25-1A-03107 - Reversed - Philip Quinteloy v. Superior Court of San Andreas, County of Los Santos

[Kotwica]

Philip Quinteloy v. Superior Court of San Andreas, County of Los Santos

 

Case Number: 25-1A-03107

Prepared by: Juan Tzompaxtle

 

APPELLATE BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

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Question Presented:

(1) Did the court err when the court in a probable cause hearing amended a charge that the State of San Andreas did not originally charge a defendant sua sponte?

 

Argument

1. JURISDICTION:
A finding of probable cause is a preliminary determination. However, when a judicial officer acts in such an egregious manner that it deprives a defendant of the rights afforded to them, those acts are immediately reviewable by an appellate court. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).  The Court of Appeals for the State of San Andreas is the initial Court of Appeals, thereby being the initial court that can perform an appellate review on the matter. Additionally, the Court granted immediate leave for an appeal in the probable cause hearing.

 

2. THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED IN A SUA SPONTE CHANGE OF THE CHARGES PRESENTED BY THE STATE.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitute outlines the right of a defendant to a neutral and detached magistrate. The United States Supreme Court has repetedly held that the neutrality, independence, and detachment of a magistrate is pivotal in the right of a defendant to obtain a fair hearing and or trial. See e.g. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979).

In addition to the long standing Constitutional requirements the Court through this action defied the Prosecutorial Discretion Doctrine. The Prosecutorial Discretion Doctrine requires the State to file initial charges, and when appropriate to amend those charges, not the court. This doctrine is related to the Fourth Amendment because a judge sua sponte amending any charge deviates from the role of the Judiciary to "not infer arguments that have not been expressly made." Larrea v. Bennet, 2002, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10067, *40. This deviation took the judiciary out of the role of an examiner of the  "four corners of the argument" in determining if probable cause exists and posed them against the defendant. If the situation was amended slightly and a judge were to coach a police officer in how they can word a search warrant affidavit in order to find probable cause any rational person would identify that the judge became a party by assisting the State in obtaining a warrant. Here, that warrant is a finding of probable cause, the same standard, but the facts are greater because the result for the defendant is detention.

The Court's decision to deviate from their authorized role as a neutral arbitrator and to amend a charge to find probable cause is in fact inferring arguments that were not made. The original charge against Mister Quinteloy was reckless evading of a [sic] peace officer. Record at 16:48. That charge requires "A person who, while operating a motor vehicle, flees or attempts to elude a peace officer while driving in a reckless or dangerous fashion is guilty of a felony." The court found that the "reckless or dangerous fashion" was not met. Record at 17:22.

The ramifications if this ruling is not overturned is substantial. It would forever taint the judicial body as one that is prosecutorial friendly, posing that the Court is another arm of the State, not the neutral arborator that the Constitution requires. It will erode the trust that the citizens place in an independent, impartial, and unbiased judiciary.

For the reasons above we ask that the Court of Appeals overturn the finding of probable cause, thus invalidating the original charge, and the reason for the detention and require the State to return the money spent on bond.

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Certification. The undersigned swears or affirms, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained herein is truthful to the best of his knowledge.

 

Sworn this 31day of March, 2025 by:

 

/s/ Juan Tzompaxtle

Juan Tzompaxtle

[Tungsten]

SAN ANDREAS COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

Case No. 25-1A-03107

In the Matter of Philip Quinteloy v. Superior Court of San Andreas, County of Los Santos

_____________________________________________________________________________

 

COURT ORDER

Synopsis

1. Jurisdiction. The Superior Court of San Andreas in the County of Los Santos heard arguments in a probable cause hearing before Judge Florence Weathers-Peterson on March 30th, 2025 at 22:18, concluding after approximately ninety minutes. This court has appellate jurisdiction over the aforementioned court because the First Appellate District hears appeals that arise from courts in the Counties of Los Santos, Red, and Flint, and the court in question is within the County of Los Santos.
 

2. The court of first instance, overseen by Judge Weathers-Peterson, found that probable cause existed in full for two charges: Grand Theft and Resisting a Peace Officer. The court of first instance dismissed the charge of Possession of a Prohibited Weapon. In the matter of the final charge, Reckless Evasion of a Peace Officer, the court of first instance reduced the charge to a lesser included offense of Evasion of a Peace Officer, a misdemeanor, and dismissed the more severe felony charge.
 

3. The court of first instance erred in reducing the charge, exceeding the limits of its judicial discretion. While a court may, during sentencing following conviction, reduce a charge for which one has been convicted into a lesser included offense therein, a court may not do so during the probable cause hearing process. This violated the separation of powers required of the court.
 

Order

4. The decision of the lower court is reversed in part. The charge of Evading a Peace Officer, being the lesser-included offense to which the original and more serious felony was reduced to by Judge Weathers-Peterson, is dismissed without prejudice. It is within the discretion of the prosecution to reintroduce this charge if they see fit to do so according to the evidence. The matter is remanded back to the court of first instance for re-hearing on the presence of probable cause for any charges the prosecution may choose to reintroduce. The court of first instance is ordered to begin trial when scheduled and without unnecessary delay.

 

Signed,

 

MARIA J. VESPASIANO

Administrative Presiding Justice

First Appellate District

San Andreas Court of Appeals

 

ENTERED: March 31st, 2025 22:56