because the cause for appeal does not involve “a novel or complex question of law that would alter the course of the litigation in a manner requiring immediate appellate intervention”. Appellant submits that the trial court has impinged upon the right of the Plaintiff in original jurisdiction to have counsel of her own choosing by, sua sponte, restricting how many attorneys Plaintiff may hire and have at her disposal. Appellants here contend that such a question is in fact a controlling question of law because of the grave implications it would have upon a great number of cases if upheld. The trial court contends that “a novel or complex question of law that would alter the course of the litigation in a manner requiring immediate appellate intervention”. Appellant respectfully disagrees. If parties to actions can be limited in the size of their legal team simply at the discretion of a court, then entire legal specialties may be excluded from a party’s repertoire of legal counsel thereby impinging upon their ability to best represent their case. Contrary to the trial court’s belief, the trial court does not have the authority to apply discretion in this way, and in so doing without staying proceedings pending appeal of its order deprives Plaintiff of her right to effective counsel. If trial courts truly have such wide-spanning discretion, departing from general administration of their courtroom and encroaching upon Plaintiff’s ability to choose her own counsel, there are surely grave implications that may prejudice a great number of cases. We contend that, by its very nature and grave consequences that may follow, this question is in fact a novel legal question. The trial court further argues in its responsive order to Appellant’s motion to stay proceedings that the movant therein has speculated and failed to substantiate its claim that irreparable harm may flow from the trial court’s failure to stay proceedings. The trial court erred by failing to consider the argument that both timely filing deadlines and the very nature of civil procedure provides that a petitioner may lose an opportunity to make certain arguments if they fail to make the requisite filings or submissions to the court when they are required by the rules of civil procedure. If a brief is not submitted in the correct step of the civil procedure, or if evidence is not submitted at the correct time, there is a high likelihood that such a brief or evidence would be excluded from consideration in the trial at hand. Therefore, since such an exclusion would tend to deny Plaintiff the ability to represent her case in its best form, the case becomes inherently prejudiced against Plaintiff and such prejudice may result in loss of the action. The consequences of the trial court’s failure to stay proceedings are potentially dire, and may result in Plaintiff ultimately losing her case if she is unable to make the best arguments with the correct evidence. Plaintiff-Appellant submits to this court that it did in fact substantiate its reasoning and did not speculate, but rather extrapolated from the mere circumstances of civil procedure and the consequences of breaking step with such procedure. The trial court applies Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (hereafter “Winter”) in justifying that Plaintiff-Appellant is not entitled to a stay because it has not substantiated that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal. However, in demonstrating the trial court’s numerous errors in interpreting the controlling case law it attempts to cite, and by the very nature of the trial court’s failure to substantiate, beyond a wholly unsupported claim to discretion flowing from the purpose statement of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, Plaintiff-Appellant submits that it has successfully demonstrated that it is likely to succeed on the merits and, in so doing, makes application for a injunctive relief against the trial court, staying the proceeding and enjoining it from continuing such proceeding until the final ruling of this court. This court has jurisdiction over underlying matter because it implicates an abuse of discretion. Plaintiff-Appellant has substantiated a comprehensive argument as to why the trial court erred in its application of discretion and implicated a controlling question of law which this court has jurisdiction to rule upon. This court is required by the standards of appellate review to give a reasonable degree of deference to the trial court, however Plaintiff-Appellant contends that it has demonstrated substantive grounds for this court to give no deference and to review this matter de novo. II. GROSS JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT IN ERRANT AND INAPPROPRIATE USAGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TOOLS TO EVALUATE CASES AND COMPOSE BRIEFS Judge Hockenbeyer’s orders have consistently utilized artificial intelligence over 90 percent, the judgment by Judge Hockenbeyer “Denying the Motion to Reconsider” was detected to have 0 human input, resulting in a decision 100% generated by Artifical Intelligence (AI). Although the Federal Rules under Rule 11 permit an attorney to certify a statement that is presented by law clerks, and AI. No such exception exists for a judge. Nor is an attorney permitted to file and certify any document that contains false information. See Smith v. Farwell, et al., No. 2282CV01197 (Suffolk Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2024), Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 2023 WL 4114965 (2023), and Kruse v. Karlen, No. ED111172 (Mo. App. E.D. Feb. 13, 2024). Judicial Canon 1 states that “A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary.” As AI is not a sound source of information (referred to as AI hallucinations) a judge’s integrity cannot lie solely on the use of such technology as he has and therefore has permanently tainted the record. Iit is unknown what AI tool he utilized, and where that AI tool pulled its analysis from. A judge who utilizes AI for 100%, and 94% respectively to rule on our motions is both not impartial or independent. The tools used to analyze and detect the use of artificial intelligence include application of Pareto Principle used-word rank distribution detection. Judge Hockenbeyer’s actions are inexcusable and provide for a remedy of his recusal, and Plaintiff-Appellants recommend and encourage review by the appellate court and Supreme Court if necessary. Attachments Reference A. AI Detection Analysis of Order Denying Motion for Appointment of Co-Counsel Reference B. AI Detection Analysis of Order Denying Motion to Stay Reference (3) AI Detection Analysis of Order on Motion to Compel Production of Evidence III. PRAYER FOR RELIEF Plaintiff-Appellant Michelle Jefferson, by and through her attorneys Donald J. Wright and Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, respectfully requests that this court grant the following relief: A temporary injunction granting a stay of the trial court proceedings pending the final order of this court; A permanent injunction enjoining the trial court from restricting further appointment of counsel, and direction that Plaintiff-Appellant Michelle Jefferson factually has such a right to appoint counsel of her choosing in the enumeration she so chooses; Furthermore, if the trial court proceeds into a further step of the trial court procedure and if such continuance would have an impact on Plaintiff-Appellant’s ability to best represent her case, Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests the following relief: A permanent injunction foreclosing on the underlying action, dismissing it without prejudice, and granting a new trial with a new judge. Sanctions and attorney fees at cost of the court. _______________________________________________ Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge. Sworn this 19 day of September, 2024 by: /s/ Jacob E. Rabinowitz Jacob E. Rabinowitz Attorney for Plaintiff [email protected] Donald J. Wright Attorney for Plaintiff [email protected]

Michelle Jefferson v. Los Santos Police Department Case Number: 24-CV-1034 Prepared by: Jacob Ezekiel Rabinowitz III and Donald J. Wright. MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING APPEAL _______________________________________________ Comes now, Donald J. Wright and Jacob E. Rabinowitz III after approval from the plaintiff, move this court for a stay of proceedings pending appeal of an immediately reviewable decision under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) and (d)1. Movant submitted a motion for addition of co-counsel with the approval of the plaintiff, asserting her rights under Fed R. Civ. P. 44, Right to and Appointment of Counsel, and 28 U.S.C. § 1654. This court issued a responsive order denying the motion for addition of co-counsel. Movant possessed grounds for its original motion as movant has been retained by Plaintiff as substitutional or supplementary counsel for this matter. Furthermore, Movant possesses grounds for this motion as a result of this court's denial of the original motion for appointment of additional counsel. Plaintiff has a right to appoint counsel of her choosing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1654. By the gender/number canon of construction, the singular of any term used in law includes the plural. Here, the word "counsel" adopts the meaning of the plural "counsel" by the applicable canon of construction. In justifying its denial of the motion, this court is alleged to have abused its discretion in a manner that is subject to immediate review by an appellate court under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) and (d)1. This court's order is immediately appealable and eligible to interlocutory appeal to the appellate division if it involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. This court's denial of the motion deprives Plaintiff of a fundamental right to appointment of counsel which is likely to deprive her of the ability to, through appointed counsel, submit the requisite motions and materials that would advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. This court's responsive order impinges Plaintiff's ability to effectively represent her argument through appointed counsel. This court admits in its denial of the motion that Plaintiff has the right to appoint counsel, but qualifies this right by stating in its order "this right does not supersede the court’s duty to ensure that the litigation process remains fair, orderly, and free from undue delays or procedural complications". This court implies that the litigation process would be made unfair, disorderly, or unduly delayed, or procedurally complicated by the introduction of co-counsel in this matter. This court's order lacks a justification for its reasoning in making this determination. Neither movant nor plaintiff was given a hearing to determine whether the introduction of co-counsel would tend to introduce such unfairness, disorder, undue delays, or procedural complications. The nature of Plaintiff's case is a civil rights matter, which is a particular area of law with its own intricacies and precedents. Movant attorneys Donald J. Wright and Jacob E. Rabinowitz III are both trained and experienced civil rights attorneys whose combined experience exceeds fifty years. As such, any such complications introduced to the proceeding by movant's application, on behalf of the retaining client, are necessary and proper due to the subject matter involved. This court states in its responsive order, "The court's responsibility extends to managing the docket in a manner that avoids the potential for inefficiency or conflict among counsel, which could ultimately prejudice the Plaintiff or the proceedings as a whole." This court alleges, without justification or evidence, that the introduction of co-counsel would prejudice either the Plaintiff or the proceedings. Neither movant nor plaintiff was given a hearing to determine whether the introduction of co-counsel would tend to introduce such prejudice. In making such an order, this court has acted sua sponte in a manner that prejudices the proceeding in favor of Defendant. This court states in its responsive order that "Courts possess broad discretion to make determinations that preserve the integrity of the judicial process, including the authority to limit the participation of counsel when it is necessary to prevent potential conflicts, confusion, or delay." In making this claim, this court has failed to substantiate the statute or rule from which it derives this authority. This court errantly references Fed R. Civ. P. 1, which is a statement of purpose, as justification. However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 is not a substantive rule that is enforceable in this way. The rule does not grant this court discretion to take an action such as denying Plaintiff the right to appoint, supplement, or dismiss counsel at her own discretion. Instead, the court has attempted to define for Plaintiff what constitutes effective counsel. 28 U.S.C. §1654 states substantively, "In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 being an administrative regulation that is superseded by 28 U.S.C. §1654, it is subject to the restrictions imposed therein. The superseding statute states clearly that "the parties may... manage and conduct causes therein". This court has erred in its failure to substantiate not only a reason why Plaintiff does not possess this right, but has also failed to produce a substantive rule or statute granting this court discretion over this specific type of matter. While courts indeed possess discretion over how to apply many rules, this is not such a rule and this court is compelled by the sixth amendment as well as the superseding statute to permit Plaintiff her right to appoint counsel. This court acknowledges that its order will be subject to de novo review if abuse of discretion can be shown in an interlocutory appeal. This court errantly justifies its order by referencing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936), which held that a stay pending the decision of a case being tried in another district court was an abuse of discretion and that a court may not by its own discretion stay proceedings pending a matter being held in another district court. The precedent referenced is irrelevant to movant's application because there is no second case being tried in another district court. Rather, there is a question of law that must be answered and whose answer may significantly impact the outcome of the present matter being tried before this court. As such, the application of this precedent is prima facie erroneous. The reasoning that follows this court's errant application of Landis begins with a premise that it has discretion over whether to stay such matters. However, as referenced in [10] above, this court does not have such discretion under Landis. Rather, this court is impelled by the administration of proper justice to stay these proceedings pending appeal because the nature of the appeal to be filed is of a matter that, if this court is reversed, would have a substantial and irreparable impact on the ability for this case to proceed. Furthermore, if Plaintiff is denied the ability to have motions, depositions, arguments, evidence, or other items submitted by the co-counsel she intends to appoint, she will have been denied her rights under the fifth amendment and many other related, subsequent statutes. This court asserts that there is no grounds for interlocutory appeal, however this court lacks jurisdiction to prevent the filing of an interlocutory appeal of the responsive order. As such, movants intend to file an appeal immediately and to move the appellate court to enjoin this court from continuing proceedings until resolution of the appeal from the responsive order. This court further asserts that it finds no significant difference in opinion, but once more this court lacks jurisdiction over any interlocutory appeal that may follow. Even while this court may assert that it has a legitimate basis, movants have substantial legal basis for disagreement and therefore this matter is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). This court states in its responsive order that Plaintiff is "adequately represented" by counsel. However, neither movant nor existing counsel has been given a hearing to ascertain whether such counsel is adequate. This court has acted sua sponte without consulting Plaintiff's counsel of record concerning any inadequacies that may be present. In doing so, this court has erred and failed to adequately analyze whether such counsel is adequate given Plaintiff's argument and present legal challenges. This court states openly in its responsive order that it may reconsider the necessity of additional counsel "should circumstances evolve in a manner that justifies additional legal representation without compromising the integrity of the proceedings." In making this statement, this court reaffirms that it is acting sua sponte to impinge upon Plaintiff's right to "manage and conduct causes therein" as the right is substantiated in 28 U.S.C. §1654. This court states in its responsive order that proceedings will continue while any subsequent appeal of the order is pending. Movant intends to appeal this immediately reviewable order within the time period prescribed by law, and continuing this case while an appeal is pending would tend to cause irreparable harm to movant's ability as co-counsel to adequately represent Plaintiff, thereby disadvantaging Plaintiff. If movant is unable to timely file motions on behalf of Plaintiff, Plaintiff may not be able to represent her case in the best light. Where irreparable harm is likely and demonstrable, this court is impelled, by its duty to ensure equal justice under law, to stay proceedings pending review because a successful appeal is likely to do irreparable harm. If this court continues proceedings and the appellate court later overturns the order after Plaintiff's counsel has been unable to adequately represent her case, the entire proceeding will be subject to dismissal by the appellate jurisdiction, with a new trial to follow. This court has a duty to avoid unnecessary delays in the administration of justice, and an order for a new trial would certainly be such a delay that this court is duty-bound to avoid. In consideration of the arguments herein, movants hereby request a stay of proceedings pending the outcome of an interlocutory appeal of the responsive order by the appellate court, which will be filed within the requisite time period prescribed by law. _______________________________________________ Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge. Sworn this 19th day of September, 2024 by: /s/ Jacob E. Rabinowitz III On Behalf of Movant Attorneys Donald J. Wright and himself. (( @almightybounter ))

** The Court Clerk receives a fax from the Office of Jacob E. Rabinowitz, Esq. TO: Court Clerk; Court Reporter; Judge Martin Hockenbeyer; Counsel for Defendant Los Santos Police Department; Lead Counsel for Plaintiff Michelle Jefferson FROM: Jacob E. Rabinowitz III, Esq. DATE: September 18th, 2024 RE: Case 24-CV-1034 Adoption of Co-Counsel in Matter, Application of Rule 44, et al. ----- To the Honorable Judge Martin Hockenbeyer: I write today in regard to a recent decision on the motion for addition of co-counsel which I believe to have been determined in error. Our client, Michelle Jefferson, has entered into a joint agreement with our firm and is entitled under Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to introduce counsel including co-counsel. Neither 28 U.S.C. §1654 nor Fed. R. Civ. R. 1 permit this court to exercise discretion over this matter. As this court knows, a misapplication of discretion by the court is subject to de novo review by an appellate court. If, upon de novo review of the issue, this court is determined to have erred in its use of discretion, a new trial must be granted. In the interest of not wasting precious time and resources, it is imperative that this case not be derailed by an abuse of discretion that will, by merit of the law, only result in the granting of a new trial. Therefore, given this court has failed to substantiate the legal basis from which it derives the right to apply discretion in this manner, we humbly implore the court to avoid the errant use of discretion, or the appearance thereof, and to defer instead to appointment of co-counsel. Furthermore, we wish to stress that a departure from the rules of civil procedure in this respect is immediately appealable as an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) and (d)1. It is our sincere hope that this court adheres to the rules that bind it. Signed, Jacob E. Rabinowitz III Counsel for Plaintiff (( @almightybounter @Kotwica @nfr.ai @John Gilbane ))

not enough business openings and/or too hard to find things that are happening. if you're new or unconnected, it is damn near impossible to find any kind of roleplay happening anywhere. a hub area would help so much with finding things when nothing else is happening - especially in those late night USA hours when the europeans have gone to sleep.

My Cavalcade (lowest engine option) only goes up to like 98 MPH, when I feel like most cars these days can do easily 130-140. Perhaps the max speed for all vehicles should be shifted up a bit so we can really haul ass down some of these highways. That would make sports cars go much faster too!