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LCS-CV-2024-001 - Post-Award - Castillo v. Los Santos County Sheriff's Department


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"Your Honor, in our profession it is customary not to object to the opposing counsels opening or closing. However, at this point I believe that opposing counsel does not deserve the decency of customary norms.

The Defense either purposefully or intentionally ignores the Supreme Courts holding in Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995), which establishes the rule and precedent "a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." It is absolutely relevant to this case that a Captain, who is seasoned in the department, who was at the scene, who had conducted questioning himself felt he was not free to leave, meeting all of the elements of a custodial interrogation. The Defense makes mention of a lay testimony, no conclusion was given, Captain Guanti never provided a lawful conclusion that he was in a custodial interrogation, nor did the witnesses in Thompson v. Keohane. This is a ludicrous statement with no significance. 

 

Additionally, it does not matter if Stefan Castillo asked to leave the interrogation. That is not required by the Thompson ruling. Rather, the mere feeling that they are unable to leave meets the first requirement, paired with the questioning and the location of the questioning the totality of the circumstance can lead any reasonable person to believe he was not free to leave. Additionally, with Captain Guanti's statement that only adds to the presumption.

 

We move the strike the statement "Your honour, in my personal experience I feel like I'm not free to leave when my mother in law wants me for Christmas, and dare I say no reasonable person believes they would be able to leave either - does that make it custodial by any meaning of the word?" as it is irrelevant. In the defenses hypothetical here there is no government actor, therefore of course there would be no custodial interrogation.

 

To address the statement that the "Defense maintains that this was demonstrably not a custodial interview and was, in fact, a performance review." The defense by not calling any witnesses, cannot now choose to add defenses. This was never properly brought forth through a witness, nor was it pled. Even if it was pled timely, the evidence clearly shows Mister Castillo was questioned regarding the shooting of a person. Therefore, despite any claim of the defense, he could have been charged with a crime. If the defense refuses that claim, they again caught in an equal protections violation claim as any other person without a badge would have been afforded their Miranda warning. 

 

We raise that the defense has not raised a single case that would support any of their claims, they did not bring forth any witnesses. In their closing argument they did not rely on any of the testimony provided by the case. Rather, opposing counsel is attempting to "read in" his own interpretation of the law which is inappropriate as an attorney is not permitted to instruct any judge on the law. We request that the defense counsel be counseled as such.

Thank you your Honor."

 

(( @Fabi, @Michael ))

Edited by Kotwica
donald j. wright, esq.
founding partner of Wright and Wong Law Firm, San Fierro.
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Your honour, we have not raised a single claim or brought forth any witnesses, as Plaintiff so rightly points out, because his 300 mostly filler questions and repetitive - often rejected - motions dragged out this case long enough that we're now at a stage where Defense has not been afforded any opportunity. This is a ploy to suppress our evidence, your honour, and as well as it's executed by Plaintiff, it's not just.

 

Defense has nothing further your honour. It is clear we cannot argue in good faith and we rely on your just and unbiased interpretation of the law.

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"Your Honor, it is uncustomary for a rebuttal. However, as Ms. Thyne is attacking my professional conduct I will put this on the record:
The defense counsel never indicated they were going to call any witnesses in their reply, or in pretrial filings. That is a failure on Ms. Thyne, no one else.
Additionally, Ms. Thyne is unaware of how evidence is to be introduced, those "filler" questions are foundation questions, the only way to bring evidence into trial. Ms. Thyne's belief was that any documents in pre-trial were somehow admitted immediately. Again, opposing counsel is unaware of the rules of court, that's no ones fault except her own. We are limited to the record created. Again, nothing of substance from opposing counsel, simply excuses.

Lastly, the statement about "dragging out" is quite remarkable coming from the counsel who did not show up to court for roughly twenty days, during those twenty days made unethical communications to my client, lied about it in open court, and was reprimanded for it. Those are your actions Ms. Thyne, not mine, do not attempt to taint the record because of your incompetence."

(( @Michael, @Fabi ))

Edited by Kotwica
donald j. wright, esq.
founding partner of Wright and Wong Law Firm, San Fierro.
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SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ANDREAS, COUNTY OF LOS SANTOS

 

PLAINTIFF: Stefan Castillo

DEFENDANT: Los Santos County Sheriff's Department

 

CASE NUMBER: LCS-CV-2024-001

 


 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGEMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

_______________________________________________
 

This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff Stefan Castillo's Motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law. For the reasons stated herein, the aforementioned motion is GRANTED.

 

OVERVIEW OF ACTION

 

A. Factual Background

 

Plaintiff Stefan Castillo worked as a sergeant for the Defendant, the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department. Defendant is a law enforcement agency duly organized, existing, and operating under the laws of the State of San Andreas. This case disputes the legality of Plaintiff Stefan Castillo's detention during the aftermath of a deputy-involved shooting incident.

 

A. Procedural History

 

The case is an action brought by Stefan Castillo (hereinafter "Plaintiff") against the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department (hereinafter "Defendant") on June 30th, 2024, alleging deprivation of rights under color of law. Plaintiff challenges the adequacy of the interview he has been taken on June 26th. On July 10th, a Motion to Modify Counsel was forwarded by Mr Donald J. Wright on behalf of the Plaintiff, which was granted. On the same day, a Motion for Summary Judgement was also forwarded by the Plaintiff, which was denied. A reconsieration was also requested, which was denied as well. Trial commenced with witness examination. During the examination of then-Sgt Elise Crawford, the Court noted the failure of the aforementioned witness to answer questions after a certain point. A request for spoliation was forwarded by the Plaintiff on September 23rd, which was replaced by a renewal of the Motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law on September 27th, 2024. The Court held a hearing for this last Motion, which is now ripe for review.

 

FINDINGS OF FACTS

 

During the night of June 25th, Plaintiff observed Mr Deandre Lawrence pursuing Mr Franklin Mejora with a baseball bat in their hand. Mr Lawrence proceeded to takle Mr Mejora on the ground, assaulting him with the aforementioned baseball bat. Plaintiff took action, discharging their service weapon at Mr Lawrence in an act of usage of force. Mr Lawrence was then detained successfully by Plaintiff and administered aid. Both Mr Lawrence and Mr Mejora were transported to medical facilities by the Los Santos County Sheriff's Department deputies. During the aftermath of the shooting, Plaintiff was questiond by the corresponding internal affairs structure of the department. The interview concludes with the placement of Plaintiff of administrative leave until June 30th.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

A. Judgement as a Matter of Law

 

Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when “a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue. . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000).

 

The court “should review all of the evidence in the record," but "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Id. see also Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F. 3d 1050, 1062. The court should give credence to the evidence favoring the non-moving party, as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted or unimpeached, to the extent that it comes from disinterested witnesses. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151. 

 

The test applied is whether the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury's verdict. Josephs, 443 F.3d at 1062. The verdict must be upheld if the evidence is adequate to support the jury's conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion from the same evidence. Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227. However, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when the jury could have relied only on speculation to reach its verdict. Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah County, 556 F.3d 797, 803.

 

The standard for judgment as a matter of law “mirrors” that for granting summary judgment. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150. Such judgement should be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1147 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248. A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

 

B. Basis for Motion

 

Based on the presented arguments, witness examinations and other exhibits, the Court understands that the interview of Plaintiff that has occurred on June 26th was in relation to the shooting that has happened one day before. During this interrogation, the Plaintiff was administered a Garrity warning. The Court ackwnoledges law enforcement personnel "do not receive a watered down version of Constitutional Rights." Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493. Furthermore, the Court distinguishes between the Garrity Rights, utilized in administrative proceedings, and Miranda Rights, used in criminal ones. Corroborating these facts, due to the criminal nature of the acts committed by Plaintiff, the Court finds it reasonable that Plaintiff should have been administered the Miranda admonishment in the same way as any other person of the public would have been.

 

In regard to the nature of the interrogation, the Court hence finds it to be custodial. In order to draw such a conclusion, the Court makes use of the test established by precent: "(1) a person is in custody or feels that their otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, (2) was questioned." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444. "A reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112.

 

Derriving from the above-referenced facts, while it is uncontested that the Miranda admonishment does not constitute a costitutional requirement, equal protection of rights does.

 

When it comes to the allegations related to deprivation of Due Process via refusal to answer questions upon the Court's instruction to do so and questionable attitude in regard to negotiations, the Court finds the deprivation of Due Process to be existent and hereby issues fines to both Sophie Thyne and Elise Crawford (( Considering the holiday of Michael and the real-life issues of Kayayday, I understand the need to prioritize real life over a game. The fines are symbolic and shall be used for roleplay purposes, however, no actual punishments will be issued due to the above-referenced considerations )).

 

DAMAGES AND FEES

 

A. Compensatory damages

 

The purpose of damages is to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in if the tort had not been committed — restitutio in integrum. Damages are not awarded to over-enrich a plaintiff far beyond his actual losses. The reverse is also the case — the plaintiff should not get far less than his actual loss. Furthermore, a wide range of reporting about both public officials and candidates is protected. Certainly, the conduct of official duties by public officials is subject to the widest scrutiny and criticism. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85. But the Court has held as well that criticism that reflects generally upon an official’s integrity and honesty is protected. According to different statutes, the term “public official” means, inter alia, "any elected official, appointed official, or employee of a Federal, State, or local unit of government in the United States".

 

Plaintiff would be entitled to overtime lost wages, however, no documents have been forwarded to the Court that would prove such a loss. As such, the Court will evaluate these damages to the best of its ability. Due to the fact that administrative leave was issued for four days, the Court finds it reasonable to award $12,500 per day, meaning $50,000.

 

B. Emotional damages and distress

 

Taking into consideration stress caused by an unproper investigative process and violation of Due Process during multiple instances, the Court finds the requested sum of $500,000 to be more than reasonable. As such, the Court awards the said sum of $500,000 under this category.

 

C. Attorney fees

 

The court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. A prevailing party is one who succeeds on "any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit...." Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 788, quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79.

 

For there to be liability there must be a violation of a federal rights, not merely a violation of federal law. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Santos 493 U.S. 103, 106.. In Blessing v. Freestone, et al. 520 U.S. 329, the Court discussed the elements needed for a finding of a violation of a federal right: “[T]he provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory." The Court finds a violation of such federal rights.

 

Under Hensley, 461 U.S. 424, the starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is reached by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate. This figure is known as the "lodestar." Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934. Attorneys must exercise reasonable billing judgment, and public interest attorneys must exercise the reasonable billing judgment used in the private sector. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Outrageous lack of billing judgment may result in no fees. Lewis v. Kendrick 940 F.2d 25. However, given the circumstances of the case, regardless that the fees seem to be lacking judgement, they will be lowered by the Court accordingly.

 

Considering the length of the case, its complexity, number of motions, nature of witness examinations, the Court finds an hourly rate of $10,000 to be multiplied by 20 billable hours, totalling to $200,000 in attorney fees. In addition to that, the Court entitles Plaintiff to costs of travel of $50,000 considering the aforementioned factors. Attorney fees should total at $250,000.

 

ORDER

 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

  • Plaintiff's Motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law is GRANTED.
  • Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages in the sum of $50,000; emotional and distress damages in the sum of $500,000; and attorney fees in the sum of $250,000.
  • Plaintiff's administrative leave is to be expunged from his record.
  • Then-Sergeant Elise Crawford is recommended to be investigated for the conduct during the interview of Plaintiff.
  • Both Ms Sophie Thyne and Ms Elise Crawford shall be fined for contempt of court (( see above ));

 

_______________________________________________

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

DATE: OCTOBER 3, 2024

 

 

Hon. Sergio Robleto

Judge

Superior Court of Los Santos

 

(( @Michael @Kayayday @Kotwica @ScubaStef - It is more of a rushed judgement. My apologies but my free time has become limited. )) 

retired Associate Justice Gregory Yarborough, Supreme Court of San Andreas

retired LSPD Deputy Chief Enrique Saavedra

retired LSSD Division Chief Samuel Wynford

et al.

 

#KeepAIOutOfLSRPCourts

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"Your honor, a demand letter has been served upon Sophie Thyne and Elise Crawford. The notice requires payment by 10/10/2024. If payment is not completed by that date we will move for further sanctions."

(( @Fabi ))

donald j. wright, esq.
founding partner of Wright and Wong Law Firm, San Fierro.
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  • izumi unlocked this topic
  • Tungsten changed the title to LCS-CV-2024-001 - Post-Award - Castillo v. Los Santos County Sheriff's Department
  • 1 month later...

(( @ScubaStef please respond within 7 days if you are still active on the server, else this case will be closed for player inactivity reasons per myself and Izumi. ))

Hon. Maria J. Vespasiano

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of San Andreas

e: [email protected]

Other Judge Characters: Florence Weathers-Peterson (1st District), Peter K. Nichols (2nd District), Jonathan C. Bonaventure II (3rd District)

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  • 4 weeks later...

(( This case is closed for player inactivity reasons. Award is vacated and the losing party will no longer be required to pay it. See screenshot for proof of inactivity. ))

 

F5Q4rrp.png

Hon. Maria J. Vespasiano

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of San Andreas

e: [email protected]

Other Judge Characters: Florence Weathers-Peterson (1st District), Peter K. Nichols (2nd District), Jonathan C. Bonaventure II (3rd District)

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