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The Valenti crime family, also known as the Los Santos crime family, is an Italian-American organized crime group that has operated primarily in the state of San Andreas, with its historical base of operations in Los Santos. The organization emerged from an East Coast–affiliated Mafia migration in the late 1980s and adopted many of the customs, hierarchy, and operational norms associated with American La Cosa Nostra. For several decades, the Valenti family was regarded by law enforcement as the dominant Mafia syndicate on the West Coast, exercising influence across illicit markets and, at its height, maintaining leverage within certain legitimate industries through corruption, intimidation, and control of contracting and labor pipelines. Its power reached its peak under the leadership of longtime boss Santino “The Butcher” Valenti, before entering a prolonged decline beginning in the early 2010s driven by sustained federal prosecutions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), waves of informant cooperation, internal leadership collapse, and competition from newer and less structured criminal groups such as the Bellantonio crime family. By the mid-2020s, investigators widely described the Valentis as severely diminished and fragmented, though some analysts continued to argue that remnants of the network persisted, operating through insulated cells rather than a visible centralized hierarchy. Origins and East Coast migration The origins of the Valenti crime family are generally traced to 1987, when a small Genovese-linked crew relocated from New York to Los Santos with the approval of the East Coast hierarchy. The move was reportedly sanctioned as a strategic expansion into a comparatively underdeveloped territory for traditional Mafia rackets, particularly those reliant on cash flow, enforcement capacity, and the ability to penetrate small businesses with limited initial attention from major task forces. Early operations centered on sports betting, loan sharking, and illegal pornography distribution, activities that generated steady revenue while providing avenues for extortion and laundering. The crew’s rapid success encouraged further migration, and by 1992 more mafiosi had shifted operations to Los Santos. The expansion began to create unease within the Genovese orbit, where senior figures reportedly viewed the West Coast outpost as increasingly autonomous, and it also drew the ire of the Petrulli crime family, a long-established Los Santos organization that had dominated the city’s underworld since the 1930s. Tensions escalated throughout 1992 and 1993 as both sides competed for gambling routes, loansharking territories, and protection rackets tied to neighborhood businesses. In October 1993, gunmen opened fire on a grocery store in East Los Santos, killing one individual and injuring another. The survivor was later identified by authorities as Santino Valenti. The shooting ignited a bloody Mafia war that lasted roughly two years and resulted in at least 23 mob-related deaths, according to law enforcement estimates. The war is widely regarded as the event that reintroduced large-scale organized crime violence to San Andreas after a period of relative quiet and established Valenti’s faction as the city’s new dominant Mafia force. The Butcher’s reign (1993–2011) From 1993 to 2011, the family entered its defining era under Santino “The Butcher” Valenti. Under Valenti, the organization expanded aggressively across San Andreas and developed a reputation for both financial sophistication and strategic violence. Investigators attributed to the family a diversified criminal portfolio including racketeering, extortion, construction kickbacks, bid rigging, illegal gambling, loansharking, and large-scale money laundering. The organization’s influence was believed to extend into legitimate sectors through controlled contracting pipelines, bribery of gatekeepers, and the cultivation of intermediaries who insulated senior decision-makers. Valenti’s administration was commonly described as modeled on East Coast tradition in structure, but his relationship with the Genovese crime family deteriorated significantly during his rise and reign. Underworld accounts described the Valentis’ West Coast independence as a continuing point of friction, with Santino Valenti resisting outside direction and viewing East Coast oversight as a threat to his autonomy and earnings. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, Santino Valenti was often described as operating in open defiance of Genovese influence. Mafia traditionalists in New York reportedly viewed Valenti as a boss who had benefited from East Coast legitimacy and then severed practical obligations once he consolidated power. The relationship was further strained by Valenti’s aggressive expansion, his alleged willingness to absorb or neutralize rival crews without Commission-style diplomacy, and his reputation for cultivating an underworld celebrity profile that New York bosses considered unnecessary attention. As a result, while the Valenti family was still regarded as part of the broader Cosa Nostra world, it was frequently treated as an outsider organization that could not be relied upon to follow East Coast norms. Despite efforts to remain discreet, the family’s wealth became increasingly visible. Court records and investigative accounts later described a conspicuous lifestyle associated with Valenti and his inner circle, including luxury properties held through nominees and shell companies, high-end vehicles, and memberships in exclusive clubs. Federal scrutiny intensified throughout the 2000s. Although Valenti was acquitted of a high-profile murder charge in 2008 involving the death of his former friend and reputed underboss Paul Nunziatta, investigators continued building broader racketeering cases. On May 29, 2011, Valenti was convicted of racketeering and conspiracy, marking the end of nearly three decades of dominance and triggering a succession crisis that would define the next decade. Though eligible for parole in 2036, his imprisonment removed the family’s central stabilizing figure, and the organization’s leadership structure began to fracture. Infighting and indictments (2011–2014) The years immediately following Valenti’s conviction were characterized by rapid turnover at the top, internal factionalism, and heightened vulnerability to federal prosecutions. Underworld and law enforcement sources commonly identified Anthony Solari as the first successor to assume day-to-day control after the Butcher’s removal. Solari’s administration was described as an interim attempt to maintain continuity with Valenti-era discipline while the organization adjusted to the loss of its patriarch and assessed legal exposure. His tenure was brief and marked by mounting federal pressure, as investigators intensified surveillance and pursued secondary prosecutions aimed at collapsing the remaining hierarchy. Following Solari, Joey “Buddha” Panzarino, a street boss and former captain associated with the Tony’s Liquor crew, was believed to have assumed control of day-to-day activities as acting boss, only to later face a RICO conviction. Leadership then shifted to Anthony Corsaro, whose administration initially brought a measure of stability and relied heavily on seasoned figures from Valenti’s inner circle, including Gino “Gigi” Giordano, Ray Avena, and Paul “Duke” Carducci. In late 2012, the family’s fragile equilibrium collapsed when Corsaro and Carducci disappeared under suspicious circumstances. Their disappearance created a vacuum and fueled speculation of internal purges and retaliatory violence. Vincent “Bulldog” Malacci, widely described as Valenti’s former driver and bodyguard, assumed control of the family for a short period before he also vanished. As scrutiny mounted, out-of-state branches in Florida, San Diego, and San Fierro attempted to influence succession, complicating leadership legitimacy. Florida-based captain Stephen Cersani was installed as boss, but his reign ended abruptly amid another damaging series of indictments. Informant cooperation proved especially devastating. Lucas Santora and Frank Nappi, both deeply embedded in Valenti operations, testified in major Mafia trials that exposed internal structure and revenue channels, eroding the secrecy culture the organization had inherited from its East Coast lineage. Underworld rumor frequently held that Samuel “Sammy the Beak” Beccarini, Valenti’s longtime consigliere, served as a de facto leader behind the scenes, using rotating figureheads as buffers. Beccarini later faced arrest and imprisonment, further destabilizing the family. The year 2014 marked the end of the immediate post-Butcher succession scramble and the beginning of a more chaotic transitional phase in which would-be reformers attempted to seize power. On January 1, 2014, Nicholas Diopare, a former Valenti captain known as “the Apache,” was murdered in a brazen daylight shooting that media outlets dubbed the “New Year’s Day Massacre.” Diopare had been one of the more visible internal contenders to restore structure after the wave of disappearances, and his killing was widely interpreted as a message that the boss seat remained contested and dangerous. Underworld accounts frequently attributed the killing to rival faction maneuvering, with particular suspicion falling on Oakland-based soldier Anthony Sutera, though no charges were filed and the case remained unresolved. Rise of the Bellantonio family (2014–2018) In the aftermath of Diopare’s murder and continuing fragmentation, the Valenti family’s instability created space for younger criminals less committed to traditional Mafia norms. Michael “The Snake” Sarino and Joseph Bellantonio formed a renegade crew that evolved into the Bellantonio crime family. Traditional mobsters derided the group as “Mickey Mouse gangsters,” emphasizing their perceived recklessness, looser recruitment standards, and street gang–like volatility. Despite this reputation, the Bellantonios grew rapidly and became the most visible organized crime force in East Los Santos by the mid-2010s. Sarino was widely rumored to have previously worked as a driver for Anthony Sutera and was later linked by law enforcement intelligence to multiple killings, including the murders of Sutera and Sarino’s mentor, captain Patrick Durante, earning him the nickname “The Snake.” In 2016, Sarino was shot and killed by his own associates, but the organization’s expansion continued under Joseph Bellantonio. By the late 2010s, the Bellantonio family had eclipsed the Valentis in street-level dominance, forcing the remnants of the Valenti organization into retreat or quiet adaptation. Resurgence attempts and the Valenti–Bellantonio war (2015–2021) Multiple efforts were made to revive the Valenti family between 2015 and 2019. A coordinated resurgence effort emerged in 2015 under Frank Carna, a figure linked to the San Diego-based Lorenzo Valenti crew. Carna sought to broker alliances among rival factions and position himself as a peacemaker in the turbulent Los Santos underworld, reportedly forming a short-lived ruling panel with Robert Luppino and Joseph Bellantonio. The alliance collapsed after Carna died in a car accident while traveling back East, triggering renewed fragmentation. A more credible revival appeared to coincide with the prison releases of Samuel “Sammy the Beak” Beccarini in 2018 and Donald “Ducks” Rigazzi in 2019. In the same period, tensions with the Bellantonio crime family escalated into a sustained turf war that drew national attention and produced numerous killings and disappearances. The conflict was widely portrayed as a clash between a weakened traditional family struggling to reclaim its footing and a newer rival whose culture was defined by volatility and street-level aggression. Bonanno involvement and Commission standing (2019–present) The Valenti crime family’s standing with the New York Mafia Commission has historically been described as peripheral and conditional, shaped by its West Coast geography and its uneven relationships with East Coast families. During Santino Valenti’s reign, the family’s poor relationship with the Genovese crime family placed it at a disadvantage within traditional Commission politics. Underworld accounts described Valenti as resistant to outside direction, and the family was frequently viewed in New York circles as independent to the point of liability. As a result, Commission interest in Los Santos was often framed less as stewardship of the Valentis and more as occasional intervention to prevent instability from becoming a national law-enforcement problem. Bonanno involvement did not become a significant factor until 2019, when the Valenti–Bellantonio war threatened to spiral into an uncontrolled cycle of retaliatory violence. Underworld reporting described the arrival of Joseph “The Barber” Uttaro, a reputed Bonanno caporegime and Commission-linked intermediary, as a turning point. Uttaro’s role was commonly characterized as that of an outside stabilizer tasked with forcing a settlement that would reduce killings, limit collateral attention, and impose a functional separation of rackets to prevent future escalation. The peace that followed was frequently described as a Commission-friendly outcome, not because it restored Valenti dominance, but because it created a workable ceasefire in a region that had become increasingly visible. The settlement was later regarded as one of the first instances in years where the West Coast conflict was contained through a traditional Cosa Nostra-style mediation rather than spiraling into prolonged factional warfare. Modern decline and the Grumo administration (2020–2024) By the early 2020s, the Valenti family increasingly appeared to prioritize survival and insulation over expansion. A key transitional figure was Paul Grumo (1966–2024), a Tampa-born administrator who rose to become acting boss during the family’s fragile rebuilding period. Grumo was described as markedly different from Santino Valenti in style, favoring low visibility, internal consolidation, and the careful reconstruction of revenue channels disrupted by prior indictments and defections. Under his stewardship, the organization reduced overt violence and shifted toward quieter forms of money movement and influence, while attempting to preserve enough cohesion to prevent splintering. Grumo’s administration was often characterized as a containment strategy. Rather than attempting to reclaim the sweeping territorial dominance of the Butcher era, the family narrowed its exposure by limiting who had access to sensitive information, reducing the number of direct touch points between senior figures and street-level operations, and leaning more heavily on intermediaries and trusted earners. This approach was reinforced by the realities of the post-2019 environment, in which the family had already endured a public war, growing surveillance, and a shrinking recruitment pool. Underworld accounts frequently described Grumo as an internal mediator who prioritized predictability, internal discipline, and the avoidance of flashy conduct that could create investigative leverage. In 2021, the family suffered a major disruption when a federal investigation triggered by the disappearance of soldier Arnold Brigone uncovered a sophisticated state-wide money laundering network orchestrated by captain Lucas “Pags” Pagano. Investigators described the operation as one of the most ambitious financial schemes ever attributed to the Los Santos Mafia. The laundering network reportedly relied on shell corporations and legitimate fronts such as farms, service firms, and agricultural wholesalers, converting illicit proceeds into seemingly lawful revenue while also evading taxes through layered bookkeeping and controlled disbursements. The resulting indictments named Pagano, Grumo, Rudolph Guercini, and Carmine “Baggs” Baggalia among the high-ranking figures, and law enforcement widely described the case as the most damaging blow to the family since Santino Valenti’s imprisonment. The case not only removed key earners and administrators but also forced the family to reassess how it moved money, how it compartmentalized decision-making, and how it insulated leadership from financial tracing. Transition to the Dippolitos (2024–present) In 2024, Paul Grumo died suddenly, with underworld accounts and investigators commonly attributing the death to an apparent heart attack. His death created another leadership vacuum at a moment when the organization’s senior ranks had already been depleted by indictments and violence. The transition that followed was widely described as the final major structural reorientation of the Valenti crime family in the post-Butcher era. Rather than elevating another short-lived figurehead, the family consolidated authority within a small leadership nucleus associated with William and Michael Dippolito. The shift represented a movement away from a single stabilizing administrator toward a dual-track model in which revenue control, enforcement credibility, and internal arbitration were coordinated through a tightly managed inner circle. By the time Grumo died, underworld observers argued that the Dippolitos had already become essential to the family’s stability in practice. William was commonly described as the figure most capable of preventing fragmentation because of his calm reputation, his ability to conduct sitdowns without provoking challenges, and his role as an allocator of rackets in an era when fewer rackets remained worth fighting over. Michael was commonly described as the operational counterpart, valued for his control of earners, his ability to enforce compliance quietly, and his role in sustaining low-exposure revenue streams that could survive the post-2021 investigative environment. The transition also marked a clearer articulation of the family’s modern operating philosophy. Under the Dippolitos, authority was maintained through tight compartmentalization, a reduced leadership footprint, and the use of buffers to separate senior figures from street activity. Disputes were increasingly handled through private sitdowns, and violence was treated as a last resort due to the legal exposure it created. The family’s day-to-day functioning was frequently described as performance-based, with influence tied to who could produce revenue, keep their people out of headlines, and preserve internal order without creating investigative openings. In this period, the Bonanno channel that had emerged during the 2019 war was increasingly described as beneficial to the new Valenti leadership nucleus. Under this view, Bonanno-linked relationships provided a form of external credibility at a moment when the Valentis had suffered repeated leadership collapses, indictments, and informant damage. Rather than granting formal recognition or direct oversight, the Bonanno connection was seen as providing practical support through structured dispute resolution, the maintenance of non-interference agreements with rival groups, and selective introductions that allowed the Valentis to remain connected to broader Cosa Nostra business norms even as their domestic footprint shrank. Sicilian Mafia ties and the Storti–Siraca ’Ndrina In the modern era, investigators and underworld sources increasingly attributed portions of Valenti narcotics and money-movement activity to transnational relationships with Italian organized crime groups, particularly Calabrian ’Ndrangheta networks and Sicilian-linked intermediaries. These relationships were most often described as pragmatic business arrangements rather than formal alliances, structured to give the Valentis access to wholesale supply while providing Italian counterparts with distribution reach and laundering opportunities in San Andreas. A key nexus in these accounts was the Storti–Siraca ’Ndrina, a Calabrian ’Ndrangheta clan reportedly involved in international cocaine trafficking. Underworld reporting described the ’Ndrina as operating through a web of intermediaries that sometimes included Sicilian-connected facilitators who could broker introductions, resolve disputes, and guarantee credibility between groups that otherwise did not share direct organizational lineage. In this framework, Sicilian ties were less commonly portrayed as command relationships and more often as connective tissue, with respected intermediaries vouching for participants, establishing terms, and ensuring transactional compliance around debt, delivery schedules, and retaliation protocols. The Valenti family’s strongest reported connection to the Storti–Siraca ’Ndrina was said to have flowed through networks linked to Michael Dippolito and his associate Giannis Savas, who allegedly facilitated shipments routed through Las Venturas and rural Bone County. These channels were described as using desert landing strips and logistics corridors disguised as agricultural transport, allowing product to enter San Andreas with reduced exposure. Analysts framed this relationship as part of a broader Mafia economic shift in which weakened domestic La Cosa Nostra groups increasingly relied on external suppliers with stronger upstream control. In this model, the Valentis’ value was local distribution capacity, debt enforcement, and laundering expertise, while the Storti–Siraca ’Ndrina’s value was access to international supply and a disciplined trafficking infrastructure. Sicilian intermediaries, where referenced, were typically described as transactional brokers who bridged cultural and operational differences between American crews and Italian counterparts and helped maintain trust without direct, high-risk contact between leadership figures. Current status By the mid-2020s, the Valenti crime family was widely assessed as severely diminished and fragmented, operating at a small fraction of its former size. Unlike the Butcher era, when the organization was believed to maintain clear command authority over crews and territories, the modern Valentis were described as a loose constellation of aging members, long-time associates, and semi-independent crews bound more by personal history than by an enforceable centralized hierarchy. Law enforcement officials often noted that defining the family’s contemporary structure was difficult because remaining members appeared to have adopted increased compartmentalization, reduced communications, and greater reliance on buffers to avoid surveillance and conspiracy exposure. Geographically, remnants were thought to persist in Los Santos and older outposts such as San Diego, San Fierro, and Florida, with occasional corridors extending toward Las Venturas. Rather than controlling territory through visible street power, the family was described as operating through selective influence, quiet loansharking, discreet money movement, and laundering arrangements tied to legitimate businesses. Some accounts suggested that surviving Valenti-connected figures increasingly relied on non-Italian intermediaries who served as practical shields, allowing older mafiosi to reduce direct exposure while still benefiting from revenue streams. The aftermath of the 2021 Pagano laundering case continued to shape operations, with analysts arguing that the organization shifted toward smaller transactions, less centralized cash pooling, and cautious legitimate mixing designed to reduce the risk of another sweeping financial indictment. Investigators remained divided on whether the Valenti crime family still functioned as a coherent family or had become a collection of residual relationships operating under an old name. One view held that the organization was effectively defunct, with most senior figures dead, imprisoned, missing, or retired. Another argued that the Valentis had evolved into a quieter formation, operating through insulated cells and legitimate business entanglements, with fewer members but a higher degree of caution and adaptability. What was broadly agreed upon was that the modern Valenti organization bore little resemblance to the syndicate that once dominated Los Santos under Santino Valenti, and its decline was commonly framed as part of a broader West Coast pattern in which traditional Mafia structures were eroded by RICO enforcement, demographic shifts, competition from agile criminal enterprises, and the increasing sophistication of financial surveillance. Out of Character Information Established in 2007, the Valenti crime family is renowned for providing the most authentic portrayal of the American Cosa Nostra on the West Coast. Our commitment to realism is evident in our structure, activities, behavior, long-standing characters and intricate storylines. The Valenti crime family's role-play standards are exceptionally high, and as such, recruitment and progression is handled strictly in-character in a realistic manner. Our faction operates with a character-first and realism-focused mindset, leading to organic, well-paced development and highly immersive role-play. Only those with unwavering commitment, quality role-play abilities, and a mindset focused on character development should attempt to join. If your main goal is to climb the ranks, accumulate riches or anything other than engage in realistic role-play, this faction is not for you. Those interested in joining should focus on developing a multi-dimensional character who adds to the realism of our setting. Characters of all backgrounds and ethnicities are welcome, provided their association with the organization is realistic. Ensure your name is authentic, such as John Romano or John Morello, and avoid unrealistic names like John Galloscianino or John Morrelo. Authenticity is paramount, and we will require a name change if this criterion is not met. Aspiring recruits are advised to develop a criminal MO for their character or find another way for their character to become an asset and/or vulnerable to our characters in some manner as a pathway to joining. The Valenti crime family's leadership reserves the right to authorize a character kill on those who work for the organization for any reason deemed fit. Feel free to post any questions or comments about the Valenti crime family in this thread. Any complaints should be handled through private messages. Only those with permission from an inductee may post screenshots on this thread. Those interested in interacting with us are welcome to join our public Discord channel (link below) where we provide notifications for upcoming business openings. https://discord.gg/2kdpkDvxbp

Circa 1989 Death Blow Of The El Rukns This Was An 8 State Raid Carried Out By The ATF and FBI Orgins Of The EL RUKN TRIBE The Five-Percent Nation of Islam often uses religious protection as a shield, but its true focus appears to be the pursuit of wealth and power. Also referred to as the Gods, the New Nation of Islam, and by other names, this group functions as a loosely connected organization that frequently clashes with internal factions rather than rival gangs. Its origins trace back to the early 1930s, emerging from the early stages of what later became known as the Black Muslim movement in the 1960s and is now called the Nation of Islam. One of the Nation’s well-known beliefs is the portrayal of the White man as a blue-eyed devil, while a lesser-known teaching is the idea that the Black man is god. The article offers an in-depth look at the Five-Percenters, detailing the key figures involved over time, examining their recent activities, criminal behavior, symbols, the role of women in the group, and exploring the debate over whether it constitutes a religion or a cult. By 1966, members of The Five Percent Nation had already established a role in multiple Illinois state prisons. The coalition grew in numbers by gathering anyone who believed in Islam and was willing to learn the teachings of the gang's rules and guidelines. The teachings of the Nation of Gods and Earths are passed on through a modern oral tradition. The advancement of a God or Earth is based on his or her memorization, recitation, comprehension, and practical application of the Supreme Mathematics and the Supreme Alphabet, and also the 120 Lessons, sometimes referred to as degrees, a revised version of the Supreme Wisdom lessons of the NOI, originally written by Wallace Fard Muhammad and Elijah Muhammad. The gang carried out a series of attacks on different gangs throughout the years. Most conflicts between them and other gangs come from converting members who were non-believers into believers in Islam. In 1976, the Five Percent Nation converted Black P Stone Ranger co-founder Jeff Fort, also known as Chief Malik, into a Muslim and a believer of Islam. He then came home and converted members of the Stones into a new and more militant improved faction called the El Rukn Tribe of Moorish Science Temple of America. It was in 1969 when a young T. Rodgers formed the Black P Stones in Los Santos with the approval of the Original 21. Initially, it was a community-based organization operating in the South Central area of Los Santos, near Crenshaw Blvd. In the book Uprising by Yusuf Jah and Sister Shah’Keyah, Chapter 9 includes an interview with T. Rodgers that provides information about the history of the Black Stones in Los Santos. T. Rodgers discusses the organization that existed during the early 1970s and some of the community work and activities with which they were involved. Since then, T. Rodgers has appeared on several television programs and movies on the topic of gangs, including Colors as Dr. Feelgood, and he was a participant in the 1989 ABC Special on Gangs hosted by Tom Brokaw. He is also featured in the F.E.D.S. Magazine DVD, where he gives an interview from the Jungles, discussing the early days of LS gangs. He was also featured in an American Drug War, a film about how the U.S. government has contributed to the drug problem in America. In 1983, Jeff Fort wanted to expand the El Rukn coalition into other states to create a stronger network for his weapons and narcotics trade. He figured since he already approved T Rodgers to create a branch of the Black P Stones in Los Santos, he could send another soldier to run a branch of the El Rukn Tribe. Ibrahim Hamilton was chosen by Jeff Fort and the Original 21 to lead a branch of the Los Santos El Rukn Tribe. October 27th 1989, the federal government issued a eight state raid on all El Rukn chapters. They had over three hundred wire taps on Jeff Fort, giving directions and instructions to gang chiefs to perform acts of violence and pick up and drop off weapons and narcotics. In Modern Day In Modern Day, the Rukn Tribe mainly supplies black street gangs across the five cities in which they operate. They stay away from gang warfare at all cost trying not to get linked back to any one group. Their business stretches from the illegal weapon trade, boosting car parts, illegal street racing, to drug trafficking. They established a weapon hauling operation that started in Indiana and Kentucky because in those states, it's easy to buy guns with no FFL or FOID. They will normally send a person who isn’t of essence with the streets to go and buy about 7-10 firearms, then haul them to a specific state then they will receive payment. They also have multiple mobile hotspots, also known as trap-houses, where they print 3D weapons such as Polymer Ghost Glocks and attachments, which the modern-day gangs call “Switches.” They also have spots for other things, such as cooking drugs and getting them ready to be distributed on the streets. The Delegation of Tribe Rukn doesn’t only operate in the streets, they operate in the prisons as well. In 1989, after the eight-state big bust, a lot of high-ranking members got life sentences and banded together. They created a car for Muslims of all kind along as you believe in the Nation of Islam, you can eat, sleep, and program with them inside of prison. They still have their hands in the drug trade from the inside and out. Outside of the illegal businesses, the Rukn Tribe has multiple legit businesses that they use to place young African American youth in. They donate thousands of dollars a year to the Black Lives Matter movement, and they also have their own academic program that takes trouble from the youth of the streets. The program teaches the youth how to be businessmen it also pays for the trades that the youth want to attend free of cost.

Good faction

W/S Acacia Blocc Carson Crips The Acacia Blocc Crip Gang (ABCC) also known as Acacia Blocc Crip, are the second largest African-American street gang located on the Eastside of Vespucci Beach, San Andreas. Their neighborhood is primarily south of Imagination Court, east of Invention Court and west of Vespucci Boulevard. Acacia Blocc Carson Crips are well known to sport the primary colors of the Oakland Raiders and the Cleveland Indians. (Black, Grey and Red) Members of the Acacia Blocc Carson Crips, are known to brand their bodies with tattoos of the Indians emblem, which is a dead give-away to rival gangs. Apart from that Acacia Blocc Crip does have a few cliques which consist of 700 Block, 1200 Block and 1300 Block. The 500 Block later emerged as a subset of the Acacia Blocc Carson Crips, mainly consisting of the younger generations of Acacia Blocc Crip. The Acacia Blocc Crip Gang (ABCC) also known as Acacia Blocc Crip, are the second largest African-American street gang located on the Eastside of Vespucci Beach, San Andreas. Their neighborhood is primarily south of Imagination Court, east of Invention Court and west of Vespucci Boulevard. Acacia Blocc Carson Crips are well known to sport the primary colors of the Oakland Raiders and the Cleveland Indians. (Black, Grey and Red) Members of the Acacia Blocc Carson Crips, are known to brand their bodies with tattoos of the Indians emblem, which is a dead give-away to rival gangs. Apart from that Acacia Blocc Crip does have a few cliques which consist of 700 Block, 1200 Block and 1300 Block. The 500 Block later emerged as a subset of the Acacia Blocc Carson Crips, mainly consisting of the younger generations of Acacia Blocc Crip. West Side of Carson 2020 Gangbanging on the border was very much alive in the year 2020. The area was packed full of rival sets: the Nutty Bloccs, Palmer Bloccs, DV70’s, DV T.Flat’s, NHP’s, and the Poccet Hoods. These street gangs have intricate alliances and feuds which have lasted from their initial emergence. The area is a catalyst for the illegal operations of a street gang; its low income housing, underfunded police force and looming threat of gentrification has resulted in continuation of the gang activity that peaked in the 1990s. From 2003 to 2007. West Carson saw a decrease in the number of gang killings per annum, but that began to rise again by 2020. In efforts to try and control gang activity in the area, the LSPD have placed several injunctions on gang members as well as employed additional recruits into their gangs and violent crimes division. Despite their efforts however, cuts in police funding have made such operations unsustainable and with West Carson's rising commercial sector, increased land value has resulted in low income households being driven into poverty. Street gangs stand against the modern-day struggles of low income households in such areas, they create a sense of community and companionship. Of course however, the anger within these impoverished communities and the hatred for their rivals is often deep seated, self-fulfilling and inevitably impairs the community Acacia Blocc Carson Crips (ABCC) V. Carson Varrio Tortilla Flats (CVTF) As the story goes, the Acacia Bloccs robbed a Tortilla Flats drug connection of a large quantity of dope nearly a decade ago. Since then, the tale of how a black street gang ripped off a Latino rival has taken on mythic proportions, but to this day police are uncertain if the fabled heist ever occurred. “You hear so many different variations of this crime,” said Terry Burgin, a Los Santos County Sheriff’s Department gang detective. “Who knows what really happened? [But] the effects are tremendous.” Over the years, the two rival gangs have battled over control of the drug trade in the Vespucci Beach area. The feud has escalated into what many residents call a race war. It used to be that innocent bystanders were not targeted, said Chris Le Grande, pastor of Great Hope Fellowship in Faith, one of Vespucci’s largest black churches. “Now it’s deliberate. ‘I’m deliberately shooting you because of your color.’ ” On Tuesday, the San Andreas attorney’s office announced a sweeping indictment against more than 60 members of Tortilla Flats, accusing the Latino gang of waging a violent campaign to drive out African American rivals. Once primarily black, the working class community of 60,000 today is mostly Latino. But some say that’s only part of the truth. The war has two sides, said Robert Ramirez, a Tortilla Flats gang member. “I’m not going to say we’re angels, but it’s fifty-fifty,” he said, as fellow gang members sprayed walls with Tortilla Flats graffiti. “ ‘Any black, shoot on sight?’ -- it’s not true. Nobody likes a racist person.” The neighborhood saw 41 homicides in 2005, surpassing the homicide rate in some of the nation’s most dangerous big cities, authorities said. About half of those killed had no gang affiliation. Homicides dropped to 19 last year after a major law enforcement crackdown that led to 230 felony arrests and the seizure of 130 weapons. But the level of violence remains high. Authorities attribute the neighborhood’s gang troubles in large part to the huge demographic shift that occurred in this economically depressed community over the last 20 years, tipping the balance of power from black to Latino and turning it into a tinderbox of racial tensions. That kind of demographic shift has occurred in many parts of Southern San Andreas, but Vespucci is one of the places where it has turned violent. The violence threatens an economic revival that has begun to revitalize the neighborhood. For years, the two rival gangs resisted outside pressures to go to war, according to those active in Tortilla Flats in the 1990s. Like many black and Latino gangs, they ignored each other during the worst gang years of the late ‘80s and early ‘90s. Instead, they focused on attacking rivals of their own race. But during the mid-'90s, the Mexican Mafia prison gang began directing Latino gangs to stop fighting each other, to “tax” drug dealers and to push blacks from their neighborhoods, according to numerous gang members and law enforcement officers. Tortilla Flats, in particular, had warred for years with CV70's, a Latino gang to the East. But under the new rules, Tortilla Flats was forced to get along with rival Latino gangs and once even played a pickup football game with CV70's, said one Tortilla Flats gang member who requested anonymity out of fear for his safety. The Mexican Mafia “didn’t understand how it worked,” he said. “I hate CV70's. I didn’t have any problem with the guys from Rollin 20's because I grew up with them. It’s kind of hard to say, ‘Now I’m going to. . . kill this black guy just because he’s black.’ But that’s how they wanted to do it.” In 1996 tensions erupted when members of a gang associated with Acacia Bloccs, known as the 6-5 Hustlers, killed a Tortilla Flats member. After some retaliation, the gangs held a peace summit at a Vespucci elementary school one night, and that “kind of squashed everything,” the gang member said. But the fighting resumed when word, perhaps mythical, spread about the Acacia Bloccs’ drug rip-off of Tortilla Flats. Race, gang rivalry and drugs have become impossibly tangled as motives in killings and assaults in the neighborhood, authorities and residents say. The result: a gangland version of racial profiling. “They just see a young man of the opposite race and they shoot,” said Olivia Rosales, a former hate-crime prosecutor, who prosecuted all the Rollin 20's-Tortilla Flats murder cases for the last two years. “They don’t stop to question whether or not they are a member of the gang.” Of the 20 cases she prosecuted, said Rosales, who now runs the district attorney’s Whittier office, “most of the victims have not been members of the rival gang.” Demetrius Perry, 22, was shot to death by Latinos yelling a gang epithet as he played basketball in January at a Vespucci middle school, witnesses said. “We used to kick it with Latinos“, said Perry’s father, Benny, who is black and grew up in the area. “Now you constantly hear about it: This is their land first and they’ve come to take it back.” Timothy Slack, who lives a few blocks from Great Hope Fellowship church, said Latino gang members often drive by shooting at blacks. He doesn’t allow his kids to go to the store and he never uses alleys anymore. Slack grew up in Vespucci when it was mostly black and had few Latinos. Back then, “they were timid,” he said. “But as their numbers started getting bigger, then they started trying to be tougher. They started thinking they could demand stuff.” But non-gang-affiliated Latinos have also been killed. In 2005, Alejandro Barrales was on his way to work at his family’s restaurant when he was shot to death allegedly by Crips while in his car at a stop sign. Gabino Lopez, 52, was killed that year while walking to a mini-market for a beer after work. A youth who reportedly wanted to join the Crips is charged with his killing. In the neighborhood where Lopez was killed, people no longer sit outside in the evening, said his daughter, Mayra Lopez. “You never know when you’re going to be the next target,” she said. But “The gang war puts a damper on everything that you do here,” said Joe Titus, 79, who was born in Vespucci and volunteers with several community organizations. “You don’t want to go out at night.” Fewer people ride bikes; fewer children play outside after school. Movable basketball stanchions, once ubiquitous in driveways, are gone. Irv Sitkoff, a local pharmacist, said people of one race complain if his employees attend faster to people of the other race. “You’ve got to be very careful,” he said. “Before, we didn’t think about it.” Sitkoff said his pharmacy has sold grim supplies to customers because of neighborhood violence: more colostomy bags, for example. One Latino mother bought antidepressant medication from him for many months after her son, an innocent bystander, was killed by a black gang, Sitkoff said. “She didn’t talk directly about it, but there’s fear,” he said. “How could there not be? I have black families who are the same way.” Meanwhile, the exodus continues. Some cliques of the Acacia Bloccs in the neighborhood don’t exist anymore. One former black gang member said he hasn’t left Vespucci because he still has family and property there. But “it’s going to come a time when everybody’s going to have to leave,” he said. “Everybody’s going to have to go.”