25-1A-04110 - Final Decision - Los Santos County Sheriff's Department v. Superior Court of San Andreas, County of Los Santos

[Justitiae]

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF SAN ANDREAS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE     LOS SANTOS COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,   Petitioner and Appellant,           v.         SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS,   Respondent.                       Court of Appeal Case No. 25-A1-04110   (Superior Court Case No. 25-LSC-04111)                            On Appeal From the Superior Court for the State of San Andreas, County of Los Santos, Case No. 25-LSC-04111, Hon. Florence Weathers-Peterson, Judge ─────────────   APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ─────────────   STAHL, WEISS & KATZ *Eugene K. Stahl, State Bar No. 990100265 [email protected] 1130 Fountain Ave, 5th Floor Los Santos, San Andreas 90071 175-4021   Attorney for Appellant LOS SANTOS COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS   I.       INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. II.      JURISDICTION................................................................................................................ III.     STATEMENT OF THE CASE.........................................................................................           A.      Summary of Facts...................................................................................................                     1.      The March 25, 2025 Police Encounter Involving the LSPD.........................                     2.      Ms. Mendoza's Claims Against Multiple Law Enforcement Agencies.........                     3.      Proceedings in the Trial Court and the Denial of LSSD's Demurrer............. IV.     STANDARD OF REVIEW............................................................................................... V.      LEGAL ARGUMENT.......................................................................................................           A.      No Justiciable Controversy Exists Between Ms. Mendoza and LSSD...................                     1.      Declaratory Relief Requires an Actual Controversy......................................                     2.      Ms. Mendoza Alleges No Enforcement or Threat by LSSD.........................                     3.      A Purely Hypothetical Future Dispute Does Not Satisfy Section 1060........                     4.      The Constitutional Ban on Advisory Opinions..............................................           B.      The Trial Court Erred in Denying LSSD's Demurrer Under Code           Civil Procedure Section 379 (Improper Joinder)...............................................................                     1.      No Factual Nexus Tying LSSD to the Same "Transaction or                      Occurrence".............................................................................................................                     2.      No Overlap of "Law or Fact" Sufficient to Cure the Missing Factual                      Connection...............................................................................................................           C.      The Trial Court's Sweeping Injunction Constitutes an Advisory Opinion as to                     LSSD......................................................................................................................                     1.      The Injunction Enjoins Purely Speculative Conduct.....................................                     2.      Desire for a Broad Ruling Does Not Relax the Standing Requirement.........                     3.      Contradiction of the Separation of Powers....................................................           D.      Public Policy Does Not Override Jurisdictional and Procedural Defects...............                     1.      Judicial Efficiency Does Not Justify an Advisory Opinion...........................                     2.      The Right to Record Police Officers Does Not Displace Basic                      Justiciability Rules...................................................................................................                     3.      The Limitations of Declaratory Relief...........................................................           E.      Conclusion on the Merits of the Trial Court's Rulings............................................ VI.    CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................   TABLE OF AUTHORITIES   Cases Blank v. Kirwan       (1985) 39 San.3d 311............................................................................................................ San Andreas Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. Superior Court       (2016) 244 San.App.4th 1135............................................................................................... City of Cotati v. Cashman       (2002) 29 San.4th 69............................................................................................................. Environmental Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra       (2008) 158 San.App.4th 877................................................................................................. Curtis v. County of Los Santos       (1985) 172 San.App.3d 1243................................................................................................ Landau v. Salam       (1971) 4 San.3d 901.............................................................................................................. Lockyer v. City and County of San Fierro       (2004) 33 San.4th 1055......................................................................................................... Pacific Legal Foundation v. San Andreas Coastal Com.       (1982) 33 San.3d 158............................................................................................................ People v. Slayton       (2001) 26 San.4th 1076......................................................................................................... People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court       (1970) 1 San.3d 910.............................................................................................................. Salazar v. Eastin       (1995) 9 San.4th 836............................................................................................................. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA       (2013) 568 U.S. 398.............................................................................................................. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife       (1992) 504 U.S. 555.............................................................................................................. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus       (2014) 573 U.S. 149..............................................................................................................   Statutes 42 U.S.C. § 1983......................................................................................................................... Code Civ. Proc.       § 904.1(a)(1).........................................................................................................................       § 430.10................................................................................................................................       § 379.....................................................................................................................................       § 1060................................................................................................................................... Pen. Code       § 610.....................................................................................................................................   I.       INTRODUCTION ᅠᅠ  This appeal arises from a trial's court decision to issue broad declaratory and injunctive relief against the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department (LSSD), notwithstanding LSSD's complete non-involvement in the events precipitating the lawsuit. Plaintiff and Respondent Gloria Mendoza filed suit based on an incident allegedly involving only the Los Santos Police Department (LSPD). In her complaint Ms. Mendoza maintained that a single LSPD officer, purportedly enforcing or threatening to enforce Penal Code section 610, violated her right to record police activity in public. Despite conceding that the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department played no role in any of these events, Ms. Mendoza requested a far-reaching ruling that would bind the LSSD—and, by extension, every named agency in the action—to an injunction and a declaratory judgment about hypothetical future uses of section 610. ᅠᅠ  Although the trial court recognized that the LSSD was not actually involved, it refused to dismiss the Department and instead granted Ms. Mendoza the requested declaratory relief, enjoining all named law enforcement agencies from any perceived future application of section 610 that would impede recording of police activity. The trial court's order thus swept LSSD into a judgment devoid of any factual basis tying it to the alleged wrongdoing. ᅠᅠ  LSSD now appeals, contending that the trial court's order contravenes fundamental requirements of justiciability and impermissibly imposes what amounts to an advisory opinion. The Department further submits that the trial court erred by rejecting LSSD's demurrer—despite Ms. Mendoza's complaint failing to allege a cognizable controversy involving LSSD—and by granting injunctive relief premised on speculation regarding hypothetical actions that LSSD was neither alleged to have taken nor is likely to take in the future. San Andreas law forbids such abstract judgments and demands that plaintiffs present an actual, concrete dispute to secure declaratory and injunctive relief. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 San.4th 69, 79; see also Pacific Legal Foundation v. San Andreas Coastal Com. (1982) 33 San.3d 158, 170.) ᅠᅠ  In addition, the procedural statutes governing joinder of multiple defendants and the requirements for obtaining injunctive remedies similarly refute the approach the trial court took. Code of Civil Procedures section 379 prescribes that named defendants share a factual nexus in terms of the "transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions" that gave rise to the complaint. Ms. Mendoza's complaint unquestionably focuses on an incident involving an LSPD officer and fails to establish that LSSD in any manner participated in, sanctioned, or threatened to carry out the alleged misconduct. By imposing relief on an uninvolved agency, the trial court ventured beyond the role courts are intended to serve. (See People v. Slayton (2001) 26 San.4th 1076, 1083 [reiterating that courts may not issue abstract rulings on the hypothetical applications of penal statutes].) ᅠᅠ  The LSSD respectfully requests that this Court: (1) reverse the trial court's judgment insofar as it applies to the Department, (2) vacate any declaratory or injunctive relief purporting to bind LSSD, and (3) direct the trial court to dismiss the action against LSSD with prejudice. This approach reaffirms longstanding principles that courts are not vested with the power to issue advisory opinions or to invent controversies where none exist. Although Ms. Mendoza may well have a justiciable dispute with LSPD, any such dispute does not automatically create grounds for retaining other agencies with no actual or alleged involvement.   II.       JURISDICTION ᅠᅠ  This Court has jurisdiction over the LSSD’s timely appeal of the trial court’s final judgment and orders granting declaratory and injunctive relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subds. (a)(1), (a)(6).)   III.      STATEMENT OF THE CASE ᅠᅠ    A.      Summary of Facts. ᅠᅠ  On April 6, 2025, Plaintiff and Respondent Gloria Mendoza initiated this action by filing a verified complaint in the Los Santos County Superior Court. She named multiple defendants, including LSPD, LSSD, and the San Andreas Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (SADCR). Central to her complaint is an alleged incident involving only LSPD and its officers. Ms. Mendoza alleged that she was standing on a public sidewalk, approximately 50 feet from an active police scene, when an LSPD officer—identified as Officer Love—demanded that she move farther away and threatened to arrest her if she did not comply. ᅠᅠ  That alleged threat rested upon an asserted application of Penal Code section 610, which Ms. Mendoza claims prohibits or restricts filming of police activity at close range. According to Ms. Mendoza, she feared being arrested under the statute and therefore moved farther back. However, she was neither arrested nor cited, and none of her belongings were confiscated. She continued to film from a greater distance, albeit with reservations about the officer's ultimatum. The complaint concedes that LSSD deputies did not appear at the scene and played no part in the officer's alleged threats.                     2.      Ms. Mendoza's Claims Against Multiple Law Enforcement Agencies. ᅠᅠ  Despite identifying an LSPD officer as the singular source of her alleged injury, Ms. Mendoza named LSSD, SADCR, and potentially any other law enforcement entity within the State of San Andreas as additional defendants. She sought declaratory judgment that section 610 is unconstitutional or, at minimum, unenforceable "as applied" to filming. She further requested a permanent injunction prohibiting all named agencies—regardless of their presence at the scene or participating in the events—from enforcing or threatening to enforce section 610 to restrict filming of on-duty police officers. ᅠᅠ  Ms. Mendoza also cited 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in her complaint but did not appear to seek monetary damages, focusing her prayer instead on equitable relief designed to curtail anticipated future applications of section 610. In essence, she framed a broad potential conflict by speculating that any law enforcement agency in the state "could" interpret section 610 as LSPD allegedly did. She did not, however, allege any specific acts by LSSD or its employees. Nor did she claim that LSSD had a policy or practice of enforcing section 610 against individuals recording police activity.                     3.      Proceedings in the Trial Court and the Denial of LSSD's Demurrer. ᅠᅠ  On April 7, 2025, LSSD demurred to Ms. Mendoza's complaint. The Department argued that the complaint failed to set forth any facts indicating LSSD involvement in the alleged incident and that no actual controversy existed with Ms. Mendoza. In particular, LSSD emphasized that the justiciable controversy requirement under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 is not satisfied by mere speculation concerning some future possibility that an agency might enforce a statute. LSSD also pointed out that Code of Civil Procedure section 379, governing joinder, imposes limits that bar the inclusion of defendants wholly disconnected from the relevant transaction or occurrence. ᅠᅠ  Ms. Mendoza's opposition rested on the theoretical premise that, because LSSD is authorized to enforce state laws, it might one day enforce section 610 in a manner she contends is overbroad. She urged that judicial efficiency favored binding every major law enforcement agency to a single judicial ruling rather than requiring separate suits. The trial court accepted Ms. Mendoza's arguments, denied LSSD's demurrer, and thereafter granted sweeping declaratory and injunctive relief against all names defendants—including LSSD—on the rationale that all such agencies share the potential to enforce or threaten enforcement of section 610. ᅠᅠ  The final judgment permanently enjoins every named agency from applying section 610 to restrict filming of police officers under the circumstances Ms. Mendoza described. Notably, the court did not reference any specific policy of LSSD. Nor did it find that LSSD had actually enforced or threatened to enforce section 610 in a similar way. Nonetheless, the broad order encompasses LSSD. LSSD now appeals, seeking reversal of the judgment and dismissal of all claims as to LSSD.   IV.      STANDARD OF REVIEW ᅠᅠ  The standard of review for orders overruling a demurrer is well established; an appellate court reviews the complaint de novo, determining whether the facts alleged are sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 San.3d 311, 318). In doing so, the Court takes as true all properly pleaded factual allegations but does not accept legal conclusions, opinions, or speculative inferences as true. (San Andreas Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. Superior Court (2016) 244 San.App.4th 1135, 1142.) ᅠᅠ  Furthermore, this appeal challenges the trial court's issuance of declaratory and injunctive relief as to LSSD. Where declaratory relief hinges on whether an "actual controversy" exists, courts employ a de novo standard to determine whether the dispute meets the legal test for justiciability. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 San.4th 69, 79.) The propriety of injunctive relief also generally depends on whether a legally cognizable harm or threat is alleged. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. San Andreas Coastal Com., supra, 33 San.3d at p. 170.) Accordingly, this Court independently reviews the trial court's rulings to ascertain whether there was a genuine controversy with respect to LSSD and, if not, whether the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss LSSD and in granting an injunction binding it. ᅠᅠ  If the allegations in Ms. Mendoza's complaint fail on their face to establish that LSSD engaged in any cognizable wrongdoing or threated future conduct, then the complaint does not state a cause of action against LSSD, and the demurrer should have been sustained without leave to amend. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10 [prescribing demurrer grounds].) The complaint’s generalized fears about how LSSD “could” apply or interpret section 610 at some future date do not supply the specific factual basis necessary to proceed.   V.       LEGAL ARGUMENT            A.      No Justiciable Controversy Exists Between Ms. Mendoza and LSSD.                       1.      Declaratory Relief Requires an Actual Controversy. ᅠᅠ  San Andreas courts, consistent with constitutional limitations on judicial power, are precluded from rendering any advisory opinions. (City of Cotati v. Cashman, supra, 29 San.4th at p. 79; Environmental Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra (2008) 158 San.App.4th 877, 885.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 requires an "actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties," emphasizing that the dispute must be both concrete and ripe. Courts are constrained to decide actual conflicts, rather than hypothetical or potential ones. ᅠᅠ  San Andreas follows a traditional rule mirroring the federal limitation of judicial power under Article III of the United States Constitution; namely, it forbids adjudication of speculative or future injuries that may never materialize. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. San Andreas Coastal Com., supra, 33 San.3d at p. 170.) Absent a real, present dispute over enforceable rights or obligations ("ripeness requirement"), any decision the court renders would cross the line into the realm of mere prophecy or conjecture.                       2.      Ms. Mendoza Alleges No Enforcement or Threat by LSSD. ᅠᅠ  Ms. Mendoza's complaint does not allege that LSSD participated in the events giving rise to the purported constitutional or statutory violation. She acknowledges that the only officer who threatened to enforce section 610 was an employee of LSPD. Indeed, by Ms. Mendoza's own account, LSSD deputies never arrived at the scene of the incident or threatened her in any way. Nor does Ms. Mendoza claim that LSSD directed or supervised LSPD's officers or had any joint law enforcement operation with LSPD. On the face of the complaint, then, LSSD did not figure into the relevant "transaction or occurrence" at all.                       3.      A Purely Hypothetical Future Dispute Does Not Satisfy Section 1060. ᅠᅠ  In pre-enforcement cases—where a plaintiff asserts a chilling effect or prospective harm—courts require a plausible showing that the defendant is poised to enforce the disputed policy or statute. (Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) 573 U.S. 149, 158.) The plaintiff must demonstrate a "substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality." (Ibid.) A purely speculative or hypothetical possibility of enforcement is not enough. (See Clapper v. Amnesty International USA (2013) 568 U.S. 398, 409; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) 504 U.S. 555, 560-561.) ᅠᅠ  Ms. Mendoza's theory rests on the notion that LSSD "could" invoke section 610 in a similarly unconstitutional manner if she were to film one of its deputies at some unspecified future date. However, the complaint does not allege, for example, that LSSD promulgated a training bulletin, a policy, a memo or a directive instructing deputies to arrest individuals recording them in public, or that LSSD has a track record of restricting such filming. Without evidence of an existing policy or past action pointing to future enforcement, Ms. Mendoza's fear of LSSD's hypothetical enforcement is far too attenuated to supply the "actual controversy" required.                       4.      The Constitutional Ban on Advisory Opinions. ᅠᅠ  The San Andreas Supreme Court has consistently held that courts may not issue opinions on a statute's constitutionality in a factual vacuum. (People v. Slayton, supra, 26 San.4th at p. 1083, 1084; People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court (1970) 1 San.3d 910, 912 [83 San. Rptr. 670, 464 P.2d 126] ["The rendering of advisory opinions falls within neither the functions nor the jurisdiction of this court."]; Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 San.4th 836, 861 [stating that courts resolve actual controversies rather than declaring abstract principles].) ᅠᅠ  Nothing in Ms. Mendoza's allegations suggest that LSSD was about to violate her rights or ever had enforced section 610 in a manner that might infringe her right to record police activity. Consequently, the trial court was effectively compelled to rule on hypothetical future conduct by LSSD, or to issue a prophylactic order that forbade LSSD from adopting a misinterpretation of section 610 at some later date. This is a paradigmatic advisory opinion. The law does not permit such sweeping judicial oversight absent a live dispute or a demonstrated likelihood that a dispute will arise imminently. ᅠᅠ  For these reasons, the trial court's refusal to dismiss LSSD was legally untenable. The complaint fails to establish any immediate or genuine controversy, rendering the suit against LSSD nonjusticiable. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the order denying LSSD's demurrer and direct the trial court to dismiss the complaint as to LSSD with prejudice. ᅠᅠ   B.      The Trial Court Erred in Denying LSSD's Demurrer Under Code of            Civil Procedure Section 379 (Improper Joinder). ᅠᅠ  Apart from the absence of any substantive claim, Ms. Mendoza's inclusion of LSSD also violates joinder rules. Code of Civil Procedure section 379 provides that multiple defendants may be joined in one action only if (1) the right to relief asserted against them arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and (2) there exists a common question of law or fact. This statute prevents plaintiffs from bringing unrelated defendants into a single suit based on purely speculative or tangential legal theories.                       1.      No Factual Nexus Tying LSSD to the Same "Transaction or                       Occurrence". ᅠᅠ  Ms. Mendoza's complaint makes clear that the "transaction or occurrence" giving rise to the alleged violation occurred on March 25, 2025, when Officer Love of LSPD threatened Ms. Mendoza under section 610. LSSD played no part. There is no claim that LSSD deputies were present, that they directed or commanded the LSPD officer's actions, or that they collaborated in any manner. The complaint simply asserts that LSSD is also a law enforcement entity within the State of San Andreas with the authority to enforce state law. ᅠᅠ  In Landau v. Salam (1971) 4 San.3d 901, 904, the San Andreas Supreme Court explained that multiple defendants cannot be joined in a single lawsuit merely because the same legal issue might apply; there must be a factual link. In that case, plaintiffs had attempted to sue different defendants over distinct automobile accidents, arguing that a common question—liability for personal injuries—united them. The Supreme Court rejected that approach as an improper stretching of the joinder rules. Similarly, in Curtis v. County of Los Santos (1985) 172 San.App.3d 1243, plaintiffs sued the County of Los Santos for injuries on a road that belong solely to the City of Palos Verdes Estates. The County successfully moved for summary judgment by showing it had no ownership or maintenance responsibility over the roadway. The court held the claim was "totally without merity" and noted that naming a jurisdictionally uninvolved agency was improper. Here, Ms. Mendoza's attempt to bind all law enforcement agencies to a single lawsuit likewise runs afoul of section 379's requirement that each defendant be factually linked to the same underlying transaction or occurrence.                       2.      No Overlap of "Law or Fact" Sufficient to Cure the Missing Factual                       Connection. ᅠᅠ  Although Ms. Mendoza posits that a "common question of law" arises—the constitutionality of section 610—there remains a fundamental deficiency: LSSD is not alleged to have contributed to the underlying factual scenario. A common question of law, by itself, cannot unify defendants when they are unrelated to the essential transaction that prompted the suit. (Landau, supra, 4 San.3d at p. 905.) Indeed, it would contravene judicial efficiency if plaintiffs were allowed to name every conceivable enforcement agency in a single action just because all of them might theoretically apply a certain statute in ways that the plaintiff fears. Such a sweeping approach would create confusion, hamper the orderly administration of justice, and spur litigation on hypothetical possibilities. ᅠᅠ  Thus, the trial court erred in rejecting LSSD's demurrer, as Ms. Mendoza's complaint flouts both the "actual controversy" rule and the statutory joinder limitations. No valid cause of action existed against LSSD, and the entire matter should have been dismissed at the demurrer stage. ᅠᅠ   C.      The Trial Court's Sweeping Injunction Constitutes an Advisory Opinion as            to LSSD.                       1.      The Injunction Enjoins Purely Speculative Conduct. ᅠᅠ  In addition to the statutory and procedural deficiencies, the injunction is itself improper as to LSSD because it prohibits conduct that LSSD never undertook or threatened to undertake. The trial court's order enjoins "all police officers and law enforcement agencies" from enforcing or threatening to enforce section 610 to curb the filming of officers. This extraordinary relief amounts to a generalized proclamation that extends beyond any actual or imminent threat posed by LSSD. The purpose of injunctive relief is to prevent ongoing or future wrongdoing that is reasonable certain to occur, not to address hypothetical scenarios that the parties themselves do not genuinely anticipate. ᅠᅠ  San Andreas courts have long understood the principle that an injunction must be premised on the likelihood of continuing or recurring harm. (See McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 San.5th 945, 953 [injunctive relief requires a showing of likely future harm].) Because LSSD's alleged wrongdoing is non-existent, and there is no evidence that LSSD has threatened Ms. Mendoza or indicated a policy of restricting filming with reference to section 610, the trial court's order is nothing more than an abstract directive.                       2.      Desire for a Broad Ruling Does Not Relax the Standing                       Requirement. ᅠᅠ  By enjoining LSSD's hypothetical future actions, the trial court stepped beyond its proper role of adjudicating actual controversies. Courts protect litigants by ensuring that judicial decrees follow actual wrongdoing or imminent harm, not hypothetical policy disputes. Where there is no actual controversy, the San Andreas Supreme Court has observed, the rendering of a declaratory judgment is beyond the power of the court. (City of Cotati, supra, 29 San.4th at p. 79.) Extending that same logic to injunctions is a natural corollary: a court cannot enjoin a defendant who never engaged in the disputed conduct and is not reasonably likely to do so.                       3.      Contradiction of the Separation of Powers. ᅠᅠ  An overly expansive injunction that purports to instruct any law enforcement agency on how it may or may not enforce a particular statute contravenes separation-of-powers principles by inserting courts into a legislative or administrative function. Courts are entrusted to decide concrete cases, not to operate as general overseers of how agencies might interpret penal laws. Permitting Ms. Mendoza to bind every major law enforcement department in the state based on the acts of one city police officer transforms the judiciary into a regulator of hypothetical scenarios. ᅠᅠ  The separation-of-powers doctrine, though not explicitly mentioned in every state constitution, underpins the structural design of government and judicial review, ensuring that courts do not exercise raw legislative or executive power. The trial court’s approach here—pre-emptively enjoining LSSD absent any factual nexus—runs afoul of those structural boundaries. ᅠᅠ   D.      Public Policy Does Not Override Jurisdictional and Procedural Defects                       1.      Judicial Efficiency Does Not Justify an Advisory Opinion. ᅠᅠ  The trial court’s order invoked considerations of “judicial efficiency,” claiming that it was more efficient to resolve the legality of section 610 in a single proceeding. While efficiency is a laudable goal, it cannot override the constitutional and statutory thresholds that require an actual, present controversy. (City of Cotati, supra, 29 San.4th at p. 80 [rejecting attempts to sidestep justiciability requirements for the sake of uniformity or convenience].) ᅠᅠ  The notion that it would be simpler to bind all law enforcement agencies in one action ignores each defendant’s separate rights, defenses, and factual circumstances. Traditional jurisdictional prerequisites, like standing and justiciability, are precisely designed to safeguard against turning courts into legislative bodies issuing broad edicts on purely hypothetical conflicts.                       2.      The Right to Record Police Officers Does Not Displace Basic                       Justiciability Rules. ᅠᅠ  While the right to record police activity in public is an important constitutional concern, it does not empower trial courts to adopt prophylactic measures that disregard the requirement of an actual controversy. Courts do not expand their jurisdiction simply because the underlying right is important or warrants robust protection. Constitutional litigation still demands that a plaintiff name defendants genuinely involved in or connected to the challenged harm. According to West’s editorial summary of Lockyer v. City and County of San Fierro (2004) 33 San.4th 1055, 1082 [“[W]hen a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, a present or threatened injury is required.”].) ᅠᅠ  Ms. Mendoza’s effort to rope in LSSD as an additional defendant, without any alleged incident involving that department, undermines these bedrock principles. If courts were to accept her approach, any plaintiff claiming a violation of a constitutional right by one agency could name all other agencies on the basis that they too “might” commit a similar violation at some indeterminate point. That expansion would risk unleashing a flood of speculative lawsuits and hamper the traditional litigation model in which concrete disputes between particular parties are resolved.                       3.      The Limitations of Declaratory Relief. ᅠᅠ  Declaratory relief is an extraordinary remedy intended to afford litigants clarity about their present legal positions in actual disputes. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) The remedy remains tethered to the requirement of a real and immediate controversy. Here, the trial court’s declaration held that section 610 could not be invoked in certain circumstances, and it specifically subjected LSSD to that declaration even though the Department had nothing to do with Ms. Mendoza’s alleged harm. Such a universal ruling strains the boundaries of declaratory relief and turns it into a vehicle for issuing advisory pronouncements. San Andreas’s declaratory relief statutes do not allow a plaintiff to obtain a generalized edict against all conceivable enforcement agencies in the absence of an immediate controversy. ᅠᅠ  Even where a statute’s constitutionality is placed at issue, the parties contesting the matter must have adverse legal interests. Courts do not assume the posture of deciding a statute’s lawfulness/constitutional in the abstract. Where, as here, only one police department is alleged to have misapplied the statute, other agencies remain purely theoretical defendants, lacking a distinct interest that triggers judicial intervention. ᅠᅠ   E.      Conclusion on the Merits of the Trial Court's Rulings. ᅠᅠ  Ms. Mendoza’s dispute with LSPD may well present a cognizable claim. But that claim does not automatically incorporate every other law enforcement agency in the state. Courts cannot sidestep the fundamental requirement of a genuine controversy simply because a plaintiff asserts that a particular statute might be broadly misapplied. The trial court’s decision to enjoin LSSD, and its refusal to grant LSSD’s demurrer, contravene both the statutory scheme governing joinder and the foundational principles limiting judicial power to the resolution of actual controversies.   V.       CONCLUSION ᅠᅠ  For the foregoing reasons, the LSSD respectfully asks this Court to reverse the portion of the judgment denying LSSD's demurrer and granting declaratory and injunctive relief against the Department. Because Ms. Mendoza has not alleged any participating or threatened enforcement by LSSD, her complaint fails to establish justiciability prerequisites vital to any lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive remedies against it. Moreover, adding LSSD as a defendant runs afoul of Code of Civil Procedure section 379, which precludes sweeping into a single lawsuit unrelated defendants who lack any factual link to the core incident. ᅠᅠ  Constitutional and procedural safeguards exist to ensure that judicial power is exercised only where there is an actual dispute. When a trial court oversteps those limits, as occurred here, it creates a precedent that undermines the principle of separation of powers and effectively transforms the court into a policy-making body. The issuance of a broad, prophylactic injunction ordering LSSD not to enforce a statute it never threatened to enforce is precisely the sort of advisory pronouncement the state's courts have consistently disallowed. ᅠᅠ  Such relief will restore adherence to the rule that parties must present a concrete, justiciable controversy before a court may exercise its remedial powers. The result will also reaffirm that constitutional adjudication is not an avenue to obtain hypothetical rulings or to subject uninvolved agencies to judicially mandated obligations.   DATED:  April 14, 2025                                                       By:       /s/ Eugene K. Stahl                                                                                                                  Eugene K. Stahl                                                                                                       Attorney for Appellant                                                                                                       LOS SANTOS COUNTY                                                                                                       SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

[Tungsten]

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF SAN ANDREAS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE     LOS SANTOS COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,   Petitioner and Appellant,           v.         SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS,   Respondent.                       Court of Appeal Case No. 25-A1-04110   (Superior Court Case No. 25-LSC-04111)                            On Appeal From the Superior Court for the State of San Andreas, County of Los Santos, Case No. 25-LSC-04111, Hon. Florence Weathers-Peterson, Judge ─────────────

OPINION AND ORDER delivered by Maria J. Vespasiano, A.P.J. 1st District     SYLLABUS   On Appeal from the Superior Court, County of Los Santos ("Superior Court"), Plaintiff contests the issuance of Declaratory Judgment as applied to the Los Santos Sheriff's Department ("LSSD") and, by extension, all [other] named defendants than the named defendant Los Santos Police Department ("LSPD").   The Superior Court issued Declaratory Judgment in the court of first instance in order to establish a set-in-stone rule as to the enforcement of Penal Code § 610, Obstruction of Justice. The underlying controversy thereof was whether a law enforcement officer may treat as obstruction a non-physical act, such as recording a police officer conducting their duties, while on public property themselves. The Superior Court answered "no", explaining that obstruction is a physical act that prevents or delays an officer from conducting duties or the failure to obey a lawful order. The court held that the enforcement of Penal Code § 610 in such a way is facially unconstitutional due to the chilling effect upon the exercise of free speech arising from the recording of a police officer for potentially press-related or public accountability purposes.   Following the declaration of such a rule, the Superior Court enjoined "all law enforcement agencies" in the State of San Andreas from engaging in similar conduct and imposed a specific injunction upon the LSPD for violating that order. The court similarly enjoined all other law enforcement agencies and imposed the risk of fines upon any agency that violates the order.   Appellant presents six questions of law, summarized here:   1. Is there a justiciable controversy that exists between the plaintiff in the trial court and the Appellant here? By extension, may the court exercise its discretion to issue declaratory judgment upon a party that was not directly involved in the underlying controversy?   2. Did the trial court err in denying the motion for demurrer raised by the LSSD pursuant to Civil Code of Procedure § 379?   3. Did the trial court issue a "sweeping injunction" that constitutes an advisory opinion? By extension, may the court do so?   4. Does public policy override jurisdictional and procedural defects?   5. Did the trial court "sidestep the fundamental requirement of a genuine controversy"? By extension, must a defendant be personally involved in such a genuine controversy for the court to have general or subject-matter jurisdiction over them?   This court has appellant jurisdiction over all named defendants due to their collective location within the First Judicial District. Appellant makes a claim that the trial court abused is discretion and errantly asserts that this court must apply a de novo standard of review. This court instead must extend deference in cases of such allegations of abuse of discretion. Appellant gives no argument as to why they are entitled to the retrying of facts and this court cannot find a genuine factual dispute either in this or the trial court brief submitted.   However, Appellant does make an argument that the order issued by the trial court incorrectly enjoined directly conduct that was purely speculative. It is for this reason that this court upholds in part and reverses in part the decision of the trial court.   ANALYSIS   I. Does there exist a justiciable controversy between Ms. Mendoza and Appellant in the trial court? And, if not, may the trial court issue declaratory relief where there is no justiciable controversy?   San Andreas Code of Civil Procedure § 1060 specifies that a court may only rule on actual controversies. Appellant argues that there is no actual controversy because the LSSD was not directly involved in the matter that gave rise to such actual controversy. While the LSSD was not directly involved, however, a plaintiff need not expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution in order to have standing. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2013). In Pacific Legal Foundation v. San Andreas Coastal Commission, supra, 33 San.3d, the court held that there is a "ripeness requirement" in issues brought before court and forecloses adjudication of speculative of future injuries that may never materialize. Further, a plaintiff lacks standing where there is no injury-in-fact that was concrete, particularized, and imminent. Considering these requirements, the court must ask whether direct involvement is required in order to establish a claim against the defendant in such an action and whether direct involvement is required to satisfy the "ripeness requirement". This court holds that there is no personal jurisdiction over Appellant due to the lack of injury-in-fact and the trial court may not enjoin directly speculative conduct where there is no personal jurisdiction. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). However, the LSSD also engages in daily law enforcement activities and such activities may result in improper arrests for conduct similar to the conduct of Plaintiff. The court has subject matter jurisdiction over the enforcement of criminal laws, particularly because the LSSD enforces laws within the confines of the City and County of Los Santos. Since there exists no current precedent that enjoins the enforcement of Penal Code § 610, the trial court was well within its jurisdiction to establish such a precedent, but errantly included Appellant in a direct injunction with threat of fines.   Appellant also errantly asserts that the trial court errantly issues an advisory opinion, but the trial court did no such thing – the trial court issued a declaratory judgment in order to resolve an actual controversy. Declaratory judgments intend to resolve an actual controversy and therefore foreclose future civil lawsuits, but advisory opinions do no such thing. This distinction is enough to dismiss the argument that the trial court erred in issued an advisory opinion because it clearly did not.     II. Did the trial court err in denying the motion for demurrer raised by the LSSD pursuant to Civil Code of Procedure § 379?   Appellant raised a motion for demurrer in the trial court, seeking to dismiss the claim as applied to itself. San Andreas Code of Civil Procedure § 379(b) states:   "It is not necessary that each defendant be interested as to every cause of action or as to all relief prayed for. Judgment may be given against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities."   Appellant is not personally interested in this cause of action and has no liability therefore. As stated in Part I of this analysis, there is no personal jurisdiction but there is subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellant. However, the San Andreas Supreme Court has stated that joinder is improper in cases where defendants are merely alleged to have engaged in similar conduct. There must be some factual link between each named Defendant and the conduct directly alleged by the plaintiff. Landau v. Salam, 4 San.3d 901, 904 (1971). This court therefore finds that the trial court issued its order based on speculation and did in fact err in denial of the motion for demurrer, but not in its declaration of facial unconstitutionality of enforcing Penal Code § 610 that chills the right to record the police found in the first amendment to the United States Constitution. This court is therefore forced to reverse in this denial on the grounds that the trial court erred in its application of judicial discretion.     III. Did the trial court issue a "sweeping injunction" that constitutes an advisory opinion? By extension, may the court do so?   As addressed in Part I, the ruling of the trial court does not constitute an advisory opinion. People ex rel Lynch v. Superior Court, 1 San.3d 910, 912 (1970); Salazar v. Eastin, 9 San.4th 836 (1995). A declaratory judgment is not an advisory opinion but rather an attempt by the court to resolve an actual controversy that forecloses future civil lawsuits. Lockyer v. City and County of San Fierro, 33 San.4th 1055, 1082 (2004).     IV. Does public policy override jurisdictional and procedural defects?   As explained in Part III of this analysis, the trial court did not issue an advisory opinion but a declaratory judgment. The trial court is not limited by Code of Civil Procedure 1060(b). However, this court need not further analyze this question because motion for demurrer was, as explained in Part II, was errantly overruled by the trial court and the appellant may not therefore be subject to a declaratory judgment.     V. Did the trial court "sidestep the fundamental requirement of a genuine controversy"? By extension, must a defendant be personally involved in such a genuine controversy for the court to have general or subject-matter jurisdiction over them?   This court has analyzed this question in Parts I and II of this analysis. This court finds that the lack of genuine controversy does in fact foreclose the inclusion of Appellant in the order itself but does not limit the ability of the trial court to find that the act of issuing precedent on the matter was and is proper. This court therefore affirms the trial court's creation of precedent while still releasing Appellant from the action raised in the trial court.     ORDER   1. The trial court erred in its denial of the motion for demurrer raised by Appellant. All defendants other than the LSPD are released from the direct injunction. The order, as applied to the LSPD, is not reversed.   2. The trial court's decision to establish a precedent that recording the police is a right is upheld and naturalized to this court.     (( OOC Errata ))   Part of Landau v. Salam, 4 San.3d 901, 904 (1971), is impossible to apply because it provides that a court does not have the jurisdiction to issue summary judgment during trial where there is no dispute over facts – this is a question for the jury. On LS-RP there is no jury and all cases are handled as bench trials, so this precedent cannot be applied – the judge acts as both judge and jury for gameplay reasons. However, the remainder of this opinion can be adequately applied and has been.     DATED:  April 17, 2025                                            By:       _____/s/ Maria J. Vespasiano                                                                                                        Maria J. Vespasiano                                                                                          Administrative Presiding Justice                                                                                                     First Appellate District