25-LSC-04111 - Final Order, Reversed in Part - Gloria Mendoza v. Los Santos Police Department, et al.

[Kotwica]

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS

COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS

CIVIL DIVISION

 

Case Name: Glorida Mendoza v. The Los Santos Police Department, The Los Santos Sheriff's Department, The San Andreas Department of Corrections, and any other law enforcement agency within the State of San Andreas.
 

Plaintiff Attorney: Juan Tzompaxtle

 

CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET

_______________________________________________

 

1. Check one box below that best describes this case:

 

Personal Torts

[ ] Assault, battery, or unlawful contact

[ ] False imprisonment

[ ] Intentional infliction of emotional distress

[ ] Deprivation of rights under color of law

 

Negligent Torts

[ ] Breach of duty

[ ] Negligent infliction of emotional distress

[ ] Professional or Medical Negligence

 

Property Torts

[ ] Trespassing or Conversion

[ ] Nuisance

[ ] Theft

[ ] Detainder

 

Dignitary Torts

[ ] Defamation (Slander or Libel)

[ ] Invasion of privacy

[ ] Breach of confidence

[ ] Abuse of process

[ ] Malicious prosecution

[ ] Alienation of affections

 

Business Torts

[ ] Fraud

[ ] Tortious interference

[ ] Conspiracy

[ ] Restraint of trade

[ ] Passing off

 

Contracts

[ ] Breach of Contract

[ ] Collections

 

Judicial Review

[ ] Denial or Revocation of Business License

[ ] Denial or Revocation of Firearms License

 

Other

[X] Declaratory Judgment/Declaratory Relief

 

2. List any damages sustained or fees accrued. Include billing rate for attorneys, expert witnesses, etc.

• N/A, declaratory judgment.

_______________________________________________

Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge.

 

Sworn this 6 day of April, 2025 by:

 

/S/ Gloria Mendoza

Gloria Mendoza

Plaintiff

 

/S/ Juan Tzompaxtle
Juan Tzompaxtle

Attorney for Plaintiff

[Kotwica]

Gloria Mendoza v. The Los Santos Police Department, The Los Santos Sheriff's Department, The San Andreas Department of Corrections, and any other law enforcement agency within the State of San Andreas.

 

Case Number: YY-XNNN

Prepared by: Juan Tzompaxtle

 

CIVIL CASE BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF

_______________________________________________

JURISDICTION AND APPLICABILITY OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT:
1. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 57 establishes the right for a Title III court to issue a declaratory judgment in the face of an actual case or controversy. to The “controversy” must necessarily be “of a justiciable nature, thus excluding an advisory decree upon a hypothetical state of facts.” Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 325, (1936).

The case presented is not hypothetical, Ms. Mendoza's right to film was cut short by a threat of a law enforcement officer thus depriving her of her constitutional rights. Although Ms. Mendoza was not arrested, that does not prohibit her from asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The fact that Officer Love used his position to move Ms. Mendoza away from a scene that she had a legal right to observe and record, and for however short a period of time she was unable to record the scene when relocated prevented her from freely exercising her rights is not "hypothetical" in nature. Rather, those two acts give rise to a claim. This court is in a position to clarify the legality of video recording and audio recording law enforcement officers in public. 

However, even if the court finds that the unconstitutional threat and actions of a law enforcement officer does not establish a claim because the case is "moot," the court is permitted under Article III, Section 2, to hear the case because it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.

 

Further, declaratory judgment is appropriate because "[a declaratory judgment] [. . .] which declares the rights of the parties or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law, without ordering anything to be done, or requiring that an actual wrong, giving rise to a cause of action for damages, should have been committed or suffered." Stanley H. Mervis, Declaratory Judgments in Virginia, 1 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 32 (1950), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol1/iss2/2. (persuasive authority.) 
 

ARGUMENT:

1. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the rights of citizens to assemble, protect the freedom of press, and protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Courts of these United States have long concerned themselves with attempts by the government to chill the rights of citizens through intimidation. The law enforcement agencies within the State of San Andreas have taken advantage of the lack of precedent established by this Court on the topic of "obstruction of justice" when law enforcement officers are faced with a member of the public recording them.

 

2. On March 25th, 2025, Ms. Mendoza, was lawfully driving on a public roadway to the Idlewood Gas Station. During this drive, she lawfully parked her vehicle, dismounted the vehicle, and proceeded to a public sidewalk where she noticed a large crowd of people being detained. Ms. Mendoza decided to record the interaction, and states she was at minimum fifty feet from the scene, when a uniformed law enforcement officer, Officer Love approached her and asked what she was doing. Ms. Mendoza informed Officer Love that she was watching and filming. Officer Love requested that Ms. Mendoza leave the scene. Ms. Mendoza stated that she was over fifty feet from the incident, Officer Love persisted and threatened Ms. Mendoza stating if she did not leave "she would join them" (referring to the detained individuals). The threat is a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 a threat under the color of law, that for a period of time required Ms. Mendoza to move from a lawful position, and deprived her of her right to record in public the actions of law enforcement officers, giving rise to this request. The threat of arrest (or detention) is sufficient to establish a claim and controversy for declaratory relief.

The facts of this case do not differ substantially from Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.C. 452 (1974). In that case, a law enforcement officer threatened a Vietnam protestor with arrest when "petitioner and others were engaged in the distribution of handbills, which criticized American involvement in Vietnam, upon the exterior sidewalk of a large shopping center." Id. "Warned that they would be arrested if they continued to handbill, the group departed. However, petitioner and a friend returned 2 days later, and police again threatened them with arrest. Fearful of this prospect, petitioner left, while his companion, who remained, was arrested and charged with violation of the statute." Id. 

 

"The district court dismissed the claims of petitioner and others because it could find no active - and hence, no justiciable - controversy between the parties. Abandoning the action for injunctive relief, petitioner appealed the district court's denial of declaratory relief to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed, holding that to obtain declaratory relief from the threat of state prosecution petitioner was required to demonstrate irreparable injury resulting from bad faith harassment by the state." The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding: 1) that since petitioner faced a genuine threat of enforcement of a state criminal statute, the case presented an actual "controversy" as required by Article III of the Constitution; 2) that since no state prosecution was pending, declaratory relief was not precluded regardless of the propriety of injunctive relief; and 3) that it was irrelevant to the grant of declaratory relief whether the statute was attacked as being invalid upon its face or as applied." Steffel.

Similar to Steffel, Ms. Mendoza faced a threat under the color of law. The charge of "obstruction of justice" has long been used to prevent the free exercise under the First Amendment. The role of the court is to determine the law drafted by the legislative branch, signed by the executive branch. In previous filing the state attacked the authority of this court to interpret and establish a test, or rule the practices of law enforcement agencies as unlawful. The facts presented in this case are unique to Ms. Mendoza but identify a larger need for the court to intervene and protect the rights of the citizens bestowed upon them by the Constitution.

 

3. The Supreme Court has held that public sidewalks, even those surrounding the Supreme Court building are a "Traditional Public Forum" See generally United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). A traditional public forum receives the highest level of scrutiny when analyzing the governments action, the deference being given to the citizen. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
 

4. The First Circuit has clearly established that videotaping police carrying out their duties in public is constitutional in Gilk v. Cunnife, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). "The First Amendment issue here is, as the parties frame it, fairly narrow: is there a constitutionally protected right to videotape police carrying out their duties in public? Basic First Amendment principles, along with case law from this and other circuits, answer that question unambiguously in the affirmative." Id. The right of a citizen to film their government and dissiminate that information is clearly affirmed throughout the opinion in Glik.

 

The filming of government officials engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers performing their responsibilities, fits comfortably within these principles. Gathering information about government officials in a form that can readily be disseminated to others serves a cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and promoting “the free discussion of governmental affairs.” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). Moreover, as the Court has noted, “[f]reedom of expression has particular significance with respect to government because it is here that the state has a special incentive to repress opposition and often wields a more effective power of suppression.’ “ First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 777 n. 11 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment 9 (1966)). This is particularly true of law enforcement officials, who are granted substantial discretion that may be misused to deprive individuals of their liberties. Cf. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1035–36 (1991) (observing that “[t]he public has an interest in [the] responsible exercise” of the discretion granted police and prosecutors). Ensuring the public's right to gather information about their officials not only aids in the uncovering of abuses, see id. at 1034–35 (recognizing a core First Amendment interest in “the dissemination of information relating to alleged governmental misconduct”), but also may have a salutary effect on the functioning of government more generally, see Press–Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (noting that “many governmental processes operate best under public scrutiny”).

 

5. The law enforcement agencies of San Andreas have long ran wild with the idea that any citizen, videotaping any law enforcement officer, at anytime, can be detained or arrested. This has chilled the First Amendment, has prevented news outlets both official and unofficial from flourishing in the City of Los Santos -- and has resulted in the wrongful detention, or diminishment in the free exercise of the First Amendment -- for far too long.

 

6. This declaratory judgment comes after the Los Santos Police Department's Internal Affairs Group has determined that "the incident [of which Ms. Mendoza retained me] did not occur." This declaratory relief seeks to enjoin the law enforcement agencies throughout the furthest jurisdiction of this court from ever depriving citizens of their constitutional rights when recording law enforcement officers.

 

7. This declaratory judgment will resolve the controversy of this case, and establish a precedent allowing Ms. Mendoza, and other citizens, if any law enforcement officer chooses to act in a manner inconsistent with the federal precedent, and order of this court.

 

8. The plaintiff's prayer is that this court to impose a defined test for determining "obstruction" -- by defining a proximity, if one is appropriate at all, consistent with federal precedent -- of which a citizen can exercise their First Amendment rights in public by videotaping and audio recording without fear of unlawful arrest or detainment, and to adopt the First Circuit opinion that violating this test -- if the court deems one appropriate -- is grounds for defeating sovereign immunity claims against the law enforcement officer and agency.

 

Exhibits

1. Video recording of the distance of Ms. Mendoza from the scene (( click the link for the album of the recording )).
(( https://imgur.com/a/m5M1MMP ))

2. Response from the LSPD who found "the event did not occur."
 

Witness List

No witnesses are required or requested.

 

_______________________________________________

Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge.

 

Sworn this 6th day of April, 2025 by:

 

/s/ Juan Tzompaxtle

Juan Tzompaxtle

Edited April 7 by Kotwica

[Tungsten]

** The clerk of courts files the case and assigns docket number 25-LSC-04111.

[JustSid]

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF SAN ANDREAS
RE: MENDOZA v. LOS SANTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.
RENEWED RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

-------------------------------------

 

• Jurisdiction and Procedural Impropriety:

Redundant Filing Against Non-Involved Parties:
As in the original motion, the plaintiff erroneously names the Los Santos Sheriff's Department (LSSD) and San Andreas Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (SADCR), although there is no connection with the incident and both these agencies. Declaratory relief necessitates a "justiciable controversy" between specific parties (Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270). They were not represented by any officers, exercised no jurisdiction over the place of the supposed conduct, and had no administrative authority over Officer Love.
Such insistence upon inclusion is judicial waste and intentional misdirection.

 

• The Video Evidence and it's Contextual Clarification: 

Officer Love's Conduct Was Lawful and Proportionate:

The video confirms Officer Love told Ms. Mendoza to "move to the other side of the street" and included the words:
"Or you could join them."

This language, even forceful in its rhetoric, was followed by no prior physical action, detention, or escalation, and Mendoza did move accordingly without protest. There had been no constitutional violation. The police may direct people to move in the public interest or to prevent obstruction to justice, even in a place of public resort, according to Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
No detention, arrest, or deprivation of liberty took place. The encounter ended peacefully, undermining allegations of coercion or violations of rights.

 

• Recording in Public; First Amendment Not Absolute:

Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions Apply:
Glik v. Cunniffe (1st Cir. 2011) recognized the right to record police in public, but continued to remark that the right is "not without limits" and needs to be balanced against public safety and scene control.
Officer Love's directive was content-neutral, meant for clearing the active arrest scene, not suppressing Mendoza's speech.

As per Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989):
"Even in a public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech."

The instruction was brief, peaceful, and reasonable, consistent with safety procedure.

 

 

• Declaratory Relief – No Continuing Threat, Not Standing:

No Live Case or Controversy:
Declaratory relief under 28 U.S. Code § 2201 or state equivalents needs a continuing or threatened future legal injury. Mendoza:

1. Was not arrested
2. Was not charged
3. Faces no ongoing harm or police interference

The case lacks the immediacy or stakes required for declaratory judgment. Courts decline jurisdiction in such abstract disputes (Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452).

Mendoza has not demonstrated a legitimate threat of future enforcement action against her recording activity.

 

• The Court Cannot Legislate:

There are no grounds for expansive judicial rulemaking:
The plaintiff asks the court to set general policies on the behaviour of all law enforcement agencies towards civilian recorders. This is not a judicial but a legislative role. Courts decide individual violations, not policy guidelines.

This request is vague, poses separation of powers conflict, and invites uneven enforcement across jurisdictions.

 

• The Accident Video Footage, Internal Affairs Report Becomes Obsolete, Not Evidence of Misconduct:

New Video Overrides Earlier IA Finding, But Doesn't Create Misconduct:
Yes, the video establishes the incident did indeed happen, which upholds against the earlier conclusion by the LSPD Internal Affairs that it "didn't occur." However:

1. This doesn't retroactively constitute constitutional wrongdoing.
2. The IA misreport can be an example of administrative failure, and not of legal fault.
3. Courts do not issue declaratory relief based on bureaucratic incompetence alone (Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288)
4. The video creates a situation that an incident did indeed take place, not that Mendoza's rights were being violated.

 

• IN CONCLUSION:

The plaintiff pleads no constitutional violation, no threat of continuation, and no fact basis for declaratory relief. The new video shows no unlawful activity on the part of Officer Love and instead confirms again that Mendoza's rights were not infringed upon.

The defense respectfully requests the petition be denied in its entirety, with prejudice as to all non-involved law enforcement agencies.

 

----------------------

Respectfully submitted,
Alexander Cornelius Braithwaite IV
Office of the District Attorney | County of Los Santos
State of San Andreas
April 07th, 2025

Edited April 7 by JustSid

[Tungsten]

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS
COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS, CIVIL DIVISION

 

Case No. 25-LSC-04111

In the Matter of Gloria Mendoza v. Los Santos Police Department, Los Santos Sheriff's Department, San Andreas Department of Corrections

_____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION AND ORDER delivered by Judge Florence Weathers-Peterson of the Superior Court
 

Syllabus

 

Plaintiff submitted a petition under the Declaratory Judgment Act requesting declaratory judgment against the named defendants for alleged constitutional rights violations.

 

Quoting from the syllabus in Gloria Mendoza v. Los Santos Police Department, et al., 25-LSC-04109:
 

On March 25th, 2025, Plaintiff Gloria Mendoza lawfully parked and proceeded to a public sidewalk upon seeing a large group of people detained in the Idlewood area. She began to record the interaction, endorsing afterward that she was approximately fifty feet away from the scene. Plaintiff endorses that she was approached by Officer Love of the Los Santos Police Department who asked what Ms. Mendoza was doing, to which she replied that she was recording the scene. Plaintiff further endorses that she was then instructed by Officer Love to leave the scene and, after a brief verbal dispute, Officer Love implied a threat of arrest by making a statement to the effect of "[Mendoza] would join them [if she did not leave the area]". The evidence presented in the petition for declaratory judgment includes a video that shows only part of the encounter. (( OOC NOTE: Screenshots of the exact actions taken or words said are required as OOC evidence in order for a video to be roleplayed. )) Plaintiff asserts that "law enforcement agencies of San Andreas have long ran wild with the idea that any citizen, videotaping any law enforcement officer, at anytime, can be detained or arrested" and that this has "chilled the First Amendment" by "prevent[ing] news outlets both official and unofficial from flourishing in the City of Los Santos" and "has resulted in the wrongful detention, or diminishment in the free exercise of the First Amendment". Plaintiff submitted a complaint to the Los Santos Police Department Internal Affairs Group and received a disposition that "the reported event did not occur".

Plaintiff argues that the alleged threat of arrest for recording in public is a violation of the first amendment, citing Gilk v. Cunnife, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011), and United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). Plaintiff further contends that this court is implored to apply a strict scrutiny test under Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), with deference being given to the citizen video recording an officer's duties whilst within a traditional public forum. Plaintiff argues that the gathering of information about public officials is a constitutionally-protected activity under the first amendment, citing Mills v. Alabama; 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 777 n. 11; Cf. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev.; 501 U.S. 1030, 1035–36 (1991), and; Press–Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 at 8 (1986). Plaintiff does not argue that the fourth amendment is implicated.

Applying precedent, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief in the form of an order of this court enjoining all law enforcement agencies within the jurisdiction of this court from deprivation of first amendment rights in the manner presupposed. Further, Plaintiff wishes this court to establish precedent in San Andreas jurisprudence by establishing a test for what constitutes "obstruction", presumably as it pertains to the crime of Obstruction of Justice as defined in § 610 of the San Andreas Penal Code. Plaintiff believes that receiving both of these in declaratory relief will "resolve the controversy of this case".

In reply, the three named defendant agencies (collectively "Defendant") claims that Plaintiff's narrative of the incident is "is uncorroborated and self-contradictory", and that there is no cause of action against the Los Santos Sheriff's Department or the San Andreas Department of Corrections. Defendant contends that there is no legal injury warranting declaratory relief and that to establish a test for obstruction as requested would be beyond this court's authority. Defendant argues that the incident occurred in a high-crime area involving a "large group of detained individuals" and that Plaintiff did not have knowledge of any active threats to officer safety that may be present. Defendant endorses the conclusion of the Los Santos Police Department's Internal Affairs Group.

 

Plaintiff submits a motion for demurrer of the named defendants Los Santos Sheriff's Department and San Andreas Department of Corrections on the grounds that they were neither present nor involved in the situation and that, under Rule 430.10(e) and (f) (( OOC NOTE: this reference is corrected due to an OOC note via DM after the topic was locked )), the pleadings do not substantiate a cause of action against these defendants and that the pleadings against such defendants is uncertain due to this lack of presence or involvement. Plaintiff errantly argues that this court is not bound by precedent arising out of Grace, Mills, and Gentile but correctly states that this court is not bound by precedent set in Glik. Plaintiff argues that courts have discovered a governmental interest in maintaining public order, implying that this court should apply a rational basis test to determine whether actions taken by officers is proscribed. Finally, Plaintiff argues that there is no legal injury, threat of future harm, or any real or immediate controversy, requesting dismissal with prejudice of the underlying action.

 

Plaintiff, in renewing the petition, introduces an additional argument invoking Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Quoting from Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936), a controversy at issue in a petition for declaratory judgment must be "of a justiciable nature, thus excluding an advisory decree upon a hypothetical state of facts" under Rule 57. Plaintiff also introduces an argument invoking precedent set in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.C. 452 (1974), asserting that a Federal court has the authority to hear challenges to state law and implying that this court does as well.

 

Defense, renewing their contest to the petition, introduces a counter-argument under Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), asserting that the interference with an officer's duties constitutes a crime.

 

Plaintiff asserts that this declaratory judgment will be a sufficient measure to resolve the controversy without need for a civil lawsuit.

 

Analysis

This court begins with an analysis of the evidence to determine whether further analysis is required. In requesting declaratory judgment in this matter, Plaintiff must show clear and convincing evidence that the events in question occurred. Plaintiff originally submitted incomplete evidence to this court in 25-LSC-04109, but has since corrected this issue. Therefore, the court may continue with evidentiary analysis to determine if there is a controversy at issue in order to satisfy the requirements of Rule 57 as asserted by Ashwander. This court, upon analysis of the evidence, finds that the evidence is sufficient to establish a controversy.

 

Evaluating the argument introduced invoking Steffel, the precedent held that federal courts have jurisdiction over state penal matters. The facts of the case as recounted in the syllabus are a near match, however the holding is neither applicable nor binding upon this court as it concerns federal courts. However, this court recognizes that it does have jurisdiction over this matter as it directly concerns at least one party within its jurisdiction, the Los Santos Police Department, which is the party directly involved. Considering the motion for demurrer introduced by the defense, this court recognizes that defendants other than the Los Santos Police Department are not directly involved. However, these other defendants are indeed still subject to the orders of this court but are immediately appealable to the respective superior courts of their local jurisdictions.

 

Evaluating whether the first amendment is implicated we look to Grace primarily, which holds that public sidewalks are a traditional public forum subject to strict scrutiny. As applied to the first amendment, strict scrutiny requires that a government entity may not restrict speech in a particular manner unless it demonstrates a compelling government interest, that the policy is narrowly tailored to achieve the goal, and that no other policy would satisfactorily achieve the desired result – all three conditions must be present. Cf. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F. 3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). Looking to Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995), it is clearly established that there is a first amendment right to gather information on public officials. Further, this court looks to Meinecke v. City of Seattle, 678 F. Supp. 3d 1309 (W.D. Wash. 2023), for further applications to the first amendment. In Meinecke, the City of Seattle's restriction on religious speech in public areas was challenged and the Ninth Circuit found it unconstitutional. Mills has a similar holding protecting the right of free press and commentary on government affairs, even on election day. Further, looking to First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), this there is clearly established precedent that discussion of certain topics may not be subjected to prior restraint, a holding very similar to Cohen v. San Andreas, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (( OOC Note: Cohen v. California has been changed to Cohen v. San Andreas because San Andreas replaces California in the game universe )). Cohen established that restrictions of first amendment speech rights must be content neutral, closely relating to the holding in First Nat'l Bank. Finally, this court looks to Press-Enter Co., which establishes that government functions operate better under public scrutiny – an objective achievable by recording of the police for use in public scrutiny. The defense argues, invoking Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), that Plaintiff's conduct was criminal because it was a disruption to the police. This court fervently disagrees given the shear number of officers on scene and the fact that none of the arrested suspects appeared to be resisting in any way that would require the immediate or emergent attention of either Officer Love or his partner.

 

With all of this considered, this court finds that there is sufficient precedent here to find a right to recording the police in public areas within the penumbra of existing precedent; while it has not yet been ruled upon within the Ninth Circuit, the existing case law establishes a sufficient breadth of protections of the first amendment in traditional public forums to suggest that this right is clearly established as well.

 

With this right recognized as clearly established, this court must apply a strict scrutiny test to determine if the police department's policies regarding the application of the charge of Obstruction of Justice satisfy three key elements: (1) a compelling government interest, (2) a narrow tailoring so as to limit the scope of the restriction as much as possible, and (3) that no other policy would be sufficient in achieving the desired effect. The defense argues that there is a compelling government interest in protecting officer safety in high-crime areas. This court recognizes there is in fact a compelling government interest in protecting officers from harm, but does this warrant restriction of the right to record the police while on a public sidewalk? This court disagrees. The policy also does not seem to be narrowly tailored, but rather entirely subjective to an officer's perception of how far a person must step away. This court therefore finds that the implied policy, as enacted by the officer in question, is arbitrary and capricious. The public must be placed on clear notice as to the exact boundaries under restriction within the traditional public forum. As established by the Supreme Court of San Andreas in Morrison v. Los Santos Police Department, these boundaries must be clearly marked such as with police tape, emergency vehicles, or the officers themselves. Police may not extend the boundary of restriction arbitrarily beyond that which is clearly marked. Finally, looking to whether alternatives would or would not be effective, this court cannot evaluate such an argument because no information or argument has been presented on the matter. Returning to the required elements of the strict scrutiny test, this court finds that the government has not satisfied two of the elements and this court cannot rule on the third. Since strict scrutiny requires that all three are true, the policy fails the test and is therefore an unconstitutional restriction upon free speech. Further, police may not utilize a charge of Obstruction of Justice as a catch-all for conduct that is entirely subjective, since to do so would call into question whether a citizen was on clear notice that their conduct was unlawful – in such cases, this court would be required to apply the rule of lenity and rule in the interests of the citizen who was not properly noticed of the illegality of such conduct.

 

Moving into an analysis of the order itself, this court establishes that the underlying policy was itself unconstitutional but was the conduct by Officer Love? This court considers whether the officer's conduct more generally would make a reasonable person feel as if they are detained. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994). In this matter, Plaintiff was threatened with arrest if she did not cease the recording of police officers. Applying these as well as First Nat'l Bank and Cohen, this court finds that Officer Love's conduct constituted a prior restraint upon Plaintiff Mendoza's recording of police while in a public place. The officers made neither an attempt to cordon off an area with police tape or emergency vehicles, nor made an attempt to marshal individuals away by establishing a clear boundary with their own bodies – quite the contrary, as a matter of fact, since they walked away from Plaintiff after making their threat of arrest. Plaintiff argues that such conduct has a chilling effect upon the exercise of the first amendment. This court agrees emphatically.

Finally, this court moves into an analysis of the constitutionality of the de-facto seizure of the Plaintiff by Officer Love's prior restraint of her conduct. Officer Love's threat of arrest constitutes verbal force under the fourth amendment since, more generally, such orders have the effect of putting a person on notice that certain conduct may result in arrest. Accordingly, this court must apply the three-prong test established in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). First, this court must consider whether the force was appropriate given the severity of the crime at issue. Second, this court must consider if there was an active threat to the officer conducting a valid arrest, accepting that suspects have an established right to resist unlawful arrests. See also John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900). Third, this court must consider whether the arrestee is engaging in active resistance or an attempt to evade arrest. This court need not look any further than the first requirement – the proportionality of force to the severity of the crime at issue. Looking to Penal Code § 622(a), there are two elements that must be satisfied: (1) the officer involved was engaged in duties pertinent to their policing powers or responsibilities, and (2) the conduct of another prevents or delays that officer from conducting the underlying duties. Looking to Penal Code § 622(b), there are two elements: (1) the presence of a lawful order by the officer, and (2) the willful disobeying of that order by another. This court, in analyzing the meaning of the words prevent and delay to mean an actual physical obstruction that comes between the officer and their duties such that the officer cannot conduct those duties. Speech cannot constitute a prevention or delay because officers are easily capable of ignoring speech. Recording the police similarly cannot constitute a prevention or delay except where a recording party is directly in the path of an officer attempting to conduct lawful duties. In analyzing the meaning of lawful order, finds that such an order must be particularly supported by a specific statute or ordinance making some conduct unlawful. The charge of Obstruction may not be used as a catch-all for conduct that an officer finds objectionable or disruptive to their own personal peace. To allow this would be to allow an officer to enforce the law according to their own subjective feelings and not according to the law. Therefore, since the order itself was unlawful under Morrison, the charge of Obstruction of Justice does not apply and therefore there is no crime at issue at all. Failing this first prong, the Graham test is not satisfied and therefore even this verbal force by Officer Love was excessive force.

This court finds that the conduct of these officers of the Los Santos Police was clearly objectionable and in flagrant violation of the first and fourth amendments.

 

Order

This court having general jurisdiction over the Los Santos Police Department and subject matter jurisdiction over violations of constitutional rights by peace officers within this state, the following order is made:

 

1. This court grants declaratory judgment in this matter and establishes that recording the police while standing in a public area or private area, on which a person has a right or privilege of presence, and which has not been established as a clearly restricted boundary. Clearly restricted boundaries shall constitute those areas of public or private property which are clearly marked as a crime scene or an emergency scene and shall be marked with police tape, emergency vehicles, clearly marked signage with writing in English, or peace officers preventing access to an area by means of blocking a sidewalk or other point of egress or entry to a particular area.
    
2. The subjective application of Obstruction of Justice, pursuant to Penal Code § 610, is facially unconstitutional. This court finds that § 622(a) is only applicable where there is actual physical obstruction of an officer. Merely speaking to or recording an officer conducting his duties shall not constitute a violation. This court further finds that § 622(b) requires that a lawful order be made and that such orders may not be subjective, arbitrary, or capricious in nature – such an order must be underpinned by a specific statute or ordinance of which a citizen has been placed on notice that they are violating. The charge of Obstruction of Justice requires some other crime and may not justify an arrest in and of itself.
    
3. The Los Santos Police Department is directly enjoined from threatening or conducting arrests of persons recording the police whilst those people are standing an area described in item (1) of this order. All peace officers and law enforcement agencies are similarly enjoined.

Violation of this order may accrue fines as deemed appropriate by a court having jurisdiction to enforce this order and shall constitute a cause of action for further civil actions. Furthermore, deliberate violations of this order by officers having actual knowledge of it shall constitute a criminal act under Penal Code § 622, Contempt of Court.
 

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/s/ FLORENCE WEATHERS-PETERSON

Florence Weathers-Peterson

Superior Court Judge, County of Los Santos

 

ENTERED: April 7th, 2025 at 23:52

[Tungsten]

** The clerk adds a docket note:

Application of order to all law enforcement agencies reversed in Los Santos Sheriff's Department v. Superior Court, 25-1A-04110.